

Trial Hearing  
Witness: CAR-D04-PPPP-0059

(Open Session)

ICC-01/05-01/08

1 International Criminal Court  
2 Trial Chamber III - Courtroom 1  
3 Situation: Central African Republic  
4 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo - ICC-01/05-01/08  
5 Presiding Judge Sylvia Steiner, Judge Joyce Aluoch and Judge Kuniko Ozaki  
6 Trial Hearing  
7 Monday, 3 September 2012  
8 (The hearing starts in open session at 9.07 a.m.)  
9 THE COURT USHER: All rise.  
10 The International Criminal Court is now in session.  
11 Please be seated.  
12 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Good morning and welcome.  
13 Could, please, court officer call the case.  
14 THE COURT OFFICER: Thank you, Madam President. Situation in the Central African  
15 Republic, in the case of The Prosecutor versus Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08.  
16 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you.  
17 Good morning and welcome the Prosecution team, Maître Douzima. I'm sure that  
18 Maître Zarambaud is about to arrive. Good morning Defence team, Mr Jean-Pierre  
19 Bemba. Good morning to our interpreters and court reporters.  
20 Today we'll start with the testimony of the second expert witness called by Defence,  
21 Witness CAR-D04-PPPP-0059, specialist in politics and strategy, Mr Octave Dioba. No  
22 application for protective measures or special measures has been made for the witness.  
23 Maître? Welcome, Maître Zarambaud.  
24 I was saying that no application for protective measures or special measures has been  
25 made for the witness and, therefore, I ask please, court usher, to bring the witness into the

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1 courtroom.

2 (The witness enters the courtroom)

3 WITNESS: CAR-D04-PPPP-0059

4 (The witness speaks French)

5 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Dioba, good morning and welcome.

6 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Good morning, your Honour.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: First of all, the Chamber would like to thank you for  
8 taking the time to come and give evidence before this Court.

9 Mr Dioba, I hope that somewhere in front of you there is a card on which it is printed the  
10 solemn undertaking, and I would like to ask you, please, to read out the words of the card.  
11 If the card is not there I ask, please, court usher to provide it to the witness.

12 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) I solemnly declare that I will tell the truth, the whole  
13 truth and nothing but the truth.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much, Mr Dioba.

15 You have provided the Court with a report comprised of 27 pages. Mr Dioba, to the best  
16 of your knowledge, are the contents of that report a true reflection of your views  
17 impartially stated?

18 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) I can assure you of that, your Honour. This report,  
19 which was subject to a personal study, reflects my point of view.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Dioba, although you will be testifying in open  
21 session, and with your identity known to the public, there are some victims, witnesses and  
22 other people connected with this case whose identities are not publicly known.  
23 With the help of the Defence, I would ask you that you exercise caution in mentioning the  
24 names of persons who may be considered vulnerable in the context of the present  
25 proceedings.

1 You will be questioned first by the Defence, then by legal -- by the Office of the Prosecutor  
2 and, finally, by the legal representatives of victims that were authorised by the Chamber  
3 to put some questions to you. Lastly, the Defence will be given the floor to clarify or to  
4 follow up some of the answers you'll be giving.

5 Mr Dioba, now there are some ground rules that must be observed during questioning.

6 As you can see, we have interpreters and court reporters. Everything you say is being  
7 translated simultaneously into English, and everything that is said in English is translated  
8 in French. For that reason, it is crucial that you try to speak slower than normal, as I'm  
9 doing now, in order to allow our interpreters and court reporters to do their job.

10 Because sometimes that seems unnatural, it is likely that you start speeding up. In that  
11 case, I will have to interrupt you and ask you to slow down. Please don't take offence.

12 It's just for practical purposes.

13 Finally, Mr Dioba, we have another rule which we call "the five-seconds golden rule."

14 That means that, after a question is put to you, you need to wait five seconds before you  
15 start giving your answer in order to allow interpreters to finish with the translation of the  
16 question. I hope that's fine with you, and again I apologise in advance if I have to  
17 interrupt you in order to remind you of these practical rules.

18 Are you ready to start with your testimony, sir?

19 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

20 You asked me first of all to introduce myself. This is something that I am going to do.

21 I'm called Dioba Octave and I am from Gabon. I am a researcher in political and strategic  
22 issues at the centre for political and research studies of the University of Yaoundé II.

23 I think that for the moment I could perhaps stop there for my presentation, given that  
24 everything else, for example my matrimonial situation, are of a private nature.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you, Mr Dioba.

1 I will give the floor then to Maître Kilolo, lead counsel for the Defence. He will be in  
2 charge of questioning you.

3 Maître Kilolo, you have the floor.

4 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Thank you very much, your Honour.

5 QUESTIONED BY MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

6 Q. Mr Dioba, good morning.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. You've already introduced yourself. Could you speak to us about your academic  
9 background, if you would be so kind?

10 A. Thank you, Counsel. Well, first of all, because we are in open session, I would like  
11 to give certain clarifications with a view to providing for better understanding. I'm not  
12 here as a factual witness. I am here following up a work of in-depth reflection that I was  
13 asked to carry out with regard to the intervention of the MLC in the Central African crisis,  
14 and it is therefore further my admission to the list of experts of the Court that I am here in  
15 order to present this work and to discuss it with all the parties here.

16 When the rebel troops of General François Bozizé and the Central African Armed Forces  
17 were fighting in Bangui, I wasn't there. As such, I'm not a factual witness. I am here as  
18 an expert and to provide the Court with expertise and, if you would allow me to say so,  
19 I'm not a Central African, nor am I Congolese. It is therefore with a concern of objectivity  
20 and neutrality and of distance that has guided me taking the floor before this esteemed  
21 Court, which is a symbol of international justice and of human rights and of the harmony  
22 of peoples.

23 Having said that, in order to answer your question, Counsel, I started my  
24 studies - primary studies - at public school in Dienga, the south of Gabon, and secondary  
25 at the Lycée of Gramotu (phon). After I got a baccalaureate I then went to University in

1 Omar Bongo in the Human Sciences Faculty, and then thereafter I then went to study  
2 communication with an option - social economic option - and thereafter, as I was  
3 interested in political issues, I therefore went to University of Yaoundé II to the Centre of  
4 Political Research and Studies on Politics and Strategy and Defence Strategy and Security  
5 Conflict Management, and in the same framework, much more with regard to my  
6 specialisation, I was admitted for an internship - well, a research internship it should be  
7 clarified here - to the higher court in -- the Defence Court in Yaoundé - this is also what's  
8 called the war school - where I was very much interested in aspects relating to the military  
9 command and peacekeeping operations, geopolitics, the geopolitics of Central Africa, civil  
10 and military actions which were carried out, civilian and military actions, and also given  
11 that France was obviously a very important partner, also their activities, also looking at  
12 their role with regards to the former colonies. And obviously I'm here -- I was also a  
13 researcher, and since then I have been carrying out activities at this centre with a course  
14 on the geopolitics of armed conflict in Central Africa.

15 Q. Beyond your own academic background and your internship as a researcher, did  
16 you take part in any colloquia or seminars on strategy and geopolitics?

17 A. Yes, of course. I indicated in the CV that I provided the Court with that the last one  
18 which I took part in goes back to last April, and this was on the new forms of threats that  
19 there were in Africa, the problems; strategic problems, legal problems and political  
20 problems. This was a colloquium which was organised by the Interim Defence Court,  
21 which was addressed or addressed this new form of conflict in Africa where the  
22 conventional norms of war are no longer respected and what to do. Well, there were lots  
23 of questions which were put to a certain group of academics, specialists, issues of -- well,  
24 military issues and issues relating to conflict. You know that in a field such as this one  
25 you always participate in seminars at all levels, so obviously it's difficult to list all of them

1 given that, well, it has been happening for a long time now.

2 Q. In your capacity as an expert in strategy and geopolitics of armed conflict in Central  
3 Africa, what was your speciality with regards to a military expert?

4 A. Thank you. Well, in order to understand strategy, first of all, well, I have to say it  
5 can seem -- well, it does seem a bit strange to have a civilian talk about strategic issues,  
6 because I'm not a military person. I'm not a soldier. I'm a civilian, it has to be said.  
7 Now, when it comes to strategy, obviously at the start this was the art of the general, so  
8 this was if you like in the hands of the military, but now, with new forms of conflict and  
9 the complexity that has arisen, a lot of civilians are now involved in military issues. So  
10 when it comes to -- well, I'm a strategist. This is different from a military strategist,  
11 because fundamentally a military strategist is an operator. This is somebody - an  
12 operator - involved in war, but what I am, this is a strategist, somebody just reflects on the  
13 issues of war.

14 So the military, well, that's a -- a soldier is a person who's trained for war. A strategist is  
15 a theorist, who reflects on issues - military issues - and who has a theoretical perspective.

16 A soldier is in the field. He can carry out a war. He could be in the theatre of  
17 operations, while the general strategist normally is just involved in reflection on this and  
18 is able to give certain ideas outside the strategic mindset of a soldier.

19 So that is the difference between a military expert and myself. An expert in the field is  
20 able to go into the field to organise the troops, to tell you to go from point A to point B. I  
21 am a theorist. I reflect on war operations and military issues.

22 Q. What are the countries of Central Africa which you have concentrated on within the  
23 framework of your expertise?

24 A. Well, it's true, as I said, the geopolitical seminar for armed conflict in Africa, which  
25 we carry out, this is something that firstly is of interest to Central African countries which

1 are in conflict, obviously.

2 If you observe -- well, if you look at a map and you look where the crises are in Africa,  
3 you will note that Central Africa since about 20 years is a zone where conflict is almost  
4 endemic in that area, and as such I have very much been interested in the Central African  
5 case, particularly in the Congo -- well, in the two Congos, but also in Chad.

6 So if you see these countries which are part of the CEMAC area, then these countries at  
7 least recently, much more Congo recently, Central African Republic and Chad, these have  
8 been subject to turbulence, but there's also a very important point to raise here with  
9 regards to this area, and this is that a lot of geopolitical specialists consider the triangle of  
10 death.

11 The triangle death. What's that? That's this area which is situated from the Chad,  
12 Central African border, Cameroon, where there is a huge amount of banditry, where  
13 people are -- where you have people who cut the roads. These are armed robbers. They  
14 stop people. They sometimes attack peaceful citizens on the roads and then they flee into  
15 the forest, sometimes taking the property of these people.

16 This is an area which is at high risk and we are very much interested in this area.

17 Personally, I'm very interested in this area, given that the actors - or the robbers - are often  
18 people who have light, small calibre weapons. So sometimes we ask ourselves: Where  
19 do these arms come from? So this is an area which is very interesting to study, for  
20 somebody who deals with conflict in Central Africa.

21 Q. To your knowledge, how many research centres are there in francophone Central  
22 Africa, in the area of geopolitics and strategy in armed conflicts?

23 A. If I consider Central Africa like the geographical space inside CEMAC, or the  
24 Central African Community of States, I believe as far as I know there are just -- there is  
25 just one centre in that area, at least as far as I know, and it is for that reason that that

1 centre receives researchers from many countries in the Central African area.

2 You also have civilians and members of security and defence forces, except there have  
3 been new developments recently. I believe the Centre for Strategic Studies in the  
4 University of Yaoundé II is the only centre existing in that domain for the time being.  
5 That is as far as I know.

6 Q. While talking about the francophone African countries, you have mentioned  
7 CEMAC and CEAC. Can you clarify what those acronyms mean?

8 A. CEMAC and CEAC are what we know as original economic organisations.

9 CEMAC is the Economic and Monitoring Community of Central African States, and it has  
10 six members: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad  
11 and Congo. This is a regional economic organisation specialising in development and  
12 there is a single currency being used in all those six countries, that is the CFA franc, which  
13 was originally linked to the French franc but now is linked to the euro.

14 The CEAC is the Economic Community of Central African States and it is a larger group  
15 bringing together not only the countries of CEMAC, that I've talked about already, but  
16 also includes a certain number of countries from the Great Lakes region; including the  
17 Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Angola, and there was also Rwanda but, if I'm  
18 not mistaken, during the Heads of States Summit in Kinshasa in 2007, Rwanda had  
19 expressed the desire to withdraw. So I believe Rwanda is no longer a member of CEAC  
20 today.

21 So, generally speaking, this was a description of those two groupings. In summary,  
22 CEAC is larger, while CEMAC is smaller, but both organisations are devoted to  
23 development in the Central African region.

24 Q. Mr Dioba, did you ever carry out any study and research trips?

25 A. Yes, of course. It is not possible to reflect on conflicts in the Central African region,

1 or republic, and then you stay in your office. I did in fact travel to Congo, to the Central  
2 African Republic, in 2009 and I analysed the issue of highway robbers.

3 I tried to analyse the situation based on interviews with several sources in order to better  
4 understand the situation, because the researcher is someone who relies on sources, given  
5 that he is not always present at the time of the events, but then he has to travel to the site  
6 and carry out analysis based on his own methodology and come out with conclusions.

7 As you know, in the area of social sciences, which is of relevance to us here, people say a  
8 lot of things, but at one point you have to make a distinction between epistemological  
9 issues and then you analyse the facts rigorously before drawing conclusions.

10 Q. With regard to the methodological tools, what framework did you use? What  
11 analytical framework did you use for your report?

12 A. Strategic sciences are part of what we generally refer to as social sciences. There is  
13 a certain amount of tools that the researcher can use in this area, but in this particular case  
14 of the report I relied on observation, observation through conversations or interviews.

15 This means that I went out and met with people who could provide important  
16 information and then you sort it out.

17 There is also documentary analysis, which is looking at a certain number of projects or  
18 publications that have been issued on the same issues by other researchers and then you  
19 try to have an understanding and then come up with your own point of view. So these  
20 are methodological tools used in social sciences and these are the type of tools that I relied  
21 on in the theoretical approach.

22 So, in a nutshell, you have discussions, analysis of documents, and then personal or  
23 individual interviews with people who might have played a role in a particular event.

24 These people can provide answers to you based on their own personal experiences which  
25 you could use to extrapolate and come out with deductions in an attempt to understand

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1 the issue on which you are working.

2 Obviously, a researcher is not someone who passively accepts everything that he is told  
3 by the sources. He tries to determine relevance, probability, reliability of what has been  
4 said, and comes up with the elements that would be important for his own work.

5 Q. In document number 3 of the Defence list, which is your report, page  
6 CAR-D04-0003-0421, amongst your sources there is a title "Documents provided to us by  
7 the Defence," and these are documents that include various witness statements from  
8 people who were questioned or interviewed at the time by the Office of the Prosecutor.  
9 My question to you is this: Did you have the opportunity to go through these various  
10 documents?

11 A. Yes, of course, I used these documents as part of my sources. I used them for my  
12 work.

13 Q. Very well. You also mentioned oral sources. Can you throw more light on that?  
14 And, if it is necessary, we might have to go into private session for you to give more  
15 details.

16 A. Yes. Of course I met with a certain number of people. As I said, I analysed the  
17 documents from the Defence, but I also wanted to meet with other people. And, as you  
18 have said, I think we should go into closed session because most of those people are  
19 former soldiers - former FACA soldiers - who are refugees in Cameroon, and those people  
20 hesitated quite a lot before expressing themselves and requested that their names not be  
21 made public. So I would like us to go into private session.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn into closed session.

23 (Private session at 9.46 a.m.)

24 (Redacted)

25 (Redacted)

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- 1 (Redacted)
- 2 (Redacted)
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- 8 (Redacted)
- 9 (Redacted)
- 10 (Redacted)
- 11 (Redacted)
- 12 (Open session at 9.56 a.m.)
- 13 THE COURT OFFICER: We are in open session, your Honours.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître, could you please repeat your question?
- 15 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)
- 16 Q. Mr Dioba, is there some sort of parallelism that you can make between the RCD and
- 17 the MLC; that is as part of your work as an expert?
- 18 A. Thank you, Counsel. I looked at the RCD, but I believe that one has to understand
- 19 the political context of Congo. At that time, the DRC was living through a crisis after
- 20 Mr Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over power as the leader of a rebel movement that had left
- 21 from the east of the Congo. That is the AFDL; that is the Alliance of Democratic Forces
- 22 for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. This movement left from the east, with the support of
- 23 a certain number of countries that perhaps I should not name, but I can say this
- 24 movement was supported by Rwanda and the current Minister of Defence of Rwanda was
- 25 one of the officers when Kinshasa fell. So after Mr Désiré Kabila took over power, the

1 constitution was suspended and a certain number of human rights were overlooked. So  
2 there were many movements, and amongst the most important movements you had the  
3 RCD and the MLC.

4 Now, these political/military movements ate into the authority of the AFDL, which was in  
5 Kinshasa, so the RCD occupied the eastern part of the Congo, while the MLC occupied the  
6 north of Congo, and the Kinshasa government occupied Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. So  
7 these movements occupied practically more than 60 per cent of the territory. This means  
8 that the government in Kinshasa found itself in a situation in which it did not have  
9 authority over the entire country.

10 As you know, the DRC is a very large country, and political scientists in Africa generally  
11 consider this country as a States continent. It is more than 2.3 million square kilometres  
12 and, if I am not mistaken, it is about 57 times the size of The Netherlands.

13 So Kinshasa did not have authority over those areas, and each movement had authority  
14 over the territory that it occupied, and this was done with the political agreement in  
15 Lusaka, which conferred de facto legitimacy to those movements, to the extent that each  
16 of those movements had administrative prerogatives, and you will realise that those  
17 movements took decisions that had nothing to do with the government in Kinshasa.  
18 They had their justice system, they appointed magistrates, and organised their defence  
19 systems and their armies.

20 So, faced with this reality, the Lusaka agreement simply recognised the powerlessness of  
21 the Kinshasa government and the three main movements; the AFDL in Kinshasa, the MLC  
22 in the north and the RCD in the east, carried out a collegial administration of the country.  
23 I looked at the situation in Kinshasa. Why? Because the prerogatives of the AFDL, the  
24 MLC, had their end zones so it was quite interesting to look at this and try to compare and  
25 see what was going on, to see how they operated in relation to the MLC. So these

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1 movements had prerogatives that were practically recognised, that were in existence.

2 They made their decisions autonomously. They operated autonomously, be it the MLC  
3 or the RCDL. Regardless of Kinshasa.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Message from the interpreters: Could the witness be encouraged  
5 to slow down.

6 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

7 Q. Sir, did you look at when the MLC was actually created?

8 A. In a study that I conducted of political/military movements in Central Africa, the  
9 MLC, the MLC emerged in 1999 led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I'm sorry to interrupt you. The interpreters are asking  
11 you please to slow down, sometimes you're going too fast for them, to help them in  
12 translating and providing us with the transcripts. Thank you.

13 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.

14 Now, when did the MLC emerge? I would say it was in 1998. Now, I told you that  
15 these movements emerged from a particular political context in the DRC. Why?

16 Because the FDL, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo and  
17 Zaire, led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, came to Kinshasa in May 1997 and drove out the  
18 former president, Marshal Sese Seko Mobutu.

19 And the elements or, rather, the criticism of the former regime emerged once again,  
20 particularly -- well, for example, basic aspects of democracy were being utterly dismissed  
21 and so the political/military movements in turn attempted to restore democracy, this  
22 democracy that everyone desired so much.

23 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

24 Q. Now, judging by your analysis, what sort of movement was the MLC when it  
25 initially emerged?

1 A. Thank you. When the MLC was created, the MLC was a military/political  
2 movement, with a much stronger military component to it, in my opinion. However,  
3 with the changes or the evolution, rather, with the Lusaka agreement, well, I tried to look  
4 at from that time, from that agreement, the Lusaka agreement that was entered into in  
5 Zambia. The international community, in light of the events and the political realities,  
6 recognised, recognised the MLC \*and the RCD as the political entities of the Congolese  
7 State, each in its own particular area.

8 When I did my analysis I saw that the MLC went from being a military movement and  
9 became far more of a political movement that administered, that managed, that had  
10 prerogatives, the prerogatives of a State in the area.

11 I'll point out one particular thing to you. Now, this is not necessarily about a State with a  
12 proper constitution. We're talking about legitimacy, not legality, so you have to see that  
13 distinction so as not to make any mistakes. In actual fact, the MLC in its area, the area  
14 that it administered, led and organised the State, took decisions, appointed people.

15 So as of that time the MLC, which practically ran the country or the State, administered  
16 the day-to-day activities of the people, could not be dismissed as a mere military  
17 movement. It was much more a political movement that had gained legitimacy to  
18 administer the State, and so those \*leaders were recognised as being legitimate, because if  
19 you look, if you observe the approach that we find within the Lusaka agreement, and  
20 when you look at the provision, the signatures of the leaders, all the leaders of the DRC,  
21 for example the leaders of the MLC, the RCD, were all put on the same level. They all  
22 had the same standing, and beside you will see the signatures of Heads of State.

23 In this particular case, you can draw a parallel. The symbolic aspect of the very  
24 provision within a political/\*diplomatic framework is such that they were at the same  
25 level as Heads of State, so it was no longer possible. From that time, when the

1 MLC -- once the MLC was put at practically the same level as Heads of State, or the  
2 government in Kinshasa, the MLC could no longer be considered as just some or one of  
3 several rebel movements. It had become a movement with legitimacy that had  
4 prerogatives.

5 Between 1999 and the year 2003, when you look at how the country was managed, you  
6 can see that pursuant to the Lusaka agreement these various movements were  
7 administering their territories. \*The MLC in the North, the RCD to the east, and the  
8 government in Kinshasa administering part of the country, and so on and so forth.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Before we go even further, I have some clarifications  
10 here that I would like to put to the -- to ask the witness to clarify.

11 The Lusaka agreements, at least this is what is publicly known, had as an objective or  
12 purpose to bring peace to DRC and therefore many rebel groups were called for the table  
13 to negotiate; is that correct?

14 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) The Lusaka agreement was intended to end all the  
15 various confrontations in the DRC.

16 As I told you, your Honour, within the Congo many -- and this is something that the  
17 political scientists have referred to as the Congolese world war, so these people were in  
18 Lusaka with one primary objective, namely ending the conflict, and they wanted to  
19 encourage reunification, and so the Lusaka agreement brought together all the various  
20 players, protagonists, stakeholders, people involved in these conflicts within the DRC.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: That means that was not only the RCD and MLC that  
22 were part of the Lusaka agreements, but as well other rebel groups in DRC?

23 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) There was the RCD-ML, the liberation movement,  
24 but you must realise that there were three major blocks, so to speak, three major blocks or  
25 coalitions, and they had -- they occupied specific areas. Consequently, those main

1 movements, they gained legitimacy as a result of the agreement, so the MLC had a  
2 particular area and the RCD had its particular area. Each movement had an area and  
3 remained within the boundaries of the area until reunification, until reunification and  
4 unification of the country, and then a single government was set up in Kinshasa.

5 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: This is exactly the difficulty I'm having. When you say  
6 that - and we know that because it's public - the Lusaka agreements had as a purpose to  
7 unify or reunify the DRC, so how -- I don't understand when you say that the Lusaka  
8 agreement could recognise legitimacy to two groups that took over part of the territory in  
9 the DRC. If the agreement was exactly to reunify, how could at the same time they  
10 recognise the legitimacy of these groups that took over 60 per cent of the territory?

11 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) The Lusaka agreement preceded a number of other  
12 agreements. Initially, it was necessary to end the conflict. That was the first thing.  
13 Now, the conflict was ended and each movement remained in its particular area, or zone,  
14 and each movement was requested to organise a number of activities of general interest.  
15 In actual fact, they were asked -- from a political science point of view they were asked to  
16 organise the State, because that was the facts of the matter, and gradually the parties were  
17 to do everything to find ways and means to move towards unification.

18 So first of all they met to end the conflict, then they took part in the unification.

19 Providing this opportunity, or allowing for this opportunity, each movement in its area  
20 organised activities of general interest, or for the general good.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Do you know approximately how many leaders of  
22 political/military movements participated at the Lusaka agreement?

23 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) There were several leaders. It must be said the  
24 movements that were the most present were the MLC, the RCD, RCDL, but to answer  
25 your question, your Honour, you can look at the signatories to the agreements to better

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1 understand. The Lusaka agreement was signed by the MLC on 1 August by the  
2 representative, the person who was responsible for that movement, but it was necessary  
3 to wait 30 days. It was only on 30 August when the agreement was signed by the RCD.  
4 As for the RCD, the agreement was signed by approximately 50 people and they were  
5 called "the founding fathers." So you can see that -- and we mustn't forget the Heads of  
6 State of Rwanda, Zimbabwe and other countries, who had also taken part in the event,  
7 each one representing his or her organisation. So there were several people responsible  
8 who were taking part in these negotiations.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you.

10 Maître Kilolo?

11 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

12 Q. Sir, when does this agreement date back to?

13 A. The Lusaka agreement has a number of specific elements to it. This agreement was  
14 signed in several stages. Consequently, some people talk about the 30th, 30 July 1999,  
15 sometimes 1 August, but the most important thing is to realise -- well, the discussions  
16 started in July '99 and the initial signatories signed on the 31st and some people signed on  
17 1 August. The RCD - the founding fathers of the RCD - signed on 30 August. So I think  
18 the important thing here to remember is the actual year.

19 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) I'd like to ask the court officer to please display  
20 document number 5 on the Defence team's list: CAR-DEF-0001-0049.

21 THE COURT OFFICER: (Interpretation) Maître Kilolo, now the reference number we  
22 have here, tab 5, is CAR-DEF-0001-0056. Is that the document you would like us to put  
23 on the screen?

24 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Yes, indeed, and the page number was 0049.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: There is no page 49, Maître Kilolo.

1 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Yes, according to my case manager it's

2 CAR-DEF-0001-0049.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Then we are not talking about the same document,

4 because document CAR-DEF-0001-0056 finishes at 59 -- sorry, finishes at 74. It starts on  
5 56, Maître Kilolo, so we don't have here 49.

6 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) In any event, I'm referring to the last page of that  
7 particular document.

8 Q. Sir, I will return to this issue a little bit later with the particular document. I will  
9 show it to you later.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître, I'm sorry to interrupt you. Maybe you are  
11 talking about document number 4 of the list? This document has a page finishing by 49.

12 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Your Honour, I would suggest that we return to this  
13 document at a later time.

14 Q. Sir, now amongst the various signatories to the Lusaka agreement, other than those  
15 representing the former political/military movement, could you tell us which countries  
16 signed the agreement?

17 A. Thank you, Counsel. I'll try to list them for you. You must realise that the crisis of  
18 the Congo - and I mentioned this earlier - was such that throughout the entire territory of  
19 the DRC various States became involved, working through the movements that they  
20 supported, and some of those States signed. I'll mention -- I'll mention Rwanda, for  
21 example, which signed. Uganda, the President of Uganda signed. The President of  
22 Uganda signed the agreement. Angola signed the agreement. Zimbabwe signed the  
23 agreement. So those were Heads of State that approved the agreement, just like various  
24 other protagonists from the Congo itself.

25 Q. Now, just to be perfectly clear about the Congolese protagonists who signed the

1 Lusaka agreement, could you list those names?

2 A. I just said a few moments ago, the protagonists included the government in  
3 Kinshasa, the government in Kinshasa of course represented by Mr Laurent-Désiré Kabila;  
4 there was the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, represented by Mr Jean-Pierre  
5 Bemba; the RCD-ML; the RCD-Goma.

6 I told you that the RCD signed the document, or rather had the document signed by the  
7 founding fathers, and they were approximately 50 people, the College of Founding  
8 Fathers, who signed the agreement and, you see, it would be quite a task to mention all of  
9 those names.

10 Q. Could you tell us a little bit about the concept known as parallelism of form in the  
11 world of diplomacy?

12 A. Well, that's a simple concept, really. If, let us say various prerogatives are  
13 recognised for one particular stakeholder in a particular situation, let us say a conflict,  
14 parallelism of form means that the same prerogatives are recognised for the other  
15 protagonist.

16 Q. Beyond the Heads of State, who signed this Lusaka agreement, and in addition to  
17 the Congolese protagonists who signed, do you know if there were other persons or  
18 organisations who signed this agreement?

19 A. The Lusaka agreement didn't just happen between the protagonists, no. In the  
20 framework of a conflictual situation there are always persons, whether with a mediation  
21 role or other, and when it came to the Lusaka agreement this was observed with regards  
22 to the representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for example, and if  
23 my memory serves me well that must have been Lamine Cissé from Senegal, if my  
24 memory serves me well.

25 Now, on the other hand, there were also representatives of the Organisation for African

1 Unity as well. That must have been, if I'm right, Mr Ketamile Masire. So the Lusaka  
2 Accord -- or I think there was SADEC representative as well.  
3 Now, the Lusaka Accord was an agreement, and an internationally recognised agreement,  
4 it was internationally validated, and the proof of this is that beyond the -- when they  
5 signed this agreement, a certain number of leaders - political leaders - from the Congo,  
6 signing movements, they had meetings with top-ranking people from the major powers  
7 and also with the people from the Security Council of the United Nations, and I think that  
8 that, once again, has been confirmed (Redacted) and I  
9 also put the question as to whether they were able to have following this meeting, if they  
10 were -- received diplomatically. They said of course.

11 By the Security Council of the United Nations, they were received by the American State  
12 Department, Quai d'Orsay as well. So you have to understand, Counsel, that the  
13 Security Council if it -- it doesn't just receive any movement.

14 Q. Mr Dioba, the fact that the international community Heads of State of different  
15 countries, and even the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity, were  
16 stakeholders in the Lusaka Accord, does that have a particular political meaning with  
17 regards to the MLC or the RCD?

18 A. Thank you. I would like to say, Counsel, here when Heads of State and  
19 international organisations, in particular the highest public servants, United Nations, can  
20 take part in that, well, here, what we're talking about is legitimacy. It's a legitimisation, a  
21 legitimisation of the movements which are stakeholders thereto. There is a legitimacy  
22 which is given to these movements and then everybody in their zone therefore had to  
23 administer things for activities of a general interest. So, indisputably, here we're  
24 talking about a legitimisation of these movements, but I'm talking about political  
25 legitimacy here.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Clarifies the witness.

2 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Very well. I'd like to ask the court officer to show  
3 document 5 of the Defence's list, page CAR-DEF-0001-0059. Could you please show the  
4 bottom of the page?

5 Q. Mr Dioba, can you see the last sentence of the Lusaka agreement at the bottom in  
6 bold, where it's written, "The agreement was signed by representatives of the Republic of  
7 Angola"?

8 A. "... of the Republic of Angola" and then there's nothing thereafter.

9 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Therefore, I would ask us to go on to the next page and  
10 this at page CAR-DEF-0001-0060.

11 A. Yes, obviously we come back to what I said before. So you can see that there were  
12 Heads of State who signed it. There you saw Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo,  
13 Republic of Namibia, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Uganda, Republic of Zimbabwe,  
14 and witnesses, representatives of the Republic of Zambia, the Organisation of African  
15 Unity, the United Nations and the Community for the Development of Southern Africa,  
16 SADEC.

17 The agreement -- so you have a first group of signatories, I spoke to you about that, and  
18 then I said afterwards the agreements were thereafter signed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the  
19 MLC, on 1 August, and I also told you that the agreement was also signed 30 days later by  
20 the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, who they would call "the founding  
21 fathers," so by 50 founding members of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie  
22 on 31 August 1999.

23 So this is very much what I explained to you a moment ago, and also with regard to all  
24 these signatories above all I would like to stress the United Nations. Why? Because the  
25 United Nations is the highest body in international diplomacy, in international diplomacy

1 or of public service generally at international level, which was created firstly to prevent  
2 war. The primary objective of the United Nations was first and foremost to prevent war  
3 from happening. So the fact that the United Nations, as well as the Organisation for  
4 African Unity -- well, here now we speak about the African Union. There was a change  
5 that happened after this, but the Organisation for African Unity, that is the major regional  
6 organisation of the whole African continent. The fact that these organisations, if I can  
7 just state that, are taking part, or did take part, in this meeting and appended their  
8 signatures thereto and encouraged the organisation by each party of matters of a general  
9 interest within the country, then that is -- from a political scientist's point of view and a  
10 diplomatic point of view, that is a legitimisation of each party in the area over which it  
11 controls.

12 Q. Mr Dioba, just by way of clarification with regard to the question of Congolese  
13 signatures of the Lusaka Accord, given that the Presiding Judge asked you a question  
14 stating that the Lusaka Accord was signed by a multitude of rebel movements, well, what  
15 do you say about this?

16 A. Well, here it's very clear. In the document before us there's not a multitude, and if  
17 the document is there I suppose it's an authentic document and you can see that here we  
18 mainly have two movements. It's written, "The Accord was signed by Jean-Pierre Bemba  
19 of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo on 1 August and thereafter by 50 founding  
20 members of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie. Well, 50 founding  
21 members doesn't mean 50 people responsible for different rebel movements. No, it's 50  
22 members of one political or politico-military movement.

23 Q. Mr Dioba, when you speak about this effect of political legitimisation of the MLC,  
24 following this Lusaka accord, what exactly does that mean with regard to the status of the  
25 MLC as presented as a politico/military movement?

1 A. Well, thank you, Counsel. I think that following this agreement, from a political  
2 perspective it's no longer possible to consider the MLC as just a common rebel movement.  
3 There was a legitimisation, a de facto legitimisation, a recognition, a recognition by these  
4 organisations but one can ask the question: Do you know how many rebel movements  
5 signed agreements with international organisations and Heads of State? To my  
6 knowledge, I hardly know any, unless my memory is deficient, but these movements,  
7 after this they are legitimate. I wasn't there but I would like to stress the legitimacy that  
8 these movements gained therefrom. After this, they can no longer be considered just as  
9 common rebel movements, no. They have become actors, state -- actors or protagonists,  
10 which are significant, which count for this country and which are hereafter interlocutors,  
11 interlocutors for these organisations there, and it is not for nothing that these movements  
12 are put on the same footing as the Kinshasa government and that they are often received  
13 at the same level. I remember this statement of Vital Kamerhe which -- who at the time  
14 was in the Kinshasa government, who told me, "Well, we were often very uneasy about  
15 this but this was a de facto situation." They were recognised at the same footing as the  
16 government so coming from a high-ranking official who negotiates for the government  
17 party, well, this is something that is very important, and beyond this statement which I  
18 remember the fact that the United Nations recognised them and accepted to negotiate  
19 with them, legitimised them, means that they could no longer be considered as just  
20 another rebel group.

21 Now, we were talking about an entity which counted and with which there needed to be  
22 discussions, and that's why they were all sitting around the same table to negotiate, and to  
23 have negotiations at international level, with actors such as the Security Council.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Kilolo, I wanted just a clarification. On page 24,  
25 lines 10 and 11, my question to the clarification I asked from the witness was, to be very

1 clear: Do you know approximately how many leaders of political/military movements  
2 participated in the Lusaka agreement? I never, I never said what you said in your  
3 question, that I mentioned that many rebel leaders signed the Lusaka agreements. My  
4 question was only whether other leaders of political/military groups were called to sit at  
5 the negotiation table in Lusaka. Just to clarify.

6 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

7 Q. Mr Dioba, within the framework of your studies, have you observed situations  
8 where there's been international recognition given to a rebel armed movement?

9 A. A moment ago I asked the question. When I asked the question, I also shared that  
10 with the courtroom, to say that if we talk about rebel movements, has there really been a  
11 rebel movement anywhere in the world which has been sitting around the same table as  
12 the representatives of state? In history, well, I don't think so, but perhaps you could see  
13 current affairs underway, with the National Transitional Council in Libya as an example, I  
14 think that the National Transitional Council, perhaps -- maybe I can remember the  
15 organisation, or the PLO but, to my knowledge, the CNT or transitional council, which is  
16 a -- it was a movement which was rapidly recognised by States to become a privileged  
17 interlocutor until the fall of the Tripoli regime, and I think to my knowledge those are the  
18 only examples to my knowledge, but in Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, to the best of my  
19 knowledge, no.

20 Q. Because you talk about the National Transitional Council in Libya in your -- from  
21 your comparative reading in-between the NTC in Libya and the MLC, could you make a  
22 comparison between the two, when the Lusaka accords were signed?

23 A. Well, you can make a comparison. The National Transitional Council was a  
24 movement which had demands from Benghazi to call for the establishment or the  
25 democratisation of Libya, given that this country was functioning under the control of one

1 individual without a particular constitution, and you will see that the MLC had pretty  
2 much the same approach to challenge the regime of Kinshasa, which was also functioning  
3 as if it were under the control of one individual who had suspended the constitution, and  
4 other institutions, so you could just say that in one way or another the two movements  
5 can be compared, above all because sooner or later one or the other was going to have a  
6 certain degree of legitimacy.

7 Q. In order to be clear: From the Lusaka agreement, how many state actors, who were  
8 internationally recognised, were there in the DRC?

9 A. Well, I told you a moment ago that when it came to the administration of Congo, in  
10 1999, at the time of reunification and formation of what the -- when the government was  
11 formed, this was -- there was a collegial management carried out in three blocks. You  
12 had Kinshasa on the one hand, which was represented firstly by Laurent-Désiré Kabila,  
13 and then after the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Joseph Kabila Kabange and on  
14 the other side, the other party was therefore going to be the MLC represented by  
15 Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba and the RCD which was going to undergo a lot of changes.  
16 Wamba Dia Wamba was the leader, that changed, but to better understand that, to look at  
17 the institutional level, if you consider there were three institutions, three blocks: The  
18 eastern block, RCD in the east, Kinshasa with the FDL, and then the north with the MLC.  
19 So it was these three components which were going to administer or manage the DRC.  
20 There wasn't a -- or hadn't been a unification until that time, so these were the main  
21 figures who were interlocutors of states or -- and so you had the people who were leading  
22 these three different components who were responsible at a political level.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Kilolo, we -- now that we are having blocks of  
24 two hours we need to be very strict because of the tape, that in two hours it's over. So we  
25 are going to our break.

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- 1 Mr Witness, we have half-an-hour break. It's almost 11 o'clock. We'll be back at 11.30.
- 2 I ask, please, court usher to accompany the witness outside the courtroom. In the
- 3 meantime, we will suspend and resume at 11.30.
- 4 (The witness stands down)
- 5 THE COURT OFFICER: All rise.
- 6 (Recess taken at 10.57 a.m.)
- 7 (Upon resuming in open session at 11.32 a.m.)
- 8 THE COURT USHER: All rise.
- 9 Please be seated.
- 10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Could, please, court usher bring the witness in.
- 11 (The witness enters the courtroom)
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Dioba, welcome back.
- 13 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Good morning once again, your Honour.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Are you ready to continue with your testimony?
- 15 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes.
- 16 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: You have the floor, Maître Kilolo.
- 17 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour.
- 18 Q. Mr Dioba, a short while ago, that is before the break, you told us that after the
- 19 Lusaka agreement Congo was administered by two state entities or, rather, three state
- 20 entities; that is the MLC, RCD and the central government in Kinshasa. Have you
- 21 analysed the reaction or position of the international community regarding this
- 22 administration of Congo by the three entities mentioned?
- 23 A. Thank you, Counsel. The reaction of the international community was approval
- 24 because as from the Lusaka agreement it was the international community that
- 25 legitimised this situation to the effect that each entity exercised powers that were

1 practically state powers on the area it controlled. So the international community could  
2 not oppose this because they approved it with an objective. There should be movement  
3 towards the unity of the country. This is why I'm saying that the international  
4 community considered all the entities concerned as equal and as their interlocutors, so  
5 I would say that community favorably welcomed this de facto situation.

6 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) I would like to ask the court officer to make available  
7 document number 5 on the Defence list, CAR-DEF-0001-0063. Please kindly display  
8 Chapter 6 of the annex, which is part and parcel of the Lusaka agreement. Would it be  
9 possible to shift the text towards the right for better visibility? Very well.

10 Q. Mr Dioba, I would like to ask you to read Chapter 6 of the annex, which was an  
11 integral part of the Lusaka agreement.

12 A. Thank you. I will read Chapter 6. "The re-establishment of the State  
13 administrative authority over the entire territory of the Congo. Pursuant to this  
14 agreement, and following the inter-Congolese political negotiations, the administrative  
15 authority of the State shall be restored throughout the entire territory of the Democratic  
16 Republic of the Congo. Following the coming into force of this agreement, there shall be  
17 a consultation mechanism between the Congolese parties which will make it possible to  
18 carry out activities throughout the national territory and also to carry out operations and  
19 actions of general interest. For example, in the area of public health, national vaccination  
20 campaigns, education" -- correction "of examinations, immigration, movement of people  
21 and property." So there is a political or diplomatic interpretation of this chapter.  
22 When the international community states that as soon as the agreement comes into force,  
23 that is there will be a consultation mechanism between the parties which will make it  
24 possible to take measures throughout the national territory and to carry out operations or  
25 activities of general interest, and this relates to activities intended for members of the

1 population in all the territories being governed or occupied, but the objective is to initiate  
2 movement towards consultation and unification, but prior to that each entity is supposed  
3 to administrator its own territory in the public interest.

4 So if you look at this as a political scientist, you will understand perfectly that the  
5 international community was actually legitimising the stakeholders and conferring upon  
6 them powers to administer those territories and take measures of public interest with the  
7 objective of moving towards the unification of the country.

8 Q. In the exercise of the respective State attributions, did you analyse the difference  
9 between the central government in Kinshasa and the MLC as well as the RCD; that is in  
10 relation to the measures that they were able to take?

11 A. Thank you. Let me repeat what I said before: Each entity took measures or  
12 decisions in the area it controlled. For example, it appointed individuals to positions.  
13 They appointed magistrates and military officers, each entity in its territory, and when the  
14 comprehensive agreement was signed all the decisions taken by the various entities were  
15 to be respected. This means that if the RCD had appointed you colonel, when the army  
16 was merged you would keep your rank as colonel just like someone else who had been  
17 appointed colonel by Kinshasa or by the MLC, and that remains the case up 'til today.  
18 If you look at what happens in the Congolese public service today, you will find that there  
19 are senior magistrates, senior military officers, who had been appointed by the various  
20 groups or entities, each in their own territory. So you will see that they all functioned at  
21 the same level and each entity took decisions that would be respected after unification.

22 Q. Mr Dioba, we are now analysing the Lusaka agreement, and it is an unsigned  
23 version, but during your research did you have access to the original document signed by  
24 the various stakeholders in that agreement?

25 A. Yes, of course. I was able to obtain a copy of the Lusaka agreement, but which I

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1 did not bring with me here. It is100 possible for me to locate that document from  
2 amongst my documents, but I saw that Lusaka agreement with the signatures of all the  
3 parties.

4 Q. Can you please tell the Court how you managed -- how you managed to obtain a  
5 copy of that agreement?

6 A. I received that agreement from Mr Azarias Ruberwa. During our discussions in  
7 Kinshasa I asked him whether he had a copy of that agreement, and (Redacted)  
8 after explaining to me that agreement, gave a copy of it to me in the form of a small  
9 pamphlet.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn very briefly into private  
11 session.

12 (Private session at 11.46 a.m.)

13 (Redacted)

14 (Redacted)

15 (Redacted)

16 (Redacted)

17 (Redacted)

18 (Redacted)

19 (Redacted)

20 (Redacted)

21 (Redacted)

22 (Redacted)

23 (Open session at 11.47 a.m.)

24 THE COURT OFFICER: We are in open session, your Honours.

25 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

1 Q. Mr Dioba, did you analyse the effects of the Lusaka agreement on the international  
2 relations of the MLC, or the RCD?

3 A. It should be pointed out that the Lusaka agreement was not an agreement for the  
4 cessation of certain areas in Congo. The parties to the Lusaka agreement, that is after the  
5 agreement, did not create any special diplomatic relations. These were not constitutional  
6 States. They were entities that had been legitimised and empowered to carry out certain  
7 acts within their respective territories. So the diplomatic relations between States and  
8 organisations were done in a collegial manner. The three entities governing Congo at the  
9 time were often received together. You would have the MLC, for example, and the RCD  
10 which did not secede. They did not have their own currency, they did not have  
11 diplomatic relations as a State, but they acted in a collegial manner because the three  
12 entities were the interlocutors of the international community. But of course a certain  
13 number of contacts could have taken place, but this is quite usual in the area of political  
14 activities.

15 Q. Did you analyse which international structures or institutions met with or received  
16 the MLC or the RCD after the Lusaka Accord; that is State entities?

17 A. You are aware that these movements were supported by States and those States  
18 were their partners. In addition to that, I have told you that the parties had been  
19 received by the Security Council and also by the governments of major powers.

20 Q. On the basis of your analysis and research on this issue, do you have any examples  
21 of countries at the international level that welcomed the MLC as a State interlocutor; that  
22 is after the Lusaka agreement?

23 A. I told you a short while ago, to begin with there is the Security Council. The  
24 Security Council is the highest diplomatic organ at the international level and, if they can  
25 receive a movement, I believe it is something very important when it comes to the

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1 recognition or legitimacy of those moments.

2 Q. Apart from the Security Council, do you remember that the MLC visited any  
3 important western capitals after the Lusaka agreement?

4 A. With regard to the stakeholders to the Lusaka agreement -- well, your Honour, can  
5 we go into closed session?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Court officer, please turn into closed session.

7 (Private session at 11.53 a.m.)

8 (Redacted)

9 (Redacted)

10 (Redacted)

11 (Redacted)

12 (Redacted)

13 (Redacted)

14 (Redacted)

15 (Redacted)

16 (Open session at 11.54 a.m.)

17 THE COURT OFFICER: We are in open session, your Honours.

18 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) I would like to ask the court officer to display document  
19 number 5 in the Defence list, page CAR-DEF-0001-0058. Can you please display Chapter  
20 3 of the Lusaka agreement, paragraph 11(b)? Is there a way to focus on subparagraph (b),  
21 to zoom in on subparagraph (b), please? Would it be possible to zoom out a little bit so  
22 that the entire text should be visible?

23 Q. Mr Dioba, can you read out Chapter 3, 11(b), of the Lusaka agreement, which starts  
24 with, "The parties shall set up ..." and ends with "... this agreement"?

25 A. That paragraph states as follows: "The parties shall set up a joint military

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1 commission ,which shall be responsible for executing immediately after this agreement  
2 comes into force, in collaboration with the Observer Group of the UN and the OAU, the  
3 peacekeeping operations right up to the time of the deployment of the peacekeeping  
4 missions of the United Nations and the OAU." Is this where you asked me to stop?  
5 "The parties shall set up a joint military commission which shall be responsible,  
6 immediately after the coming into force of this agreement and in collaboration with the  
7 Observer Mission of the UN and the OAU, for executing the operations - the  
8 peacekeeping operations - up until the deployment of the peacekeeping mission of the UN  
9 and the OAU," and you will notice that all the time mention is made of "the parties,"  
10 which means that the three parties were legitimised by the Lusaka agreement.  
11 So at the military level, mention is made of the three parties, and even at the level of the  
12 other domains mention is made of those same three parties. So this is further proof that  
13 the Lusaka agreement legitimised the political/military movements of the Democratic  
14 Republic of the Congo because here they're being given the right to be responsible for  
15 peacekeeping operations, and this means - and I will repeat - that each entity had its army,  
16 so this mission was attributed to their armies, which would carry out the mission until the  
17 UN peacekeeping force is in place.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: When the Lusaka agreement was signed, Mr Witness?  
19 When? The date, do you remember that?

20 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. A few moments ago I was  
21 saying that the signature of the Lusaka agreement was progressive in nature. That is  
22 why it's difficult to say that it was signed on a particular date. That's a problem. You  
23 see, the first signatures were the States; that was on 30 July, I believe. You'll also see that  
24 the MLC, the MLC signed the agreement on 1 August. The MLC signed on 1 August.

25 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Which year, Mr Witness? Sorry to interrupt you, July,

1 August of which year?

2 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Oh, I'm sorry. 1999, your Honour. The MLC signed  
3 the agreement on 1 August 1999 and the RCD signed 30 days later, on 31 August 1999. It  
4 was signed by approximately 50 people, and they were called the Founding Fathers. So  
5 given these various dates, given that the signatures were provided over the course of time,  
6 it would be better not to speak of a specific date; it would be better to give a date for each  
7 particular stakeholder signing.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Is it of your knowledge when the Security Council  
9 deployed the MONUC to DRC?

10 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) After the signature of the Lusaka agreement the  
11 peacekeeping operations were managed by the administration, and I believe that  
12 MONUC came in, if my memory serves me correctly, in the year 2000, early in the year  
13 2000, but I'm not 100 per cent sure of the exact date on which MONUC deployed but, in  
14 any event, the UN mission to the Congo was one of the largest missions deployed by the  
15 UN, one of the most large -- the largest ones in the world in terms of men and equipment,  
16 and its aim was to ensure the security of people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Which means, and I ask you to correct me if I'm wrong,  
18 that this Article 11(b) that you just read, that authorised a mixed military commission for  
19 the maintenance of peace, was supposed to being -- to force only to the moment the  
20 MONUC arrived, which was in the year 2000; is that correct? So it was a provisional  
21 mixed commission, military commission?

22 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you. Yes, it was a joint endeavour before the  
23 arrival. The arrival of MONUC made it possible to help the country move towards  
24 unification, so the mixed commission, the joint commission, was a provisional thing but it  
25 doesn't mean that each entity still had its men, its soldiers, in its territory awaiting

1 unification or the setting up of a national army. So that commission had to be a  
2 provisional thing, waiting for the UN operations to begin.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: I'm sorry to interrupt, Maître Kilolo, just because I need  
4 to understand the chronology of the events. Here, on chapter 6 of Annex A of the Lusaka  
5 agreement, which is page 0063, talks about the reunited the armed forces of DRC. No,  
6 sorry, no that. It's chapter 10. "Formation d'une armée nationale," saying that in the  
7 terms of the present agreement, and in accordance with the negotiations, the troops of the  
8 parties, as you call them, would be integrated into the armed forces. This is part of the  
9 agreement on reunification.

10 In accordance with Annex B of the Lusaka agreement, there was some time limits for  
11 compliance with all different steps of the agreement. Do you know how long it would  
12 take for the troops of these two parties to be integrated into the armed forces as part of the  
13 agreement?

14 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. It was supposed to take  
15 four years, but you have to look at the evolution. After the 1999 Lusaka agreement we  
16 saw the Sun City agreements. In 2002, that was the inclusive agreement. You'll see that  
17 those agreements, despite the fact that they had been signed, there still were a number of  
18 problems, problems with implementation in the field.

19 So the Sun City agreement led to the Pretoria agreement in 2003, and after that agreement  
20 unification went ahead with the one-plus-four government; one president of the  
21 government and four vice-presidents, and as of that point in time all three administrations,  
22 or all three governments, if you wanted to put it that way, were brought together  
23 including the military government.

24 So each group brought -- each group had its decisions and acts. The soldiers of each  
25 component were to join the national unified army, and each official -- correction, each

1 officer retained his rank. Within the MLC, for example, the leaders -- if the leaders had  
2 said you were a colonel, after the formation of the national army you would retain that  
3 rank, you would still be a colonel. Similarly, if the RCD had given a particular rank to a  
4 soldier, that soldier kept his rank. So the agreement did not come into effect  
5 immediately; it was a gradual thing. So the unification became clearer as time went on.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, I'm not really concerned about the grade of  
7 the officers that were -- the grades that were kept when they were integrated into the  
8 national armed forces. My concern here is the chronology, because you are talking about  
9 legitimacy of the two parties, the MLC and the RCD. Yes. RCD --

10 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, the RCD.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: -- about a calendar of implementation of the Lusaka  
12 agreement, and I can see that there are many different time limits. The longest one is one  
13 year. Now you are saying that between '99, when the Lusaka agreement was signed, to  
14 2002, it was still legitimate for the two parties to keep their armed wing and fight against  
15 the government?

16 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. As of that point in time  
17 the role of the parties was no longer to fight the government. I told you, I said initially,  
18 that each entity, each entity administered its area, the area that it had control over. In the  
19 final analysis, the concern was no longer waging war against the government. Each  
20 administration, with its army, administered its territory and moved gradually towards  
21 unification and the formation of a single government and a single army.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: In accordance with the Lusaka agreement, you mention  
23 that it was going progressively, progressively. How long the agreement provided  
24 for? I'm not saying in de facto, but did the agreement mention any time limit for the  
25 integration of these armed forces?

1 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) The agreement -- the agreement determined -- well, in  
2 actual fact, the agreement gave the opportunity to the various entities to gradually move  
3 towards. But, your Honour, today -- well, the signing of an agreement doesn't  
4 necessarily mean -- it doesn't necessarily mean that it will be implemented immediately.  
5 When an agreement is reached, that's one thing, but implementation is another. There  
6 can be all kinds of problems with implementation, that's why I'm talking about the  
7 gradual movement, or the gradual implementation. There were various points that the  
8 movements, the entities could not agree on and so to be careful I'm speaking about a  
9 gradual movement.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, would it be fair for me to say that in  
11 conclusion this agreement was never complied with or at least until 2002 when another  
12 agreement had to be signed?

13 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. One can't say it in that de  
14 facto manner. The agreement was implemented in one way or another, and I do dare say  
15 in political agreements there are always a number of diverging points.

16 You see, your Honour, the agreement made it possible to stabilise; to stabilise each entity  
17 within its area. The agreement made it possible to end the direct clashes, even  
18 though - even though - there were still a few points that were divisive, and then gradually  
19 they moved to Sun City and then Pretoria, but you can't say that the agreement was not  
20 implemented. It was just the starting point for unification of the Congo.

21 If we look at this unification of the DRC, we see that this agreement was the starting point.  
22 It was implemented but, like all political agreements, when various stakeholders all come  
23 together you can't say that the implementation is immediate. There are always a few  
24 minor points that the parties can't correct -- agree to, and those points are gradually  
25 corrected and with time everyone converges and finds common ground.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you, Mr Dioba.

2 Maître Kilolo, you have the floor.

3 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) I would like to ask the court usher if he could please  
4 display Article 2 of the Lusaka agreement, once again document number 5 on the  
5 Defence list, the same page, CAR-DEF-0001-0058? Might it be possible to focus on  
6 Article 2 so that we can read it in its entirety?

7 Q. Sir, would you be so kind as to read out Article 2 of the Lusaka agreement for us, if  
8 you could?

9 A. Thank you. Article 2 speaks to security concerns and it reads as follows:

10 "Immediately upon the coming into force of this agreement, the signatories commit to  
11 immediately finding solutions to the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the  
12 Congo and neighbouring countries."

13 So if you were to ask me for a comment, Counsel, I would prefer to say that this is  
14 something clear and precise. It's indicated quite clearly in print in simple French that the  
15 signatories commit to finding immediate solutions to the security concerns; not just of the  
16 DRC, but also the concerns of neighbouring countries. It's quite clear.

17 Q. Sir, I'd like to ask you what is your analysis of this particular chapter, chapter -- this  
18 article, rather, Article 2 of the Lusaka agreement, in relation to the capacity to  
19 implement - the MLC's capacity to implement - it at the time?

20 A. Well, that's quite simple. Initially we said that the Lusaka agreement recognised  
21 the various entities; the entities that were to take a number of actions in the general  
22 interest. That was said earlier. Each entity had a military organisation; a military  
23 organisation that was supposed to be moving towards unification and the formation of a  
24 national army.

25 Now, here the signatures -- the signatories mentioned here are the three major

1 components. So the Lusaka agreement afforded them legitimacy, even legality, the  
2 ability to find solutions to these security concerns; the security concerns of both the DRC  
3 and neighbouring countries. It's quite clear that the army, the Congolese army at the  
4 time divided into three components, did have that opportunity to provide greater security  
5 for neighbouring countries. The Lusaka agreement provides for that in this article,  
6 Article 2, concerns relating to security.

7 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Could the court usher please display once again  
8 document number 5 on the Defence list of documents, CAR-DEF-0001-0062, Article 5 of  
9 the Lusaka agreement?

10 Q. Sir, would you be so kind as to read out Chapter 5 from the Lusaka agreement?

11 A. Chapter 5: "National dialogue. Inter-Congolese political negotiations.  
12 Immediately upon the coming into force of this ceasefire agreement in the DRC, the  
13 parties agree to make every possible effort to create a suitable framework for  
14 Inter-Congolese political negotiations intended for the implementation of a new political  
15 order in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

16 5.2. With a view to implementing the new political order and ensuring this national  
17 reconciliation, thanks to the Inter-Congolese political negotiations, the Congolese parties  
18 agree to follow the following principles. The Inter-Congolese political negotiations  
19 process must include amongst the various Congolese parties the following entities: The  
20 government of the RDC, the Congolese -- the Rassemblement Congolais pour la  
21 Démocratie, the MLC, the political opposition and the representatives of active forces of  
22 the nation. All participants will enjoy equal identical status. All resolutions adopted  
23 during the Inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be binding upon all parties. The  
24 parties agree that -- so that the Organisation for African Unity can assist the DRC with the  
25 organisation of Inter-Congolese political negotiations led by a neutral facilitator chosen by

1 the parties in light of his moral authority, international credibility and experience, with a  
2 view to successful Inter-Congolese political negotiations; negotiations that are inclusive in  
3 nature that shall lead to national reconciliation.

4 This facilitator shall be responsible for the following: The facilitator shall contact  
5 stakeholders with a view to organising these political negotiations, and the framework  
6 shall be one that -- shall be a framework that will bring people together and will ensure all  
7 the necessary security prerequisites."

8 Now, this document ends right there.

9 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Court officer, if we could move to the next page, please?

10 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) So, as I was saying: "The facilitator shall organise, in  
11 co-operation with the Inter-Congolese parties, consultations with a view to inviting the  
12 main organisations and political parties that are representative and recognised, as well as  
13 the main representatives of the active forces of the nation.

14 The facilitator shall organise the discussions in light of this time frame with a view to the  
15 establishment of a new political order in the DRC. Without any prejudice to other points  
16 that could be raised by participants, the Congolese parties agree that the agenda for these  
17 political negotiations shall have to do with the timelines and the principles for the political  
18 negotiations.

19 The formation of the new Congolese army. The members of this army shall come from  
20 the Congolese Armed Forces, the Armed Forces of the Congolese Rally for Democracy  
21 and the Armed Forces of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo.

22 The new political order in the DRC, in particular the institutions, shall be put into effect  
23 with a view to governance in the DRC; the process for free democratic and transparent  
24 elections in the DRC, a draft constitution, that shall apply in the DRC after elections are  
25 held.

1 The timetable for Inter-Congolese political negotiations are as follows: Choice of  
2 facilitator D-Day plus 15; beginning of national dialogue, D-Day plus/minus -- plus 45; the  
3 time frame for the end of the national dialogue D-Day plus 90; installation, or setting up  
4 rather, of new institutions D-Day plus 91."

5 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

6 Q. Sir, the Presiding Judge asked you an important question a few moments ago. She  
7 asked you whether the fact that the MLC had continued to keep the MLC within its  
8 territory after the coming into effect of the Lusaka agreement, did that mean that the  
9 Lusaka agreement was not complied with? Could you answer that question in light of  
10 Chapter 5 of the Lusaka agreement?

11 A. I was clear, saying that the process was a gradual one, and you can see that the  
12 timetable for negotiations, that the timetable shows that. It is true that one can't say that  
13 the agreement had not been implemented because in the final analysis there was this  
14 movement towards unification and the text shows that. It speaks of moving towards  
15 unification. It was not a matter of blocking the agreement; it was a matter of respecting a  
16 certain process so as not to clash with the agreement.

17 So this approach was gradual, and certainly it was leading towards the negotiations  
18 mentioned in the article here, negotiations that were to be held gradually amongst all the  
19 various parties with a view to setting up a unified army.

20 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Very well, Mr Dioba.

21 I would ask the court officer to make available page CAR-DEF-0001-0059, Article 3 of the  
22 Lusaka agreement, namely, paragraph 17 thereof. Could you also focus in, in order to  
23 better highlight paragraph 17, please.

24 Q. Mr Dioba, if it's easier for you now, could I ask you to read Chapter 3, paragraph 17,  
25 of the Lusaka agreement?

1 A. Paragraph 17. "The parties to this agreement must take all necessary measures for  
2 the normalisation of the situation along the international frontiers orders of the  
3 Democratic Republic of Congo including the illicit traffic, the controlling the illicit traffic  
4 of weapons and infiltration of armed groups." That's what we were saying before.  
5 Here, what we're talking about is, well, we have to remind ourselves here that if, despite  
6 the fact that Congo or the territory of the Congo was administered by three different  
7 entities, Congo -- well, there hadn't been secession there, so the Congolese territory was  
8 intact, but with collegial management or administration by three different entities,  
9 different administrative entities.  
10 Now, each entity had a territory, and on this territory, if this territory had borders,  
11 international borders, then this territory -- the army of that territory was responsible for  
12 controlling all the illicit traffic and the infiltration of weapons and armed groups, but here,  
13 we're still at this level of recognition of the entities in their territories in order to  
14 administer the civil, civilian and military acts with regards to the control of the borders.  
15 Particularly where it concerns this paragraph, the parties to this accord, as you saw in the  
16 agreement, there are three parties, three essential parties. You have the Government of  
17 Kinshasa, you have the MLC and the RCD. So when we speak about the parties to this  
18 agreement, thank you, your Honour, for reminding me, we mustn't be mistaken here.  
19 When we speak about parties to this agreement, things have to be clear. Here we are  
20 talking about the Kinshasa government, the MLC and the RCD.  
21 So it was demonstrated, and I demonstrated previously, that each entity had an  
22 administrative role in its territory and, as such, when we speak about the parties to this  
23 agreement having to take all necessary measures to normalise the situation along the  
24 international borders of the DRC, each one in its territory had to do that with regards to  
25 the borders.

1 The Democratic Republic of the Congo has a border in the north with the Central African  
2 Republic, so the army of the MLC had, had to look at this border at the same level that the  
3 RCD army had to look at the eastern frontier, namely with Rwanda and others, so each  
4 army had to be responsible for ensuring that along the borders, the international borders  
5 of the Democratic Republic of Congo, that there wasn't traffic or infiltration of armed  
6 groups, and this is another way of conferring legitimacy to them by carrying  
7 out -- allowing them to carry out military actions along those borders to ensure the  
8 security of the country.

9 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) I would ask the court officer to show Chapter 3,  
10 paragraph 20, of the Lusaka agreement. This is on the same page, CAR-DEF-0001-0059,  
11 if you would be so kind.

12 Q. If that is okay, could you please read paragraph 20 of Chapter 3 of the Lusaka  
13 agreement?

14 A. Thank you. "Under the terms of this agreement, and following on from national  
15 dialogue, there will be a mechanism for the establishment of a national army which is  
16 restructured and integrated including the forces of the Congolese signing parties of this  
17 present agreement on the basis of negotiations between the Government of the  
18 Democratic Republic of Congo, the RCD and the MLC."

19 So you can see here, and as I said previously, these are the stakeholders, these are the  
20 parties who have to form this national army, a unified army, and each of them keeps its  
21 prerogatives and particularly within the framework of the administration of its territory.  
22 You can't lose sight of this.

23 Attributing to the three movements, or the two main movements, if you can put it like  
24 that, RCD, the MLC, putting them at the same level of the Kinshasa government, the other  
25 stakeholders who are going to participate in the establishment of this army, there isn't

1 another entity, and it's these entities who are responsible not only for ensuring security  
2 along the borders but also security for neighbours but, in addition to that, internal security  
3 within the country. They are the ones who are going to build this national army.

4 Q. Mr Dioba, in order to ensure that we understand each other well, I'll go back to the  
5 question that was put by the Presiding Judge.

6 In what framework are we ultimately with this Lusaka agreement? On the one hand you  
7 have an interpretation, which would be to say that from the entry into force of the Lusaka  
8 agreement, the armed forces respectively of the MLC and the RCD were automatically  
9 integrated into the national army such that the MLC and the RCD could no longer have an  
10 autonomous armed force on the territory that they were administering, or are we talking  
11 about a different scenario, a different interpretation, whereby from the entry into force of  
12 the Lusaka agreement there is a transitional period which comes into being during which  
13 the MLC and the RCD could legitimately not only administer their territory but also  
14 continue to manage their armed forces on their territory until there was inter-Congolese  
15 national dialogue established which would come later for the formation of a national  
16 army?

17 A. Well, the terms of the agreement are clear: The agreement, the Lusaka agreement,  
18 comes within a framework whereby having stabilised, the entities would administer and  
19 that would go progressively towards national dialogue and this would make it possible  
20 for the unification of all the military entities. That's clear. That doesn't mean that de  
21 facto, after the signing of this agreement, okay, an army was formed, no. They are  
22 talking about negotiations. The agreement always go back to the need to discuss and  
23 negotiate the possibilities of unification of the territory and all the components thereof;  
24 namely, the armed forces. So when I talk about progressive, that's what I mean.

25 Q. If you would --

1 A. If you would excuse me, Counsel, if we just look at 20, for example, it does say  
2 clearly under the terms of this agreement and coming out of national dialogue there will  
3 be -- there's a future tense used "will be," there will be a mechanism for the formation of a  
4 national army, which is restructured and integrated. So you can see the future tense  
5 used here does show that this is something that will be progressive but, in the meantime,  
6 each entity remains in its territory and progressively there will be a mechanism so as they  
7 are speaking this mechanism hasn't been set up and that's why they use the future tense  
8 here.

9 The future tense is used here to express the fact that there will be a mechanism for the  
10 formation of a national army, and the form of this army will be one that is restructured  
11 and which is integrated. What does that mean? Integrated means that they are going to  
12 take all the components and they are going to put them together; so a national army  
13 which is restructured and which is integrated.

14 Having stated that - having stated that - they make a clarification. There's a precision  
15 made here. It is not just anyone who is integrated but, no, this will include the forces of  
16 the Congolese parties who have signed this agreement on the basis of negotiations  
17 between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, i.e. Kinshasa, the  
18 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD in eastern (sic) Goma, and the  
19 Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC, which is in the north, Gbadolite. So  
20 that's clear.

21 Q. Mr Dioba, I'd like to put you a question in your capacity as an expert recognised by  
22 the ICC, also being a researcher at this sole centre of research that can be found in  
23 francophone Africa which deals with strategic and geopolitical issues related to armed  
24 conflicts in Central Africa.

25 The MLC as an entity, after the Lusaka agreement and before the reunification of the

1 country in 2003, so we're talking between 1999 and 2003 here, could it commit its troops  
2 abroad at the same level as the central government in Kinshasa could have done so for its  
3 armed forces?

4 A. Counsel, I shall answer you clearly. We have examined the agreement. We have  
5 observed that the agreement itself gives the possibility to the entities not only to make safe  
6 their territory, or secure their territory. They even spoke about neighbouring countries  
7 that was showed on the screen. Well, I had it here. I had it projected here. It is the  
8 agreement that tells us this.

9 So the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC, which had autonomy with  
10 regards to its functioning, of course it could take up contacts and it could deploy its army  
11 for the security of the frontiers not only within the territory, but also in neighbouring  
12 countries. There's no ambiguity here. As far as I'm concerned, there is absolutely no  
13 ambiguity here in that regard.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Sorry, Maître Kilolo, to interrupt you again, but just to  
15 make it sure that I understand what the witness has just said because on page 57, as from  
16 line 5, the witness said, "So it was demonstrated, and I demonstrated previously, that each  
17 entity had an administrative role in its territory and as such, when we speak about the  
18 parties to this agreement having to take all necessary measures to normalise the situation  
19 along the international borders of the DRC, each one on its territory had to do that with  
20 regards to the borders."

21 So when the agreement said that, "So the party has to ensure the ...", what is the wording  
22 of Article 17, "... normalisation of the situation on the borders, international borders,  
23 including the control of arms trafficking and infiltration of armed groups," you  
24 understand that as being an authorisation for the parties to intervene militarily in other  
25 countries? Is that your conclusion? Secure the borders is the same as sending troops to

1 another country? I did not understand the relation between one authorisation and your  
2 conclusion. I wanted some clarification, please.

3 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you. Thank you, your Honour.

4 This is a measure which has been put on the screen, or an article that was shown on the  
5 screen. We're not only talking about internal security, but we're also talking about  
6 neighbouring countries, unless we no longer remember that.

7 This provision was put on the screen and it clearly stated -- if the court officer could find it  
8 again, we discussed it a moment ago where it was clearly said, "... the securisation (sic) of  
9 neighbouring countries." It's a provision that was shown here a moment ago, one of the  
10 provisions of the Lusaka agreement, so I've just interpreted this provision and if we could  
11 find it again I certainly didn't make a mistake in this regard.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: So maybe I'm wrong, but I was referring to this  
13 paragraph 17 that was put on our screens. That says, and I will read in French in order  
14 to be loyal to the witness, (Interpretation) "The parties to this agreement must take all the  
15 necessary measures for the normalisation of the situation along the international borders  
16 of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the control of illicit traffic of arms and  
17 infiltration of armed groups."

18 (Speaks English) This is what I read. And this -- the conclusion is that this article  
19 allows the party to send troops to neighbouring countries.

20 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Thank you, your Honour. No, not this -- not this  
21 provision. This speaks about securisation along the borders, but what I'm saying is it's  
22 not this one. We did comment on a provision previously, which not only talks about  
23 security at an internal level, but also there's a possibility to securise (sic) the neighbouring  
24 countries and we've presented it here. We even commented on that provision.

25 So I think that it wasn't very long ago and I do remember it, so we can find this provision

1 and once again maybe we can comment once again on this particular provision. It's  
2 not -- it's not this point 17, it is a previous provision, but now I don't know if it's Chapter 2  
3 or what, but we did show it on the screen here and I did comment on it.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maybe I'm wrong.  
5 You can proceed, Maître Kilolo.

6 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) Your Honour, if you would allow me, I would try to  
7 help you in order to find the correct article.

8 JUDGE ALUOCH: Sorry, Mr Kilolo. The witness says he did comment on it. Maybe  
9 he can remind us what was his comment on it? The topic that is going on right now, the  
10 witness recalls that he commented on it. What was his comment? It's not clear. What  
11 was it? Whether --

12 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) To be fair to the expert witness, I would ask the court  
13 officer to show Article 2 of the Lusaka agreement, CAR-DEF-0001-0059.

14 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) So that's it. That is obviously this Article 2, in terms  
15 of concerns with regards to security, Provision 4, and this is what is written: "On the  
16 coming into force of this agreement, the parties commit themselves to immediately  
17 address the security concerns of the DRC and ...", and this is a conjunction in French, "...  
18 her neighbouring countries."

19 So it is clear, your Honour.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Mr Witness, I know it's clear and I can read it even in  
21 French. My doubt is, it is your conclusion as an expert that this article that you just read  
22 means that the party, the signataire, is authorised to intervene militarily in another  
23 country? I'm just asking whether it is your conclusion as an expert?

24 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Your Honour, thank you, and I'm going to ask a  
25 question myself. Well, how can we find solutions to the concerns of neighbouring

1 countries if we don't have a possibility to intervene? I mean, that's the question I would  
2 ask and everybody can ask themselves that question.

3 Now, the agreement says that the signatories, or the parties, commit themselves to  
4 addressing the security concern of neighbouring countries. Now, how do you find, or  
5 how do you address, these security concerns of neighbouring countries if you don't have  
6 the possibility to intervene? That's the problem.

7 My conclusion, therefore, is clear. That gives legitimacy to the parties, gives them the  
8 possibility to intervene, if they have to meet the security concerns of neighbouring  
9 countries, and it's only following that path. It's not just being on your territory that the  
10 security problems can be addressed. Well, that can be done perhaps through negotiation,  
11 yes, but if military force is needed then the best way of finding a solution to security  
12 concerns of a neighbouring country is to go and help that country in its territory when this  
13 country is confronted with problems of security.

14 That is my conviction and my expert point of view.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you.

16 Maître Kilolo?

17 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation)

18 Q. Mr Dioba, now that you have shed light importantly on the understanding of the  
19 MLC and its prerogatives, it's legitimately recognised prerogatives recognised by the  
20 international community, I would like now to focus on the Central African Republic. Do  
21 you think that it is important to take into account political and diplomatic and strategic  
22 considerations in order to understand, well, the crisis in the Central African Republic, or  
23 what was happening between October 2002 and March 2003?

24 A. Thank you. In a study where -- which reflects on the intervention in the Central  
25 African Republic, you cannot not take into account the political situation in the Central

1 African Republic in order to understand developments there. So, of course, it's necessary  
2 to understand the context, the political context, of this country and to see under what  
3 circumstances, for example, and in what context a foreign force intervenes or is called  
4 upon to intervene in this country.

5 Obviously, there is a particular political context that would require a foreign force to  
6 intervene in the Central African Republic, so that has to be taken into account.

7 Q. Do you know when the Central African Republic acceded to independence?

8 A. The Central African Republic, well, that was 13 August 1960. There was a whole  
9 series of francophone African countries that had independence. I think Congo was  
10 13 August, Gabon 17 August and the Central African Republic I believe it was on  
11 13 August 1960, if I'm not mistaken.

12 Q. Mr Dioba, I would like to remind you once again to please slow down so that the  
13 court reporters can record whatever we are saying in real-time. This is something that all  
14 of us have to do.

15 Now, since the accession of the CAR to independence, to your knowledge and based on  
16 your analysis, was the political history of this country affected by any particular  
17 phenomenon?

18 A. Thank you, Counsel. I would like to say that the political history of the Central  
19 African Republic has been marked by the particular phenomenon of military coup d'états.  
20 I will try to explain.

21 Madam President, your Honours, if today we find ourselves in this courtroom, well, I'm  
22 simply talking about a historical approach over a period that is relatively recent, but we  
23 are here because of military coups in 2001, August 2001.

24 Your Honour, I would like to ask that we go into closed session, and I wanted to talk  
25 about a sitting Head of State, and I have a lot of respect for our country's institutions, that

1 is why I'm asking we go into private session.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Maître Kilolo, as you know, usually we go into private  
3 session when we are dealing with protection issues. Do you think that now it's time to  
4 go into private session for the discussion on the history of a country?

5 MR KILOLO: (Interpretation) In answer to your question, your Honour, I would like  
6 to ask Mr Dioba the same question.

7 Q. Sir, do you think that the names of known public personalities can be mentioned in  
8 open session, except of course you think that for personal reasons that you believe  
9 yourself are necessary we need to go to closed session?

10 A. If this is the usual practice in the Court, then I would like to continue with my  
11 testimony.

12 There is this major phenomenon of coup d'états in the Central African Republic. The  
13 people of the Central African Republic have made coup d'états the option of choice to  
14 accede to the presidency, so that is how I understand it. For me, they have turned coup  
15 d'états into the method - the preferred method - of acceding to supreme power in the  
16 country.

17 And why am I saying this, your Honour? It is because if we are now in this courtroom, it  
18 is because initially there was a coup d'état, a coup d'état perpetrated by the former Chief  
19 of Staff of the Armies, General Bozizé.

20 Following that failed coup d'état there were raids carried out against Bangui in an attempt  
21 by him to destabilise the institutions of his country. It was an effort to put an end  
22 through force and weapons to the mandate of a democratically-elected Head of State and  
23 to take over power by force. So if we analyse why we are here today, it is actually  
24 because of that initial incident. And as you know, there was this initiative to fragilise  
25 this country by the military movements which has caused our presence here today.

1 One can always ask questions, such as why is it that the people of the Central African  
2 Republic, despite the reinstitution or institution of a pluralistic democracy in their country,  
3 still have this tendency to perpetrate coup d'états or to take over power by force? So this  
4 is a fact that I have identified after analysing the political history of this country, the  
5 phenomenon of coup d'états.

6 Q. Mr Dioba, let me now move on to the facts. Based on your analysis, what have  
7 been the various methods of accession to power in the Central African Republic ever since  
8 this country achieved independence, and you can please mention the various Heads of  
9 States who have occupied power up to 15 March 2003?

10 A. We talked about the independence of the Central African Republic a short while ago,  
11 and we are going to start from this period of independence with President David Dacko.  
12 David Dacko was overthrown in 1965 by General Jean-Bédél Bokassa through a military  
13 coup d'état. This is why they referred to it as the Christmas Eve coup d'état, because it  
14 took place on 31 December 1965.

15 When General Jean-Bédél Bokassa took over power much later on in 1976, General  
16 Jean-Bédél Bokassa changed the structure of the Central African state; he transformed the  
17 Central African Republic into an empire and he became Emperor Bokassa I.

18 THE INTERPRETER: And correction, the coup d'état was on New Years Eve,  
19 31 December 1965. So it is the New Year Eve's coup.

20 THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Now, in 1979, there was another coup d'état in the  
21 Central African Republic, and it was marked by the return of David Dacko, but what was  
22 special about this coup d'état, your Honour, is that it was perpetrated with the support of  
23 the former colonial power.

24 As you know, at that time, France had an interventionist doctrine in Africa and of course  
25 there has been a paradigm shift today given that the French government is standing more

1 towards the reinforcement of security and co-operation. So they have moved away from  
2 military intervention in Africa to co-operation. So this was just a digression.  
3 This operation was known as Operation Barracuda, which brought back David Dacko to  
4 power and removed Jean-Bédél Bokassa, but David Dacko was not president for long.  
5 Two years later, and I believe this was in 1981, another general, General André Kolingba,  
6 perpetrated his own military coup d'état and took over power from David Dacko.  
7 André Kolingba instituted a one-party system up until the early '90s, and you will realise  
8 that in the early '90s the new world geopolitical configuration led to a certain number of  
9 African countries, particularly francophone countries, moving towards pluralistic  
10 democracy, and the Central African Republic was part of that movement.  
11 As from 1992, a certain number of multiparty elections took place, and the Central African  
12 Republic had also accepted this new method of State organisation. There was, therefore,  
13 an election in October 1993, and at this election Mr Ange-Félix Patassé was elected  
14 president, and the main political party behind his election was the MLPC. However,  
15 after he was elected, Ange-Félix Patassé was going to be affected once again by the  
16 vampire of power grabs, that is mutinies, and I believe this was as from 1996.  
17 We have talked about the introduction of pluralistic democracy, but unfortunately this  
18 was not going to banish the demons of coup d'états amongst the Central African leaders.  
19 This is how come in 2001 André Kolingba, who had been president before, tried or  
20 attempted another coup d'état in the month of May, and then there was also the coup  
21 d'état of the former Chief of Staff, General François Bozizé.  
22 The confrontation, or conflict, that followed from October 2002 led to the acts and  
23 consequences that are being examined by this august Court, and this led of course to the  
24 taking of power on 15 March 2003 through the use of arms by General François Bozizé,  
25 who took over the presidency.

1 So this is a brief political history of the Central African Republic, which was marked by a  
2 particular phenomenon, the coup d'états. And one can wonder when you look at all  
3 these individuals, and the events that took place and that are bringing us here together,  
4 this is the conclusion that one can reach.

5 Q. Mr Dioba, if you wish, I think we should look more closely at President Bokassa  
6 because you say that the Republic was transformed into an empire during his reign. As a  
7 geopolitical scientist, how would you describe that regime of Bokassa in the Central  
8 African Republic?

9 A. Thank you. The regime under Jean-Bédél Bokassa, who self-claimed himself  
10 emperor, was a sort of monarchy. And in order to not create any misunderstanding, I  
11 have to say that monarchies are not always illegal or mismanaged, but there are  
12 monarchies throughout the world which are well-managed, well-administered and quite  
13 legal, but Jean-Bédél Bokassa's regime was a bloody or sanguinary and despotic regime.  
14 For those who are familiar with the situation or who were in the Central African Republic,  
15 there are always anecdotes about the sanguinary nature of the Bokassa regime. It was a  
16 regime that was marked by violence and the spilling of blood.  
17 During his trial by the Central African courts, this is something that emerged, and it was  
18 stated that this was a dictatorial and despotic regime. This is a reality, and many people  
19 who have written about this situation actually recognise this.

20 Q. Once again, I will ask you a question as a geopolitical scientist. Did you look at the  
21 role of General Bozizé during Jean-Bédél Bokassa's regime?

22 A. No, I cannot tell you that I particularly analysed his role because, at that time,  
23 Mr Bozizé was a mere aide de camp of General Bokassa, so which particular role could he  
24 have played except being a close collaborator of the leader of the country? So Mr Bozizé  
25 was an aide de camp to Emperor Bokassa.

1 Q. One last question before we adjourn: Do you know who promoted François Bozizé  
2 to the rank of general?

3 A. Based on what I know, it was Emperor Bokassa I who promoted Bozizé to the rank  
4 of general. At that time, he was one of the youngest generals who was promoted to  
5 general. At the time, he was his immediate collaborator, his aide de camp, and you  
6 know that when you are an aide de camp of a Head of State you have to be a trusted  
7 collaborator, a close collaborator. It is not just anyone who can be appointed an aide de  
8 camp. It must be someone that is well-trusted, so it is someone who must be  
9 unconditionally loyal, so it must be a close and important relationship.

10 PRESIDING JUDGE STEINER: Thank you very much, Maître Kilolo.

11 Mr Dioba, we are now adjourning for today. You have the whole afternoon to take some  
12 rest and to get prepared for tomorrow morning. At 9 o'clock we will resume with your  
13 testimony.

14 I thank very much the Prosecution team, the legal representatives of victims, the  
15 Defence team, Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. I thank very much our interpreters, court  
16 reporters.

17 We will adjourn and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

18 I ask, please, the court usher to accompany the witness outside the courtroom.

19 (The witness stands down)

20 THE COURT OFFICER: All rise.

21 (The hearing ends in open session at 1.25 p.m.)

22 CORRECTIONS REPORT:

23 The Court Interpretation and Translation Section has made the following corrections  
24 in the transcript:

25 \*Page 16 line 6

- 1 "...recognised the MLC, the AFDL, as the political elements of the Congolese  
2 State..." is corrected by "...recognised the MLC and the RCD as the political entities  
3 of the Congolese State..."  
4 \*Page 16 line 18  
5 "...so those people..." is corrected by "...so those leaders..."  
6 \*Page 16 line 24  
7 "...a political/democratic framework..." is corrected by "... a political/diplomatic  
8 framework..."  
9 \*Page 17 line 7  
10 "...RCD to the east,..." is corrected by "...The MLC in the North, the RCD to the  
11 east..."