

1 International Criminal Court
2 Trial Chamber I
3 Situation: Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
4 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé
5 ICC-02/11-01/15
6 Presiding Judge Cuno Tarfusser, Judge Olga Herrera Carbuccion and
7 Judge Geoffrey Henderson
8 Trial Hearing - Courtroom 1
9 Monday, 20 February 2017
10 (The hearing starts in open session at 9.31 a.m.)
11 THE COURT USHER: [9:31:15] All rise.
12 The International Criminal Court is now in session.
13 Please be seated.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:31:42] Good morning. Good morning to
15 everyone. I immediately give the floor, if there is nothing else to discuss, to the
16 Office of the Prosecutor for his two-hour session. You have a two-hour session.
17 And I just would remind you, the less you speak, the more the witness can speak, and
18 this is why we are here for.
19 And the parties, the less they intervene, the more time they have to question the
20 witness. So this is how we should proceed for the next two hours. You have the
21 floor.
22 MR MACDONALD: [9:32:25] Good morning, your Honours. Mr President, your
23 Honours, sorry.
24 WITNESS: CIV-OTP-P-0046 (On former oath)
25 (The witness speaks French)

1 QUESTIONED BY MR MACDONALD: (Continuing)

2 Q. [9:32:42] (Interpretation) Good morning, Mr President -- oh, good morning
3 Mr Witness, I apologise.

4 I would like to quite simply at the outset revisit the issue of grenades. And I would
5 like to put rather more technical questions to you. MP7 grenades, do you know
6 what type of grenade that is?

7 A. [9:33:10] That is correct, I do know what they are. They are tear gas grenades.

8 Q. [9:33:17] And HG84, do you know what type of grenade that is?

9 A. [9:33:28] Well, I would admit to not knowing those grenades. The specialists
10 will be able to tell you specifically. But I do know the MP7s well.

11 Q. [9:33:43] And were I to suggest to you that the HG84 grenades are explosive in
12 nature, would that ring a bell?

13 A. [9:33:51] No, that doesn't mean a thing to me. As I said to you, the specialists
14 will be able to give you more specific details.

15 Q. [9:33:58] Very well. Let's move ahead. Let us come back to the issue of
16 making Abobo PK18 secure. On Friday you mentioned to us that in January, and I
17 think subsequently, there were a number of operations in Abobo PK18. And I'm
18 going to put the question to you as to whether you remember the dates where there
19 were operations making that neighbourhood secure?

20 A. [9:35:03] I can't remember the dates. I do not recall, but I do know that there
21 were operations in the area of Abobo.

22 Q. [9:35:12] Very well. So I'm going to be calling up document 0045-1429.
23 And still if necessary, Mr President, we do have hard copies for the witness.
24 Could we move down the document somewhat, please.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:36:20] Second page I think you mean.

1 MR MACDONALD: [9:36:24] (Interpretation) Yes. Could we please see the
2 second page and then could we then see the third page, please.

3 Q. [9:36:49] Mr Witness, do you remember having seen this document?

4 A. [9:36:52] Yes, I have seen the document.

5 Q. [9:36:59] So it would seem to be that they are indicating here that an operation began
6 on 11 January 2011 at approximately 7 o'clock. Is that 7 o'clock in the morning?

7 A. [9:37:12] Yes, indeed. It's the morning, 7 a.m.

8 Q. [9:37:17] And on the last page we can see the number or the members of the FDS
9 who were involved, more than 700 members, if not 774. Do you remember what the
10 objective of this operation was? What was the aim?

11 A. [9:37:49] The aim is contained in the document. It was with a view to searching
12 for arms, ammunitions and grenades.

13 Q. [9:38:00] And in the jargon, was it a coup de poing operation?

14 *A. [9:38:06] No.

15 Q. [9:38:06] What is an *opération coup de poing*, a raid?

16 A. [9:38:18] A raid is like an operation conducted to search for ... It's like, you
17 know, slinging a net out there and trying to catch people. That's what it is, somewhat.

18 Q. [9:38:37] So we also saw on Friday that subsequent to the incidents of *the 11th, a
19 curfew was imposed on the 12th from 7 p.m. in the evening. Do you remember
20 whether the chief of general staff addressed the nation over the RTI with regard to
21 that curfew and with regard to making secure Abobo?

22 A. [9:39:21] I would admit to not remembering.

23 Q. [9:39:30] Your Honours, there is a video that we will not be showing in order to
24 expedite our questioning, but there is one on 12 January, a message, that is.

25 If I move forward now, Mr Witness, do you recall having had work meetings -- let me

1 rephrase.

2 During the post-election period, that is to say during the crisis, same dates, November
3 to April, did you meet with Mr Charles Blé Goudé?

4 A. [9:40:26] I never had any work sessions with Mr Charles Blé Goudé.

5 Q. [9:40:36] So my question as I rephrased it was, did you meet with Mr Charles
6 Blé Goudé?

7 A. [9:40:41] No, during that period, never.

8 Q. [9:40:46] Do you remember having met the president of the republic, Mr Gbagbo
9 at the time, on 12 January 2011 at his residence?

10 A. [9:41:11] Yes, I did meet him. But as to the date, I do not recall precisely.

11 Q. [9:41:20] Do you remember who was present?

12 A. [9:41:24] I do not know whether it was that date or not. But we met with the
13 president of the republic, indeed, the minister of youth, Mr Blé Goudé at the time, the
14 minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of defence and the
15 major commanders.

16 Q. [9:41:50] Do you recall what you discussed?

17 A. [9:41:57] No, we didn't discuss. We came to make a proposal.

18 Q. [9:42:09] Do you remember how long that meeting was?

19 A. [9:42:11] No, I'm not able to recall that.

20 Q. [9:42:13] What was your proposal?

21 A. [9:42:21] Our proposal was, if possible, to withdraw.

22 Q. [9:42:30] When you say to withdraw, what do you mean by that?

23 A. [9:42:39] That means that after the elections it was indicated *that he did not win
24 the elections, therefore the wish was expressed that he no longer continue to stay in
25 office as Head of State in order to avoid difficulties.

1 Q. [9:42:59] So you remember having had a meeting with Mr Gbagbo when you
2 asked him to withdraw?

3 A. [9:43:11] I can confirm that.

4 Q. [9:43:14] But you no longer recall when?

5 A. [9:43:18] No. I do not have the specific date in mind.

6 Q. [9:43:27] At the residence, how many encounters did you have in the presence of
7 the higher echelons of hierarchy of the FDS, the generals and the ministers, from
8 January to April that is 2011?

9 A. [9:43:48] I can't tell you with any certainty. Every time the president invited us,
10 it meant that figures of authority, his co-workers would be there to. So I couldn't
11 count the number of people who were present on each occasion.

12 Q. [9:44:08] If you allow me just one second.

13 So as we're on the subject, what was the answer from Mr Gbagbo?

14 A. [9:44:48] He didn't give us an answer. He said "I have understood."

15 Q. [9:44:56] What was the reaction? What was Mr Gbagbo's reaction to that
16 request?

17 A. [9:45:08] I told *you what he said. But I don't know whether there was another
18 *reaction from him.

19 Q. [9:45:16] Before going to the residence to request that he withdraw, was there
20 any former meeting of the hierarchy of the FDS?

21 A. [9:45:40] Yes, indeed. There was a meeting before we went to the residence.

22 Q. [9:45:46] At what location?

23 A. [9:45:51] At the general staff headquarters.

24 Q. [9:45:57] And who was in attendance?

25 A. [9:46:00] All the major figures of command were present.

1 Q. [9:46:07] Were there any civilian authorities present, members of the cabinet?

2 A. [9:46:14] No. This was a meeting at the staff HQ, so there was no civilians
3 present.

4 Q. [9:46:24] And during that meeting at the HQ, was this a unanimous decision
5 that was reached to recommend that to the president?

6 A. [9:46:40] Yes, indeed. This was in fact the second meeting. *For the very first
7 meeting, it was General Mangou Philippe, chief of general staff, who went. But
8 because we didn't receive an answer, we requested that we go together as the general
9 command to see the head of state. So this was a unanimous decision. *It is true
10 that of all... In fact it was a unanimous decision.

11 Q. [9:47:14] What do you mean by one out of all of them? I didn't really grasp
12 what you meant.

13 A. [9:47:24] That means that when we decided to go and see the chief of state, the
14 general commander supreme of the gendarmerie didn't want to go. But at the end,
15 at the last minute he joined the group and we went together.

16 Q. [9:47:43] Do you remember why the commander general of the gendarmerie
17 didn't want to go and see Mr Gbagbo?

18 A. [9:47:57] I would admit that he didn't give any answer.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:48:05] Excuse me. Can I just for clarity ask
20 the witness who, and name them, who are the major figures of command which met
21 in this meeting? Who are they? Thank you. By name and police corps.

22 THE WITNESS: [9:48:31] (Interpretation) Mr President, in fact, they were all the
23 heads of command: The head of the police, the head of the gendarmerie, the head of
24 the armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire and the commander of CECOS. All four of them
25 were appointed by the chief of state.

1 MR MACDONALD: [9:49:02] (Interpretation)

2 Q. [9:49:03] So just to confirm, Guiai Bi Poin, Mr Philippe Mangou, Mr Kassaraté
3 and yourself; is that correct?

4 A. [9:49:25] I can confirm.

5 Q. [9:49:29] Aside from you four, were there any other generals from the FDS in
6 attendance at the HQ?

7 A. [9:49:41] No. I gave the main names. If there were any other people, those
8 were just co-workers, but I've given you the most important ones.

9 Q. [9:49:55] Was General Detoh Létho present?

10 A. [9:50:02] Well, I would say that *he was a collaborator of the army chief of staff. In that capacity,
11 once the chief of staff gave his position, it would be as if General Detoh Létho did not exist.

12 THE INTERPRETER: [9:50:20] Overlapping speakers.

13 MR MACDONALD: [9:50:23] (Interpretation)

14 Q. [9:50:24] We are attempting to entertain who was --

15 (Counsel confer)

16 MR MACDONALD: [9:50:47] (Interpretation)

17 Q. [9:50:48] Mr Witness, it would be important to say which co-workers were there
18 of the generals.

19 I'm going to put my two ears on because there is noise in the courtroom.

20 So was Mr Detoh Létho in attendance?

21 A. [9:51:13] Generally speaking he was in attendance, but I can't tell you precisely
22 whether he was there on that day.

23 Q. General Vagba Faussignaux?

24 A. [9:51:24] Yes, he was there.

25 Q. [9:51:25] General Dogbo Blé?

1 A. [9:51:28] No.

2 Q. [9:51:29] General Boniface Konan?

3 A. [9:51:42] I can't remember either.

4 Q. [9:51:43] Very well. Do you remember whether it was before or after the
5 African Union finally declared that it was supporting Mr Ouattara rather as president,
6 recognized president of Côte d'Ivoire?

7 A. [9:52:12] No, I don't precisely recall.

8 Q. [9:52:20] Very well. We'll come back to that. Last question: In order to try
9 and locate us in time, because I don't want to waste too much time on this, do you
10 know whether it was rather in January or towards the end of the crisis?

11 A. [9:52:42] I can't tell you precisely. I can't tell you precisely.

12 Q. [9:52:55] And this meeting took place where?

13 A. [9:53:06] The meeting of the --

14 THE INTERPRETER: [9:53:10] Overlapping speakers. The exchange was lost.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:53:16] The meeting took place where?

16 Because there was a problem with interpreters.

17 MR MACDONALD: [9:53:24] (Interpretation)

18 Q. [9:53:25] The meeting with the president.

19 A. [9:53:30] The meeting took place at his private residence.

20 Q. [9:53:37] Have you already met with the president at the presidential palace in
21 company of the generals?

22 A. [9:53:47] Yes, on each occasion where there are meetings, they take place at the
23 presidential palace.

24 Q. [9:53:54] And so this meeting where you asked him to withdraw was at the
25 residence and not at the palace?

1 A. [9:54:04] We are not the ones to determine where the meeting is held. We
2 request a meeting, and if he wants to receive us at the residence, we go there; and if
3 it's at the palace, we go there too.

4 Q. [9:54:22] I would now like to show a video to you, and the video is 0064-0110,
5 and we will be presenting an excerpt therefrom, from page 03, that is to say 03.49 to
6 the 05.11. There is a corresponding transcript, 0086-1013, and for the interpreters
7 and the transcribers lines 5 to 27. I'm being told that it has been sent and received.

8 THE INTERPRETER: [9:55:31] Message from the interpreter: The interpreter is
9 looking for it.

10 MR MACDONALD: (Interpretation) I think we need to move on to evidence 2.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:55:50] They have not found it yet, the
12 interpreters.

13 THE INTERPRETER: [9:55:53] Message from the interpreter: We are rifling
14 through piles of transcripts --

15 MR MACDONALD: So while they are looking --

16 THE INTERPRETER: -- that we have before us.

17 MR MACDONALD: -- at it, your Honour --

18 THE INTERPRETER: -- we can't find it, so we would like to have it --

19 MR MACDONALD: -- I will provide the following --

20 THE INTERPRETER: -- on the screen, please. Thank you.

21 MR MACDONALD: -- information. This is --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:56:08] Excuse me. Can you send it to the
23 interpreters so --

24 MR MACDONALD: [9:56:11] It's been sent, your Honour.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:56:14] Okay. Tell me please when you are

1 ready. It has been sent.

2 THE INTERPRETER: [9:56:39] Message from the interpreter: Respectfully, your
3 Honour, we have looked through all the ones we have and we haven't yet found it.
4 We do apologise.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:56:47] My question is can you not send it via
6 email in this moment? Yes, she's doing it.

7 MR MACDONALD: [9:56:53] It's been sent.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:56:54] They haven't got it yet, I'm told. You
9 should have it now.

10 THE INTERPRETER: [9:57:05] Very much appreciated. Thank you, your Honour.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:57:08] Okay. We are ready to go.

12 MR MACDONALD: [9:57:12] Just to clarify, your Honour, that this is a video
13 recording of 12 January 2011.

14 (Viewing of the video excerpt)

15 THE INTERPRETER: [9:57:33] (Interpretation of the video excerpt)

16 "Yesterday Wednesday, *the president of the republic, President Laurent Gbagbo,
17 exchanged views with the chiefs of the major commands of the national army.

18 Together they examined the situation, security situation of the country, and then they
19 took measures in order to ensure the security of the country and Ivorians.

20 This encounter between the head of state, President Laurent Gbagbo, with the high
21 military hierarchy was of capital importance with a view -- in view of the amplitude
22 of the attacks and the violence perpetrated by armed individuals who take for targets
23 the forces of defence and security and the population who do not adhere to their
24 cause. *The president of the republic, Laurent Gbagbo, commander in chief of the
25 army, was given a synopsis of the meeting that the generals had well beforehand at

1 the general staff headquarters. The commanders of the navy, the air force, the land
2 forces, the CECOS, the gendarmerie and the police and Lieutenant General Philippe
3 Mangou decided upon measures to ensure security in the territory and defuse any
4 attempts to render certain areas of Abidjan commune uncontrollable. This meeting
5 was enlarged to the members of the government, was extended to the members of the
6 government, notably the Prime Minister Gilbert Aké N'Gbo, the Lieutenant General
7 Philippe Mangou" --

8 MR MACDONALD: (Overlapping speakers)

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpretation is not finished, Mr President.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:59:15] That's why I'm stopping the Prosecutor.

11 THE INTERPRETER: [9:59:24] I shall continue.

12 "This meeting was extended to the members of the government, notably the Prime
13 Minister Gilbert Aké N'Gbo" --

14 MR MACDONALD: (Overlapping speakers)

15 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:59:32] Can you please wait until the translation
16 is finished. Thank you.

17 THE INTERPRETER: [9:59:39] -- "Philippe Mangou, when coming out of the
18 meeting, denounced the observed partiality out in the field with regard to the UN
19 Blue Berets."

20 Thank you.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [9:59:57] Now, Mr Prosecutor.

22 MR MACDONALD: [9:59:59] (Interpretation)

23 Q. [10:00:15] So is that the meeting that you were referring to with the president
24 when you requested that he withdraw, or this video that we just saw, does it refer to
25 another meeting, a meeting before that with the president?

1 A. [10:00:30] Your Honour, those were two different meetings. *The one that we've just seen
2 was a meeting at which the head of state wanted information and a report on attacks of the forces.
3 Whereas for the prior – the other meeting I referred to, we were the ones who asked to have that
4 meeting with him and I would be surprised that it would get that much media attention.

5 Q. [10:01:08] During that meeting with Mr Gbagbo, were any measures taken, that
6 is, did he decide any particular measures regarding the security in Abobo?

7 And perhaps we can go into private session if it's necessary, your Honour.

8 A. [10:01:48] No. There were no particular measures. I believe I already said
9 that last week, and perhaps you didn't want to take account of that comment. I said
10 that many policemen, gendarme and soldiers had been killed at Abobo Gare. *And I
11 think it was for that reason that the supreme chief of the army wanted to understand
12 what had occurred. But no particular measures had been taken. As I told you, the
13 chief of staff took measures so that the army be able to take over the security situation
14 at Abobo Gare, but I don't think any particular measures had been taken at that
15 meeting to my knowledge. *The supreme chief of the army wanted to understand
16 what had occurred in Abobo.

17 Q. [10:02:45] *Was it discussed with him during that meeting that Abobo should be
18 declared a war zone?

19 A. [10:02:57] *I've already answered that question. But let me repeat myself, I
20 relayed a message saying that there was a curfew in place in Abobo Gare. And that
21 it was one of my co-workers who attended a meeting at the staff HQ who had stated
22 in a report that Abobo had been declared a war zone. I don't believe there was a
23 decree signed by the then Head of state referring to Abobo as a war zone.

24 Q. [10:03:32] During that meeting was there discussion, and if need be we can go
25 into private session, was there discussion of Mr Kouyaté Youssouf?

1 A. [10:04:03] *I don't remember whether it was on that particular occasion. It's possible.
2 But on several occasions instructions were given to me to – to dismiss the then principal
3 commissioner, Kouyaté Youssouf, from his position, but I don't remember whether it was
4 on that occasion. By the way, several persons have questioned me about this.

5 Q. [10:04:32] Mr Kouyaté Youssouf, for the purposes of the transcript and correct
6 me of course if I'm wrong, his post was deputy to the prefecture for public security; is
7 that correct?

8 A. [10:04:49] Yes, indeed. I don't think it was at that meeting because, unless I'm mistaken,
9 he left his post on 11 January, whereas this meeting was the 12th. *Kouyaté Youssouf was
10 the deputy police prefect N°. 1, that is the prefect in charge of operations in the city of Abidjan.

11 Q. [10:05:16] Who asked you that he be removed from his post?

12 A. [10:05:22] Let me repeat, several people requested that. Obviously the
13 president himself asked that he be removed from his post in the presence of the
14 minister of the interior.

15 Q. [10:05:40] Who asked you the first time, who asked you to remove him from his
16 post?

17 A. [10:06:06] People working with the president had called me on the telephone
18 and asked that he be removed from his post.

19 Q. [10:06:22] Can you give us names? Mr Witness, if you prefer we can go into
20 private session. I would like to hear the names of the individuals who called you?

21 A. [10:06:30] Ahouman Nathaniel, who is deceased. General Dogbo Blé. Those
22 were two individuals who called me before the president himself gave me the
23 instructions to do so.

24 Q. [10:06:50] Mr Ahouman, what was he in charge of?

25 A. [10:07:14] He was in charge of the presidential security group.

1 Q. [10:07:19] Do you remember whether the minister of the interior himself asked
2 you to remove the other gentleman from his post?

3 A. [10:07:28] Well, I said when the president gave me instructions to remove
4 Commissioner Kouyaté from his post it was in the presence of the minister of the
5 interior.

6 Q. [10:07:44] Why did Mr Dogbo Blé ask you to remove him from his post?

7 A. [10:07:55] The reasons given by those three individuals who told me about it
8 and the president of the republic, the reasons were the same for all. During the
9 period of the war, Commissioner Kouyaté had lost his father. And he was not able
10 to go to Bouaké because of the fighting, the war. And he was represented at his
11 father's funeral by Commander Chérif Ousmane, *who was the Bouaké war lord.
12 And therefore there was a relationship between Kouyaté Youssouf and Chérif
13 Ousmane. And that was the reason that was given to me to remove him from his
14 post.

15 Q. [10:08:55] So Chérif Ousmane was a rebel, so to speak, to use the term; is that
16 correct?

17 A. [10:09:07] Yes, indeed.

18 Q. [10:09:12] When Mr Ahouman asked you *to remove or dismiss him, what did you do?

19 A. [10:09:29] *No, Ahouman was not my hierarchical chief.

20 Q. [10:09:35] When Mr Dogbo Blé asked you?

21 A. [10:09:37] No, he was not my chief, my hierarchical chief either.

22 Q. [10:09:40] Was there a reason why you didn't do it? Was there another reason
23 why you did not do that other than the fact that they were not your hierarchical
24 superiors?

25 A. [10:10:05] No, there is no other reason, proof being when my chief, that is the

1 president of the republic gave the instruction in front of the minister of the interior,
2 and let me add that it was a ministerial decree, that was how he was removed from
3 his post.

4 MR MACDONALD: [10:10:38] (Interpretation) Your Honour, I'd like to refresh the
5 witness's memory and take a look at document 0014-0289 page 315.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:10:57] May I just intervene for a moment
7 before you do so, because at page 14 in the answer from line 10, at page 14 of the
8 English transcript, the words "chef supreme des armées" was translated in "chief of
9 staff".

10 MR MACDONALD: [10:11:23] As it should be commander in-chief.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:11:25] Yes. So this also from the answer
12 comes clearly out that it's not the --

13 MR MACDONALD: [10:11:34] Mr Mangou.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:11:36] -- Chef d'État-major, the chef of
15 supreme des armées; which is the supreme commander of the army, which is
16 different.

17 MR MACDONALD: [10:11:48] (Interpretation)

18 Q. [10:11:49] Witness, I'd like to take a look at lines 907 to 942 on this very topic.

19 And I'm going to begin in the middle of the paragraph *at line 900 to 910, and I quote.

20 A. [10:12:26] I beg your pardon. I don't have the document.

21 Q. [10:12:29] I'm going to read it. Quote --

22 THE INTERPRETER: [10:12:39] Could counsel wait just a moment for the document
23 to come up on the screen, please?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:12:45] Can you just for a moment, until the
25 document comes up on the screen. Thank you.

1 THE INTERPRETER: [10:12:50] Your Honour. Thank you. It's there now.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:12:54] Now it's on the screen. We can
3 proceed.

4 MR MACDONALD: [10:13:23] (Interpretation)

5 Q. I shall begin once again. For the purposes of the transcript I'm beginning on
6 line 910 in the middle of the line. And I quote:

7 (Interpretation) "I had, for example, received a call from General Dogbo Blé, asking
8 to remove this director. I myself felt that he had not committed any particular fault,
9 and therefore I did not remove him. I received a call from the director of the GSPR,
10 Colonel Ahouman, to remove him. I said again: 'I don't have any information.' So
11 there were a lot of events, and that particular day when he brought us together, I
12 mentioned all of those who were present." End of quote.

13 And then I shall continue:

14 "Dogbo Blé, Ahouman, the minister of the interior, the minister of defence, of foreign
15 affairs. So, for some reason, he asked me the question, and he said Bredou, you have
16 to remove Youssouf Kouyaté." End of quote.

17 My first question is: you yourself at that point in time according to you, Mr Youssouf
18 Kouyaté had not committed any particular mistake or any particular fault?

19 A. [10:15:18] Yes, I can confirm that.

20 Q. [10:15:21] When the president of the republic asked you to remove him, that was
21 when you carried through?

22 A. [10:15:28] I can confirm, I can confirm that.

23 Q. [10:15:34] I would like to talk about something else now. During the
24 post-electoral crisis, that is between the months of November and April, were there
25 militiamen in the police? And if necessary, we can go into private session if you

1 prefer.

2 A. [10:16:16] I can tell you that there was no militia within the police. In other
3 words, they were not part of the police as such.

4 Q. [10:16:37] Were there any militiamen integrated into the police who were part of
5 operations on the ground alongside of policemen?

6 A. [10:16:51] I will repeat my answer: There were no militiamen as part of the
7 police.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [10:17:03] Excuse me. But you do understand
9 that your answer doesn't respond to the question put by the Prosecutor? They are
10 two different things. Formalistically you are right, but here we are going -- it's not a
11 matter of form, it's a matter of substance, and I think we should go into private
12 session for this.

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- 11 (Open session at 11.04 a.m.)
- 12 THE COURT OFFICER: [11:04:56] We're in open session, your Honour.
- 13 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:04:59] Thank you very much.
- 14 Mr Prosecutor.
- 15 I think we should start from this, the whole questioning on this matter, so that --
- 16 MR MACDONALD: [11:05:09] Yes.
- 17 Q. [11:05:10] (Interpretation) Witness, did you have any knowledge, regardless of
- 18 the source, *of a call made by Mr Blé Goudé in late February for the protection of
- 19 neighbourhoods?
- 20 A. [11:05:26] I must say I don't remember.
- 21 Q. [11:05:31] I'd like to call up document 0045-0135. Can you see this document
- 22 on the screen?
- 23 A. [11:06:15] No, nothing at all. Okay. Now I can see it.
- 24 Q. [11:06:26] *Well, let's take a look at the top of the document. It says 4 March 2011, 19h44,
- 25 police prefect of Abidjan, and there is also a telephone number. We need to display the

1 document toward the bottom. I want to see the top of the document, or even further,
2 the very top of the document to have the timestamp and the date, please, so that the
3 witness can see.

4 Okay, so this is a police document; is that correct?

5 A. [11:07:13] Yes, indeed, it's a police document.

6 Q. [11:07:16] I'm going to read it out for the purposes of the transcription. I'm
7 reading from the first page, if we could scroll down. This is page 0135: "I have the
8 honour to report that according to reports received from our co-workers, the chiefs of
9 the *arrondissements*, it was observed that offences had been committed during checks
10 carried out by the population at the checkpoints within the neighbourhoods.
11 Indeed following Minister Blé Goudé's appeal, checkpoints were positioned in the
12 various neighbourhoods to provide for security.

13 Unfortunately, within the population in charge of those roadblocks, there were
14 delinquents who committed offences.

15 Other offences were also noted in the vicinity of those areas."

16 My question is: Did you receive reports regarding the types of offences that took
17 place at those checkpoints following Mr Blé Goudé's appeal?

18 A. [11:08:43] Well, it was the offences that were reported to me.

19 Q. [11:08:53] I'd like to call the attention of the Court to page 0137. There is a
20 paragraph entitled "Murders" on page 0136 and then you have the details. And I'm
21 quoting:

22 "In addition cases of individuals killed and burned in Yopougon occurred -- were
23 perpetrated by individuals who had built up the self-defence roadblocks.

24 On a daily basis these violations, these serious criminal violations continued to be
25 perpetrated in various different zones."

1 My question is: Was this reported that individuals were burned alive?

2 A. [11:09:54] Yes. My co-workers reported that.

3 Q. [11:10:05] I'm going to skip one or two parts, one or two documents and go to
4 0045-0127. Have you seen this document before?

5 A. [11:10:56] You've already asked me that question and I said yes, I have seen it.
6 I confirm.

7 Q. [11:11:03] I'd like to take a look at the next page, please, 0128. And I'm going to
8 read out a comment:

9 "These abuses have the consequence of distorting the noble action of the self-defence
10 groups that are trying to respond to Minister Charles Blé Goudé's appeal to the
11 intrusion of rebel fighters in the Abidjan district in general and in the commune of
12 Yopougon in particular.

13 *Suggestion: It would be preferable that these young people -- or, rather, it is
14 necessary that these young people be registered and assigned to specific roadblocks;
15 that they be supported by appropriately; and that they receive some sort of
16 compensation in order to avoid racketeering."

17 Were any measures taken along those lines, to your knowledge?

18 A. [11:12:58] No measures along those lines were taken.

19 Q. [11:13:05] Let's go on to the events that took place on 3 March 2011. So March 3,
20 2011, seven women were killed in Abobo.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: No, what happened (Overlapping speakers)

22 MR MACDONALD: (Interpretation) I will rephrase.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:13:46] Yes, you can rephrase, but the damage
24 is done, okay.

25 MR MACDONALD: [11:13:50] I know, your Honour, I mean it's --

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:13:52] Yes. It's not all clear. In this trial
2 nothing is clear, it seems, so I think we have to be particularly careful.

3 MR MACDONALD: [11:14:12] (Interpretation)

4 Q. [11:14:15] Did you hear about an incident that is said to have taken place in
5 Abobo on March 3, 2011?

6 A. [11:14:21] I would like to state that the period from November to March, in fact,
7 the police was no longer active in Abobo. I did hear about that event, to answer
8 your question.

9 Q. [11:14:45] What did you learn exactly?

10 A. [11:14:54] Well, *you already mentioned the death of women in Abobo.

11 Q. [11:14:59] Where were you when you learned about it?

12 A. [11:15:04] I learned about it at the staff headquarters because *the chief of staff
13 himself wanted to understand what had happened and received that information at a
14 meeting.

15 Q. [11:15:21] And what exactly did you receive by way of information?

16 A. [11:15:25] I can repeat what I said a moment ago, that there had been deaths,
17 women were killed in Abobo.

18 Q. [11:15:32] Did you have any details about which vehicles were involved in the
19 incident?

20 A. [11:15:40] No. I didn't have any details. As I said a moment ago, the police
21 was no longer acting in -- during that period, under the territorial authorities in
22 Abobo.

23 Q. [11:15:55] I'd like to refresh your memory, Witness, and I'd like to draw your
24 attention to page 0014-0326, and to be specific, page 0338, starting at line *46
25 to 461.

1 MR MACDONALD: [11:17:15] Your Honours, I think there is an issue.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:17:18] Yes.

3 MR LAUCCI: [11:17:20] (Interpretation) I believe that the passage that was just
4 mentioned should be discussed in private session because of the notion of
5 responsibility of hierarchical superiors.

6 THE INTERPRETER: [11:17:39] And the interpreter adds: It was a apparently line
7 46 to line 461.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:17:45] Well, let's make this confrontation in
9 private session then.

10 (Private session at 11.17 a.m.)

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- 13 (Open session at 11.28 a.m.)
- 14 THE COURT OFFICER: [11:28:52] We're in open session, your Honour.
- 15 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:28:57] Thank you.
- 16 Mr Prosecutor.
- 17 MR MACDONALD: [11:29:03] (Interpretation) I'd like to have 0048-1348. Could
- 18 we enlarge it a bit.
- 19 Q. This is a note sent to the minister of the interior. It is a synthesis of the daily
- 20 information reports covering the period 16 to 21 March 2011.
- 21 Do you recognize this kind of document?
- 22 A. [11:29:56] Yes, indeed.
- 23 Q. [11:29:58] Because there is no precise number or date.
- 24 It refers to a period of time. And we can also note that it's not signed.
- 25 Is that exceptional?

1 A. [11:30:14] Well, perhaps you could ask the question to whoever gave it to you, *because
2 if the document is not signed, -- I don't know, this could mean that it was drafted and
3 probably sent to the minister. I don't know. I do not know who gave you that document.

4 Q. [11:30:31] Was it a type of document that you've already seen, that is this
5 synthesis BQI?

6 A. [11:30:40] Yes, that's why I said I recognize it as a police document.

7 Q. [11:30:43] I'd like to draw the attention of the Chamber to page 1349, 1349,
8 paragraph 3. It's the next page. And I'm going to read it out, "Assassination of the
9 imam of the Great Mosque in Port-Bouët II" and then you can read the details.
10 Do you recall that incident?

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:31:35] Maître Gbougnon.

12 MR GBOUGNON: [11:31:37] (Interpretation) Yes, Mr President, I have an issue
13 with when the Prosecutor continues to put questions with regard to the document
14 when the witness says, page 49, line 23, "Maybe you could put the question" -- I'm
15 quoting here, sorry:

16 "Maybe you could put the question to the individual who gave that document to you,
17 because if that document isn't signed it might mean that it was drafted and that it was
18 sent, not sent to the ministry."

19 Mr President, I'm rather surprised that we continue to put questions to the witness.
20 He's saying if it isn't signed then it can't have been sent. He says you should ask the
21 person who gave it to you that question. I think that's quite clear.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:32:34]

23 MR MACDONALD: [11:32:39] It's a recognized document of the police. It has a
24 date of synthèse. We've heard how the BQIs are sent also to the ministre on a daily
25 basis. Therefore, therefore, I'm refreshing also the memory of the witness about that

1 incident, your Honour. And here we're trying to, you know, obviously we're
2 interested in the content. And by asking questions to this witness obviously.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:33:23] Yes. When the witness said "Well,
4 perhaps you could ask the question to whoever gave it to you, because if it's not
5 signed, then I don't know" -- the question was: "There is no precise number or date.
6 It refers to a period of time. And we can also note that it's not signed. Is that an
7 exception?"

8 Then the witness answered: "You have to ask the person who drafted it, whoever
9 gave it to you" on the question, because why it was not signed from the formal point
10 of view, not from its content. The document as such as a police document he has
11 recognized it and therefore he can give answer, if he knows, on what is written in
12 there.

13 Mr Prosecutor, please.

14 MR MACDONALD: [11:34:28] (Interpretation)

15 Q. [11:34:29] So my question is as follows, Mr Witness: We can see that there is a question
16 as to whether 15 March the imam of the Grand Mosque of Port-Bouët II was found dead *from
17 a bullet wound. Were you informed of this incident and is this an incident that you remember?

18 A. [11:34:53] Yes, I do recall.

19 Q. [11:34:54] Very well. Thank you.

20 MR MACDONALD: We shall take the break here, Mr President, but you're going to
21 be asking me how much longer. You gave me two hours. We had a bit of a
22 problem with the video. There have also been interruptions. So maximum 30 but
23 probably less than 30 minutes left for me. I am informed that up to now we have
24 used allegedly 11 hours of the 12 that we had anticipated, Mr President.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [11:35:29] Yes, I must say I do not agree with the

1 way how this timing is counted like in the basketball. I would prefer the football
2 way of counting the time. I think we have to change this, because otherwise
3 everything goes out of control of the Chamber.

4 So we take the break. I give you another 20 minutes, not more than 20 minutes when
5 we come back.

6 Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned to 12.05.

7 THE COURT USHER: [11:36:01] All rise.

8 (Recess taken at 11.36 a.m.)

9 (Upon resuming in open session at 12.08 p.m.)

10 THE COURT USHER: [12:08:24] All rise.

11 Please be seated.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:08:46] Yes. Good -- well, good morning is
13 too late, but the floor is to the Office of the Prosecutor once again and with the
14 finishing of his questioning in view. Okay, thank you very much.

15 MR MACDONALD: [12:09:08] (Interpretation)

16 Q. [12:09:10] Mr Witness, a few moments ago we did see a *summary BQI, daily
17 information report, and now I'd like to show you something else, another document,
18 and I'd like to ask if 0045-0793 could be displayed on the screen.

19 (Speaks English) And, your Honours, for this one I would really kindly ask that we
20 provide a copy to the witness. We have a binder. It's 160-something pages. By the
21 title you will see why. But I think it will be easier for the witness to have a look at
22 this document, a paper copy. It's clean. We just put it in a binder because it's more
23 voluminous.

24 (Interpretation) Now, Witness, we can see the first page of the document here. And
25 just for the court record, I'd like to ask you to look at the last page, that's 0959.

1 Now, Witness, when we leaf through this document we see that this is a chronological
2 account of various events, some are summarised, in some other details more details
3 are given. Have you ever seen such a document?

4 A. [12:11:22] Yes, I have.

5 Q. [12:11:23] Very well. And could you tell us, give us details why was this
6 document drawn up, if there was a reason?

7 A. [12:11:35] *Yes, the deputy director of public security prepared the document
8 as a reminder; so that in case he was asked a question, he could offer an account of the
9 various events that had occurred at various places at various times.

10 Q. [12:11:57] So this document was sent on to you?

11 A. [12:12:00] Yes.

12 Q. [12:12:01] And did you forward on to your minister, the minister of the
13 interior? Do you remember?

14 A. [12:12:07] I don't remember, but I think I must have sent it on for him to have
15 an overview of the events that occurred.

16 Q. [12:12:19] Very well. I'd like to now move on to another topic.

17 Mr Witness, we saw on Friday, and I will mention the document in question, it
18 doesn't need to be put up on the screen, 0047-0535, more specifically at page 0536 we
19 see the *number of people who had been detained and a distinction was *even made
20 between men and women, actually. Now, are you aware of women being stopped
21 and detained by -- and arrested by the police?

22 A. [12:13:09] In the usual day-to-day work of the police, it is possible that we
23 might detain women, but that particular case, without the document in front of me, I
24 really couldn't say.

25 Q. [12:13:24] Is there a specific policy followed when a woman is arrested? Are

1 there any special places of detention for women?

2 A. [12:13:34] Yes.

3 Q. [12:13:35] And are they detained with men as well or just with women?

4 A. [12:13:42] Our detention centre has one part for men, one part for women and
5 one part for children, that is to say minors.

6 Q. [12:14:03] Now, we have some information on *record, sir, that would indicate
7 that crimes of sexual violence were *committed by law enforcement staff. Did you
8 hear anything about such crimes during the post-election crisis?

9 A. [12:14:21] Yes, we did hear about a number of cases.

10 Q. [12:14:29] And who did you -- well, did you -- provide a report about these cases?

11 A. [12:14:35] No. *In those cases, no, I did not provide a report. I think that if I
12 was made aware of something, *I would have taken the necessary measures because
13 if a police officer raped somebody, that would be an offence for which he would
14 receive punishment or an investigation would be conducted *as the case may be. And
15 I would have to report on the outcome of all that.

16 Q. [12:15:03] And who informed you of these cases?

17 A. [12:15:09] The police prefect of Abidjan, he was the one who told me.

18 Q. [12:15:18] And what was the general context? When did you receive this
19 report from him?

20 A. [12:15:25] I don't have the document actually right in front of me, but I do
21 know that there was one event and I believe there was mention made of a rape at the
22 police préfecture and the various measures were taken.

23 Q. [12:15:41] Was that in relation to a particular incident that we have discussed
24 here ever since the beginning of your testimony?

25 A. [12:15:49] I don't remember. As I said, I don't have the document right in

1 front of me. So many things happened. I can't remember all the details of every
2 event.

3 Q. [12:16:00] And what happened exactly at the police préfecture? What
4 happened during that incident?

5 A. [12:16:10] If I recall, mention was made of a young girl being raped and I
6 asked for the police officer who did that, I called for him to be punished.

7 Q. [12:16:40] At line -- correction, page 55, line 8, you seem to indicate that you
8 were informed of a certain number of crimes or cases, a certain number of cases of
9 sexual violence. Now, was that -- I will read the passage again, page 55, line 8:
10 "Yes, we did become aware of a certain number of cases" and this is in the plural,
11 cases, actes in French. So it would appear that a certain number of rapes occurred.
12 What can you tell us in this regard? Can you -- you gave us an example, what about
13 other examples? What happened in these other cases? Where?

14 A. [12:17:57] That is the only example I'm aware of.

15 Q. [12:18:05] I'd like us to revisit one particular -- and just to conclude this -- well,
16 this young girl, do you know why she had been arrested?

17 A. [12:18:20] I don't remember.

18 Q. [12:18:31] Mr Witness, now, I would like -- when I want to go back to the issue
19 of the militiamen, did you discipline the commander of the CRS1?

20 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:18:50] Let's go into private session, please.
21 Let's go please into private session just for the ...

22 (Private session at 12.19 p.m.)

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1 (Open session at 12.24 p.m.)

2 THE COURT USHER: [12:24:18] We're in open session, your Honour.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:24:20] So we are back in open session. The
4 Prosecutor has finished his questioning of this witness, which is on the stand the
5 fourth day today, and I now give the floor immediately for approximately one hour to
6 the Defence. And I suppose the Defence of Mr Gbagbo.

7 Maître Altit.

8 MR ALTIT: [12:24:47] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

9 QUESTIONED BY MR ALTIT: (Interpretation)

10 Q. [12:25:24] Good afternoon, Mr Witness.

11 A. [12:25:28] Good afternoon, Counsel.

12 Q. [12:25:33] I am Emmanuel Altit and I am the lead counsel defending
13 Mr Laurent Gbagbo. It is now my turn to put a number of questions to you, and
14 since you have already told us a great many things, I would be most grateful if you
15 could answer my questions very specifically, very targeted way; is that all right?

16 A. [12:26:00] Okay.

17 Q. [12:26:01] Thank you. Let us begin right away.

18 Now, you told us that -- and this was on 15 February when you were giving
19 testimony, that you had been the director of the intervention units for a while, if
20 I -- between 2000 and 2008?

21 A. [12:26:27] Yes.

22 Q. [12:26:27] And at the same time you were the deputy commander of CECOS;
23 is that right?

24 A. [12:26:33] Yes, quite right.

25 Q. [12:26:34] So if I understand correctly the members of the CECOS did not only

1 have *duties in their army of origin but also had duties at CECOS at the same time; is
2 that right?

3 A. [12:26:54] Yes, that's right.

4 Q. [12:26:57] Now, does that mean that when a person was appointed to CECOS,
5 one still reported to one's original commander?

6 A. [12:27:09] That is correct.

7 Q. [12:27:12] Thank you. And I think we agree that the CECOS brought together
8 police officers, gendarmes and soldiers; is that right?

9 A. [12:27:25] Yes, that is right.

10 Q. [12:27:28] My question to you is this: Was there any sort of shifts or people
11 taking turns or a rotation, and then after a while some people would be appointed to
12 CECOS and then others would take over later, or were entire units transferred to
13 CECOS? Was there any kind of rotation?

14 A. [12:27:57] Thank you. Within the leadership team there were no changes. *What is more,
15 the CECOS commander remained in office during the entire time CECOS was in existence. The
16 leaders of the sections, which were organised by neighbourhood: Yopougon, Adjame, Abobo,
17 Koumassi, et cetera, also remained there on duty permanently ; unless otherwise reassigned by
18 their original army unit. *For example, if a gendarme is called back, his replacement would take
19 up the job of CECOS commander within the neighbourhood section. But the actual rank and file
20 would rotate; for example, we might take one squad from the CRS1 unit, they would serve for a
21 while and then they would be replaced. So there was a rotation in a way.

22 Q. [12:28:55] Thank you. Now, you have told us that CECOS was created
23 in 2005, right in the middle of the crisis, *to pool together the limited resources of the
24 various armies, in your words. Now, could you tell us which crisis you're talking
25 about? You mentioned the 2005 crisis; is that correct?

1 A. [12:29:30] Well, when one speaks about a crisis, when it comes to Côte d'Ivoire,
2 it's the year 2002 to 2011. Of course it depends which particular crisis you're talking
3 about. We went through the crisis from 2002 to 2011 and at one particular point,
4 owing to a number of attacks, we had to *bring our men together and pool our
5 resources in order to offset the attacks when they occurred.

6 Q. [12:30:02] Very well. In light of the various attacks, these attacks occurred
7 from 2002 to 2011; is that what you're telling us?

8 A. [12:30:16] Exactly, yes.

9 Q. [12:30:17] Very well. Attacks by whom upon whom?

10 A. [12:30:25] In 2002, there was an aggression from the north, people were
11 coming from the north toward Abidjan and they had to be pushed back, and it was
12 from then that *the aggressors took the main neighbourhood of Bouaké, and then after
13 there was Man and Bouna. That was the first phase.

14 And then the attacks continued until 2011, where there were the greatest losses. And
15 I told you already that the police lost many men, and that's *something I'm very
16 familiar with. Of course others as well, but I was more involved with the police and
17 so it went through to 2011. So the aggressions took place from 2002 to 2011.

18 Q. [12:31:39] Very well. So these aggressions that started in 2002 that led to the
19 division of the country already in 2002, but did not put an end to the attacks, who was
20 leading these attacks? Do you have any names to give us?

21 A. [12:32:01] *Well, what is remarkable and is well known is that there was a
22 secretary general who was the father, Guillaume Soro, and who had a military team
23 commanded by the chief of staff of the FAFN.

24 Q. [12:32:24] Very well. *What is the name of that chief of staff?

25 A. [12:32:30] *It's of course Soumaila Bakayoko.

1 Q. [12:32:37] So if I understand correctly, from 2002 it was the same individuals
2 who were responsible for all of the attacks through to 2011; is that correct?

3 A. [12:32:46] Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. [12:32:47] Thank you. Those individuals who were attacking the country and
5 divided it into two then carried out additional attacks. What is their role today if
6 they have any role in the state structure?

7 A. [12:33:12] Today, at present?

8 MR MACDONALD: [12:33:17] Quick question of relevance. Today what's their
9 role in the --

10 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:33:20] Could be.

11 MR MACDONALD: [12:33:23] -- state apparatus.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:33:24] I don't know yet. Could be.
13 Please go ahead.

14 MR ALTIT: [12:33:30] (Interpretation)

15 Q. [12:33:31] Would you answer my question?

16 A. [12:33:33] I'm thinking. The commander of the guard republican is -- the
17 present chief of staff is not a former rebel, he was a member of the army.

18 THE INTERPRETER: [12:33:57] Could the witness be asked to repeat the
19 beginning of his response, which was not clearly heard?

20 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:34:02] Stop. We did not get the beginning
21 of your answer. So it was not translated as well.

22 THE WITNESS: [12:34:16] (Interpretation) I will repeat, your Honour.

23 *The current commander of the Republican Guard group is Commander Wattao.

24 And the *BCP 1, the commander is Chérif Ousmane. Those are the two individuals

25 *who are in position at present. They are both lieutenant colonels. Otherwise, the

1 others, are the ordinary forces – meaning the former FDS soldiers. The current chief of
2 staff is the Director, or should I say the commander of the military academy who has
3 now been promoted to chief of staff, chief of general staff of the army.

4 MR ALTIT: [12:35:02] (Interpretation)

5 Q. [12:35:05] Thank you. You were referring to 2005 and you said that it was a
6 crisis period, and I'm going to quote you from the February 15 transcript on page 13,
7 line 3. Rather, starting on line 2 -- well, let's start at line 1 while we're at it. I'm
8 going to read it out. This is what you stated, you're going to recognize your own
9 words. I quote: "So CECOS was to fight against major crime. If you take a look at
10 the date, that is 2005, we were in the middle of a crisis. The police which was
11 supposed to deal with urban crime was not equipped for that, did not have the
12 necessary equipment, and, therefore, it had to work on a permanent basis with the
13 gendarmerie, and since the gendarmerie was also ill-equipped it received support
14 from the army. That's why the three units worked together." End of quote. So
15 you were referring to insufficient equipment, insufficient means? What exactly do
16 you mean by that? Could you give us an illustration of what you mean?

17 A. [12:36:49] Your Honour, I'd like to say that the police only had hand guns. I
18 think I said that in the transcript. But the attacks that we were undergoing was with
19 more major weapons, and if you take the case of 2002 they were using
20 highly-perfected weapons. I'm referring to attacks on police stations with
21 Kalashnikovs, for example, and yet the police had no means to fight alone against that
22 type of urban aggression, and that's why CECOS was set up. And the gendarmerie
23 had greater means than the police, shared their means with the police, as well as the
24 army also shared their means. So the three forces, the police, the gendarmerie and
25 the army worked together.

1 Q. [12:37:53] Very well. A moment ago you referred to highly-perfected
2 weapons that the rebels had in 2002 and you mention Kalashnikovs. What other
3 types of weapons were used against the police?

4 A. [12:38:15] Well, I don't know very well the question of weapons because we
5 did *not find them. We however picked up some ammunition, but I don't know
6 exactly what it was. But in any case it was not police ammunition, that
7 was -- wouldn't have been possible.

8 Q. [12:38:37] Very well. As regards the numbers of police officers, was it the
9 same between 2005, the date where you were complaining about insufficient means,
10 and the beginning of the crisis in 2010? And to have an idea of the period I'm
11 referring to the second round of the presidential elections.

12 A. [12:39:04] The numbers of policemen remained the same, there was no increase.

13 Q. [12:39:12] Is it fair to say that the police was insufficiently manned?

14 A. [12:39:18] Yes, indeed. Even today there is an insufficient number of police
15 forces.

16 Q. [12:39:27] Very well. Can you please tell us, if you remember, roughly how
17 many officers there were in each of the districts in November of 2010, the 28th to be
18 precise?

19 A. [12:39:50] I'm afraid I don't remember the numbers.

20 Q. [12:39:55] Can you give us an estimate? Is it like a hundred, 150? Do you
21 have a rough idea?

22 A. [12:40:05] Well, what I can say is that we requested that there were at least a
23 hundred officers in each district. But as regards the various districts, the
24 arrondissements police stations also had police officers. It would vary from one
25 neighbourhood to the other. If you take Adjamé, which had a number of larger

1 police stations with higher numbers of police officers, they had more officers than
2 elsewhere. But as a general rule we ask that they have at least 100 police officers.

3 Q. You referred to Adjamé. Do you have an idea of population count in Adjamé?

4 A. [12:40:55] *The mayor of Adjame always says that Adjame is the mostly highly
5 populated neighbourhood of Abidjan during the day, but at night there are fewer people
6 since Adjame is sort of an intersection where there is a lot of trading and there's the
7 station, so there's a lot of people in Adjame. He says about 2 million inhabitants.

8 Q. [12:41:19] I've understood that it's a bit complicated, but could you give us an
9 approximate number of policemen working in the local police *districts and stations
10 in Adjamé, either in 2005 or around 28 November 2010, given that you've said that the
11 numbers basically didn't change during that period?

12 A. [12:41:40] *Yes. I can't really give you precise numbers. But if we take the
13 district police stations, where there would be about *100 policemen per district. Given
14 that each police station worked in shifts, an average of 40 to 50 men, if you multiply
15 that by eight, that makes 400. So 400 + 100 would give around 500 policemen in total.

16 Q. [12:42:03] Very well. So much for the police stations, but I imagine that
17 during the day at any one point in time everyone isn't working, some people are
18 resting, others are on sick leave. Can you tell us roughly, on average, how many
19 policemen are working at any one given point in time out of the 400 or 500 you
20 referred to?

21 A. [12:42:37] Well, *you will have to divide operational strength of the police station
22 by three. There are three shifts of 8 hours each for every 24 hours. Therefore, every eight
23 hours you would have roughly a third of that number who would be working *out of
24 the 500, so that would be a hundred and seventy five, 175 at most on duty.

25 Q. [12:43:03] So 115 police officers for two million inhabitants; is that correct?

1 A. [12:43:09] Yes, roughly speaking, that's correct.

2 Q. [12:43:13] Can we do the same exercise for Yopougon, how many inhabitants
3 and how many police officers?

4 A. [12:43:22] It's roughly *the same exercise. Yopougon is the largest
5 neighbourhood in Abidjan. There's a lot more men in Yopougon at night than
6 during the day. So it's roughly the same calculation: about 100 per district, and there
7 are three police stations. Since in Yopougon there are not too many police stations,
8 they had around 70 men each adding up to around 280 for a total of maybe 380.

9 Q. [12:43:57] 380 divided by three; is that correct?

10 A. [12:44:00] Yes.

11 Q. [12:44:05] Can we do the same thing for Abobo?

12 A. [12:44:08] Yes. Same thing. So 100 per district, the same number per district,
13 but there are many more police stations there, so if you multiply 50 times six, that
14 gives you 300 or 400, so 400 divided by three, that gives you about 125.

15 Q. [12:44:36] For a population of how many individuals in Abobo?

16 A. [12:44:42] Well, I'd say 1.5 million in Abobo, but it's an area where people go
17 home to spend the night, *like Yopougon. There're fewer people there during the day.
18 But there are many more people there at night.

19 Q. [12:44:56] I imagine that it's roughly the same ratios in the other neighbourhoods
20 throughout Abidjan; is that correct, the same ratio of police officers per population?

21 A. [12:45:10] Yes, the ratio is very low. The number of police officers per
22 inhabitant is very low and that's why it's very important to increase that ratio because
23 it just does not enable us to fight against crime effectively.

24 Q. [12:45:24] Very well. Do you remember the average number of men in each
25 of the CRS companies, the four?

1 A. [12:45:41] Roughly between 500 and 600 in each of the CRS companies, except
2 CRS3 and CRS4. *CRS3 was Gagnoa and CRS4 was in Divo and they both didn't
3 have as many men. Roughly about 150 men. Whereas 1 and 2, CRS1 and 2 had
4 roughly 600 men.

5 Q. [12:46:12] So to be perfectly clear, CRS3 had roughly 150, CRS1 and 2 each had
6 600 officers; is that correct?

7 A. [12:46:26] Yes, I can confirm that.

8 Q. [12:46:28] Very well. With the same percentage of men working at any one
9 given point in time is what you told us?

10 A. [12:46:38] Well, it's not quite the same for the CRS. They would work two
11 times 12 hours, they would work 12-hour shifts rather than 8-hour shifts at the police
12 station. Those are administrative units, whereas the CRS are intervention units and,
13 therefore, you may have anywhere between 250 to 300 men who are operational at
14 any given point at time.

15 Q. [12:47:10] Per CRS company; is that correct?

16 A. [12:47:12] Yes, except that CRS3 and 4 were different, as I said a moment ago.

17 Q. [12:47:18] Very well. I believe I remember that you gave us the number of
18 men in CIPPA, but can you recall that number, please?

19 A. [12:47:33] I think I said it was 200 to 250 at the most.

20 Q. [12:47:40] And again should we divide by three to know how many are
21 working at any given point in time?

22 A. [12:47:50] No. Again this is an intervention unit, so you would divide by two.

23 Q. [12:47:55] Okay. And what about the BAE, how many officers would be
24 working at any one given point in time in particular at the beginning of the crisis?

25 A. [12:48:08] Well, the BAE has roughly the same numbers as the CRS units,

1 between 400 and 500, because the BAE comes in to support the CRS.

2 Q. [12:48:31] Very well. So how many would be working at any given point in
3 time?

4 A. [12:48:36] Half, in other words, if it's 500, it would be 250, if it's 400, that would
5 bring it down to 200.

6 Q. [12:48:45] Very well. In your testimony you stated that the BAE had anti-riot
7 tanks, and later in response to the OTP's questions you said that you called a tank an
8 armoured vehicle because that's what a tank is. Can you confirm?

9 A. [12:49:11] Yes, I confirm.

10 Q. [12:49:12] And you stated that such an armoured vehicle has nothing to do
11 with a war *tank; is that correct?

12 A. [12:49:20] Yes.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:49:22] Excuse me, just to come back, can we
14 not repeat and ask if he confirms what he already said. Just put the question. If he
15 said this, just put the question. This is part of the directive of 6 February 2017.
16 Please go ahead.

17 MR ALTIT: [12:49:49] (Interpretation) Of course, your Honour, you're right.
18 But on this particular point the witness was questioned on several occasions and his
19 responses were a bit confusing. My purpose was to clarify in the interest of the
20 understanding of all, in particular the Chamber, your Honour.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:50:09] Okay.

22 MR ALTIT: [12:50:12] (Interpretation) Thank you.

23 Q. [12:50:16] A question that was not put to you is as follows: Can you explain
24 the main difference, if there is a difference, between a tank, a war tank, and this kind
25 of armoured vehicle that you're referring to here?

1 A. [12:50:38] The BAE tanks have extremely vulnerable tyres, and that's why if
2 there's a major *armed intervention we wouldn't use them, because they have ordinary
3 tyres; whereas if you take a real war tank that runs on chains, you're not going to have
4 that problem. Secondly, *as I said it's only for keeping order. It's not an antitank or
5 anything else. If you play around with it, it's going to explode. You see, it was just an
6 armoured vehicle for maintaining order and it could resist small calibre *weapons
7 projectiles. A war tank is something different and could even be an antitank.

8 Q. [12:51:40] So what you're saying is that the armour isn't very thick, it's not a
9 heavily-armoured vehicle for fighting, it's just for keeping order; is that correct?

10 A. [12:51:57] Yes.

11 Q. [12:51:59] And what about the weapons, is there a difference?

12 A. [12:52:08] Aside from the tanks, there's no difference in the weapons used by
13 the police.

14 Q. [12:52:18] I'm not talking about the weapons generally used by the police.
15 I'm talking about any weapons on the tank.

16 A. [12:52:27] We didn't have any weapons on the tank as such.

17 Q. So there were no canons, there were no --

18 A. [12:52:39] No, there was none of that. Maybe I should have stated, the police
19 tanks, if you will, are non-equipped when they're delivered. It is the policeman who
20 gets onto the tank who has weapons. He will use conventional means when he gets
21 into the tank.

22 Q. [12:52:59] Very well. Is it correct to say that what you're calling "tank" is
23 really a troop transport vehicle, a *personnel transport vehicle?

24 A. [12:53:16] Well, perhaps I need to explain further. *Whenever police were
25 working as a team, in fact, when they go out in a team, they're like troops. When we

1 talk about troops, it could be starting with two individuals, ... from two or five, five is
2 a brigade, twelve is a group, and the tank can hold at least twelve people, so that
3 would make a group from that point of view. We're not talking about troops of
4 hundreds of individuals, no.

5 Q. [12:53:54] Very well. You told us that two of those vehicles that you're
6 referring to as a tank had been handed over to the BAE; is that correct?

7 A. [12:54:10] No, let me correct. Two of those vehicles were given to the mobile
8 detachment, the DMIR, the rapid intervention unit.

9 Q. [12:54:28] Did those tanks function? Were they functional?

10 A. [12:54:36] The two that were handed over to the DMIR were functional.
11 However, the two that remained within the BAE were no longer able to function, they
12 had broken down.

13 Q. [12:54:50] Very well. Okay. So there were two that functioned in the DMIR,
14 two in the BAE that didn't. Were there any other vehicles of that sort within the
15 police?

16 A. [12:55:02] No. Can I add that other than the BAE, no other unit had such tanks.

17 Q. [12:55:18] Therefore, the remainder of the vehicle fleet were trucks; is that
18 what you stated before? Can you confirm that?

19 A. [12:55:25] Yes, I confirm that.

20 Q. [12:55:27] My question: How many trucks?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [12:55:52] How many, how many trucks is the
22 question.

23 THE WITNESS: [12:55:56] (Interpretation) How many trucks in the BAE or how
24 many trucks throughout the police?

25 MR ALTIT: [12:56:03] (Interpretation)

1 Q. [12:56:05] I'll rephrase my question. To your knowledge, how many trucks
2 were there in the police on November 28, 2010, if we set aside the armoured vehicles
3 we've just talked about?

4 A. [12:56:26] Well, there were not more than 10.

5 Q. [12:56:31] Very well. I'd like to talk about weapons now.

6 According to your testimony, you said that the police officers did have equipment to
7 maintain order.

8 A. [12:57:01] Yes.

9 Q. [12:57:03] For those of us who are not professionals, that means fighting
10 against riots; is that correct?

11 A. [12:57:09] Yes. These are what we refer to as conventional means to restore
12 order.

13 Q. [12:57:16] Very well. To be absolutely clear and precise, we talked about
14 grenades and launch grenades. How many launch grenades, tear gas launch
15 grenades did the neighbourhood police stations have?

16 A. [12:57:33] Generally speaking, the neighbourhood police stations didn't have
17 grenade launchers, but they did have hand grenades. As I said, a neighbourhood
18 police station is an administrative unit. So if an event occurs, they're going to go on
19 site to provide further information. And immediately the intervention unit that is
20 going to be sent to support that unit will be the district unit, and it's that unit that has
21 the grenade launchers and et cetera.

22 Q. [12:58:14] Very well. To be absolutely clear, because the purpose here is to
23 clarify things when necessary, because what you've already stated has already been
24 written down, but sometimes we need further clarification and I think it's useful here
25 to ask you, when you're referring to grenades or launch grenades, you're only talking

1 about tear gas grenades and tear gas grenade launchers; is that correct?

2 A. [12:58:45] Yes, that's correct. Let me add that the police, when we refer to
3 conventional weapons, this means non-lethal weapons.

4 Q. [12:59:01] Very well. Let me ask the following question: As regards the
5 intervention units, how many tear gas launch grenades did the units from the police
6 préfecture have or the CRS or the BAE?

7 A. [12:59:18] Roughly for each, each of those units, at least 10.

8 Q. [12:59:28] Very well. I imagine that for each grenade launcher there's also
9 ammunition, the actual grenades. To your knowledge, the units that had those tear
10 gas launch grenades, did they have enough ammunition?

11 A. [12:59:52] Well, this was a period of crisis and there was an embargo, and that
12 was one of the major difficulties. We didn't have any grenades left, we had no
13 ammunition left.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: We who? You said "we." Who "we"? "We"
15 the police or "we" the FDS or "we" who?

16 THE WITNESS: [13:00:34] (Interpretation) Well, each time I speak and I say "we,"
17 I mean I'm speaking on behalf of the police. The police didn't have any more
18 resources. They didn't have enough -- rather, we didn't have enough grenades, we
19 didn't have enough ammunition.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: Maître Altit.

21 MR ALTIT: [13:00:57] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

22 Q. [13:00:58] Now, as for *what you said about the tear gas, grenades or canisters,
23 did that also hold true for the hand guns and the ammunition for the hand guns?

24 A. [13:01:16] Your Honour, in the year 2000 when Minister Boga was appointed
25 minister of the interior, my first request to him was for more handguns. The police

1 didn't have any. So ever since from the time of the year 2000 right until after the
2 crisis, during all that time the police did not have enough ammunition, did not have
3 enough handguns, so we were very much at a disadvantage, to answer your question.

4 Q. [13:01:50] Yes, yes. So we are trying to understand, sir, and are we to
5 understand that each police officer -- well, not each police officer, that there weren't
6 enough pistols or handguns for each policeman; is that what you're telling us?

7 A. [13:02:12] That is correct.

8 Q. [13:02:13] Very well. Finally, you mentioned Kalashnikovs to protect the
9 barracks, and you said more specifically that they were absolutely necessary because,
10 I quote you, "That was during a period of time when we came under attack several
11 times."

12 Now, to your knowledge, how many attacks against the police stations and the police
13 units occurred during the crisis? How many attacks occurred?

14 A. [13:02:52] I can't tell you how many, but I can say a great many attacks, a great
15 many attacks. I'm not even counting attacks upon individual police officers. There
16 were many attacks.

17 Q. [13:03:08] Well, just to better understand, could we say, for example, there
18 were several attacks per month, per week, per day, just to get a better idea of the
19 extent of these attacks?

20 A. [13:03:22] At the beginning it was less, but towards the end the attacks became
21 more and more frequent.

22 Q. [13:03:35] And you're speaking about attack upon law enforcement staff?

23 A. [13:03:42] I repeat, when I talk about assaults I mean assaults upon the police.
24 It could be police stations, units, officers.

25 Q. [13:03:58] So you're talking about police officers being attacked?

1 A. [13:04:01] Yes, that's right.

2 Q. [13:04:12] Were these attacks led by attackers with firearms?

3 A. [13:04:21] Well, I can't tell you exactly whether or not it was rebels, but when
4 the crisis finally ended that is when all was revealed, because several times we
5 underwent attack at the police stations in Abobo and later we learned that it was IB
6 behind those attacks. At first we didn't know, but it was later, after we realised it
7 was probably him who was behind those attacks.

8 Q. [13:05:01] Very well. Were any police officers killed during these attacks?

9 A. [13:05:08] Many police officers were killed.

10 Q. [13:05:14] How many, if you recall?

11 A. [13:05:22] I remember last week that the day that really hit hard was the day
12 that we had nine deaths the same day. Generally speaking, I think there were 40 of
13 us in all.

14 Q. [13:05:45] Very well. And how many Kalashnikov would a neighbourhood
15 police station have to defend itself?

16 A. [13:05:57] I can't give you any percentages. Some police stations didn't have
17 any Kalashnikovs at all.

18 Q. [13:06:02] Could you tell us perhaps how many Kalashnikovs per district?

19 A. [13:06:07] Yes, by district maybe two or three per district. And the
20 intervention units, sometime -- well, sometimes even as many as five.

21 Q. [13:06:20] I didn't hear.

22 A. Five. Three plus two.

23 Q. [13:06:26] Very well. So two or three Kalashnikovs for an entire district and
24 sometimes up to five, or less, for one complete rapid response unit such as the BAE,
25 or the CRS; is that right?

1 A. [13:06:43] Right.

2 Q. [13:06:52] And was it a problem to get ammunition for the Kalashnikov?

3 A. [13:06:57] Yes, it was the same problem. We were under blockade so it was
4 difficult to procure ammunition.

5 Q. [13:07:04] Very well. You were questioned by the OTP about radio
6 communications. I don't want to return to that point really, but just a few follow-up
7 questions. Now, first of all, regarding the equipment, did each patrol or did each
8 rapid response unit have a radio?

9 A. [13:07:29] No.

10 Q. [13:07:33] Could we say that you were short of radio communications
11 equipment?

12 A. [13:07:39] That's right. We were very much short of radio communications
13 equipment.

14 Q. [13:07:54] And was that a disadvantage when you had to organise operations?

15 A. [13:08:01] Indeed. A man in the field without a radio is -- well, he *it's like
16 has no idea what's going on. And in terms of the organisation, yes, it is a
17 disadvantage. It's like *a man without ears.

18 Q. [13:08:18] Very well. And to your knowledge, were the French intelligence
19 services listening into your communications?

20 A. [13:08:31] I can confirm *in that regard that the police were being listened to,
21 their communications were being intercepted. I remember one time *when all my
22 communications were repeated *back to me by the head of the SCTIP, and that's when
23 I realised that, yes, our communications were being intercepted.

24 Q. [13:09:00] So you're telling us that your communications were being intercepted
25 but you didn't know if it was the French or the rebel forces; is that what you're telling us?

1 A. [13:09:12] What I can tell you is that a Frenchman told me what I had said at a
2 certain time, so I can confirm that point when it comes to the French.

3 Q. [13:09:23] Very well. So now, to your knowledge, were *the services or the
4 French army in possession of any or several listening posts in Côte d'Ivoire?

5 A. [13:09:38] I can't tell you much really because I didn't have a lot to do with
6 French military forces.

7 Q. [13:09:50] Very well. So now you have told us in relation to your experience
8 that in 1999, after the coup d'état, you spent two months at home before you were
9 recalled to your duties *as deputy Mayor at the Abidjan mayor's office –

10 THE INTERPRETER: Excessive speed.

11 MR ALTIT: (Interpretation)

12 Q. *Do you remember that?

13 A. [13:10:22] Yes

14 Q. [13:10:23] And who were the people who carried out the coup?

15 A. [13:10:28] The people -- the people behind the coup d'état, who did it? Well, I
16 know Boka Yapi and then after it was the head, the military leader. That's what I know.

17 Q. [13:10:52] And what was their aim?

18 A. [13:10:56] Well, their aim was -- well, what *we read in the media was that
19 their aim was to get rid of President Henri Konan Bédié.

20 Q. [13:11:15] And who would come in to replace him?

21 A. [13:11:17] I couldn't say because I don't have any other information than that,
22 that's all I know.

23 Q. [13:11:28] Between that time, the coup d'état of 1999 and the 2002 coup d'état,
24 were there any others?

25 A. [13:11:37] There were several attempts, many attempts, but no coup d'état

1 properly speaking.

2 Q. [13:11:55] And these attempts, were they carried out by the same person *as in
3 1999?

4 A. [13:12:02] Yes, exactly. If you wish, it's just the logical consequence, or since,
5 you see, after -- after the military junta was put in place it was necessary to ensure -- I
6 don't know quite how to put it. Well, ensure that the people who had been behind
7 the coup d'état would take over.

8 Q. [13:12:39] Very well. And were -- was it the same people still plotting and
9 scheming in 2002 *and in subsequent years as you explained?

10 A. [13:12:51] Yes, indeed.

11 Q. [13:12:59] Very well. Now you mentioned *the September 2002 attack by the rebels and the
12 ensuing occupation of the north. What was the police able to do and what happened to it, the police
13 forces who were stationed in the north of the country ... in those areas occupied by the rebels?

14 A. [13:13:17] Well, I must point out that there weren't a lot of policemen who
15 stayed with the rebellion. All the policemen went to the south. So maybe 20 police
16 officers had remained in the northern part of the country during the rebellion.

17 Q. [13:13:39] These rebels who held the north of the country, did they carry out
18 any acts of violence or abuse?

19 A. [13:13:45] Yes, I heard it said that there were such crimes, but I can't tell you
20 exactly because we were not there on a daily basis.

21 Q. [13:14:02] And since the police was no longer present in the north, who was
22 protecting the people from the rebels' acts of violence and abuse?

23 A. [13:14:16] To my knowledge, I think it was the UN, the UN force responsible
24 for Côte d'Ivoire, the UNOCI.

25 Q. [13:14:33] As a high-ranking police official, what do you know about possible

1 involvement of the French services in the rebellion between 2002 and 2010?

2 A. [13:14:49] I have no information, so I really can't make a comment. I learned
3 like everyone else that the rebels were being protected and trained by the French, but
4 I have no specific item of information.

5 Q. [13:15:12] Do you remember who was appointed prime minister in 2007?

6 A. [13:15:23] Well, various prime ministers came and went. I don't remember.
7 Many were appointed, but I don't know exactly who it might have been in 2007.

8 Q. [13:15:35] I'll put the question to you differently. Do you remember whether
9 Guillaume Soro *was at any time appointed prime minister?

10 A. [13:15:47] Yes I do.

11 Q. [13:15:49] Prime minister serving under President Gbagbo?

12 Do you remember whether there was an attack upon Mr Guillaume Soro?

13 A. [13:16:05] I remember that as well.

14 Q. [13:16:12] To your knowledge, who was behind that?

15 A. [13:16:16] I don't know. Even now the investigators, well, are not necessarily
16 aware. The investigations are still underway.

17 Q. [13:16:40] Do you remember an operation called the DDR operation?

18 A. [13:16:46] Oh, yes, I do.

19 Q. [13:16:49] What was that all about?

20 A. [13:16:54] It was an operation to demobilise. Well, the three -- I don't
21 remember the exact name, but I remember the operation.

22 Q. [13:17:14] And what was the purpose of this operation?

23 A. [13:17:26] Yes, to my knowledge it was to demobilise people and return them
24 to society. That was the purpose.

25 Q. [13:17:38] Demobilise the rebels; is that what you're telling us?

1 A. [13:17:45] Well, *ultimately the demobilization was on both sides, both camps, not just
2 the rebels, because within the last framework I know of, that they took stock of everyone
3 who had been involved in the fighting. All that was needed was to show proof of it.

4 Q. [13:18:08] And how was this evidence provided?

5 A. [13:18:13] By providing a weapon, a weapon to prove that you had been a
6 combatant, and once you provided that proof, you had proven that you were a
7 combatant, and then you would be returned to society.

8 Q. [13:18:32] Very well. To your knowledge, did the rebel forces disarm at that
9 time?

10 A. [13:18:46] I couldn't really tell you much, because during the survey many
11 people *disarmed. Was that all? I don't know. I don't have the list that the DDR
12 people provided. At one -- at one point it was announced that the DDR operation
13 had come to an end. Was everybody disarmed? I couldn't tell you whether
14 everybody was actually disarmed.

15 Q. [13:19:19] Did this operation also mean former rebels were integrated in the
16 armed forces or the police?

17 A. [13:19:30] As far as the police was concerned, we received 300. And these
18 people are still within the police.

19 Q. [13:19:41] So 300 former rebels you mean?

20 A. [13:19:44] Yes, exactly.

21 Q. [13:19:51] Very well. Sir, now I believe it was last Thursday, do you
22 remember seeing a speech by President Gbagbo, a speech he gave in Divo in August?

23 A. [13:20:18] I was there. I remember.

24 Q. [13:20:24] My first question to you is this, and it wasn't entirely clear why, why
25 was it that a republican security company had been sent to Divo and was operating

1 there?

2 A. [13:20:43] Divo was an area where there was a great deal of crime. It was an
3 area where coffee and cacao were being grown and there were *many attacks. There
4 was an intervention unit there because that would help ensure safety.

5 Q. [13:21:10] Very well. I think I understand what you're telling us, but could I
6 ask you to be a bit more specific just for the benefit of all of us, could you explain this
7 link between the fact that it was an area where coffee and cocoa were being grown
8 and the fact that it was an area with high crime? What was the link?

9 A. [13:21:34] Of course there was a link. *An area where cocoa and coffee are
10 grown is an area where a lot of money changes hands. Buyers bring cash to the
11 cocoa and coffee farmers and then thieves come to collect the money at night. A well
12 trained team is needed to provide security to the population in this context.

13 Q. [13:22:02] That's much clearer. Thank you, sir.
14 Now, you were asked who was there when President Gbagbo gave his speech and
15 you mentioned a number of people. My question to you is this: Amongst the
16 people who were there, were there -- well, rather, among the officers or the VIPs,
17 were there any former rebels there?

18 A. [13:22:33] I don't think so, not to my knowledge.

19 Q. [13:22:35] Very well.

20 Your Honour, I can continue, but I'm about to begin an entirely new line of
21 questioning and perhaps your Chamber may wish to suspend now. I am in your
22 hands.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [13:23:05] Okay, so we suspend for lunch and
24 we come back at 3 o'clock. The hearing is adjourned. At the end of the day I
25 obviously ask just to have an overview. Okay, thank you very much.

1 THE COURT USHER: [13:23:28] All rise.

2 (Recess taken at 1.23 p.m.)

3 (Upon resuming in open session at 3.04 p.m.)

4 THE COURT USHER: [15:04:46] All rise.

5 Please be seated.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:05:10] Good afternoon.

7 Good afternoon, Mr Witness.

8 I give immediately the floor to Maître Altit for his questioning.

9 MR ALTIT: [15:05:22] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. Before we
10 begin, your Honour, I do believe that just as we parted ways, I had just put a question
11 to the witness and he gave a reply, but I don't think it was entirely transcribed. Page
12 86, today's transcript, and the response, line 2 and onwards, and not all of his reply
13 was transcribed.

14 I'm just raising that point so that the court reporters can complete the transcript once
15 they have a moment.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:06:24] Okay. Well noted I think by the
17 court reporters. And let's go on.

18 MR ALTIT: [15:06:31] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

19 Q. [15:06:36] Good afternoon once again, Mr Witness. We will continue if that's
20 fine by you. Can you hear me?

21 A. [15:06:48] Just fine.

22 Q. [15:06:49] Perfect. Now, you told us that you stepped down as director
23 general of the national police on 11 January *2017, is that correct?

24 A. [15:07:07] Correct.

25 Q. [15:07:07] Very well. Could you tell us what happened in January 2007, the

1 event that is -- correction, 11 January 2017. Now, could you tell us why *you were
2 no longer the administrator general of the national police?

3 A. [15:07:28] As I said earlier to the *presiding Judge, general administrator is a
4 rank, I still bear that rank, but I am no longer the general administrator of *the
5 national police.

6 Q. [15:07:41] I'm so sorry. Let me rephrase. Can you tell us what happened in
7 January 2017, the event *and the reason why you were no longer the director of the
8 national police?

9 A. [15:07:54] Yes, indeed. Last time I said that it was a matter *relating to
10 disturbances (unrest) within the troops. Afterwards, the three leaders of the three
11 major commands were dismissed of their duties, the head of the national police, the
12 superior commander of the gendarmerie and the general chief of staff of the armed
13 forces of Côte d'Ivoire. They were relieved of their duties.

14 Q. [15:08:29] Very well. What do you mean by *disturbances, so to speak?

15 MR MACDONALD: [15:08:41] With your permission, it's not related at all, your
16 Honours, to the facts of during the PEV. The Chamber has asked questions on this
17 topic, your Honour, and that was clearly answered by the witness. So unless we can
18 demonstrate a quick link to the relevance of the credibility of the witness, I don't think
19 this topic should be broached. Thank you.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:09:04] Well, I think it should be, although
21 briefly, because I can hear also in the questioning by myself a few days ago that on
22 this topic the witness was a bit evasive, so I would like just to come back to it but
23 briefly. Okay, please.

24 MR ALTIT: [15:09:26] (Interpretation) Thank you. If you don't mind, your
25 Honour, just one point regarding the objection. First of all, this is a question eliciting

1 a clarification, not -- well, in response to a question from the Prosecution, because
2 initially it was the Prosecution who raised the issue and, second, this is directly linked
3 to the events.

4 Q. [15:09:52] *Now, Mr witness kindly answer my question which is: you talk about a number of
5 disturbances in the ranks, so to speak. What did the soldiers want? What -- were they asking for?

6 A. [15:10:02] Well, the soldiers were calling for a bonus and I really can't
7 comment.

8 Q. [15:10:12] We'll come back to that point.

9 But I'm told that there is no transcript, at least not any French transcript. Perhaps we
10 should just pause for a moment.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:10:25] There is English transcript. I don't
12 know the French. It seems to be good, I'm told.

13 MR ALTIT: [15:10:42] (Interpretation) It seems to be working now, but I have the
14 impression that the first few exchanges of the hearing were not, this afternoon, were
15 not recorded, at least not in French.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:10:54] Court officer?

17 THE COURT OFFICER: [15:10:58] Don't worry, they will be put back to the
18 transcript, whatever was missing.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:11:06] Believe us.

20 MR ALTIT: [15:11:09] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. And my
21 thanks go to the courtroom officer as well.

22 Q. [15:11:22] Sir, you told us -- and now I forget the exact wording that you used,
23 and we have no transcript, but in any event, please stay tuned, don't move.

24 Listen, I am so sorry my memory fails, but I believe you said that they wanted some
25 money; is that correct? Is that what you said. Am I right? Wrong? Am I wrong?

1 A. [15:11:50] I said that they were demanding a certain number of things.

2 Q. [15:11:58] What did they want?

3 A. [15:11:59] Money.

4 Q. [15:12:05] So I will put this question to you. Why, why were they demanding
5 money? Why did they think there was money owing to them? Please tell us so that
6 we can understand.

7 A. [15:12:19] I really can't say very much about it because I don't know what it
8 was all about.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:12:25] Give we also give a subject to "they,"
10 because we are always talking at least in English about "they" wanted money. Who
11 exactly?

12 MR ALTIT: [15:12:38] (Interpretation)

13 Q. [15:12:40] Mr Witness, let me put the question to you. Who were these
14 people asking for money, demanding money?

15 A. [15:12:48] The soldiers, the soldiers who were demanding money.

16 Q. [15:12:56] Let me ask you this: Would you like us to discuss this calmly in
17 private session, quickly, but very specifically? Do you see what I'm driving at?

18 A. [15:13:11] Really I have no problem.

19 Q. [15:13:14] You want us to go into private session?

20 A. [15:13:17] Yes.

21 MR ALTIT: [15:13:19] (Interpretation) Your Honour, can we go --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:13:22] Let's go please in private session. It
23 will be brief I think.

24 (Private session at 3.13 p.m.)

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3 (Open session at 3.17 p.m.)

4 THE COURT OFFICER: [15:17:46] We're in open session, your Honour.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:17:55] Maître Altit.

6 MR ALTIT: [15:17:57] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

7 Q. [15:18:02] Now, on 16 February you told us that the integrated command
8 centre that was in charge of ensuring safety during the time of the elections was led
9 by Kouakou Nicolas; is that correct?

10 A. [15:18:28] Yes, that's right.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:18:30] This is one of those questions which
12 not need to be confirmed. If he said it, just go with the question.

13 MR ALTIT: [15:18:42] (Interpretation) Thank you. But, you see, this is to service
14 the foundations for other questions.

15 Q. [15:18:51] This gentleman, Mr Kouakou, Kouakou Nicolas, he belonged to
16 which party?

17 A. [15:18:59] I don't know. The integrated command centre *was the link between the
18 security forces and the FAFN. The command -- the integrated command centre, you see to
19 put it in other words was the force that used elements from the FAFN and the FDS. So really
20 I'm not in a position to determine its political affiliation. I haven't understood your question.

21 Q. [15:19:28] You yourself, what political party do you belong to, if you do belong
22 to one?

23 A. [15:19:36] I'm a police officer. I'm not a member of a political party.

24 Q. [15:19:42] Very well. And this gentleman Kouakou, Kouakou, what is he
25 doing now?

1 A. [15:19:51] This general is the superior command of the national gendarmerie of
2 Côte d'Ivoire.

3 Q. [15:20:01] Very well. And what was his role?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:20:11] Now? Is he now? Now?

5 MR ALTIT: [15:20:12] (Interpretation)

6 Q. [15:20:13] So you mean now?

7 A. [15:20:15] Yes, yes, he is the superior commander of the national gendarmerie
8 of Côte d'Ivoire at the present time.

9 Q. [15:20:27] And what was his role during the crisis?

10 A. [15:20:30] I repeat, he was the commander of the integrated command centre.

11 Q. [15:20:43] Very well, I've understood that, but that was at the beginning of the
12 crisis and then during the crisis he played a different role, perhaps?

13 A. [15:20:56] I don't know.

14 Q. [15:21:09] Sir, I would like to refer you to your statement just to simplify
15 matters, *it's 0014-0400. That's the reference number. Page 418, *lines 613 to 622.

16 I will read out what you said. Perhaps we should wait a moment for the interpreters.
17 I'm looking at the booth.

18 THE INTERPRETER: [15:22:13] Message from the interpreters: Unfortunately we
19 have a great many transcripts and other documents in the booth and we must admit
20 we are a bit lost, but.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:22:22] We have it on the screen, I think.

22 MR ALTIT: [15:22:30] (Interpretation) Very well.

23 Q. [15:22:33] I'll read out your statement. Investigator number 1 --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:22:41] From line?

25 MR ALTIT: [15:22:42] (Interpretation) *Mr President, at lines 1613 to 622.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:22:54] 613 not 1613.

2 MR ALTIT: [15:22:57] (Interpretation) Yes.

3 Q. [15:23:00] Let me read out what you said.

4 Investigator number 1: "Did you take the decision yourself?"

5 Interviewee: "I was not contacted." Investigator 1: "Very well. And how did

6 you go *there?"

7 "How I went *there, I called General Nicolas." Investigator 1: "Who was whom?"

8 Interviewee: "General Nicolas was the former commander of the CCI."

9 Investigator 1: "CCI, what's that?" Interviewee: "Integrated command centre. It

10 was General Nicolas. So, since I knew he was already there, I called him and he sent

11 me a young soldier by the name of *Ayo Arra who took me as far as the Golf."

12 End of quote. So my question, sir: How long was this general at the Golf hotel for,

13 General Nicolas?

14 A. [15:24:17] I can't give you a specific answer, but I do know that he was at the

15 Golf hotel because he called me beforehand and he asked me what my position was.

16 That is when I learned that he was at the Golf hotel. That was I believe one or two

17 days before.

18 Q. [15:24:46] And what position did you -- was he asking you about your political

19 position?

20 A. [15:24:53] No, no. He wanted to know where I was, where I physically was

21 located at the time of the call, when he was calling me.

22 Q. [15:25:07] Very well. In more general terms, during the crisis were you

23 contact with officials from the rebel movement or the RHDP who might have been at

24 the Golf hotel?

25 A. [15:25:24] I mentioned General Nicolas, yes. And that's because *he was a fellow student mate

1 of mine at university. We were at the faculty of law while they were at the faculty of History and
2 Geography. Well, many years, we had known each other since 1980. And in 1982 *I met him at the
3 military academy where he was undergoing training to become an active officer and I was going
4 through my reserve officer training, so we've known each other since then, a very long time. And
5 on 31 March when we realised that all the leaders had left their posts because some were in danger,
6 that is when he called me and told me that he had gone to the Golf.

7 Q. [15:26:17] Very well. So you're telling us on 31 March of 2011 all the military
8 leaders left their positions, they stepped down, is that --

9 A. [15:26:32] Yes, that's what I'm saying.

10 Q. [15:26:37] Now on that day were they subjected to any particular attack that
11 would have led them to this decision to leave their positions?

12 A. [15:26:48] *On 31 March the rebels entered Yopougon. And I've already told
13 you that the National Police did not have the resources to protect themselves or to
14 retaliate. I had asked for the position of the chief of staff and I was told that he was
15 not there. I must confess that I didn't know where he was. So I was at the office
16 until 10 and I said to myself, well, there's no point staying here because there's -- there
17 was no way to protect myself. He had asked --

18 THE INTERPRETER: [15:27:28] Correction from the interpreter: The witness had
19 asked -- made the request of the army chief of staff.

20 MR ALTIT: [15:27:40] (Interpretation)

21 Q. [15:27:43] So you're telling us, sir, that on 31 March you left your post and you
22 went to the Golf hotel; is that what you're telling us?

23 A. [15:27:55] No, that's not what happened. I'm describing to you what
24 happened. It was quite a long journey or saga even. I left my office at 10, as I told
25 you. I was walking throughout the whole Plateau area, and then I decided I would

1 go home and I realised that I was not in a safe place and I went to the 43rd BIMA.

2 Q. [15:28:39] Could you kindly explain to us what the 43rd BIMA is and where it is located?

3 A. [15:28:45] That was the French force that was in Côte d'Ivoire with its
4 headquarters at Port-Bouët.

5 Q. [15:28:57] So you had contacts there at the 43rd BIMA?

6 A. [15:29:01] No. I had no contacts there. It's just that we worked with people
7 from the French cooperation agency as a part of the police and, you see, I called the
8 head of the police and he said to me, "Well, if you want us to ensure your safety, you
9 can come to the 43rd BIMA." And so that is how it came to be that I went there.

10 Q. [15:29:31] Very well. So the French police officers were there that day and
11 perhaps the days before, the days after in the premises of the *43rd BIMA, *within the
12 premises of the 43rd BIMA, right?

13 A. [15:29:46] No, no, no, no, that's not right. I called, I got him on the phone and he
14 told me to go and he would make the arrangements so I would be welcomed at the
15 entrance to the 43rd BIMA. I didn't see any French police officer. There were only *two
16 who worked with us at the time. Actually the people I saw there were French soldiers.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:30:12] Excuse me. You said "I called him."
18 We never give names to these people. Who you called? Who did you call?

19 THE WITNESS: [15:30:29] (Interpretation) I would admit that I do not recall the
20 *name, but it was a French colonel of the gendarmerie. *He was the chief of SCTIP,
21 but I do not -- no longer recall his name.

22 MR ALTIT: [15:30:44] (Interpretation)

23 Q. [15:30:46] For this to be clear, when you're talking about French policemen,
24 namely this colonel of the gendarmerie to whom you are alluding; is that correct?

25 A. [15:30:56] Yes, indeed. In fact, it was a French gendarme who was in relation

1 with the Ivorian gendarmerie. He is the chief of the SCTIP of the
2 cooperation -- French cooperation in Côte d'Ivoire.

3 Q. [15:31:17] Does that mean that at the time there were policemen or French
4 gendarmes who were working closely with the Ivorian policemen and does that mean
5 that in the hypothesis that you were to answer in the affirmative that they were
6 located or they worked in the premises or offices of the Ivorian police?

7 A. [15:31:42] Well, I'm going to have to give you a bit of history here. Since 1960
8 French cooperation always worked with the police, the Ivorian police. *At that time it
9 was called the SCTIP, that is, the service for international technical police cooperation.
10 So since 1960 until now, we have always worked together with the French police.
11 And as I said, at the beginning of the 1960s, this cooperation had as a mission to train
12 police hierarchy, but it's changed name because SCTIP at the time was only policemen
13 but today you have the DCI, the international cooperation directorate, that comprises
14 both police and gendarme. And it was in that context that the colonel, whom I was
15 talking to you about, is the chief of the DCI in Côte d'Ivoire and it was with he, or him
16 that I took contact.

17 *They do not work in our premises, rather they work in the French embassy. And
18 they take care of everything to do with security at the French embassy.
19 But as I was saying to you I was not safe, so I called him for him to be able to take care
20 of me and then he oriented me towards the 43rd BIMA.

21 Q. [15:33:17] Very well. So you called this colonel in the -- this French colonel in
22 the gendarmerie, he organised for you to go to 43rd BIMA. How long did you stay
23 there?

24 A. [15:33:30] I stayed there for three days.

25 Q. [15:33:33] Very well. And it was the people in charge of the 43rd BIMA who

1 organised for you to go to the hôtel du Golf, was it?

2 A. [15:33:44] No, they didn't organise my journey to the hôtel du Golf. We are
3 talking here about the 4th. And these were three days that I mentioned to you. So
4 on the 4th, the general who was in command of the BIMA asked me to go to the 43rd
5 BIMA and I refused.

6 Q. [15:34:08] Very well. So he asked you to come back to the 43rd BIMA, do we
7 agree?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:34:18] We're always writing 42nd BIMA,
9 I don't know why, in the English transcript.

10 MR ALTIT: [15:34:27] (No interpretation)

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:34:32] Oui, oui, oui. I just say that in the
12 transcript, English, twice it's written 42nd BIMA.

13 MR ALTIT: [15:34:46] (Interpretation)

14 Q. [15:34:48] Now, sir, for us to understand correctly you're at the 43rd BIMA and
15 then you went to the hôtel du Golf; is that correct?

16 A. [15:34:56] No, that is not correct. That's not that at all. After having spent
17 three days since the general requested that I go to the hôtel du Golf and after I refused,
18 they took me out of the 43rd BIMA and dropped me off in the bush behind the
19 airport.

20 Q. [15:35:28] Allow me to ask you a question for things to be clear for us. So you
21 were at the 43rd BIMA, the French general asked you to go to the Golf, you refused
22 and subject, or subsequent to your refusal, they made you leave the French military
23 base at the 43rd BIMA and dropped you off in the bush; did I understand you
24 correctly?

25 A. [15:35:50] That is correct. That is my statement.

1 Q. [15:35:56] Very well. And what did you do in the bush?

2 A. [15:36:02] I went to a small village behind the airport by the name of Adjahui.

3 So when you're in Koumassi and you're facing the lagoon, it is the lagoon that
4 separates this neighbourhood from that village.

5 Q. [15:36:20] Very well. Of what ethnic origin are you, yourself?

6 A. [15:36:32] I'm Agni from the Akan group. I'm from Agnibilekrou.

7 Q. [15:36:41] Very well. Thank you. So you remained at the 43rd BIMA from
8 31 March to 3rd or 4th April; is that correct?

9 A. [15:36:49] That is correct.

10 Q. [15:36:51] And whilst you were there, did the French forces or were the French
11 forces bombing the Ivorian army positions, the gendarmerie positions, the police
12 positions?

13 A. [15:37:05] I'm not in a position to say. It's a military camp. When you arrive
14 they take all the measures for you not to be able to follow what they're doing. I was
15 in a room and I wasn't allowed to go out. I had my meals and I slept in the same
16 place, so I didn't know what was going on in the camp because it's a big place.

17 Q. [15:37:40] Very well.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:37:41] You were under arrest somehow?

19 THE WITNESS: [15:37:51] (Interpretation) No, not exactly. If you like, I was in
20 the same condition as I am here now.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:38:07] That's good. So, but you were in
22 this room, could you leave this room? Could you move freely?

23 THE WITNESS: [15:38:23] (Interpretation) No. Mr President, let's be very clear.
24 You know, if I need to move, I have to be accompanied by somebody. And as I did
25 not have the right to go into another room, I just had one room that I was confined to.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:38:42] Okay.

2 Maître Altit.

3 MR ALTIT: [15:38:44] (Interpretation) Thank you, Mr President.

4 Q. [15:38:50] Now, the 43rd BIMA base, was it the base for the combat helicopters
5 of the French army?

6 A. [15:39:02] Yes, I can confirm that.

7 Q. [15:39:04] Very well. To your knowledge, did the French army attack
8 positions, bases, police units in Abidjan during the crisis?

9 A. [15:39:24] The police did not come under attack, rather it was the military
10 bases that came under attack with the military tanks.

11 Q. [15:39:35] For us to understand correctly, the French army, you say, did not
12 attack the police, but attacked the Ivorian army and it attacked the Ivorian army with
13 tanks? It's not very clear. Or did they attack the tanks themselves?

14 A. [15:39:55] I meant that the French army destroyed the tanks belonging to the
15 Ivorian army.

16 Q. [15:40:06] With which arms or weapons were the tanks of the Ivorian army
17 destroyed?

18 A. [15:40:16] I can't answer that specifically. I do not have an intricate
19 knowledge of military weapons. I know some but not all of them.

20 Q. [15:40:31] Could you tell us whether, whilst you were at the 43rd BIMA, you
21 were in a position to ascertain whether the French military chiefs were in contact with
22 many chiefs of Ivorian security forces, police gendarmerie, et cetera?

23 A. [15:41:03] I repeat again what I said. The position that I was in at the time did
24 not enable me to know what was going on in the camp. I was alone in my room and
25 it was a lady soldier who would bring me something to eat. So I really didn't have

1 any knowledge of what was going on in the camp.

2 Q. [15:41:36] Very well. So I shall come back to General Nicolas. Did he have a
3 function that was close to that of an Ivorian head of state?

4 A. [15:41:56] Yes, indeed. He was, if I'm not mistaken, aide de camp to
5 President Bédié.

6 Q. [15:42:10] Very well. And with regard to the integrated control command
7 centre, *you said to me that ensuring security for the elections was done by the
8 security forces and the representatives of rebel forces; is that correct?

9 A. [15:42:32] I can confirm that.

10 Q. [15:42:34] These rebel forces who were in Abidjan, where did they go once the
11 elections had finished?

12 A. [15:42:49] After the elections those rebel forces went back to their camp in the
13 northern area.

14 Q. [15:43:02] Very well. Were there any rebel forces in the hôtel du Golf
15 stationed there?

16 A. [15:43:13] I can't tell you that with any certainty, but when we arrived on
17 11 April, that is when I saw that there were rebels present at the hôtel du Golf.

18 Q. [15:43:32] Very well. Were they numerous?

19 A. [15:43:37] I can't say, but I know that there were quite a few of them.

20 Q. [15:43:43] Did you see any heavy weaponry?

21 A. [15:43:48] I would always say the same, that I don't really know military
22 weapons very well. Because when you say "heavy weaponry" I think that means
23 everything apart from assault weapons. The rest is all heavy weaponry. But apart
24 from that, I don't really know the names.

25 Q. [15:44:06] Did you, for example, see any machine guns mounted on pickups or

1 vehicles?

2 A. [15:44:14] No, on that day I did not -- or, *on that day I did not see any.

3 However, I know that when they came to attack those who had set up the blockade
4 they came with weapons mounted onto vehicles. But on 11 April I didn't see any.

5 Q. [15:44:44] Very well. So from what you are saying, there were attacks by
6 rebel soldiers from the hôtel du Golf led on vehicles on which weapons were
7 mounted; is that what you're saying?

8 A. [15:45:02] Yes.

9 Q. [15:45:04] Very well. Okay, okay. So let's talk about the crisis itself. You
10 spoke to us about roadblocks between the two rounds set up by the RHDP militants
11 or the LMP activists; do you remember?

12 A. [15:45:37] Yes, remember only too well.

13 Q. [15:45:40] And you said to us that you did not have the means, or the police
14 did not have the means to do away or remove those roadblocks, so was this a
15 question of lack of means; is that what you're saying to us?

16 A. [15:46:00] Yes, indeed, *the problem was one of lack of means. And in my
17 statement you can see that on some occasions we were obliged to hold discussions
18 with those who were manning the roadblocks *so that they could leave.

19 Q. [15:46:13] Very well. Now, let's place ourselves between the two rounds in
20 time. If I've understood your testimony correctly, and tell me, you said to us that
21 during that period between the two rounds there was tension between groups in the
22 neighbourhoods and these were groups of youths; is that correct?

23 A. [15:46:40] That is correct.

24 Q. [15:46:47] And you said to us that the police was attempting to separate, that's
25 what I understood, they were attempting to separate the adversaries; is that correct?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:47:00] Yes, but you're -- it's always the same.

2 Well, if he said so, and he said so, why should what was correct a few days ago
3 shouldn't be correct now?

4 MR ALTIT: [15:47:24] (Interpretation) Well, it wasn't that clear, Mr President.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:47:27] Now come on, it was very clear.

6 MR ALTIT: [15:47:29] (Interpretation) Very well.

7 Q. [15:47:42] Mr Witness, you spoke to us about policemen who were killed at the
8 roadblocks. Was it during that period between the two rounds of the election?

9 A. [15:47:51] Yes. During that period many policemen were killed.

10 Q. [15:48:06] Very well. Very well. Very well.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:48:12] Do you know how many? Have
12 you -- do you know how many policemen were killed about in numbers? "Many" is
13 quite vague. It's clear that also one is too much, but still, if you have a number or an
14 estimate would be nice.

15 THE WITNESS: [15:48:41] (Interpretation) Thank you, Mr President. This
16 morning I said that we had a day where we lost nine policemen at the Abobo Gare
17 roundabout. I said that only this morning.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:48:55] Yes, but that is one day. We are
19 talking about a period, in this case the period between the two rounds of election
20 where you said many policemen have been killed. My question is: What do you
21 mean by "many"? Have you an exact figure or an estimate?

22 THE WITNESS: [15:49:25] (Interpretation) I would estimate approximately 40,
23 because when we counted up we had lost approximately 40 policemen.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:49:32] Between the two rounds of election?

25 THE WITNESS: [15:49:39] (Interpretation) That's why I'm putting the bar at 40,

1 because after there were people who had disappeared, we do not have news of those
2 people, some of these people to date. We don't know whether they were killed or
3 not or whether they have disappeared in legal terms. So I can't even give you a
4 figure today.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:50:04] Yes. But you're talking about this
6 period between the two elections or are you talking about the whole period of the
7 crisis?

8 THE WITNESS: [15:50:14] (Interpretation) Mr President, I shall repeat myself. I
9 do not have a specific figure for that period *of the two rounds, but I would say that it
10 is not in excess of 40. *Because some people died before and others received the
11 information afterwards. So we can't know whether those people died during that period
12 or not. There's a doubt. But I think that if I give the figure 40, then that's right.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:50:43] But now I repeat myself. Are you
14 talking about 40 in between the first and the second round or during the whole crisis?

15 THE WITNESS: [15:51:04] (Interpretation) Mr President, I'll come back to the
16 same thing again. Throughout the whole period of the crisis we lost 40 policemen.
17 But I can't say today whether between the two rounds we lost 40 or not, because
18 relatives still come to say to us that they still do not have news of such and such an
19 individual. So we have not in an exhaustive manner really provided a definitive
20 number for disappeared or deceased individuals.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:51:40] Maître Altit.

22 MR ALTIT: [15:51:41] (Interpretation) Thank you, Mr President.

23 Q. [15:51:51] So we've gone past the second round and we've come to
24 28 November, between 28 November 2010 and 15 December 2010, were there any
25 crimes committed by rebels or elements *of the RHDP to your knowledge?

1 A. [15:52:12] It is difficult for me to answer your question specifically, because
2 when we say a crime is committed or violent acts are committed *by the rebels, that
3 means that the police has made that observation or we have heard or we see the
4 bodies. But it's a long time afterwards that we are told that the Invisible Commando
5 killed those people, so we can't say exactly that it is the rebels who killed those people.

6 Q. [15:53:00] Very well. Now, with regard to the incident before the RDR
7 headquarters in Yopougon, you said that the question is not finished or the case is not
8 closed. Do you mean that you do not know who attacked whom?

9 A. [15:53:22] Yes. In the report that has been tendered into evidence, the
10 commander of the Toits Rouges squadron acknowledged that it was his elements who
11 attacked, but we do not yet have proof. *Well, as I said, we were not the ones who
12 conducted that investigation. As long as it was the gendarmerie that acted, they
13 would be the ones to handle the procedure. We can't give you specifically, we can't
14 tell you specifically whether it was the gendarmerie who attacked *the people who
15 came from the RDR. But all I can say is that they in their statement said that it was
16 the elements *from Toits Rouges who attacked the RDR HQ in Wassakara.

17 Q. [15:54:27] Very well. With regard to the swearing-in ceremony that you
18 talked to us about, such a swearing-in ceremony for a new president *with the
19 presence of various constituted corps, particularly the heads of security forces, was it
20 the usual practice in Cote d'Ivoire? Was it normal to have such a swearing-in
21 ceremony of such a size and nature?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:55:07] We are talking about the swearing-in
23 ceremony of President Gbagbo? No, just for the record.

24 MR ALTIT: [15:55:15] (Interpretation) Yes, yes, Mr President. This is the entire
25 discussion whether he was supposed to go or not that the witness told us about at length.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [15:55:27] Yes, yes, I know. Just sometimes it's
2 good to have it also, the names on the record, because when we're going to re-read it,
3 we have to go back and guess.

4 THE WITNESS: [15:55:54] (Interpretation) It is an ordinary occasion, but it's solemn.

5 MR ALTIT: [15:56:03] (Interpretation)

6 Q. [15:56:06] Very well. Now, with regard to the blockade, you told us that
7 there was a blockade at the hôtel du Golf. And I would like us to understand what
8 you mean by the word "blockade," and for that purpose I'm going to be putting a
9 number of questions to you.
10 Firstly, were there any police observation posts close to the hôtel du Golf before what
11 you refer to as the blockade?

12 A. [15:56:40] Yes, indeed. Last week I repeated this. I said that at the outset
13 there were, there were the police forces present. And then when the rebels at the
14 hôtel du Golf forced their way through the blockade held by the police, then - then
15 the chief of staff took measures to ensure the safety at the roadblock.

16 Q. [15:57:17] Very well. So this observation post, is that the one that was at the
17 Marie-Thérèse intersection; is that the one?

18 A. [15:57:27] Yes, that is the one before the carrefour Marie-Thérèse,
19 Marie-Thérèse intersection.

20 Q. [15:57:36] When you say that the rebels, when you say that the rebels forced
21 their way through, do you mean that they attacked that position?

22 A. [15:57:53] Yes, I think you're right. I have to be more specific.
23 Commander Mourou went through with his vehicle through that roadblock at the
24 Marie-Thérèse intersection without coming to a stop.

25 Q. [15:58:10] Very well. So if I understand correctly, the police was lacking in

1 means and it asked the army to help; is that right?

2 A. [15:58:27] Yes.

3 Q. [15:58:31] And the army replaced the police at the Marie-Thérèse intersection
4 and that's what you refer to as the blockade; is that correct?

5 A. [15:58:41] Well, maybe I'm misusing language, but this was the language that
6 was used habitually during that period when we talk or use the word "blockade."

7 Q. [15:58:57] In concrete terms, is that it? You're using the word "blockade," was
8 it when the army replaced the police at the Marie-Thérèse intersection; is that right?

9 A. [15:59:11] That's correct.

10 Q. [15:59:12] Was the hôtel du Golf located close to the residence of the president
11 of the republic?

12 A. [15:59:22] I might need to shed light or light might need to be shed in fact.
13 Which president of the republic?

14 Q. [15:59:32] I shall rephrase. The hôtel du Golf, is it located close to the location
15 where President Gbagbo resided at that moment in time?

16 A. [15:59:43] Well, that is why I wanted you to be a little bit clearer. It is closer
17 to the residence of Mr Ouattara than to that of President Gbagbo. It is true that they
18 are all on the lagoon side, but Mr Gbagbo's residence is far further afield than that of
19 Mr Ouattara.

20 Q. [16:00:11] Could you give us an estimate, a kilometre? 2 kilometres?
21 500 metres?

22 A. [16:00:20] President Ouattara's residence is about 250 or 300 metres away;
23 however, if you take a different path, not exactly a linear path, it's about 2 kilometres
24 from President Gbagbo's residence. As the crow flies it would be 1 kilometre.

25 Q. [16:00:48] Very well. Now, this particular spot, that position, the

1 Marie-Thérèse intersection, now was the idea to ward off an attack upon the residence
2 of President Gbagbo?

3 A. [16:01:11] Yes, indeed. Indeed. That was one of the reasons, because
4 some -- there were shells that could have hit President Gbagbo's residence and, you
5 see, we could not let them get that far, so the roadblock was set up there at that spot
6 so that they would not be able to attack the residence of President Gbagbo.

7 Q. [16:01:48] Do you remember a document that the Prosecution showed you that
8 had a list of possible locations for observation posts? Do you remember?

9 A. [16:02:01] No.

10 Q. [16:02:02] Well, we'll show it to you again.

11 THE INTERPRETER: [16:02:11] Microphone, please.

12 MR ALTIT: [16:02:12] (Interpretation)

13 Q. [16:02:15] CIV-OTP-0045-0449, 0045-0449.

14 Can you see the document?

15 A. [16:03:14] No, the document I see here is from the general intelligence
16 directorate.

17 Q. [16:03:23] No, no, no. This is the right --

18 A. [16:03:25] No, it's from the general intelligence directorate.

19 Q. [16:03:31] Very well. All right. This is the document we would like to ask
20 you about, okay?

21 A. [16:03:39] Okay.

22 Q. [16:03:40] Now this is "Re: Ensuring the safety of strategic sites in Abidjan."

23 And just to make things fast, now these positions were not necessarily actually set up,
24 is that what you told us? These were just proposals and they weren't necessarily
25 followed?

1 A. [16:04:04] Yes, indeed. I said that last week.

2 Q. [16:04:06] Very well. Now if we could move on to page 0045 -- correction,
3 0450, you'll see -- can you see, can you see that page, 0450?

4 A. [16:04:28] Yes.

5 Q. [16:04:30] Third heading, "the Riviera area, *Marie-Thérèse intersection and
6 M'Pouto " can you see that?

7 A. [16:04:46] Yes.

8 Q. [16:04:56] It says "Set up the necessary -- make the necessary arrangements to
9 keep the people in charge of the rebellion *heading out to the city." Was this
10 something you were working on within the police force to keep the rebel forces from
11 *advancing from the Golf hotel towards the city?

12 A. [16:05:20] Well, the sentence doesn't mean exactly what you've said. What it
13 means is that there were people in charge in the rebel movement at the Golf and they
14 could go in and out as they wished. So to ensure that they could not take up
15 positions within the city of Abidjan, they had to be blocked and indeed driven out.

16 THE INTERPRETER: [16:06:05] Interpreter correction: Prevented from leaving.

17 MR ALTIT: [16:06:10] (Interpretation)

18 Q. [16:06:12] Now these soldiers stationed at the Golf, did they launch an attack
19 on 16 December against these measures that had these fences, blockades, and the like,
20 that had been set up?

21 A. [16:06:29] I don't have the exact date in mind, but indeed there was an attack
22 upon the men from the FDS who were stationed there at the Marie-Thérèse
23 intersection.

24 Q. [16:06:52] Very well. We'll move on to something else now. Now you said
25 that the Prosecution of the ICC talked to you about a mission, a mission to

1 gather -- no, rather, the Prosecution mentioned a mission to gather information, and
2 that was within your actual unit by representatives of the Prosecution itself. And
3 I would like to ask you some questions just to seek some clarity. First of all, do you
4 remember when you personally met these people, namely, these people who had
5 been sent by the OTP?

6 A. [16:07:45] The first time or the day they actually came to my office?

7 Q. [16:07:50] Tell me what dates you remember, please.

8 A. [16:07:56] I can't remember the actual dates, not off the top of my head. But
9 yes, I did meet with two people who came to see -- well, they asked me to a place and
10 they took a statement from me.

11 Q. [16:08:12] Very well.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:08:14] These people, you mean the
13 investigators. These people, as it is translated, doesn't seem very polite, I must say.

14 MR ALTIT: [16:08:28] (Interpretation) Well, you see, the question was about the
15 gathering of information, the people who went there on behalf of the OTP to gather
16 documents, that is the point I am trying to clear up.

17 Q. [16:08:47] Do you remember meeting these people, the people who came to get
18 documents, who asked you for documents?

19 A. [16:08:53] Yes, as I said a few moments ago, they asked me initially to, to meet
20 with them at another place. There were two representatives from the OTP at first
21 and then later they came to the office to get a number of documents.

22 Q. [16:09:15] Very well. Now, later on, when was that exactly when they came
23 to get the documents?

24 A. [16:09:23] Once again, it's difficult to give you specific dates, but I do know
25 that they came to my office.

1 Q. [16:09:34] May 2013, would that seem to be in keeping with your recollections?

2 A. [16:09:41] I couldn't say that for sure, whether that is the date.

3 Q. [16:09:47] Very well. Now, during this initial meeting to gather documents,
4 did the investigators from the OTP tell you what they wanted, what they were
5 looking for in specific terms?

6 A. [16:10:09] Yes. Yes, that's right. We provided some documents to them and
7 they went through them, they took what they wanted and returned the other
8 documents to us. They knew exactly what they were looking for.

9 Q. [16:10:26] But did they tell you, did they tell you specifically what they were
10 looking for?

11 A. [16:10:31] No, they didn't tell me what they were looking for. They didn't say
12 exactly what they were looking for.

13 Q. [16:10:44] Did they tell you that they were looking for information about the
14 rebels?

15 A. [16:10:50] Once again, I reiterate, they did not tell me exactly what they were
16 looking for. On the other hand, I provided -- we provided documents to them.
17 They took some, they returned others. That is why I deduced that they knew what
18 they were looking for. But they did not say "we're looking for specific things
19 A, B or C".

20 Q. [16:11:17] After that initial meeting to gather documents, did you see the OTP
21 investigators again to discuss documents that they may have obtained?

22 A. [16:11:29] We never talked about documents. Each time they met with me
23 they put some questions to me and they would take -- well, first -- the first time they
24 recorded the discussion on an audio cassette and then later they sent a transcription
25 thereof. But everything was recorded in audio form.

1 Q. [16:12:00] Very well. Did the investigators ask you about the chain of
2 custody of documents that they obtained from you or from your units?

3 A. [16:12:16] *It was here last week that the Prosecution asked me that question.
4 They've never asked that question before.

5 Q. [16:12:33] Let me make sure I've understood. Tell me if I have understood.
6 So the investigators never asked you how the documents they had chosen had been
7 obtained or brought together, gathered up, sorted through and kept after the crisis?

8 A. [16:12:56] I reiterate, they never asked me the question. They came to my
9 office, they were given access to a number of documents, they took what they wanted
10 to take and they returned all the others.

11 Q. [16:13:17] During the crisis, or after the crisis were police premises looted?

12 A. [16:13:33] During the crisis all the police offices were looted to such an extent
13 that we started from scratch when it came to documents and the like, and equipment
14 to ensure follow-up.

15 Q. [16:13:58] Now that is what you said in 2011 when you were interviewed by
16 the investigators. Now today are you telling us that despite that, despite the fact
17 that you already had talked to them about that, they never tried to get greater details
18 about the looting and how the looting may have affected the storage of documents or
19 the chain of custody of documents, each particular police station?

20 A. [16:14:37] They never asked me that.

21 Q. [16:14:53] Sir, your testimony is such that we have the impression that it was
22 not you who gave the information that the Prosecution has provided, but rather
23 contact persons who had been designated by you in each particular unit to provide
24 documents to the Prosecution; is that correct?

25 A. [16:15:15] Well, I can go even further than that. Some documents were taken

1 from my office, yes, indeed. They worked with some other people I was working
2 with. But further than that, the documents that they had may have been given by
3 me -- correction, not given by the director general of the police. They may have
4 gotten the documents from other people within the police.

5 THE INTERPRETER: [16:15:58] Microphone, please.

6 MR ALTIT: [16:16:00] (Interpretation)

7 Q. [16:16:02] A number of names have been placed on the case record. Could
8 you tell us who these people are. Staff sergeant N'Da Say Elloukou?

9 A. [16:16:19] I know of a N'Da Say, but the third name doesn't ring a bell at all.
10 There was a staff sergeant by that name, yes.

11 Q. [16:16:36] Was that person a contact person, a go-between that you appointed
12 to speak to the OTP investigators?

13 A. [16:16:58] I don't think I designated *anyone like N'Da Say to speak with the
14 OTP. On the other hand, he was supposed to look for documents, and since he was
15 the one holding the documents, I made him available to them, but he was not a
16 contact person.

17 Q. [16:17:29] Staff sergeant *Coulibaly Koumayo Horo Martin, was that person a contact person?

18 A. [16:17:41] I would be surprised. *Koumayo was not within my Secretariat. It is true that he
19 was a photographer from the directorate General, but he had nothing to do with documentation.

20 Q. [16:17:59] Kouadio Joël, staff sergeant Kouadio Joël?

21 A. [16:18:12] That name does not ring a bell at all.

22 Q. [16:18:19] Colonel Kouacou, Albert?

23 A. [16:18:21] There is a person by that name who is the director of the school, but
24 I'm not entirely sure of the name but the colonel, the police -- that person was the
25 director of the school.

1 Q. [16:18:36] So was that person a contact person, did you designate him to be
2 contact person?

3 A. [16:18:43] I would be surprised. He was the director of the school. He
4 wouldn't be designated contact person for the archives for the records.

5 Q. [16:18:55] Kalou Bly Armel, sergeant Kalou Bly Armel?

6 A. [16:19:04] That name doesn't ring a bell either.

7 Q. [16:19:09] Commissioner *Yao Joseph?

8 A. [16:19:13] Yes that is the current police prefect of Abidjan.

9 Q. [16:19:20] Was he a contact person?

10 A. [16:19:22] *That is what I told you a short while ago. I did not designate him
11 but perhaps in the course of the investigation they may have turned to him. I said
12 that some documents may have been provided by *some police authorities without
13 my knowledge, but I did not designate *him to be a contact person. The
14 investigators *never told me that they had contacted the police prefect of Abidjan.

15 Q. [16:19:47] Kangah Casimir?

16 A. [16:19:54] Same thing, assistant -- he's the assistant to the police prefect of
17 Abidjan.

18 Q. [16:20:01] But not a contact person?

19 A. [16:20:03] Perhaps as part of their investigations they wanted to *hear him or -- but
20 they didn't go through the hierarchical channels. In any event, I'm not aware of anything.

21 Q. [16:20:15] Sergeant Sallia Adaman?

22 A. [16:20:19] Doesn't ring a bell at all.

23 Q. [16:20:23] Kouyate Youssouf, commissioner Kouyate Youssouf?

24 A. [16:20:27] We discussed that quite a bit this morning. He was the assistant
25 prefect at the time responsible for operations, but he was not given as a contact

1 person.

2 Q. [16:20:39] He wasn't a contact person?

3 A. [16:20:41] No.

4 Q. [16:20:43] What happened to him later on, after 11 April?

5 A. [16:20:52] He became the director of the intervention units.

6 Q. [16:20:59] Sergeant Brou Pierre?

7 A. [16:21:13] Doesn't ring a bell either.

8 Q. [16:21:15] Commissioner Niagne Honoré?

9 A. [16:21:19] He was the director of the judicial police. He retired two years ago.

10 Q. [16:21:25] That person wasn't a contact person?

11 A. [16:21:28] No.

12 Q. [16:21:30] Commissioner Elloh?

13 A. [16:21:35] Same thing, *he was the deputy director of the judicial criminal
14 police, and is currently the director of judicial police.

15 Q. [16:21:42] Not a contact person?

16 A. [16:21:44] No.

17 Q. [16:21:46] Major Assoumou?

18 A. [16:21:51] He was in charge of the archives, the records of the judicial police.

19 As I said earlier, *and I repeat, I did not designate these people to be contact persons,
20 but perhaps in the course of the investigation *they were contacted directly. I did not
21 designate them as contact persons, and they never asked me either.

22 THE INTERPRETER: [16:22:20] Message from the interpreters: Could counsel be
23 requested to repeat the names slowly and one at a time.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:22:28] All names?

25 THE INTERPRETER: [16:22:30] Message from the interpreters: The last two names.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:22:34] The last question completely missed
2 with the last two names.

3 MR ALTIT: [16:22:46] (Interpretation)

4 Q. [16:22:47] Mr Witness, I'll put the question again: Sergeant-chef Yao Ernest,
5 was he a contact person that you may have designated?

6 A. [16:22:57] I don't even know that person.

7 Q. [16:23:02] Staff sergeant Yankou Bertin?

8 A. [16:23:06] Same thing, I don't know that person.

9 THE INTERPRETER: [16:23:10] Yankou Bertin was the name just given.

10 MR ALTIT: (Interpretation)

11 Q. Now the contact persons that you designated, did they report back to you
12 regarding their contacts or exchanges with the OTP?

13 A. [16:23:36] Thank you, Mr President. When I received those two *personalities who
14 were representing the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, they told me to never
15 tell anyone that they had come to take a statement from me. So I was not in a position to share
16 an opinion with anyone, *let alone designate any of my close collaborators. Yet, today I learn
17 that people gave police documents to the Prosecutor. I was not aware of that. I don't know
18 whether they said the same thing to those elements because they too did not report anything
19 to me. So, I know nothing about the documents that have been produced here. It is here and
20 now that I am learning about and seeing some of these documents.

21 Q. [16:24:29] So you didn't know exactly what happened. You don't know who
22 might have chosen the documents, gathered them together, collated them, turned
23 them over to the OTP, you don't know?

24 A. [16:24:50] I confirm that, other than what the people within my secretariat
25 provided to me -- to them.

1 Q. [16:25:03] And today? You are not in a position to tell us how many
2 documents were handed over to the OTP; is that what you're telling us?

3 A. [16:25:15] I can't even do that because you saw last week there were
4 documents that were actually faxes between a police commission -- a police station
5 and a prefecture. I was not a recipient of such faxes, so I really can't tell you how
6 many documents were handed over to the OTP.

7 Q. [16:25:42] Sir, who asked you to cooperate with the investigators of the ICC?

8 A. [16:25:53] I do know that they came to make contact over the phone and they
9 asked me -- they were carrying out an investigation into Côte d'Ivoire, particularly
10 about the last war, rather, the last crisis, and I reported to my hierarchy, to the
11 minister and he told me to go. So I went and I met with them.

12 Q. [16:26:26] I'm sorry, sir, but I haven't quite understood. Who called you to let
13 you know that investigators -- or rather, investigation was under way?

14 A. [16:26:37] They themselves contacted me. I don't know how they got my
15 number. But they did contact me and I reported to my hierarchy and my hierarchy
16 told me to respond to them, which is what I did.

17 Q. [16:26:58] You talk about the hierarchy. Who do you mean exactly?

18 A. [16:27:01] *It was after the crisis, and it was minister Hamed Bakayoko, who is
19 still a minister to this day.

20 MR ALTIT: [16:27:17] (Interpretation) Your Honour, I am about to take up
21 another matter so I leave it in your hands. Should I press on?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:27:26] No, I think we stop here. It was a
23 long day for the witness. And I stop here with the questioning for today.

24 Mr Witness, thank you. You can go home hopefully a little bit freer than you were in
25 that famous room and so you have more possibility to move. And --

1 THE WITNESS: [16:27:55] (Interpretation) Thank you.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:27:56] And we see each other tomorrow
3 morning at 9.30. Thank you very much.

4 (The witness stands down)

5 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:28:10] Close the mic, please, otherwise we
6 hear what you are saying. Although not very well. Shouldn't have been too secret.
7 And I just would just like for organisational purposes to have an overview on how we
8 continue, for how long, bearing in mind that the last session of Friday probably, or
9 earlier and that's okay, is for the re-examination and the re-re-examination, to leave
10 that open because we never know. So Maître Altit. It's very approximate if I -- I
11 can imagine, but ...

12 MR ALTIT: [16:29:02] (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. Yes very
13 approximate, I hope I'm not being too bold when I say that I should be in a position to
14 conclude tomorrow, by the end of the day. If I go beyond that slightly, please don't
15 hold it against me. I will endeavour to really just stick to the most essential points.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE TARFUSSER: [16:29:31] (Overlapping speakers) you don't go
17 far beyond that, I will not.

18 Okay. Thank you very much. So tomorrow is the whole day for Maître Altit and
19 then we'll see.

20 Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned to tomorrow morning 9.30.

21 THE COURT OFFICER: [16:29:50] All rise.

22 (The hearing ends in open session at 4.29 p.m.)