

1 International Criminal Court
2 Appeals Chamber
3 Situation: Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
4 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and
5 Charles Blé Goudé - ICC-02/11-01/15
6 Presiding Judge Chile Eboe-Esuji, Judge Howard Morrison,
7 Judge Piotr Hofmański, Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, and
8 Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa
9 Appeals Hearing - Courtroom 1 via Interactio
10 Tuesday, 23 June 2020
11 (The hearing starts in open session at 10.08 a.m.)
12 THE COURT OFFICER: [10:08:33] All rise.
13 The International Criminal Court is now in session.
14 Please be seated.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:09:03] Thank you very much and
16 welcome back everyone.
17 We will not be taking new appearances, we will assume we remain as we were
18 yesterday. Unless there's any change in appearances, someone can raise their
19 hand electronically so we can take a note of that.
20 Yes, I see Ms Brady.
21 Can you please, on the record, reflect any change in appearances.
22 MS BRADY: [10:09:53] Your Honours, the appearances are the same with one
23 exception, Mr Guariglia will only be joining us from the second session today.
24 Thank you.
25 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:10:04] Thank you very much.

1 So no more hands raised, so the appearances remain as they were.

2 Now, announcements. Today, counsel for victims will kick off submissions
3 on ground 2. After that, counsel for Gbagbo, followed by counsel for
4 Blé Goudé in the usual order.

5 Then after the submissions of counsel for Mr Blé Goudé, we will take the first
6 segment of Judges' questions at that point, instead of waiting all the way till the
7 end for Judges' questions to come. We believe it's more convenient to do it
8 that way at this stage.

9 So questions from the Judges will come -- the first segment of questions from
10 Judges will come at the end of submissions from Mr Knoops.

11 So we then, having got that announcement out of the way, we will proceed
12 with our hearing.

13 Ms Massidda, it's your turn now to submit on ground 2.

14 MS MASSIDDA: [10:11:29] Thank you very much, your Honour.

15 I will proceed with our submissions on ground 2.

16 The majority failed to identify the standard of proof applicable to a no case to
17 answer motions before issuing its 15 January 2019 oral decision. As a result,
18 the majority erred in law and failed to articulate a clear approach in assessing
19 the sufficiency of the evidence for the purposes of a no case to answer motion.
20 Further, Judge Tarfusser's opinion and Judge Henderson's reasons provided *ex*
21 *post facto* two separate and conflicting reasoning, including a separate and
22 conflicting standard of review for vacating the charges against Mr Gbagbo and
23 Mr Blé Goudé.

24 The majority's failure to set a clear defined standard of proof for a no case to
25 answer proceedings amounts to a legal and procedural error, which, in turn,

1 precluded the proper assessment of the evidence before the Trial Chamber.

2 It is a common principle that a chamber cannot properly determine whether
3 a fact or state of affairs exists without applying the relevant standard of proof
4 to that determination. In addition, in the absence of a clear provision within
5 the Court's legal texts specifying the standard for a no case to answer motions,
6 it was the Chamber's duty to inform all participants on how the relevant
7 proceedings will unfold in order to achieve certainty.

8 The overall failure of the Trial Chamber in dealing with a no case to answer
9 proceedings, including the failure to provide notice to all participants, is
10 mainly rooted on its inability to agree on the applicable standard and to
11 properly articulate it before and when issuing the decision.

12 In addition, the lack of notice about the applicable standard is also a standalone
13 error, which further impacts on the fairness of the proceedings and on the
14 outcome of the decision.

15 The procedural history of this case shows that the majority reached its decision
16 on whether or not the Prosecution presented sufficient evidence to continue
17 with the trial without knowing which standard of proof it was to apply.

18 If such a standard was ever clarified in the respective minds of the two Judges
19 forming the majority, this was only after the 15 January 2019 oral decision had
20 been issued, and at which point the determination vacating the charges against
21 the two defendants had already been made.

22 The individual effort made by Judge Tarfusser and Judge Henderson to define
23 the applicable standard of proof in the 16 July 2019 reasons cannot remedy the
24 failure to apply a standard at the time the majority took its decision putting an
25 end to the trial.

1 In reading the three annexes supposed to form the basis for the 15 January 2019
2 oral decision, it is clear that the three Judges failed to agree on a common
3 applicable standard. In fact, in the written reasons, the three Judges made no
4 secret that they looked at the evidence against three different thresholds.

5 While such fractured views are acceptable between the majority and the
6 dissenting Judge, a disagreement of this magnitude within the majority itself is
7 inadmissible. The majority cannot simply agree on the outcome of the
8 proceedings, an acquittal, in this case, without agreeing on the reasons why the
9 two defendants are to be acquitted and how to reach such a conclusion.

10 As a consequence of the Trial Chamber's failure to agree on one applicable
11 standard, the evidence was not properly assessed and the decision is vitiated in
12 toto and therefore invalid.

13 In this sense, the errors identified in the first and second grounds of appeal
14 have a common root. The majority inability to agree - one, on the very nature
15 of and legal basis for issuing the decision; two, on the standard to be applied;
16 three, on the approach to the evidence; and four, on how to reach a verdict,
17 resulted in the issuance of a decision which fails to meet the mandatory
18 requirements of Article 74(5) of the Statute and that does not identify, articulate
19 and apply a common standard of proof.

20 The majority inability to agree on any of said crucial aspects before orally
21 acquitting the defendants led the two Judges of the majority - to borrow an
22 expression used yesterday by the Prosecution - to basically put the cart before
23 the horse. First acquit, and then find the reasons to do so.

24 The issuance *ex post facto* of the two separate and conflicting reasonings for
25 vacating the charges demonstrates that the disagreement within the majority

1 remained and that the evidence assessment of Judge Henderson was moulded
2 to justify the 15 January 2019 oral decision.

3 This led to apply what has been defined by distinguished scholar, Professor
4 Darryl Robinson, as an, I quote, "unprecedented evidentiary standard," end of
5 quote. Professor Robinson, in his interesting analysis of the written reasons,
6 noted the approach to evidence of the majority as being hypersceptical to
7 potentially incriminating evidence. Looking at each item in isolation,
8 scrutinising it for any possible reason to disbelieve or downplay it, including
9 freely inventing alternative narratives for each item, even without any
10 evidentiary support.

11 In his analysis, Professor Robinson provides a list of definition of errors, which
12 I would like to use before going to specific examples.

13 He indicates that the approach of a majority is characterised by a consistent
14 speculative doubt, insofar evidence is discredited to mere possibilities and
15 alternative narratives are not subjected to critical assessment of their
16 plausibility.

17 Most importantly, there is no assessment of the cumulative implausibility of all
18 of the different exonerating theories invented for each piece of evidence.

19 Credulity to exonerating evidence, insofar the hyperscepticism to incriminating
20 evidence is combined with uncritical credulity toward potential exonerating
21 evidence.

22 Pointillistic corroboration, a novel, narrow conception of corroboration focused
23 on fine details and failing to apply standard reasoning tools for assessing
24 patterns.

25 Rigid formalism over substance, insofar analytical categories are applied with

1 a rigidity beyond any national system. While a more standard approach
2 considers context that may make a particular piece of evidence highly reliable.
3 Fastidiousness, insofar evidence is rejected because of minor inconsistencies
4 that are commonplace in human recollection or the reasoning insists on a level
5 of critical tidiness and precision.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:21:47] Ms Massidda, a pace alert.

7 MS MASSIDDA: [10:21:57] Thank you very much, your Honour, I'm guided.

8 Fastidiousness, insofar evidence is rejected because of minor inconsistencies
9 that are commonplace in human recollection or the reasoning insists on a level
10 of clinical tidiness and precision that may be unattainable, even from an
11 omniscient perspective.

12 And finally, novel barriers for crimes against humanity, requiring proof of
13 perpetrator motives, perceiving rape as opportunistic and unconnected to
14 surrounding violations and inquiring whether all members of an organisation
15 carry out inhumane acts at every opportunity.

16 And indeed, your Honours, in numerous instances there is no reasoning
17 supporting many of the crucial factual findings of the Trial Chamber or said
18 reasoning is flawed in several aspects. In fact, when existing, the reasoning
19 shows a general lack of proper consideration of items of evidence that were
20 relevant on their face, and as such should have been addressed.

21 The majority also failed to adopt a holistic approach to evidence. In particular,
22 failing to assess individual items of evidence and/or specific facts in light of the
23 elements in the entire record of the case and in the context of other key
24 corroborating evidence and/or other significant facts.

25 For the purposes of explaining how the majority's acquittal is unreliable and

1 the decision unsound, I will briefly refer to five examples of findings in
2 Judge Henderson's reasons and Judge Tarfusser's opinion that are the most
3 relevant to the interest of the victims, borrowing from Professor Robinson the
4 use of the categories of errors I have just quoted.

5 Starting with the 16-19 December 2010 rapes in connection with the RTI march,
6 the first charged incident.

7 A rigid formalism led Judge Henderson, despite abundant evidence in this
8 regard, to ignore the ethnical targeting of the Dioula women taking part at the
9 march. Refraining from entering a finding of existence of a policy to rape
10 female pro-Ouattara demonstrators on the basis of hearsay evidence - and,
11 ignoring that direct evidence of formal adoption of a policy is not
12 required - and that a policy need not to be formalised, but can be inferred from
13 the manner in which the acts occurred.

14 In relation to the 25th February 2011 clashes on Boulevard Principal, the second
15 charged incident, pointillistic corroboration and fastidiousness are clear in the
16 failure by the majority to analyse the evidence in its entirety. Applying
17 instead a fragmentary approach, and discarding evidence following an overly
18 strict standard of proof expecting all witnesses to be entirely concordant as to
19 the exact timing of the events.

20 The hypersceptical approach led Judge Henderson to speculating on the
21 reasons for which the police shot on the civilians, mentioning in paragraph
22 1668 of his reasoning that the police, and I quote:

23 "Police shooting was [...] possibly aimed at averting a situation which
24 endangered their own physical integrity rather than at attacking the civilians in
25 front of them."

1 End of quote.

2 This alternative inference is not supported by the evidence in the record of the
3 case, which to the contrary does not allow for such a conclusion.

4 In relation to the 3 March 2011 attack on the women's demonstration, the third
5 charged incident, again, the hypersceptical approach cumulated with the
6 speculative doubt led Judge Henderson to provide a set of alternative
7 hypotheses in assessing the evidence as to the attribution of gunfire to the FDS
8 convoy on that day.

9 Instead of proceeding to a rigorous assessment of the evidence, the analysis
10 offers a different scenario in which there might have been armed individuals
11 amongst the women's march and/or victims could have been injured by
12 ricocheting bullets. However, there is not a single piece of evidence in the
13 record of the case pointing to the presence of any armed person who could
14 have fired against the crowd. Such a scenario remains fully unsupported and
15 even contradicted by the evidence in the record, including eyewitness
16 testimonies and forensic evidence showing that the wounds observed on the
17 three victims - for which it was possible to recover the body and to do
18 a positive DNA test - all appear to be injuries by bullets coming from left to
19 right. Showing a clear pattern within them as they were all found to have
20 remarkably similar injuries at the same level, neck and shoulder area.

21 In relation to the 17 March 2011 shelling of the Abobo market, the fourth
22 charged incident, a rigid formalism over substance led Judge Henderson to
23 completely disregard all eyewitness testimonies, disregarding them as hearsay.
24 However, being inside the house - while the house itself is being shelled or
25 being hit and losing consciousness during the bombing or even arriving at the

1 place of the incidents a few minutes after the shelling took place - does not turn
2 any of the evidence provided into hearsay evidence.

3 Finally, in relation to the 12 April 2011 rapes in Yopougon, the fifth charged
4 incident, despite finding that the crimes committed displayed a pattern of
5 criminality motivated by ethnic animosity, Judge Henderson created a novel
6 barrier for crimes against humanity in concluding at paragraph 1860 of his
7 reasoning that, and I quote:

8 "[...] it is not possible to make a precise determination as to how many of the
9 victims were killed because they were Dioula". End of quote.

10 And that the crimes committed by some perpetrators were opportunistic in
11 nature and not aimed at harming Ouattara supporters.

12 So a conclusion was reached merely relying on two instances alleging a sudden
13 change in mind of the perpetrators, that instead of leaving the house of the
14 victims after the rape, decided to stay and also to kill.

15 This deduction is purely speculative. No reasonable trial chamber would
16 have come to such a conclusion if the totality of the evidence had been
17 correctly analysed, including the indication of mass graves containing
18 numerous bodies of individuals of Dioula ethnicity; the fact that individuals of
19 Guéré ethnicity showed to the attackers the Dioula houses; and the threats
20 made to all Dioulas on the day preceding the attack.

21 Your Honours, these errors not only demonstrate that the majority decision is
22 unsafe, but also show that the majority failed to properly assess the extent of
23 the victimisation suffered. A determination that in light of the outcome of the
24 trial was more than necessary to the hundreds of victims participating in this
25 case.

1 Victims noted with deep regret that the decision did not even mention their
2 targeting, sufferings and the dramatic consequences of the crimes on them,
3 their families and their communities.

4 This concludes, your Honour, my submission on the second ground, which I
5 submit should also be granted.

6 Thank you.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:33:02] Thank you very much,
8 Ms Massidda.

9 Now we will take submissions from counsel for Mr Gbagbo.

10 MR ALTIT: [10:33:13](Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour, ladies and
11 gentlemen.

12 It is Professor Jacobs who, and on behalf of the Defence team for Mr Gbagbo,
13 will plead on the second ground of appeal.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:33:31] You may proceed, Mr Jacobs.

15 MR JACOBS: [10:33:35](Interpretation) Good morning, your Honours.

16 As we pointed out yesterday, it is striking to note that the 900-page judgment is
17 incredibly absent -- is endorsed -- that is endorsed by Judge Tarfusser is
18 incredibly absent from the Prosecution's appeal brief.

19 As I was saying yesterday, the Prosecutor himself concedes that he does not
20 challenge the standard of proof adopted by Judge Henderson. Going further,
21 the Prosecutor says that it is not requesting the Appeals Chamber, generally
22 speaking, and I quote:

23 Is not asking to apply the factual standard of review overall and declare on that
24 basis that the majority's overall conclusions on the five charged incidents were
25 unreasonable, such that it led to a miscarriage of justice warranting reversal of

1 the acquittals. End of quote.

2 So to be clear, and in a word, the Prosecution is not challenging the acquittal as
3 such. On that basis, it is difficult to make sense of where precisely the
4 Prosecution is finding fault with the Judges in her second ground of appeal,
5 because the Prosecution merely provides unsupported and unrelated
6 assertions as to the errors supposedly committed by the Judges.

7 But if one examines these assertions one by one, it is easy to ascertain that they
8 are devoid of any merit. Indeed, the Judges followed a normal no case to
9 answer procedure which allowed everybody to express themselves with regard
10 both to the standard of proof to be adopted at this stage of the proceedings and
11 the merits of the case.

12 As to the standard of proof, the procedure followed by the Judges is that -- that
13 any Judge would have followed. The parties and participants were able to
14 express themselves at length - both in writing and during the hearings held in
15 October and November 2018 - on their understanding of the standard of proof
16 applicable to a no case to answer proceedings. And the Judges ruled on this
17 question in their final decision; namely, the written observations of July 2019.
18 So this sequence of events is entirely normal.

19 Moreover, we should recall that this is more or less what happened in the Ruto
20 case because during the no case to answer, the parties had expressed
21 a disagreement as to the standard to adopt. The parties were heard and the
22 issue was ruled upon in the Judges' decision dated the 5th of April 2016,
23 exactly as happened in the case at bar.

24 Up against such a state of affairs, the Prosecutor is hard-pressed to be able to
25 present the Appeals Chamber with examples of authorities in support of its

1 assertion that the Judges did not follow the appropriate and normal procedure.
2 The only example the Prosecutor harks back to again and again in its written
3 submissions is that of the Ayyash case. This jurisprudence is absolutely not
4 transposable to the case at hand. Indeed, in the Ayyash case, the
5 chamber -- the trial chamber asked for the parties and participants to provide
6 their views on the standard of proof to be applied after - I repeat, after entering
7 the decision.

8 This enabled the appeals chamber in the Ayyash case to come to the conclusion
9 that the trial chamber had not clearly decided upon a standard of proof when
10 reaching a decision. Here, the Prosecutor is incapable of demonstrating that
11 at the time of entering the acquittal in January 2019, the Judges had not
12 analysed the Prosecutor's evidence, according to a well-defined standard,
13 quote:

14 Having meticulously reviewed the evidence and considered all the legal and
15 factual arguments presented orally and in writing by the parties and
16 participants.

17 And this we can read in the majority's reasons of July 2019. And the
18 Prosecutor does not challenge it.

19 What is more, when presenting its evidence at trial before the Trial Chamber,
20 the Prosecution was only too aware of the applicable standard of proof, that of
21 beyond all reasonable doubt.

22 It is, therefore, logically in the light of this standard that the Prosecution
23 presented its evidence at trial. At that time, knowledge of the no case to
24 answer standard that the Chamber might have applied would have been of
25 little use, especially if, by definition, the Prosecutor thought that its evidence

1 could satisfy the higher standard - the standard of beyond all reasonable
2 doubt - the Prosecutor would certainly have thought it could satisfy the lower
3 standard, which is that applicable to a no case to answer proceedings.
4 Accordingly, the fact that a lower standard existed during the no case to
5 answer proceedings is of no import if a higher standard existed that the
6 Prosecution applied. To claim as the Prosecutor does that it was unaware of
7 the standard applied whilst it was presenting its evidence is therefore not
8 convincing.

9 During the no case to answer proceedings themselves, the Prosecutor
10 expressed herself to the full with regard to her evidence. She cannot claim
11 that she was in any way limited by either the absence of any standard or the
12 absence of any freedom.

13 The Prosecutor was granted all the necessary latitude during the no case to
14 answer proceedings. In the 542 pages of its mid-trial brief and also in the
15 1,057 pages of its response to the no case to answer motion filed by the Defence,
16 and during the three days of oral submissions in October 2018 to explain just
17 how solid, reliable, authentic and corroborated its evidence is.

18 So the Prosecution was able to present its evidence as it deemed fit. This is
19 why the Prosecutor is incapable of answering a very simple question put by the
20 Defence since the outset of this appeal; namely, how would communicating
21 a specific no case to answer standard of proof to the Prosecution beforehand
22 have changed the manner in which the Prosecution presented its evidence
23 during trial? Or the manner in which it defended its evidence during the no
24 case to answer?

25 The simple question that the Defence is putting is, what more could the

1 Prosecution have done?

2 The Prosecution has failed to answer this question in its appeal brief. Nor
3 does the Prosecution answer this question in its responses to the Judges'
4 questions. And yesterday, it continued to fail to respond to this question once
5 again in its oral submissions. This is not surprising as it was granted the most
6 extreme latitude when presenting its evidence.

7 Based on the fact that the Judges followed a normal no case to answer
8 procedure and explained the standard they adopted to acquit Laurent Gbagbo
9 in their written reasons of July 2019, the Prosecutor is attempting to draw an
10 illogical conclusion; namely, that the Judges entered an acquittal in January
11 2019 without having previously decided upon the standard to apply.

12 Once again, the Prosecutor is impugning the motives of the majority in its
13 appeal brief and it should be clearly pointed out that the Prosecutor presents
14 no elements whatsoever in support of this allegation.

15 Indeed, neither the fact that the standard of proof was discussed during the no
16 case to answer itself, nor the fact that the Judges failed to explain in their
17 judgment of January 2019 which standard they had adopted, can support the
18 assertion that the Judges failed to adopt a specific standard at that moment in
19 time. Nor could it support the assertion that they failed to analyse the
20 evidence in the light of this standard.

21 Another point. The Prosecutor seems to be finding fault with the Judges for
22 having failed to reach an agreement on the standard of proof applicable at the
23 time of entering an acquittal. Such a position is a caricature of the analysis
24 presented by Judge Tarfusser in his opinion with regard to the applicable
25 standard of proof.

1 Therefore, even if Judge Tarfusser does indeed mention the standard of beyond
2 all reasonable doubt as being applicable in theory to a no case to answer
3 proceedings, he specifies, nevertheless, in his opinion, that in the matter at
4 hand, he and Judge Henderson are entirely in agreement as to the manner in
5 which the evidence should be reviewed.

6 May I quote paragraph 67 of the separate opinion of Judge Tarfusser, I quote:
7 "What matters, more and beyond labels and theoretical approaches, is that the
8 Majority's view is soundly and strongly rooted in an in-depth analysis of the
9 evidence (and of its exceptional weakness) on which my fellow Judge Geoffrey
10 Henderson and I could not be more in agreement." End of quote.

11 Judge Tarfusser then goes on to explain very clearly that in the matter at hand,
12 the question of standard is of little practical consequence considering that the
13 Prosecution evidence is so weak that it does not meet any standard of proof,
14 even the lowest.

15 Judge Tarfusser explained in the clearest of manners, according to the standard
16 applied, that is to say, the standard defined in Judge Henderson's written
17 reasons, that there is nothing to support the Prosecution's allegations.

18 The majority Judges are, therefore, in complete agreement as they have
19 followed the same approach, applied the same standard and reached the same
20 conclusions.

21 There is, therefore, no need to dissect Judge Tarfusser's theoretical observations
22 on the beyond all reasonable doubt standard. As Judge Tarfusser explains
23 that in his opinion and according to Judge Henderson, the Prosecution has not
24 met the lower standard; that adopted by the majority. If the Prosecution has
25 failed to meet the lower standard, it has, by definition, failed to meet the higher

1 standard, that of beyond all reasonable doubt.

2 Generally speaking, it must be underscored that what the Prosecutor attempts
3 to portray as the expression of disagreement is an entirely routine practice in
4 international criminal law. It is common for a judge in the majority to issue
5 a separate or concurring opinion clarifying subtle differences in the approach
6 he or she would have taken to things.

7 Numerous examples of this practice are to be found among the Court's
8 previous decisions, and the Defence has presented a number of them in its
9 written responses to questions raised by the Appeals Chamber in the Ruto and
10 Lubanga cases and also in the Afghanistan situation.

11 In all of these examples, it is frequent for judges whilst -- it is apparent that it is
12 a regular occurrence for judges ruling with the majority to express in a separate
13 or concurring opinion slightly divergent views and, in some instances,
14 theoretical disagreement as to the chamber's approach to a particular issue
15 without calling into question the decision itself.

16 The Judges in this case at bar, therefore did nothing out of the ordinary and it
17 is difficult to ascertain exactly what the Prosecutor reproaches them for.

18 Before moving on to my last point, that is, the issue of factual examples
19 presented by the Prosecutor, I would like to say a brief word about the
20 standard of proof to be applied during the no case to answer proceedings.

21 Firstly, as the Prosecutor does not challenge the standard of proof adopted by
22 the majority, the issue of the definition of this standard of proof would seem, in
23 our opinion, to exceed the scope of the present appeal.

24 Secondly, with regard to the Defence's position as to what the standard of
25 proof for a no case to answer proceeding should be, I would refer you to the

1 submissions that we made orally during the no case to answer and also to the
2 response we provided to the questions of the Appeals Chamber Judges.

3 Here, we should simply note that the Prosecution is - and has done on each
4 occasion in its written submissions - continuing to ignore the decision in the
5 Ruto case, in which both Judges Fremr and Eboe-Osuji clearly and
6 convincingly outlined the reasons why it is the duty of the Judges to delve into
7 the quality of the Prosecution evidence within a no case to answer proceedings.

8 Finally, a word on the factual examples presented by the Prosecutor as
9 illustrating, according to her, the errors of law and procedure that the majority
10 Judges are alleged to have committed.

11 Firstly, the Prosecutor does not demonstrate on a single occasion that the
12 supposedly problematic application of the standard in the examples it provides
13 was a result of the so-called gray area surrounding the question of this
14 standard in no case to answer proceedings.

15 And how can the Prosecutor have demonstrated this, since there is
16 absolutely -- since it fails to challenge the standard adopted in the reasons by
17 its own admission.

18 Secondly, if these factual examples in reality have no bearing upon the
19 Prosecutor's second ground of appeal, this begs the question as to what
20 purpose they actually serve. As the Prosecution admits itself, these examples
21 cannot be used to challenge the acquittal.

22 Further still, the Prosecutor contends, and I quote, paragraph 260 of the
23 Prosecutor's appeal brief, quote:

24 One cannot expect an appellant appealing against an almost
25 1,000-page decision of acquittal in a complex case such as this, involving

1 multiple predicate factual findings, to demonstrate that the final disposition of
2 the case would necessarily have been any different.

3 End of quote.

4 This is precisely what one does expect of an appellant; namely, that it shows
5 the -- or demonstrates the errors and the impact of the errors.

6 The scale of the decision on acquittal, which we should recall is a result of the
7 scale of the Prosecutor's case, cannot serve as an excuse for the Prosecution to
8 shirk its requirement, to conduct -- or to identify errors that would have
9 affected the final decision. The Prosecution cannot subsequently, under the
10 pretext that the exercise is too complicated, claim that legally speaking there
11 was no need for it to be carried out.

12 Under such circumstances, the Appeals Chamber should ignore these factual
13 examples in the context of the present appeal. If the Appeals Chamber were
14 nevertheless to consider them, I have a number of rapid observations to make.
15 Firstly, the Prosecutor would have to file further submissions in order to meet
16 its requirement to demonstrate, according to the recognised standard, that
17 these factual errors exist and affected the impugned decision. The Defence
18 would then need to be in a position to respond to such submissions.

19 If we look at the factual examples themselves, and because of time it's difficult
20 to come back to them in detail, it's difficult, namely, for me to answer the
21 general observations of the Prosecution and the specific observations of the
22 LRVs with regard to each incident, but we can notice a number of approaches.
23 The Prosecution has isolated --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [10:59:19] Mr Jacobs, you have five
25 minutes left.

1 MR JACOBS: [10:59:20] (Interpretation) -- certain factual conclusions.
2 Thank you, your Honour.
3 The Prosecution isolates certain factual conclusions to give the impression that
4 the Judges relied on just one item of evidence or one testimony to establish
5 a factual finding; whereas, the factual findings of Judges were based on an
6 exhaustive analysis of the Prosecution evidence.
7 We can take the example of sexual violence mentioned by the LRV at an earlier
8 stage today. She is trying to have us believe that the analysis of these
9 allegations were undertaken as to the existence of a common plan or an
10 organisational policy.
11 Far from analysing these allegations in an isolated manner, the Judges analysed
12 them in a detailed manner, over scores of pages of allegations by the
13 Prosecution as to the existence of a common plan in order to reach the
14 conclusion that there was no evidence as to a common plan.
15 So to try and have people believe that the Judges isolated those questions and
16 did not consider them or review them as part of the evidence is untrue.
17 There are other approaches of the Prosecution. When she changes the
18 narrative in its mid-trial brief or the Prosecution goes on to say that the Judges
19 also ignored other evidence, other witness testimony without ever mentioning
20 which, also leading us to believe that they have put to one side other items of
21 evidence that don't actually exist.
22 In reality - and this will be my last point, your Honour - these examples seem
23 to serve another purpose, that of luring the Judges onto a factual terrain, as if
24 the factual allegations could still be considered of any substance whatsoever.
25 Whilst the Trial Chamber Judges found after several years of analysis that the

1 Prosecution evidence was exceptionally weak and did not survive the litmus
2 test - and, they go on to say as if the trial had never occurred and arguing in the
3 same way that they did at the beginning of the trial - the Appeals Chamber
4 cannot follow or validate the Prosecution in this approach, which involves
5 absolutely putting to one side the existence of two years of trial and the
6 comprehensive and exhaustive analysis of the evidence.

7 By way of conclusion, the Appeals Chamber simply cannot validate the
8 Prosecution approach which involves using smokescreens to have us forget
9 that, in reality, it is incapable of challenging the acquittal.

10 Thank you.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [11:03:24] Thank you very much,
12 Mr Jacobs.

13 We will now rise for our morning break for 45 minutes.

14 When we return, counsel for Mr Blé Goudé will make his submissions.

15 The Court will rise now.

16 THE COURT OFFICER: [11:03:48] All rise.

17 (Recess taken at 11.03 a.m.)

18 (Upon resuming in open session at 11.52 a.m.)

19 THE COURT OFFICER: [11:52:25] All rise.

20 Please be seated.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [11:52:56] Thank you very much,
22 everyone.

23 Mr Knoops, it's your turn now.

24 MR KNOOPS: [11:53:11] Thank you, Mr President, your Honours.

25 The Defence for Mr Blé Goudé will entertain today three topics: First, the

1 alleged lack of clarity of the applicable standard; secondly, some remarks about
2 the standard of review applying to the six examples the Prosecution did
3 mention in its submissions; and thirdly, the material effect of those alleged
4 appeal grounds on the acquittal.

5 Mr President, the Prosecution asserts that one cannot apply the beyond
6 reasonable doubt standard at the NCTA stage. However, as already found by
7 the honourable Judges Fremr and yourself in the Ruto and Sang case, the
8 decision number 5 in that case rendered, does not limit the Judges to terminate
9 a weak case at the end of the Prosecution presentation of evidence, even if a
10 reasonable trier of facts could have convicted under the traditional NCTA test.

11 The submissions of the Defence of Mr Blé Goudé are fully consistent, as was
12 also highlighted by your opinion in the NCTA case in Ruto and Sang, where in
13 paragraph 112 you submitted that there can be no legitimate complaint from
14 the Prosecution if the case is terminated following a thorough review of the
15 Prosecution evidence that correctly reveals the case as too weak to continue.

16 Furthermore, speaking about the Prosecution submitting that the Defence of
17 Mr Blé Goudé were not to be consistent in its approach, in paragraph 126 of
18 your opinion, your reasoning in the Ruto and Sang case, in the NCTA decision,
19 your Honours submitted that no case to answer proceedings do not constrain
20 the amplitude of statutory powers permitting the Chambers to do its own
21 operation. And that is to say, your Honours, that the Court's statutory
22 framework in no way binds Trial Chambers to apply one single standard of
23 proof or approach to the assessment of the evidence at hand in a specific NCTA
24 case of a trial. It is fully within the Trial Chamber's discretion to determine
25 which test and approach it will apply which is tailor-made to the case before it.

1 And of course that discretion is not absolute. It has to be administrated
2 within the boundaries of Article 66 of the Statute.

3 Mr President, this is exactly what was done by the majority in this case. You
4 find in the reasonings of Judge Henderson's majority opinion at paragraphs 4
5 till 7 exactly the various specific factors which he took into account which led
6 the majority to apply the standard as it did apply, Mr President.

7 There were no constraints in line with the jurisprudence as to the evaluation of
8 the quality of the evidence. The Chamber was confronted with a submission
9 regime instead of an admission regime. There was no proper proceeding to
10 correct the reliability and credibility of Article 68(2) witnesses and the
11 Prosecution led evidence based on leading questions.

12 Also Judge Fremr found in paragraph 19 of his reasoning in the Ruto and Sang
13 NCTA decision that indeed if the Chamber, after assessing the evidence in
14 accordance with its standard, comes to the conclusion that after the Prosecution
15 has finished its case, that it could not support a conviction beyond reasonable
16 doubt, then it should enter an acquittal and therewith end the proceedings,
17 even, your Honours, even if it were possible for a different trier of fact to be
18 satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the basis of the
19 same evidence.

20 Now, your Honours, the second part of the complaint of the Prosecution is that
21 there was no clarity in the standard applied by the majority. This argument is,
22 with all due respect, without foundation. Actually, the Prosecution in
23 paragraph 32 of its answers to the Chamber expects from a Trial Chamber an
24 evidentiary menu which it has and can comply with in order to arrive at a
25 conviction. Because if you read paragraph 32 of the answers of the

1 Prosecution, Prosecution submits, I quote:

2 "Knowing merely that the Prosecution must prove the accused's guilt beyond
3 reasonable doubt or that [the] evidence must be 'sufficient' to sustain
4 conviction is inadequate. Neither of these obvious propositions" still quoting
5 the Prosecution "reflects the ... nuanced aspects of any NCTA standards of
6 proof ..."

7 Now, Mr President, law is not, as the Prosecution made an analogy yesterday,
8 a game. Nowhere in the Prosecution's submissions do we see the affirmation
9 that its evidence at the close of its case was capable at all of proving that
10 Charles Blé Goudé was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For this an
11 evidentiary menu, as apparently required based on the submission of the
12 Prosecution, is not necessary. Mr President, and yet, the evidence at the close
13 of its case was capable of proving that Charles Blé Goudé was guilty beyond a
14 reasonable doubt was what you could have expected from a Prosecution after a
15 trial which commenced over four years ago. A trial, by the way, whereby the
16 Pre-Trial Chamber in the case of Mr Gbagbo already gave the Prosecution a
17 first chance. As the Bench might recall, the Pre-Trial Chamber gave the
18 Prosecution six months extra notice with a list of questions it had to comply
19 with in order to have the charges confirmed. That was already a first chance,
20 Mr President, in this case.

21 Still, even today, Mr President, your Honours, the Prosecution is unable to
22 clearly state to the Chamber whether it will be able to successfully retry
23 Mr Charles Blé Goudé because it knows it will run into the same procedural
24 evidentiary stumbling block as it did in the first trial, namely a complete lack of
25 evidence to sustain its case.

1 Mr President, it must be recalled that when the Chamber, the Trial Chamber,
2 by the way, unanimously, with the consent of Ms Carbucciona Herrera,
3 unanimously determined there was a basis to allow a no case to answer, the
4 Prosecution had already closed its case. You find it in the second conduct of
5 proceedings order, paragraphs 1, 9 and 10 of the Trial Chamber.

6 Unanimously, Mr President, unanimously.

7 By then, the evidence should have passed every test, every test on an NCTA
8 which could be imagined. By then the Prosecution should have passed any
9 test. It closed its case. And the question was: What was the Prosecution
10 waiting for? This menu to comply with like the Pre-Trial Chamber gave them
11 on a plate when it suspended the confirmation of charges decision for six
12 months?

13 Even, let us hypothetically say, had the Prosecution been given such an
14 evidentiary menu card from the Trial Chamber for an NCTA, would this have
15 changed the evidence, Mr President? No. The weakness was right from the
16 start there and it didn't change. It became only weaker after the close of the
17 Prosecution case of two years. It would not have changed one bit,
18 Mr President. The complaint of the Prosecution is purely artificial.

19 And at this juncture I would like to rectify two erroneous submissions made by
20 the Prosecution which are related to the clarity of the standard in the present
21 proceedings.

22 The first error in the Prosecution argument is that the Defence shifted its views
23 on the NCTA, and the second relates to the Prosecution's submission regarding
24 the Trial Chamber's approach towards corroboration.

25 As to the first erroneous remark of the Prosecution, the position of the Defence

1 was from beginning of this case really clear. We never, not once, changed our
2 position. We were the ones to ask the Judges that a no case proceeding case
3 should be entertained in the case of Charles Blé Goudé. This was submitted in
4 2015 based on the Ruto principles and that this principles -- those principles
5 could apply in the instant case. And we also mentioned decision number 5
6 that the criteria for an NCTA cannot be interpreted in such a way as to
7 constrain the powers under Article 64(2) to not allow for the assessment of
8 credibility and reliability in order to terminate a weak case.

9 This interpretation was also put forward by the Defence team of Charles Blé
10 Goudé in response to the Chamber's order - again unanimous order,
11 Mr President - when the Chamber invited every party whether they wished to
12 proceed with a no case to answer or not. That invitation itself from the Bench
13 unanimously speaks for itself. A unanimous, as mentioned, order. And in
14 this order, with the consent of Mrs Carbucciona Herrera, you find already the
15 standard. There was a standard. The standard was: Can the Prosecution
16 please explain to us why there is insufficient evidence which could reasonably
17 support a conviction. That was the standard. It was clear from the
18 beginning. The Defence didn't ask for clarification. The standard was clear.
19 We therefore never once, Mr President, your Honours, altered our views as to
20 the elements required to satisfy an NCTA motion.

21 The second erroneous submission by the Prosecution regarding the lack of
22 clarity, alleged lack of clarity, relates to corroboration. Prosecution submits in
23 paragraph 33 of its responses to your Honours' questions that Judge
24 Henderson had an overly rigid approach versus corroboration and that the
25 Prosecution was misguided and should have been guided by the previously

1 and broad approach endorsed by the Appeals Chambers. And it refers to the
2 Bemba Appeals Chamber case, paragraph 1018.

3 But, Mr President, this judgment Bemba does not support the Prosecution
4 submission in the slightest. That paragraph 1018 merely states that the Trial
5 Chamber in that case found that the question to what extent corroboration is
6 needed is a matter of assessing the evidence and cannot be ruled upon in the
7 abstract. And it also held that no witness is per se unreliable because they
8 previously had given a false testimony. The Chamber in that scenario found
9 no error in the Trial Chamber's approach.

10 But, Mr President, your Honours, this authority does therefore not support the
11 Prosecution's argument in this case since the citation does not provide for a
12 particular approach or definition towards corroboration. It's important to
13 recall that it was the Prosecution in this case, Mr President, who tried to define
14 corroboration in the abstract and requested the Trial Chamber to adopt the
15 definition applied by the ICTR. The Prosecution therefore was well aware
16 that the Trial Chamber could adopt the approach it did since Judge Henderson
17 made it perfectly clear in a previous decision that he had misgivings regarding
18 this overly broad interpretation of corroboration as by the Prosecution.

19 I refer your Honours to the Rule 68 decision, with the dissenting opinion of
20 Judge Henderson. That decision, Mr President, your Honours, dates back
21 already to 2017, so well before the Defence submissions on the no case to
22 answer. And the Prosecution was therefore well put on notice on how the
23 Chamber perceived corroboration.

24 Your Honours, this will conclude my first part by saying that Judge
25 Henderson's reasons reveal therefore, contrary to the Prosecution's submission,

1 that the majority of the Chamber actively engaged with the parties. He
2 provided, Judge Henderson, a definition, although not required to do so,
3 because the definition of a corroboration, as suggested by the Prosecution, was
4 greatly disputed between the parties and this dispute began simply because the
5 Prosecution started this submission.

6 Mr President, second point, the standard of review related to the six examples.

7 Very briefly on this. You will find in our submissions the response to the
8 Prosecution document to support the appeal in paragraph 222 already that
9 these examples are totally unrelated to the Prosecution's second ground of
10 appeal, namely that the Trial Chamber allegedly did not have a standard in
11 mind.

12 What the Prosecution forgets to say also during the hearings in these days, that
13 the Prosecution itself asked for the charges against Charles Blé Goudé to be
14 dismissed regarding Abobo, the 3 March 2011 incident and the 17 March 2011
15 incident. Therefore, out of these so-called six incidents, these six examples,
16 only three examples remain in the document in support of the appeal, which is
17 of course utterly insufficient to sustain the second ground of appeal.

18 Second remark is the circularity in the Prosecution arguments regarding these
19 six examples. In essence, the Prosecution in its paragraphs 40 to 43 of its
20 answers to the Bench say actually that the lack of a clear standard led by the
21 Chamber also caused a flawed approach in its evidence. However, the
22 Prosecution has not shown any connection between the lack of a clear standard
23 and the supposed flawed approach. For instance, how is the Chamber's
24 finding that alleged victims of sexual violence were not raped simply because
25 they were pro-Ouattara supporters, but rather, their support served as a

1 pretext for crimes, how does this at all relate to the Chamber not having a
2 standard in mind?

3 Slow down.

4 You will find no answer, Mr President, in the Prosecution's submissions.

5 How can you say the errors in the first ground materially affected the decision
6 because the majority's decision was not fully informed? That's a circular
7 reasoning, Mr President, and cannot be sustained in a court of law.

8 My final point, the third point relates to the material impact which I already
9 touched upon, as you know, yesterday.

10 The Prosecution argues that it need not show that Mr Blé Goudé was guilty
11 beyond a reasonable doubt on appeal because no first instance -- no Chamber
12 in first instance has considered that test. That argument is quite inconsistent.

13 THE COURT OFFICER: [12:14:37] I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr Knoops. I
14 notice no French interpretation.

15 We do. Thank you very much.

16 Mr Knoops, please.

17 MR KNOOPS: [12:14:50] (Microphone not activated)

18 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:15:20] Mr Knoops --

19 MR KNOOPS: [12:15:23] Sorry, red button. It has multiple meanings, the
20 red button, but for today I think it's to speak.

21 As to the last point, the material impact, the Prosecution argument is
22 inconsistent with its first ground of appeal. On the one hand it argues that
23 acquittals are governed by Article 74, must comply with Article 74. On the
24 other hand it argues that an appeal of an NCTA acquittal should not be
25 governed by the standard of review as articulated in Article 74. These

1 arguments are right and clearly inconsistent.

2 Mr President, your Honours, no matter what test the Chamber would apply,
3 even if it would apply the less stringent standard of the material effect we
4 discussed yesterday and deviates from Article -- from paragraph 284 of the
5 Ngudjolo Appeals Chamber decision, even then the Prosecution appeal must
6 fail. There's not even the remotest possibility that the majority's decision
7 would have been different had it not committed the alleged errors because, as
8 the majority noted, none of the alleged 11 contributions of Charles Blé Goudé
9 were actually to be linked to the crimes. The Prosecution did not dispute this
10 finding. It did not base its appeal on errors of fact.

11 The crux of the matter, and the Prosecution avoids this discussion by simply
12 canvassing six examples - in fact, there are just three left - that have nothing to
13 do with Charles Blé Goudé. And given the complete lack of evidence to link
14 Mr Blé Goudé to the crimes, as correctly observed by the majority, it was
15 simply of no consequence what standard was used to make that assessment.

16 Mr President, my final remark is the following: The Prosecution conceives
17 and concedes in paragraph 30 of its answers to the Bench that Judge
18 Henderson articulated the correct test in his July 2019 reasoning but that it was
19 too late. This is purely speculative. The Prosecution speculates that this
20 standard was not in the minds of the Judges at the time when they decided to
21 acquit. This is without foundation and purely speculative. No one of us in
22 this courtroom or outside were, in those six months the Chamber deliberated,
23 in the presence of the Judges. How can we say, how can we possibly say,
24 Mr President, that this standard was not in the minds of the Judges at the time
25 of the acquittal?

1 And finally, as to the LRV, with all due respect to Professor Robinson and his
2 intellect, it's not to a professor of law to comment on errors. It's purely
3 opinion.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:19:16] You have three minutes.

5 MR KNOOPS: [12:19:20] Yes.

6 This is exactly why in this Court opinion evidence is not allowed to individuals
7 who are not qualified to be experts in these courts and admitted as experts in
8 these courts. It's not appropriate to comment on a verdict. Of course
9 academically you could, but it has no value in a court of law.

10 And secondly, as to the LRV observation the majority decision would be unsafe,
11 that is the argument of the LRV, the acquittal would be unreliable. Well, Mr
12 President, in my submission this is totally inappropriate to say this in a court of
13 law while the witness and the LRV does not have a standing to comment on
14 guilt or innocence. And apart from this, it's totally outside the scope of the
15 appeal. The Prosecution appeal is not about that the decision would be
16 unsafe. There's no appeal ground formulated on alleged errors of law -- fact.
17 The six examples were qualified as mini errors by the Court -- by the
18 Prosecution, and under this disguise, under this procedure disguise the
19 Prosecution intends to indirectly also submit errors of fact while suggesting
20 that this is not the basis of their appeal.

21 Mr President, this concludes our submissions with respect to the second appeal
22 ground. Thank you.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:21:12] Thank you, Mr Knoops.

24 We will now take questions from the Judges at this stage, the first segment of
25 questions from the Judges. And I will invite Judge Ibáñez to ask a question.

1 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [12:21:49] Thank you for the floor,
2 Mr President.
3 This is for all the parties, about the principle of legality.
4 The principle of legality is a mandatory source of law that requires that
5 criminal laws, both substantive and procedural, being *lex specialis*, be publicly
6 available before their application and that all parties and participants be on
7 notice of such special laws and procedures for fairness of the accused as well as
8 the Prosecution and victims.
9 This principle is reflected in Articles 22 to 24 of the Statute as a requirement of
10 due process of law and the proper administration of justice. It is also part of
11 international human rights law as reflected in Articles 11 of the Universal
12 Declaration of Human Rights, 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and
13 Political Rights, 8(1) and 9 of the American Convention of Human Rights, 7 of
14 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and 7 of the European
15 Convention on Human Rights.
16 Taking this into account, I would like to ask the parties:
17 Did the proceedings conducted at trial and the acquittals entered by the
18 majority of Trial Chamber comply with the principle of legality, considering
19 that neither the Statute nor the Rules mention the no case to answer procedure
20 nor the standard of proof applicable for that specific procedure?
21 And (b) Accordingly, the principle of legality, Article 21 and 22, can the
22 jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the no case to answer and its
23 applicable procedure, for example, the Rule 98 *bis* of the rules of the ICTY, be
24 preferred to the laws and procedures that were previously publicised under
25 the Rome Statute --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:24:26] Judge Ibáñez, there is a technical
2 difficulty.

3 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [12:24:30] Okay.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:24:32] Ms Massidda, you -- I
5 understand you have issue with sound?

6 MS MASSIDDA: [12:24:42] Yes, your Honour. Now I have refreshed three
7 times and it appears that -- sorry, can someone speak because I'm not sure that
8 I can hear you.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:24:53] Okay. I asked you is the
10 problem resolved now.

11 MS MASSIDDA: [12:24:57] Yes, your Honour. I was not able to hear the
12 question of Judge Ibáñez because I was not hearing since I think at least
13 eight minutes. So I couldn't follow the last part of Mr Knoops' presentation
14 and I couldn't hear the question by Judge Ibáñez.

15 Thank you, your Honour. Now it seems okay.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:25:21] All right. One second.
17 Judge Ibáñez will summarise her question.

18 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [12:25:56] Thank you, Mr President. I'm
19 sorry because the difficulties, the technicalities.

20 To summarise the first question is regarding the principle of legality as a
21 mandatory source of law under the legal framework of Rome Statute as *lex*
22 *specialis*. That means that all the substantive and procedural laws need to be
23 publicly noticed by all the parties and participants as a source of fairness for
24 everybody, and this principle and human right proper -- guarantee of proper
25 administration of justice is enshrined in a number of treaties on international

1 human rights law.

2 Then taking into account this mandatory nature of principle of legality, the
3 questions are as follows:

4 (a) Did the proceedings conducted at trial and the acquittals entered by the
5 majority of Trial Chamber comply with the principle of legality, considering
6 that neither the Statute nor the Rules mentioned a no case to answer procedure
7 and the standard of proof for that specific procedure?

8 (b) According to the principle of legality, Article 21 and 22, can the
9 jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the no case to answer and its
10 applicable procedure be preferred to the laws and procedures that were
11 previously publicised under the Statute, that is to enter an acquittal under
12 Article 74 and apply the standard of proof under Article 66(3) of the Statute?

13 (c) Even taking into account the jurisprudence of this Court, can the Judges
14 invoke their discretion to acquit in a way other than that provided by Articles
15 74 and 66(3) of the Statute?

16 And (d) Is this procedure equally fair for the accused as for victims and the
17 Prosecutor?

18 That will be the first set of questions.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:28:45] All right. Judge Ibáñez's
20 question was directed to all counsel.

21 Yes. Who wants to raise their hand? Why don't we do it this way. Yes,
22 I think so, I was actually going to begin with Ms Brady. Let's go in the order
23 since the question is to all counsel.

24 Briefly, Ms Brady. After you, we will go to victims' counsel and then
25 Mr Gbagbo's counsel and Mr Blé Goudé's counsel.

1 Ms Brady, proceed, please.

2 MS BRADY: [12:29:28] Thank you, thank you, your Honour. To answer this,
3 this is to organise our answer, Mr Gallmetzer will respond and then
4 Ms Narayanan will also say a few words after him. Thank you.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:29:44] Mr Gallmetzer.

6 MR GALLMETZER: [12:29:47] Thank you very much.

7 So it is our position that indeed the principle of legality is a fundamental
8 principle that is applicable at all case and at all stages of the proceedings.

9 And turning to question (a) of Judge Ibáñez, the Trial Chamber did not comply
10 with the principle. It did not comply with this principle from a procedural
11 point of view and not from a substantive point of view.

12 From a procedural point of view, of course we said that the Chamber has
13 discretion in the conduct of the proceedings, and we were very specific in
14 response to question (a) to your, to your questions. We said that it does have,
15 under Article 64 and different provisions, leeway to organise the proceedings
16 and it has indeed a duty to conduct the proceedings in an expeditious manner.
17 So it can entertain, it has a discretion to entertain a request for a no case to
18 answer with a view to expediting the proceedings, but when it comes to
19 deciding a no case to answer motion, and if the Chamber decides to acquit the
20 accused, then the procedure that has to be followed is the mandatory one that
21 is expressly set out under the Statute, and that is Article 74. There is no other
22 provision. The Chamber has no discretion. And in the application of the
23 principle of legality, the only way for a Chamber to issue a decision of acquittal,
24 a final decision of acquittal that reduces all the effects, it must be entered under
25 Article 74 and it must comply with all the requirements set out in Article 74(5).

1 On question (b) Articles 21 and 22, including the ICTY's jurisprudence, their
2 interpretive guides for the Trial Chamber in interpreting in the first place,
3 obviously, the legal basis of a decision of acquittal under Article 74, a Chamber
4 may be guided on how to interpret Article 74. But in no way can it just
5 identify an alternative legal basis altogether and dispense of all the guarantees
6 and all the safeguards under Article 74 and enter a final acquittal decision on a
7 legally inexistent basis to justify such an acquittal and all its effects.

8 The ICTY's jurisprudence to the extent that it is of guidance, it supports our
9 case, it supports that our final decision of acquittal is, as they call it at the ICTY,
10 a judgment of acquittal, to which all the procedural and substantive effects of a
11 decision in our Court under Article 74 apply.

12 This -- actually, I think I have already answered question (c). Article 74 is
13 indeed the only legal provision that can be applied to enter a judgment under
14 Article 74, and the Chamber erred in failing to comply with that provision and
15 with the requirements as foreseen in Article 74(5).

16 And the process is, and this is turning to question (d), the process laid out by
17 the Statute is indeed equally fair to all the parties and participants. The
18 Defence laments that if the Chamber rejects -- sorry, if the Prosecution has a
19 direct right to appeal, that creates an inequality of arms. But that is not true
20 because the Prosecution can appeal directly because this is a final decision. If
21 the Chamber rejects a no case to answer, that would be an interlocutory
22 decision and the proceedings will continue. But eventually the Chamber will
23 continue the trial, it will get to the end of the trial and will enter a final decision
24 on -- of conviction or acquittal, and that decision, then the Defence can equally
25 appeal directly. So there is no inequality and the procedure that has been

1 currently thought through by the drafters of the Statute is indeed equally fair
2 to all parties and participants.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:35:00] Thank you, Mr Gallmetzer.
4 Ms Narayanan, briefly, please.

5 THE COURT OFFICER: [12:35:23] You now have the floor.

6 MS NARAYANAN: [12:35:26] Thank you very much, your Honours. I'm
7 sorry, I think there was a slight technological problem there.
8 Judge Ibáñez, thank you very much for your question. I just wanted to add
9 from the perspective of ground 2 to what Mr Gallmetzer has already said. We
10 believe that the point that you raise about the necessity for predictability and
11 procedural law is exactly where the majority failed in this case.
12 Now the no case to answer standard of proof is fundamental and what makes
13 it even more necessary to have predictability in this case is that it is a novel
14 issue, it was a novel issue, it remains one, and it is, unlike what the Defence has
15 said, a highly complex subject.
16 Now, your Honours, it is a question of fairness and proper administration of
17 justice so your question goes right to that. And if I might add, it also goes to
18 how the pool of evidence was treated in this case. And, your Honours, this
19 was the pool of evidence in a case of serious charges brought under
20 international criminal law and are deserved to be treated fairly and
21 predictably.

22 Thank you very much, your Honour.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:36:41] Thank you.

24 Ms Massidda, your turn next.

25 MS MASSIDDA: [12:36:46] Thank you very much, your Honours.

1 Thank you, Judge Ibáñez, for your question. I will have a slight different
2 perspective. I fully agree with what Mr Gallmetzer has just said, but I just
3 wanted to underline in relation to the issue of principle of legality and
4 principle of certainty and the no case to answer motion.

5 Now a decision on whether or not to conduct a no case to answer motion is
6 discretionary in nature. This is something which has already been said
7 several times by the practice of the Court. However, in dealing with a no case
8 to answer motion, and I will quote the Ntaganda judgment of 5 September 2017,
9 paragraph 43 and 44, decision 2026 of the Appeals Chamber. A no case to
10 answer procedure is discretionary in nature. However, the discretion must be
11 exercised on a case-by-case basis, and I quote, "in a manner that ensures that
12 the trial proceedings are fair and expeditious pursuant to Article 64(2) and
13 64(3)(a) of the Statute." End of quote.

14 Now, this quote is actually reiterating the same reasoning in the Ruto and Sang
15 decision number 5 of 3 June 2014 at paragraphs 15 and 16. The number of the
16 decision is 1334.

17 Now, in the present case, the majority actually failed to do so. The no case to
18 answer procedure was never intrinsically fair, nor contributed to overall
19 fairness of a trial, and it was also extremely long in nature.

20 This said, once the result of a no case to answer proceedings is an acquittal, we
21 also reiterate, as the Prosecution, that the provision to be applied is Article
22 74(5).

23 Now, Article 74(5), as correctly noted by Judge Ibáñez, has to be interpreted in
24 accordance with Article 21(3) of the Statute, namely, in a way which grants the
25 respect of international human rights.

1 So Article 21(3) - and I link this observation to the ICTY practice which could
2 be a tool for the Chamber - in the absence of provisions in the Rome Statute,
3 then the jurisprudence of other tribunals or of the European Court of Human
4 Rights or of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or other
5 internationalised tribunals may be of assistance to the relevant Chamber in
6 interpreting the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and other text.
7 And finally, I think that I have stressed several times in my interventions how
8 the entire proceeding lacked, to some extent, a fairness, a fairness which I
9 repeat what I said yesterday, a proceedings has to be fair towards all parties
10 and participants - and this goes to your last question, Madam Judge - to the
11 Defence, the Prosecution and the victims alike. And as I noted also in my
12 written submissions, victims had and still have the feeling that to some extent
13 fairness was not granted in these proceedings.
14 I hope that I have answered your questions. Otherwise I will be happy to
15 elaborate further.

16 Thank you very much, Mr President.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:41:17] Ms Massidda, don't hang up yet.
18 While you are on the line -- I will give the floor later to counsel for Mr Gbagbo
19 and Mr Blé Goudé. But on this issue, I am -- you said that you agreed with
20 the submissions of Mr Gallmetzer, then you added to the extent you did
21 not -- your fuller additions did not detract from what he said. That's the sense
22 of it. Fair enough. Mr Gallmetzer's submissions to the effect that, yes,
23 indeed, there is room for no case to answer procedure itself in the Statute. His
24 problem was how it was applied in this case. That's what I understood him to
25 be saying in the context of the complaint of the Prosecutor, that Article 74(5)

1 was not complied with. That was the difficulty Mr Gallmetzer said they have,
2 but not with the idea of no case to answer itself.

3 Do you agree with that or not?

4 MS MASSIDDA: [12:42:43] Your Honour, if I understand correctly, your
5 point is more in relation to the possibility or not within the Rome Statute
6 framework of entertaining a no case to answer motion.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:42:56] Yes.

8 MS MASSIDDA: [12:42:56] Now, in our written submissions we have pleaded
9 that there is no provision. And this goes also actually to the observation by
10 Mr Jacobs yesterday on grounds 1 on our submission. We pleaded that there
11 is no strictly a provision in title, if I can put it that way, no case to answer
12 motion proceeding. It doesn't exist in the Rome Statute. I think that we can
13 all agree on that.

14 Now, this does not mean that a no case to answer procedure cannot entertain.
15 But in our submission a no case to answer motion can only be entertained only
16 in exceptional circumstances. And we also indicated in our submission that in
17 this specific case there was no indication of exceptional circumstances which
18 could have allowed or justified the entertainment of a no case to answer
19 motion. This was our position and this remains our position in relation to the
20 specific possibility of entertaining the no case to answer motion.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:44:23] As I was reading your
22 submissions, your answers to the questions, your written answers to the
23 questions, you say in paragraph 3, you say in paragraph 3 that the victims have
24 constantly, constantly indicated that a no case to answer proceedings have the
25 potential of prejudicially affecting the interests of the victims in seeking justice.

1 The point there is that the victims have constantly indicated that there's a
2 potential for prejudicial effect.

3 Now, for the record, though, is it correct to say that there are only two cases
4 where the no case to answer proceedings have been done in this Court?

5 MS MASSIDDA: [12:45:23] That's correct, your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:45:26] Yes.

7 MS MASSIDDA: [12:45:27] My reference was to the discussions of these
8 matters, not only in the two cases, but also in the other cases before the Court
9 in which the Defence tried to activate a no case to answer motion and the Trial
10 Chamber did not entertain the motion.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:45:48] All right.

12 MS MASSIDDA: [12:45:49] And the reference is to the Ongwen case and to
13 the Ntaganda case.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:45:53] All right. Okay.

15 But in the Ruto case, for example, the victims counsel did support the idea of a
16 no case to answer process. You recognise that.

17 MS MASSIDDA: [12:46:13] I know that, your Honour. And for the full
18 background of the story, he was advised not to, by the way, by the Office of
19 Public Counsel for Victims. But of course a legal representative of victims is
20 free of taking or not taking any advice. As far as counsel from the office are
21 concerned, we constantly opposed the proceeding.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:46:37] But, you see, the difficulty is that
23 I'm not sure that it's fair to that counsel who is not here now to testify as to the
24 discussion you may have had with him or her -- it was a him in that case.
25 But the interesting thing, though, is paragraph 9 of decision number 5 in the

1 Ruto case. I think it may be fair to put it on record. It says this, quote:
2 "The Legal Representative submits that 'no case to answer' motions should be
3 permitted by the Chamber. He submits that the filing of such motions is
4 'consistent with the need to keep victims apprised of developments in the case
5 and will further help to manage victims' expectations, based on the evidence
6 that shall have been adduced by the close of the Prosecution's case'. More
7 generally, the Legal Representative recognises that the practice is consistent
8 with the right to a fair trial, and the procedure adopted by the ad hoc tribunals,
9 as well as the criminal courts of Kenya. He submits that the participating
10 victims are therefore likely to be familiar with and aware of the practice."

11 Unquote.

12 So that was the submission that the Bench in that case heard. They did not
13 hear any submission from the representative of victims saying no, do not do
14 this. That's fair enough.

15 MS MASSIDDA: [12:48:24] Your Honour, if I may, I do not think there is
16 necessarily a contradiction --

17 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: All right.

18 MS MASSIDDA: [12:48:31] -- in what was submitted in the Ruto case and
19 what we are submitting now because the bottom line is that a no case to
20 answer motion is permissible before the Court. There is already practice
21 about that. For us, the point is that a no case to answer motion is permissible
22 under certain conditions and that a no case to answer motion proceeding is fair
23 if certain barriers, if certain rules are known and followed since the beginning
24 of a discussion of entertaining a no case to answer motion, which in our
25 submission is not what happened in this case.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:49:22] Thank you.

2 I think Judge Ibáñez has a question for you.

3 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [12:49:27] No, not exactly a question. Thank
4 you, Mr President. It's just to thank you for your follow-up questions. But
5 I'm afraid that the line of questioning has slightly changed.

6 My questions are directed to ask about the principle of legality and its
7 observation, not only in entertaining the no case to answer motions, but in the
8 standard of proof and all the procedures. So I would like the parties to
9 answer about this. Okay? Thank you very much.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:50:07] Thank you.

11 Now it looks like Judge Ibáñez -- yes, fair enough. So why don't we then
12 continue.

13 Mr Altit? All right. And then we come back to Mr Knoops.

14 Mr Altit, your turn next.

15 MR ALTIT: [12:50:33](Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

16 Professor Jacobs will be responding to Judge Ibáñez's queries and in his
17 presentation he had begun at least an initial response to the question put.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [12:50:59] Mr Jacobs, then over to you.

19 MR JACOBS: [12:51:03] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

20 Thank you, Judge Ibáñez, for that very important question.

21 In relation to the principle of legality, I will respond with three points.

22 First of all, as I began explaining and as I summarised in my earlier
23 presentation, the principle of legality was respected because the proceedings
24 were entirely normal. There was an adversarial proceedings between parties
25 and participants, both taking written form and during hearings, regarding the

1 standard of proof, and that those proceedings led to a decision, which is the
2 normal way of going about these matters.

3 The Prosecution had opportunities to provide examples of jurisprudence.

4 I think we need to recall once again what the Prosecution would have us forget
5 during the appeals. Just because there are proceedings, that doesn't mean that

6 there is certainty. When the proceedings turn to the question of standard of
7 proof, there was a precedent, namely the Ruto case. And as I reminded the

8 Court, the Judges clearly explained what standard of proof was correct to

9 apply in the case of a no case to answer application. The standard of proof

10 that was applicable to the solidity of the evidence of the Prosecution, that

11 standard existed and the Prosecution themselves conceded that it was the

12 standard overall held by the Judges of the majority. They did not question

13 that in -- that point in the ruling. The Prosecution throughout the entire

14 proceedings attempted to impose another standard of proof that had never

15 been applied at the ICC. That doesn't mean that there is uncertainty.

16 So that is my first point.

17 Now, my second point has to do with the law that is applicable. Once again,

18 I think that the principle of legality was respected. As we said earlier, the

19 issue, since no case to answer did not exist in the Rome Statute, the question

20 was: What provisions of the Statute could inspire the Judges as they handed
21 down a decision and throughout the course of the proceedings?

22 So it was not a matter of determining which provision was applicable, but

23 rather, what principles of the spirit of the Rome Statute could inspire the

24 Judges. And if we look beyond the theoretical discussion, namely whether

25 74(5) applies or not, one can find that the spirit of the Statute was respected,

1 and the Prosecution is having difficulty demonstrating that was a true problem.

2 We had public proceedings in January 2019 and the sole aim of those
3 proceedings was to respect the right to freedom of Mr Gbagbo.

4 And let me stress, once again, we have seen in the responses given earlier
5 today, we heard the Prosecution and the Legal Representative of Victims, they
6 have invited the Chamber to interpret 74(5) in a certain way except when it
7 comes to respecting the rights of Mr Gbagbo.

8 We have a ruling with grounds, 950 pages, 950 pages of grounds have been
9 given and once again the Prosecution is unable to make their case and their
10 conclusions. Furthermore, the Prosecution was entitled to file an appeal
11 under the normal conditions because the deadlines began once the decision
12 had been notified.

13 Another point, the issue of the content of the oral decision, which, as we
14 pointed out in our response to the Prosecution's brief, was in accordance with
15 human rights. The end of the proceedings, that is to say, the acquittal, and the
16 simplified grounds for the acquittal were given. There is no document that
17 the Prosecution can point to that from an objective point of view would allow
18 one to say that the Judges have forgotten something.

19 So we can clearly see that beyond the theoretical discussion, the spirit of the
20 Rome Statute was respected at each and every stage of the proceedings.

21 My third point has to do with the general unfairness. Already there has been
22 no unfairness -- correction, there has been no fairness towards the acquitted
23 person, Mr Gbagbo. I'm starting with this point because the principle of
24 legality, as set out in the Statute, Article 22, 23 and 24, is decision as a right of
25 the accused person, the person who is on trial. This also can be seen in human

1 rights jurisprudence. It is a right that belongs to the person who is facing trial,
2 first and foremost.

3 There was no more fairness or unfairness towards the Prosecution. As we
4 pointed out earlier, the Prosecution was able to provide their evidence freely
5 throughout the course of the trial and the Prosecution was able to defend her
6 case during the no case to answer proceedings.

7 There was no harm to the Prosecution. The Prosecution cannot demonstrate
8 any harm. So there has been no unfairness towards the Prosecution. Nor
9 has there been any unfairness towards the victims represented here. They
10 were able to express their views and concerns, as is set out in the Statute,
11 throughout the course of the trial and during the no case to answer
12 proceedings.

13 I won't hark back to this because it's been already mentioned in our
14 submissions, but really it was the decision of the Legal Representative of
15 Victims not to call witnesses, not to exercise her rights. It was not the Judges'
16 fault.

17 And one last point, Mr President, your Honours, I note that the Legal
18 Representative of Victims has once again returned to this issue that goes
19 beyond the legal framework, namely the general unfairness of the proceedings.
20 I already have spoken to that yesterday. And above all, she did not complain
21 about this during the course of the proceedings, not a single time. Sometimes
22 when the Judges made decisions about prior recorded testimony, she had no
23 remarks then.

24 Today's complaints, this challenging the -- about the Judges throughout the
25 trial can be attributed to only one thing, the fact that there has been an acquittal,

1 as if she was entitled to a conviction. Such a challenge of the entire
2 proceedings on this basis is not acceptable.

3 Thank you.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [13:00:01] Thank you.

5 Mr Knoops, why don't we take our break and when we come back, you will
6 take your turn on the question, all right? Thank you.

7 The Court will rise.

8 THE COURT OFFICER: [13:00:32] All rise.

9 (Recess taken at 1.00 p.m.)

10 (Upon resuming in open session at 1.52 p.m.)

11 THE COURT OFFICER: [13:53:00] All rise.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [13:53:34] Mr Knoops, if you can be brief,
13 and don't be shy to adopt any answer somebody else may already have given.

14 MR KNOOPS: [13:53:46] Of course.

15 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [13:53:54] Thank you.

16 Just to remind that the question is focused in the mandatory nature of the
17 principle of legality and it's in part in the no case to answer proceed, standard
18 of proof or whatever. Please, focus on that. Thank you.

19 MR KNOOPS: [13:54:19] Thank you, Mr President, Honourable Judge Ibáñez
20 for your question.

21 I think it's not in dispute that the NCTA proceedings are, as such, the inclusion
22 thereof, not unfair or in violation with the principle of legality, despite that the
23 NCTA proceedings are not governed in the Statute of Rome. I dare to say,
24 your Honours, that it would not be fair to a defendant, and it would even
25 contrary to human rights law, if the defendant has to stand trial and not have

1 the right to not to respond to a case where the evidence doesn't meet the
2 threshold of the required evidence. My first remark.
3 Secondly, and my submission is that this is something which is inherently
4 connected to the system of the ICC, legality starts with how a system of law is
5 built. The ICC system, as being a hybrid system in nature, actually
6 undeniably violates the principle of legality as such, because it's inevitable that
7 if you bring together an inquisitorial and an adversarial system of law and you
8 create Trial Chambers, they have to be laboratories of a *sui generis* nature.
9 So the preliminary question to I think the question of Judge Ibáñez is, is legality
10 not -- does legality not start with how the system is built? If you look, for
11 instance, at each chamber in this Court can determine whether or not to allow
12 witness preparation, whether or not to apply a system of submission or
13 admission, visibility of documents, and each chamber can define the mode of
14 questioning according to whether the calling or non-calling party is conducting
15 the examination. If you compare the Rule 85 and Rule 90 of the ICTY and
16 ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence with Article 64 of the Statute and the
17 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of this Court, you'll see that all these elements
18 are not defined neither in the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
19 There starts the principle of legality. If there is no legality on those principles,
20 you can question, of course, the legality of the system as such.
21 But I still believe that despite that the ICC system as being a hybrid system,
22 undeniably can ever comply strictly with the principle of legality --
23 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [13:58:25] Sorry, sorry, sorry. Sorry, are you
24 stating that Article 64 of the Statute is against the principle of legality? Did I
25 misunderstand you? Please correct me, if any. Okay. Thank you.

1 MR KNOOPS: [13:58:44] Thank you, your Honour Judge Ibáñez.

2 No, I might express myself not fully accurately. I'm saying Article 64
3 of the Statute is administrating to Trial Chambers a broad discretion to
4 determine the conduct of proceedings.

5 So preliminary to the question whether an NCTA proceedings are legal or fair
6 and whether the absence of that proceedings and the absence of a standard is
7 unfair or not legal, I think we first have to look how the ICC system as such is
8 built, if that system already in itself cannot comply strictly with the principle of
9 legality. Because my client here, Mr Blé Goudé, faces a different procedure
10 than a defendant in another chamber in this court, simply because
11 the chambers are not unanimous in whether witness preparation should be
12 allowed, where there is a system of admission of -- submission of documentary
13 evidence, how the mode of questioning is being conducted. If on those
14 principle issues there is no unanimity in this Court simply because it's not
15 governed by the Statute or the Rules and the Chambers differ in their
16 interpretation because they come from different countries, at the basis of this
17 system *ab initio* a defendant therefore never faces a legality, because his trial
18 might be differently conducted than another defendant. That is my point.

19 That is my point. And it's not -- (Overlapping speakers)

20 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:00:44] (Microphone not activated)

21 THE COURT OFFICER: [14:00:48] I'm sorry, Mr Knoops, you need to
22 reengage your microphone.

23 MR KNOOPS: [14:01:00] Done.

24 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:01:06] A follow-up question: Are you
25 asserting that the discretion given in Article 64 to the judges allows them to

1 interpret the law against the written provisions of Rome Statute? Are you
2 arguing that this discretion allows the judges to act or to resolve with no
3 observation of the written norms of Rome Statute? Can you clarify this,
4 please.

5 MR KNOOPS: [14:01:42] Thank you.

6 No, Honourable Judge Madam Ibáñez, that's not my submission.

7 My submission is that when we are opening the box of Pandora about legality
8 here, in regard to an NCTA proceeding, and we are discussing whether or not
9 that procedure as such or the standards applied by a chamber in an instant case
10 is fair or not fair or legal or not legal, we touch upon the fundamental of this
11 Court. And I think it's undeniable that every chamber in this honourable
12 Court, given the text of Article 64, has to interpret it, the Statute, in accordance
13 with the spirit and nature.

14 But from the prospective of the defendant, like Mr Blé Goudé, he received
15 a certain trial based on a certain procedure, yet another Trial Chamber applies
16 a different procedure in terms of witness preparation, admission, submission
17 regime and mode of questioning, three fundamental issues of a criminal trial.
18 So there I think discussion should start and I think if we come to criticise the
19 NCTA procedure as such because it's not governed in the Statute or that the
20 standard is not clear or chambers might differ in standard, I think it's not fair to
21 the proceedings as such because they are built on a system which from the
22 beginning, from the perspective of defendant, does not comply with legality.
23 And finally, if I may conclude my answer to your questions, Honourable
24 Judge Madam Ibáñez, I still believe --

25 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:03:54] Wait a moment, please.

1 Just to clarify the last point, the last part of your answer: Are you equating
2 the issue of preparation of witnesses with the fundamental issues raised in no
3 case to answer which procedure is same to the termination of the proceedings,
4 to the termination of a trial and, of course, to reach an acquittal, are you
5 equating preparation of witnesses with this fundamental procedure to end
6 a trial?

7 Thank you.

8 MR KNOOPS: [14:04:32] Very interesting question, Madam.

9 Although it seems a minor issue compared to the overarching principle of
10 legality of fair trial, yet I dare to say that the way witnesses are prepared or not,
11 or witnesses are questioned on the basis of a certain mode, might be decisive
12 for the outcome of a fair trial.

13 And this is one of the factors Judge Henderson mentioned in the reasons why
14 he with Mr Tarfusser didn't adopt the Ruto Sang model, simply because the
15 characteristics of the trial which enrolled in the case of Charles Blé Goudé were
16 quite different, that the way the Prosecution questioned witnesses was actually
17 decisive also for the outcome of the case. You will find this in paragraphs 4, 5
18 and 7 of his majority opinion.

19 But despite this more philosophical remark on your questions 1, 3 and 4,
20 Honourable Judge Ibáñez, I still believe, based on the spirit and nature, that
21 both procedurally and substantively the proceedings which led to acquittal
22 were in accordance with the legality, within the parameters of the hybrid
23 system of this court, with this caveat, and procedurally, it was quite clear from
24 June 2018, when the Trial Chamber unanimously agreed to allow this NCA
25 proceedings, from that moment it was crystal clear procedurally and in terms

1 of the standard of evidence, what was expected from the Defence. We never
2 asked for a clarification, we know what our job was in the NCTA. And for
3 the Prosecution, it was totally aware, it was totally clear what test it had to
4 meet to sustain a conviction or to proceed.

5 So, to conclude, legality, indeed, very important, crucial. But then we should
6 look at the whole system as such and the NCTA is derivative of the start of
7 a criminal law system which starts with the rules of evidence, conduct of
8 proceedings. And, secondly, the proceedings within these parameters of the
9 hybrid system did comply with fairness and legality.

10 Thank you.

11 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:07:29] Thank you.

12 (Appeals Chamber confer)

13 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:08:46] Thank you. I will continue, please,
14 and I suggest, suggest -- this is question for our Professor Jacobs, please
15 concrete answers. The first is regarding inspiration versus sources of law in
16 Rome Statute.

17 It was submitted, and Professor Jacobs have submitted yesterday, that the
18 judges do not have to find the no case to answer procedure in the provisions of
19 Rome Statute, but, I quote:

20 "It is only natural for the judges to seek inspiration on a case-by-case basis from
21 the provisions of the Statute whose contents can assist and guide them
22 throughout the proceedings." This is in page 38, lines 22 of yesterday's
23 transcripts.

24 I note that, and you know, that in Article 21(1) the Statute clearly establishes
25 what is the hierarchy of the sources of law.

1 I don't have to repeat it.

2 And the question is regarding this article: Is the inspiration a valid source of
3 law to put an end to a trial proceedings and can the inspiration override the
4 literal and strict interpretation of Article 74 and 66(3) of the Statute to put an
5 end to a trial?

6 And the second part of this question for Counsel Jacobs is about the spirit of
7 Rome Statute versus the object and purpose of Rome Statute.

8 It was also submitted yesterday, and today it was repeated, and also it's in
9 paragraph 16 of the written submissions, that the spirit of the Statute allows for
10 an acquittal pursuant a no case to answer motion, so I would like to ask the
11 counsellor, what do you understand by the spirit of Rome Statute and could
12 not, rather, be correct the way of interpretation under the Vienna Convention
13 on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and according Article 31(1) to find the object and
14 purpose of Rome Statute -- of the Statute as reflected in the spirit of the treaty
15 and its settle in the preamble of the Statute, that is, namely to put an end to
16 impunity for atrocious crimes.

17 That will be the question, thank you.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:11:37] Mr Jacobs, that's to you. Try
19 and answer it in two minutes.

20 MR JACOBS: [14:11:48] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

21 Thank you, Judge Carranza, for her questions and I shall try to answer them
22 rapidly.

23 Firstly, it is important that the point of departure of the discussion be, that is,
24 the no case to answer, is to protect the rights of the defendant. This is
25 a procedure that has been accepted in the Ruto case and was recognised as

1 applicable in the appeal judgment Ntaganda as protecting the fairness of the
2 proceedings. So the point of departure is that it is indispensable, these
3 proceedings, the no case to answer proceedings, to safeguard the rights of
4 the accused and to mean also that the Defence does not have to present a case if
5 the Prosecution's case is not sufficiently strong. So the rights of the defendant
6 are really at the heart of this discussion.

7 Now, in the same ilk, other proceedings before the ICC have been
8 acknowledged by the judges without having been foreseen in the Statute as
9 abuse of procedure. So we need to find an applicable law here, we can't
10 simply say that such-and-such an article will automatically come into play, as
11 the Prosecutor does.

12 So, hereby we can attach a rationale to what we explained. Where there are
13 no provisions of the Statute that can be automatically applied, one has to then
14 look in the Statute, inspire oneself from its contents with a view to ascertaining
15 which provision can be applied. One is not going to say, well, we put
16 the Statute to one side because it's not doing its job. No. We have to make
17 the Statute operational. We have to make the no case to answer proceedings
18 operational, as they have been recognised by other cases before the Court to be
19 indispensable for the rights of the defendant.

20 So one can seek inspiration from the requirements of Article 74(5) in terms of
21 reasons and in terms of publicity which have been expected without, however,
22 reaching the conclusion that Article 74(5) is indeed applicable.

23 Lastly, and to remain brief but I can specify if you so wish, your Honour, with
24 regard to the aim or object and purpose of the Statute. The fight against
25 impunity is the objective, the general objective of the ICC, we cannot deny that.

1 But the Court was set up with a view to making sure that this fight was within
2 the framework of proceedings and the fight against impunity cannot be a way
3 of denying the individual the respect of their rights. This is an objective that
4 we all share, but we also share the objective of putting in place these
5 proceedings in an exemplary manner, in a democratic and modern manner, by
6 respecting the rights of individual.

7 The rights of Laurent Gbagbo were at the centre of the proceedings, there was
8 no lack of fairness towards the Prosecution or the Legal Representatives for
9 Victims and justice was done.

10 Thank you.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:15:34] Mr Jacobs, beginning with you,
12 you do say that we can derive inspiration from provisions of the Rome Statute,
13 should I say, that approximates what should apply, more or less, even though
14 it may not have -- the applicable provision may not have been spelt out as such
15 in a given case, and you said it's in that regard that it is possible to derive
16 inspiration from Article 74(5), but that doesn't mean that that article necessarily
17 applies. If that is the case, by what provision are we then to judge those
18 norms that we are to derive inspiration from, vis-à-vis article 74(5)? In other
19 words, if there is a question that a provision in the Rome Statute had been
20 violated, where would that violation be situated? For instance, in a case of
21 judgment of acquittal in no case to answer proceeding, what provision should
22 be the standard that guides what the judgment should look like, if the
23 approximate provision would be Article 74(5)? That I say we can derive
24 inspiration from it doesn't mean it applies. Which provision should then be
25 applied to see whether or not judgment was correct in form?

1 MR JACOBS: [14:17:42] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

2 The answer, the simple answer to that question is that there is no article in
3 the Statute that is strictly applicable because the no case to answer proceedings
4 is not foreseen explicitly within the Statute, or not provided for, so one cannot
5 say *ab initio* that such-and-such an article of the Statute would be applicable to
6 NCTAs.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:18:19] (Overlapping speakers) you now
8 see the difficulty there in the sense then that no case to answer judgments
9 become then unregulated as a matter of their form, whereas other judgments
10 are regulated as a matter of their form.

11 MR JACOBS: [14:18:42] Thank you, your Honour.

12 No, no. I was just coming to that.

13 Article 74(5), as we said, crystallises the intention of the drafters of the Statute,
14 that there are some intentions when drafting a decision, that is to say the
15 reasons, the publicity, the fact that the decision needs to be clear. So in the
16 light of these major principles or general principles of law that are provided for
17 in Article 21 of the Statute, one can judge whether the decision issued at the
18 end of a no case to answer proceedings follows such a rationale, like any other
19 decision.

20 It doesn't automatically follow 74(5), but there are -- there is -- but the true
21 question here is whether everything has been respected, whether the rationale
22 of the proceedings has been followed, whether the requirements in terms of
23 human rights that the drafters of the Statute have foreseen when handing
24 down a decision was respected by the judges. We are of the opinion that they
25 have been, and this can be concretely verified, as can -- as was the case in the

1 Ruto case, for example, more or less.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:20:06] Thank you.

3 I now turn it over to Mr Knoops, still on this issue but not exactly the same
4 question.

5 Mr Knoops, you -- perhaps there comes a point where you and Mr Gallmetzer
6 might have started from the same starting point, although you didn't quite
7 conclude, you clearly did not conclude in the same place.

8 This is what I am talking about: You in your submission, Mr Knoops, said
9 that in the Ruto Sang case, I am looking at -- you did cite, I believe, paragraph 1
10 of the reasons of Judge Fremr and you said that that paragraph says that the
11 judgment in that case was based on Article 64, 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute
12 and not Article 74.

13 Is there any other passage in the Ruto Sang judgment that -- from which you
14 rest the submission that Article 74 did not apply in that case? Apart from
15 paragraph 1, is there any other passage? And that also should go to
16 Mr Gallmetzer who also seemed to have suggested that - unless I got him
17 wrong - that the Ruto Sang was not based on Article 74(5).

18 Mr Knoops?

19 MR KNOOPS: [14:22:12] Thank you, Mr President.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:22:13] Let me tell you why so you may
21 take it all in stride as well.

22 If you look at paragraph 1 of Judge Fremr's reasons, he doesn't actually say that
23 Article 74 does not apply. If is there any other passage in that judgment upon
24 which you rest the view that Article 74 did not guide that judgment, that
25 would be good to know.

1 MR KNOOPS: [14:22:44] Thank you, Mr President.

2 No, you are right, Honourable Judge Fremr doesn't say expressly that

3 Article 74 is not applicable. But we deduce from paragraph 1 the

4 non-mentioning of Article 74, that for him, like in the majority opinion of the

5 Charles Blé Goudé case, and also in the dissenting opinion of Ms Carbuccia

6 Herrera, indeed the basis should be Article 66(2). That comes the closest, if I

7 read the reasoning of Judge Fremr, that comes the closest to the nature of the

8 NCTA, notwithstanding that of course the decision itself on an NCTA in its

9 effect could have an acquittal and has to comply of course with certain

10 standards how to motivate that decision.

11 We can even take it further to say the decision, the nature of the proceedings

12 should be governed by 66(2), but the decision itself, how it's being put on paper

13 could be governed by the principles of Articles 40 -- 74(5). Not to say that 74

14 as such applies, but the principles of 74(5) could apply to the reasoning and the

15 way the judges motivate an acquittal as such based on an NCTA.

16 Is there then a different between the fact that in the Ruto Sang case the charges

17 were vacated, and in the case of Charles Blé Goudé there was not a formal

18 acquittal but a decision which could be materially equated with an acquittal?

19 I don't believe so, Mr President. I don't think that the way the case ended, the

20 difference in ending the case in Ruto Sang compared to the ending of the case

21 in the case of Mr Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé is decisive to say then 74

22 should in its entirety apply, including the automatic right to appeal. Because

23 there are numerous law systems in the world where certification for NCTAs is

24 required, such as in England, England and Wales, and that is simply because of

25 the fact that the Prosecution has different proceedings.

1 May I point your Honours to an interesting dissertation of Mr Djukic, he
2 defended his thesis in 2017, and in his thesis he explains why in case of an
3 NCTA a certification should be required in case of a granting of such a request,
4 because it's a significant inroad into the double jeopardy principle if
5 the Prosecution would have an unfettered right to appeal without certification
6 an NCTA decision. And he relies on the Criminal Justice Act 2003, England
7 and Wales, sections 57(4) and 58(8), to make his point.

8 Now to conclude my answer to you, Mr President, indeed Judge Fremr didn't
9 exclude the applicability of 74, but we deduce from his decision that he clearly
10 had in mind the spirit and nature of 66(2) and, when reading his decision in
11 full, we believe that was the proper standard, the proper basis, the provision in
12 the Statute which comes closest to the nature of an NCTA. Because - and then
13 I will also answer maybe the question of the Honourable Judge Ibáñez to
14 Mr Jacobs - it's a --

15 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:27:27] Before we do that, let's clean up
16 this one first, please, and so once we finish then we can do that. I want
17 to -- (Overlapping speakers)

18 MR KNOOPS: (Overlapping speakers)

19 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: -- (Overlapping speakers) that deduction
20 you were talking about, let's see how far it goes.

21 If you look at paragraph 1 of Judge Fremr's judgment -- reasons, rather, the
22 reference to Article 64, Article 66 and Article 67. Now let's leave Article 64 to
23 the side, because you did allude to it just now, 64(2) I think you said, leave that
24 to the side and look at Article 66 and 67, Article 66 deals with the presumption
25 of innocence and Article 67 deals with the rights of the accused person.

1 Is it fair to say that in every judgment of acquittal rendered pursuant to
2 Article 74(5), these two provisions could also be in operation, presumption of
3 innocence and the right of the defendant? You see where I am coming from?

4 MR KNOOPS: [14:28:57] Yes, yes.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:28:58] All right. Assuming that that is
6 the case then, so what are we to make of 64? You alluded to it. Is it fair to
7 say that all that 64 -- the reference to 64 does there is to find a foothold within
8 the Statute for the whole procedure of no case to answer in the first place, if
9 you don't have that foretold you cannot do that? Is it fair to look at that, look
10 at it in that way?

11 MR ALTIT: [14:29:33] Yes.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:29:33] So that you now compare it to
13 what happens in, say, Article 65 of the Rome Statute. Article 65 deals with
14 guilty pleas and that's the foothold for guilty pleas, 65, but then the judgment
15 still has to comply with 74(5). Is that a reasonable way to look at what
16 paragraph 1 of the reasons of Judge Fremr is telling us?

17 MR KNOOPS: [14:30:09] Yes.

18 Mr President, indeed, first remark, my response to you, of course Article 74(5)
19 actually makes implicitly reference to 66(2), because otherwise how can you
20 acquit at the end of the trial without looking at 66(2)?

21 Article 74, if you look also at the academic commentaries, such as even the
22 commentary cited by the Prosecution, Mr Vasiliev in the Klamberg
23 commentary, you will see that 74 was enacted on the basis that the totality, the
24 entirety of the proceedings were concluded. So I would suggest
25 a differentiation; 74(5), with 66(2), applies to formal acquittals which are based

1 on the merits of both prosecution and defence case, therefore it's the totality,
2 the entirety of the proceedings. 66(2), without 74, apart from 74(5), applies to
3 halfway judgments like NCTAs, because if we accept that 74(1) till (4) apply to
4 full judgments on the full merits of the case whereby the Court has heard both
5 the Prosecution and the Defence case, that is what we understand of the merits
6 of the case, it means that a halfway proceeding is not covered by 74 as such,
7 that was not the intention of the drafters of the Statute. Look at the
8 commentaries, Mr President. And therefore, if you are looking for analogy
9 within this hybrid system we just discussed, the closest which comes to an
10 NCTA basis to dispose of is 66(2), without 74(1) till (4), and of course we can
11 argue about 74(5) because that relates to how the judge writes it down. Of
12 course that also applies to a halfway decision and that was complied with in
13 the instant case.

14 So I think Judge Fremr was totally right and he must have seen it this way, it's
15 the way I read his opinion, that he said, look, if he would have accepted that
16 the decision in Ruto Sang where the charges were vacated was a full judgment,
17 he would have applied 74. No, he didn't do so, Mr President. He saw that
18 this was a halfway station so he couldn't rely on 74, he had to apply 66(2) in
19 combination with 67. Because it's of course a natural right, it's derivative of
20 the habeas corpus right and relief of a defendant - speaking about overarching
21 human rights - it's a habeas corpus relief that every defendant, every criminal
22 law system can ask for the charges to be dismissed as a derivative of his natural
23 right to habeas corpus. So we don't need actually an article in the provision or
24 in the Statute, because it's a natural right that every defendant can ask a judge
25 to dismiss a case if the Prosecution didn't meet its burden, it's the

1 habeas corpus principle.

2 But let us look into the Statute, there should be a differentiation made - and
3 that's what I think Judge Fremr clearly saw in paragraph 1, otherwise he would
4 have reasoned differently - that once we deal with actually a very novel
5 phenomenon like NCTA, which is indeed not governed by the Statute, and we
6 don't find it, a judge looks at the provision which comes close to the nature;
7 and that's the disposal of the burden of proof, 66(2), not 74, because that deals
8 with everything the judge has been delivered with.

9 I hope, Mr President, that this answers your question in a way.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:34:51] But it raises others. When you
11 say full judgment or full trial, then 74 applies; because there is no full trial,
12 Rule 74 doesn't apply. What makes a full trial? Is it a mere formality or is
13 the attractant to it because a defence called evidence? What makes a full trial
14 that should attract, that should attract Article 74(5)?

15 MR KNOOPS: [14:35:25] Full trial, Mr President, and I can give you now, if
16 you wish, the citation of the gentleman I mentioned.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:35:36] You don't have to give citation,
18 just you can make the submission.

19 MR KNOOPS: [14:35:41] A full trial, I am just a simple --

20 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:35:43] (Overlapping speakers) the
21 gentleman you are talking about is no authority for us, just give other
22 submission.

23 MR KNOOPS: [14:35:50] I am happy to hear. That might sound the same for
24 Mr Robinson then of the LRVs for submissions. I'm grateful, Mr President.
25 Now, I'm just a simple lawyer, Mr President. I would say a full trial is

1 a prosecution and defence case. There is no other option. That's a full trial.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:36:08] Do you contemplate at all that in
3 that sense -- you can have that sense of a full trial if at the conclusion of
4 the Prosecution case Defence does this, gets up, says, "Your Honours, I'm going
5 to open my case. Here is my case: The case of the Prosecution is weak,
6 dismiss it. I'm calling no evidence, I close my case right here." No evidence
7 has been called. What is the material difference between that scenario and
8 one in which all that has happened was absence of that submission as brief,
9 maybe a two-minute, one-minute case for the Defence, all you are left is the
10 bulk of the evidence called by the Prosecution, would 74 apply in that case and
11 not in the other one?

12 MR KNOOPS: [14:37:25] Mr President, I have just a brief answer to your very
13 interesting question. I once said -- I did once a trial in the United States with
14 a colleague and we didn't call witnesses, and we said to the judge, "Our
15 defence case, Honourable Judge, is that we don't have witnesses. That's our
16 defence case." And that statement of the Defence was clearly a defence
17 because it said everything. So, in other words, even if the defendant chooses
18 in his defence case, having given the chance to provide the Defence, says
19 "I don't call witnesses," that's a defence case, because that is something very
20 strong in certain cases.

21 Thank you.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:38:11] You are not answering my
23 question, my question is: In that kind of scenario, are you saying that what
24 happened there with you and your colleague, your friend in the US, if it
25 happened at the ICC then Article 74 will guide the judgment or will control the

1 judgment --

2 MR KNOOPS: [14:38:39] Yes.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:38:40] -- of the Trial Chamber. But if
4 that didn't happen and all you had was only witness and evidence from
5 the Prosecution and the case stopped at the no case to answer stage, Article 74
6 cannot apply. If that is your view, tell me what is the material difference
7 between the two scenarios, material as opposed to form.

8 MR KNOOPS: [14:39:06] Yes. Very simply, Mr President, we also answered
9 this yesterday, we submitted this: The standard of proof. The standard of
10 proof. The standard of proof is different because -- and that's also what
11 Madam Carbuca Herrera said in her dissent at halfway stage, the standard of
12 proof is different from -- with the Defence case. That's the material difference.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:39:34] Did you see the standard of
14 proof -- well, let me stop there because other colleagues may have --

15 MR GALLMETZER: [14:39:49] Your Honour, may I also address this
16 question?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:39:54] Before Judge Ibáñez comes in,
18 Mr Gallmetzer, I believe I hear him, he wants to intervene, because actually this
19 question was also directed at you in a sense. So, Mr Gallmetzer.

20 MR GALLMETZER: [14:40:07] Yes, indeed, and that is why I took the liberty
21 to intervene.

22 So now obviously discussion has quite evolved now while you were asking
23 questions to my learned colleague, and I've made notes.

24 I will try to now start again from the beginning and talk the issue through.

25 So the first point is that indeed Judge Fremr or the Ruto decision as a whole

1 does not expressly mention Article 74. I had time to double-check it now and
2 the only mention to Article 74 is in footnote 492, but that is simply because
3 your separate opinion relies on an article -- on a different quote from an
4 Article 74 judgment, so it is not an indication that Article 74 was the legal basis.
5 And as I mentioned yesterday, the Ruto decision is a very different decision
6 from the 15 January acquittal decision in this case. It vacated the charges
7 without prejudice, so it was not an acquittal. And therefore, it is not
8 necessarily a guiding precedent for determining the issues on appeal that are
9 before you in this case, your Honour.

10 In any event, let me say that, in fact, though, however, when rendering their
11 judgment, the Appeals Chamber came -- sorry, the Trial Chamber in the Ruto
12 case came very close, came very close to complying with all the requirements
13 under Article 74(5). The judges, although they both issued -- the majority
14 judges, they both issued their own opinions, there was full agreement on the
15 factual reasons and that were actually developed in Judge Fremr's opinion, and
16 Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji started off by saying he is in full agreement without all
17 the factual findings and there is no need to repeat. Although Judge Tarfusser
18 says the same here, we see that there are significant differences in this case,
19 there are significant differences on the standard of proof, on the legal basis of
20 the decision, and these inconsistencies simply do not exist in the Ruto case.
21 Also, the Ruto decision was issued in one day, there was no deference to
22 a future reasoning, so there as well the Ruto decision was compliant with the
23 Article 74 requirements.

24 On the next point, both the Ruto decision and in fact also the cover -- the cover
25 decision, if you want to, the 6 July reasoning, the short statement, quote

1 a number of provisions that inform the decision. They include Article 64, 66,
2 67, 69. These provisions all of course are applicable in the trial proceedings,
3 they are applicable in informing the decision in the border sense to ensure that
4 the proceedings are conducted in a fair and expeditious manner in compliance
5 with the Statute. The cover decision also includes Article 74, and this is at
6 page 3, which the Ruto decision does not. However, that does not mean that
7 all these provisions are the basis for the actual acquittal in that case. There is
8 an express provision in the Statute and that is Article 74. An acquittal
9 decision under the Statute can only be entered under Article 74. And this
10 goes back to Judge Ibáñez's question of principle of legality. There is no
11 reason to invent, by inspiration or any other means, an alternative legal basis
12 when we have one that is as clear as Article 74. And 74 is not just a matter of
13 formality. What matters most, your Honour, is that Article 74 sets out very
14 clear requirements and safeguards in subparagraph (5). These safeguards
15 have a purpose and the purpose is to ensure that the decision is fully informed
16 and the public at large can have full trust in the outcome of the proceedings.
17 That is why they are there and that is why it is mandatory for the Chamber to
18 comply with them.

19 Next, that the Court has a hybrid -- (Overlapping speakers)

20 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:44:56] You have to, you have to slow
21 down.

22 MR GALLMETZER: [14:44:58] I apologise. I apologise.

23 So the next point is that the Court indeed has a hybrid procedural legal system
24 and that judges have some discretion in conducting, in how to conduct the
25 procedures before them. There is no excuse for not complying with the clear

1 and express legal provisions that there are. Article 74 is exactly that,
2 Article 74 determines that this is the legal provision that is applicable for
3 decisions on -- of conviction or acquittal and it sets out precise requirements,
4 no inspiration can be sought to bypass that legal provision.

5 And finally the question of a full trial, the trial is full exactly because
6 the Chamber has to take into consideration all the evidence that has been
7 submitted and discussed before it. It was the Defence who made a no case to
8 answer motion. The Defence cannot now go back and say, well, because we
9 made this motion the trial wasn't full. It was in the Defence's discretion to
10 make or not to make it and, therefore, it had to live with the consequences.
11 And because the decision that followed from the no case to answer motion is
12 a decision of acquittal that terminates the proceedings, that triggers all the
13 effects, including *ne bis in idem*, there is absolutely no alternative legal basis
14 under the Statute other than Article 54 to terminate this decision and the
15 requirements have to be mandatorily enforced in order to ensure the legality of
16 that decision.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:46:58] Thank you very much.
18 (Appeals Chamber confer)

19 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:48:15] Mr Gallmetzer, you spoke last.
20 I am going to take you to some other points, another question. A brief one,
21 because we should be rounding up soon.

22 In your submission you argued that what was done in January by the
23 Trial Chamber was not a summary of the judgment and therefore what was
24 done in July was reasoning given after the fact of rendering the judgment itself.
25 On the basis of that submission, would it be the case that your position that at

1 the ICC a Trial Chamber could never render a verdict with reasons to follow?

2 Is that what you're saying?

3 MR GALLMETZER: [14:49:37] Your Honour, there are two aspects I need to
4 address here. First of all, we say that the last sentence of Article 74 - and
5 please let me just read it to make sure I do not misstate anything - sorry, just
6 a second please.

7 Okay, it says: "[A] decision or a summary thereof [of the decision] shall be
8 delivered in open court."

9 So the reference to the summary in this provision refers to the manner in which
10 a chamber ensures publicity of the decision. This, in principle, should not be
11 seen as a legal basis for proceeding in a way that the Trial Chamber has in this
12 case, namely by issuing a verdict with no reasons whatsoever and then to
13 provide reasons five months later (Overlapping speakers).

14 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:50:50] I understand, I understand that
15 to be your position, there is no question. But that's exactly the reason why I
16 ask you the question. Are you saying, by that reading of Article 74(5), the last
17 sentence of that, your interpretation of it, does it then boil down to -- let's
18 assume you are correct, that by January the -- assuming again *arguendo* that as
19 of January the Trial Chamber had not developed their reasons, assuming
20 you are right on that, and you are right that it was only after that that they
21 crafted the reasons and then rendered it in July. If you are right in that
22 submission, does it not mean that that interpretation you have of Article 74(5)
23 precludes the facility of a Trial Chamber finishing a trial and saying, "Here is
24 our verdict. Reasons to follow"? Is that your position?

25 MR GALLMETZER: [14:52:16] As you will recall, your Honours, we put here

1 two positions in the alternative. Our primary position was exactly that,
2 that -- and this again takes us back to Judge Ibáñez's point on the principle of
3 legality. The Statute appears to be clear on this point, so the decision needs to
4 be delivered in full and the Chamber needs to issue one decision, a decision
5 that cannot be integrated, amended or in any way complemented at a later
6 stage.

7 However, in our secondary point that we make on this issue, we do concede
8 that there may, there may be situations where a chamber has discretion to issue
9 a verdict and to render its reasons at a later stage. However, that needs to be
10 done under very strict conditions to ensure all the underlying principles that
11 Article 74, and in particular 74(5), is meant to uphold. That decision is fully
12 informed, that there is one decision, that there is no backwards reasoning, that
13 the decision is made accessible to the public. And both in our appeal brief
14 and in response to -- in our written response to question 8 of the
15 Appeals Chamber, we set out what we think should be the requirements in
16 such a case under Article 74 of an oral summary decision that would need to
17 accompany the verdict. A verdict alone we say would always be insufficient,
18 but a summary -- a substantive summary that in summary form sets out all
19 the Chamber's factual findings and conclusions, where it is clear that
20 the Chamber has indeed made all of these and what remains are only -- is only
21 the completion of the editorial process, that there is no backwards reasoning,
22 that the principle of one decision and a fully informed decision and its
23 publicity, if all of these provisions are complied with then in theory it might be
24 possible.

25 But let me be very clear, in this case the Chamber's 15 January decision by no

1 means, not even closely, complied with these requirements. It simply stated --
2 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:54:55] Is it possible that -- I am trying
3 to understand, especially when I read your submissions about when it might
4 be acceptable, if I might characterise it that way. You said in certain -- if there
5 is going to be a departure there are some rules that must be respected and you
6 give, I believe, some of those. To what extent then is your complaint about
7 error in this regard one of degree as opposed to an absolute requirement that
8 must be respected? To what extent is that a matter of degree? Give you an
9 example now to help you, perhaps: What if it was clear that at the time the
10 Trial Chamber was rendering their verdict, perhaps in a short case
11 hypothetically -- (Overlapping speakers)
12 THE INTERPRETER: [14:55:51] Message from the English booth: Sorry to
13 interrupt, but there's a major echo. The French interpretation are having
14 problems.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:56:01] (Overlapping speakers) And
16 release it the next day, or a week later. Are we still in the same zone of
17 concern?
18 MR GALLMETZER: [14:56:15] Your Honour, again I must say it, our primary
19 decision is obviously that the decision needs to be rendered as a whole in one
20 instalment, not several.
21 Now, if we come to these hypothetical questions - and again let me just as
22 a premise say that the decision, the appeal decision is far out any hypothesis
23 that we may discuss now - if it was indeed clear that the Chamber had made in
24 a short and confined case with two witnesses and one document, if
25 the Chamber had made all their findings on the evidence and drawn all their

1 conclusions, in such a small case may be humanly possible, then perhaps, then
2 perhaps this is possible, but in that case the Chamber would also be able to
3 summarise its findings and conclusions.

4 In this case with over a hundred witnesses, with over 4,000 documents, it is not
5 humanly not possible to do exactly that without writing it down. And let me
6 please recall some of the, of the statements that senior and experienced judges
7 have made, and we have quoted them in our appeal brief, it is not uncommon
8 for a judge during the writing process to change a course of reason initially
9 taken and to revert the outcome. So initial impressions on the evidence while
10 sitting at trial, during the trial and hearing the witnesses, they are of value,
11 perhaps, to get first impressions. But a judgment cannot be based on first
12 impressions, a judgment is based on a systemic analysis of all the evidence in
13 its context and then to draft it in order to make sure that the decision and the
14 conclusion can be justified. And that is why the conclusion has to come at the
15 end. It cannot be made based on preliminary expressions and then the
16 conclusions are simply there to justify an already preconceived outcome.

17 In cases as complex as this, this Court cannot do it, we need to acknowledge
18 that cases before this Court are not small or simple enough to, to take this
19 course of action. And I think this is the time to put this down in our
20 jurisprudence to make sure that this doesn't happen again in the future.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:58:55] All right, we will leave it at that
22 for me for now. There will be more questions tomorrow. But Judge Ibáñez
23 wants to pose a question to you to think about overnight, if I understand
24 correct.

25 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:59:09] Yes.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:59:11] Not to answer now.

2 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: No, no, no.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [14:59:11] She wants to give you questions,
4 some homework, for us to mull over tomorrow. Remember the answers have
5 to be brief even then tomorrow.

6 Judge Ibáñez.

7 JUDGE IBÁÑEZ CARRANZA: [14:59:21] Thank you, Mr President.

8 It's homework for tomorrow for the parties. It's regarding the standard of
9 proof, the issue of standard of proof.

10 Regarding the submissions as to an alleged lack of agreement on standard of
11 proof between Judge Henderson and Judge Tarfusser, how could the

12 Appeals Chamber be sure that the judge who applied the higher standard

13 agrees that no single piece of evidence met the lower standard so that the

14 proceedings be continued when he was rather thinking whether the evidence

15 left room for reasonable doubt? In other words, can we be sure that

16 Judge Tarfusser did not reach an acquittal because he found reasonable doubts

17 in the evidence while he was rather be supposed to simply assess whether the

18 evidence was sufficient to convict and leave the issue of reasonable doubt

19 assessment to the end of the case and let the proceedings continue?

20 For tomorrow, please, thank you.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE EBOE-OSUJI: [15:00:41] Thank you.

22 And there will be more questions on the standard of proof tomorrow in

23 addition to that. But for now let's take our leave of the courtroom and meet

24 again tomorrow.

25 The Court is adjourned.

- 1 THE COURT OFFICER: [15:00:55] All rise.
- 2 (The hearing ends in open session at 3.00 p.m.)