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LIBYA'S QADDAFI

The Politics of Contradiction

Mansour O. El-Kikhia

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
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*To Mansour R. Kikhia
and
the People of Libya*

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Five

Qaddafi's State

POLITICS

When he was young and lacking political experience, Qaddafi was content to emulate the Egyptian form of government under his mentor, Nasser. He failed, though, to recognize that one country's policies and form of government cannot be arbitrarily imposed on another country with a different history, a different population, and a different set of beliefs. Nasser's system might have been successful in Egypt, but there was no guarantee of its success in Libya. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Nasser's parliament, was powerless in Egypt because of Nasser's own overwhelming charisma and popular appeal, as well as his ability to consolidate political and economic power in his own hands. General Qaddafi perhaps expected the Libyan version of Egypt's parliament to be powerless in Libya but soon discovered after the establishment of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU) in 1970 that legislative institutions, however primitive, can grow in power if opportunity permits.

This was quite apparent in 1972. Popularly elected delegates to the Libyan parliament, the LASU, demanded, debated, and passed laws guaranteeing rights and security for Libya's inhabitants. The parliamentary body also questioned the government, which was controlled by military members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and held it responsible for the implementation of policies. Delegates to the LASU were initially very successful in starting the country on the path to popular democracy, Libyan style.¹ The parliament attracted Libyan scholars and professionals from all disciplines who saw it as a vehicle for beneficial change and a forum in which the government could be interrogated and held accountable. The slogan of the era was "Freedom, Socialism, and Unity." Many members hoped to further democracy, distribute Libya's enormous wealth among its tiny population, and eventually join other Arab governments in some sort of Arab Union.

That was not what Qaddafi wanted. The revolution had moved in a direction that would have ultimately left him with little control. Lisa Anderson

maintains that "as early as 1973, Qadhdhafi and his colleagues felt that the Libyan population had not exhibited the fervor for revolutionary change they had anticipated."² Perhaps most damaging to General Qaddafi as head of the government and the state was the constant policy interrogation he had to undergo in the LASU. Much like Libya's previous leaders, he disliked intellectuals questioning him or exposing his inadequacies.³ Theoretically, all Libyans had to be card-carrying members of the LASU. General Qaddafi, however, retained the power of veto on membership and did use it frequently to deny membership to many, including some civilian members of his own appointed government.⁴

The LASU experience taught Qaddafi that the game of democracy has its own rules, which included free speech and participation for every citizen. The fact that, in Anderson's words, he "announced a campaign against, among others, the bourgeoisie and bureaucrats" indicated that he did not like playing that game.⁵ He rationalized imposing his own nondemocratic game by pointing out that democracy was only democratic to the majority; since democracy cannot be achieved for the whole, it should be denied to the whole.⁶ At first, Qaddafi did not know what political system he wanted, but the LASU gave him an operational model of what he did not want. He chose instead a system that avoided the state.⁷ The ultimate result of rule through people's committees was chaos. Hence ended the first and last democratic experiment during the rule of General Qaddafi. The Libyan strongman is unlikely to submit to the will of the people in the future. His policies have demonstrated a firm belief in holding power until death, a belief shared by the majority of past and present Arab leaders.

Qaddafi realized that a direct attack on the LASU would cost him the limited support he had won in his few years in power. More worrisome were divisions that could occur in the RCC if he should try to dilute the powers of the other eleven members. His colleagues held important positions in the LASU and were looking to build their own independent power bases. He needed to lay groundwork before launching his second coup, to rid himself of the LASU and troublesome coconspirators in the RCC.

In preparation, he adopted the classic British colonial divide-and-conquer policy. By exacerbating the existing divisions in Libyan society, Qaddafi soon created chaos. Initially he used the few supporters he had acquired, along with members of his tribe, to spearhead the change. In a well-planned and well-executed move, Qaddafi's supporters took over the leadership of public and private organizations. Workers were encouraged to take over the factories, private firms with more than ten employees were nationalized, and workers were encouraged to form people's committees and to run them. Private property was nationalized, and renters were told not to pay rent to landlords. Even the



armed forces fell into disarray when soldiers were encouraged to disobey officers. It did not take long for the chaos to develop a momentum of its own. The society was truly divided: son against father, employee against employer, landlord against renter, merchant against buyer, student against teacher, woman against man, poor against rich, police against army, Arab nationalist against isolationist, Nasserist against Ba'thist.⁸ Qaddafi had succeeded in turning Libyan society against itself in a destructive frenzy. Into that unstable environment he unleashed his "solution to the problems of mankind," the Third International Theory. In the Zwara (now renamed Five Points City) speech, he made it clear that only those who adopted the new ideology would be safe from harassment and injury and could enjoy the benefits of his revolution.⁹ Many were forced by economic conditions to adopt it. Some of the new recruits advocated change but lacked the capacity to reflect on the implications of the new system. Others were opportunists blinded by hatred and jealousy, with little or no moral conviction.

The Zwara speech inaugurated the Libyan leader's version of "popular democracy." Central to the concept was the formation of people's committees at every level of Libyan society. These committees, in turn, sent delegates to the General People's Congress (GPC), which replaced the LASU as the only legislative body in the country. The GPC was empowered by Qaddafi to select the executive branch of government, including ministers, prime ministers, and heads of state.

General Qaddafi was not merely interested in replacing the LASU with the GPC. He was intent upon shaking the traditional foundations of Libyan society, eliminating every form of opposition, and instituting a system that guaranteed the future survival of his regime, even though formal institutions such as the GPC were unable to accomplish Qaddafi's goals alone. Hence emerged a need for a parallel informal structure accountable only to Qaddafi. In 1977 the Libyan leader declared "the authority of the people," which established Libya as a *jamahiriya*—a term for which there is no exact translation but which refers to a "state of the masses" where Libyans were supposed to rule themselves without state institutions.¹⁰ Overseeing in the *jamahiriya* was entrusted to the newly created revolutionary committees.

Judging by the numerous arrests as well as civilian and military executions in 1977,¹¹ it did not occur to the multitudes who had joined the people's committees in 1974 that their newly acquired power was ephemeral. Three years after the Zwara speech, their roles as leaders ended as abruptly as they had begun. The real power was vested by General Qaddafi in the informal structure, the newly created revolutionary committees developed by him to oversee the people's committees. Leaders of these committees were primarily selected from Qaddafi's tribe. Until 1994 the leadership of these committees con-

tinued to be in the hands of his kinsmen along with few individuals from loyal tribes (see figure A.1).

Revolutionary committee members on the other hand were initially selected from the pool of respondents to General Qaddafi's speech. However, continued membership in that exclusive organization was contingent not only upon one's memorizing Qaddafi's speeches and emulating him in every manner but also upon one's creating and inciting "revolutionary" disruption in certain assigned areas. As is the case in all such movements, some of these committee members were true believers, but others were opportunistic and corrupt. Their loyalty to General Qaddafi earned them material benefits denied to other segments of society. It permitted them to travel abroad and live in the best hotels in the world at Libyan government expense, to dabble in business when possible, to take commissions on government-imported products, and to accomplish other endeavors. Other benefits included the appropriation of private homes after forcibly removing the owners and the acquisition of large, long-term, interest-free loans from government banks. Some were able to arrange for full scholarships to universities in the United States and Europe. While abroad, they manned Libya's embassies after converting them to people's bureaus, hounded and persecuted other Libyans who had fled the country fearing for their lives, compiled death lists, and took out contracts on Qaddafi's opponents overseas.

Perhaps the most important function of the revolutionary committees today is to insulate Qaddafi from an officious bureaucracy and from other members of the RCC. More than once, they have given Qaddafi the moral and physical support to overcome coup attempts by dissident members of the RCC and by Libyan exiles. Members of the revolutionary committees oversee and mobilize but do not hold official positions; the members of people's committees do. Each revolutionary member represents Qaddafi; therefore, decisions made by the committees are nonnegotiable and irrevocable and, in many instances, unquestionable.¹²

These seemingly omnipotent committees are not invulnerable to the manipulation of General Qaddafi, the person who created them and who knows their weaknesses. He understands the allure of power and, therefore, purges them periodically to prevent committee members from developing their own individual followings.¹³ The purges usually begin when revolutionary committee members acquire enough wealth and influence. When they materially have a great deal to lose by opposing the regime, Qaddafi moves against them benignly. They are usually posted abroad in people's bureaus (embassies), banks, and other regional and international Libyan government interests across the globe. At home, the vacancies are filled either by emerging members of Qaddafi's tribe or other candidates from Libya's impoverished population.



One such purge took place on September 1, 1994, when Qaddafi ordered the establishment of 250 cleansing committees, which he entrusted with verifying what Libyans own. Libyans must now periodically give to a cleansing committee in their area of residence a full account of their material wealth and their means of acquiring it. Amputation of the hands is the punishment for those individuals that do not declare their wealth and are caught by the authorities.¹⁴

In September 1993, while celebrating the twenty-fourth anniversary of his coup, General Qaddafi declared he was no longer satisfied with Libya's political structure. Apparently fascinated by the 1871 Paris commune, he decided to establish a commune system in 1993 Libya. He envisaged dividing the country into 1,500 autonomous, self-run, self-regulating communes. The cleansing committees were to be the final building blocks for integrating the commune system into the political structure.

This type of policy fits the pattern of deliberate destabilization employed by Qaddafi for almost a quarter of a century. It is extremely difficult to know why the General does what he does, because only few individuals in his inner circle are privy to his thought process. However, these sudden periodic changes in the political structure are proving to be his primary technique for diffusing domestic pressures on the regime. New laws, regulations, and committees have in the past been very successful in diverting public attention to personal matters and away from the regime's actions.

The economic hardship during the past fifteen years of Qaddafi's rule forced more than one delegate to the GPC to question the wisdom of policies that deprived Libyans of their basic freedoms and thrust their economy into an endless depression.¹⁵ Recently, for the first time, many members of the GPC publicly expressed their frustration. Some members blamed the regime for the international ostracism of Libya and the pariah status imposed on the country by the Security Council of the United Nations. The mere fact that delegates began to ask questions told General Qaddafi that a point of equilibrium—a flaw in his system that must be avoided at all costs—had been reached. The people and the political structure had adapted to the new rules and regulations. Opponents of the regime began to focus on the sources of instability, namely General Qaddafi and his revolutionary committees, and plan for their elimination.¹⁶ Sensing danger, the government issued a new set of edicts and established new ephemeral institutions in an effort to diffuse the threat by creating further instability.

General Qaddafi's regime is capable of inflicting tremendous psychological pain without physical force. Even though it frequently resorts to raw physical terror, the regime has always preferred psychological pressure. A society can get used to physical violence in any form including torture and death, but no

society can withstand the psychological trauma of continuously living on the edge of uncertainty. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Qaddafi's character is his affinity for social experimentation. He has always maintained that his system is an experiment in social engineering, and thus experimentation is part and parcel of the whole package.

The General is not insane, and the attempts that many have made to use psychological models of analysis to prove he is are not only short-sighted but neglect the sub-systemic factors that shape Libyan politics and society.¹⁷

Most world leaders employ a certain degree of temporal plagiarism in trying to revive past glories of their societies, but very few do this as intensively as Qaddafi does. In recent history, Libya's political destiny moved from the court of the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul, to the court of King Victor Emmanuel in Rome (1912), to the court of the Fascist Mussolini (1922), to the court of the United Nations in New York (1948). In contrast to all the others, the United Nations attempted to establish a democratic system with democratic institutions in the newly established Kingdom of Libya, but the system failed. In the UN scheme, too much power was embedded in the monarch at the expense of popular democratic institutions. Hence, whoever controlled the monarch controlled the country, and Qaddafi proved that in 1969.

Qaddafi claims to be seeking a global utopian society. In the abstract, any political theory can appear workable. Thus the *leader*, as he likes to call himself, could theoretically combine elements of Islam, Marxism, Nasserism, and African socialism with his own thought, and still have a theory. Indeed a magnificent theory can be devised because on a temporal level, most contradiction can be rationalized. However, when applied to a society bound not only by time but also by space, the theory falls apart, and chaos in most cases ensues.

Over the past two decades, official and unofficial political institutions in Libya have undergone a number of name changes and little else. The real seat of power remains the same: General Qaddafi and a small inner circle made up of close associates and some newly emerging members of his tribe. Since a nation cannot survive, to say nothing of prosper, under such irrational and hybrid policies as some of these have been, the cost to Libya has been great. Well into the twenty-first century, Libya will continue to suffer from the chaotic malice of the past twenty-five years.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEN

During the past two decades coup attempts, instability, and popular discontent have forced General Qaddafi increasingly to rely on members of his own tribe, the Qathathfa, to guarantee his personal security and the security of his regime. The Qathathfa is rather a small tribe that was exiled from Cyrenaica to the barren Sirtica region during the nineteenth century. Poor and illiterate,



many of its members lived, until the revolution, a nomadic life herding livestock. The monarchy denied them membership in the prestigious Cyrenaica Defense Forces, which were reserved for individuals from loyal tribes of the Green Mountain of Cyrenaica. The Qathathfa, however, were able to join the armed forces and the police force, both of which were considered by the monarchy to be secondary organizations.

General Qaddafi promoted junior Qathathfa officers in the armed forces and entrusted them with sensitive military posts. He also encouraged and facilitated the transfer of his kinsmen from the police to the armed forces, where they were either kept their former ranks or were promoted and entrusted with important positions (see appendix).

Today there are a large number of Qathathfa junior officers headed by a core of colonels who are individually and jointly responsible for the preservation of the regime. Most prominent among them are Ahmad Qathaf al-Damm, Masoud Abdul-Hafith, Misbah Abdul-Hafith, Khalifa Ihneish, Omar Ishkal, Al-Barani Ishkal, Omran Atiatallah al-Qaddafi, Imhamad Mahmoud al-Qaddafi, Khamis Masoud al-Qaddafi, Saad Masoud al-Qathaf, Hassan al-Kabir al-Qaddafi, and Ali al-Kilbo. Periodically, General Qaddafi assigns them new responsibilities or changes their portfolios. Until April 1995 the central sector (Sirte) was under the command of Colonel Khalifa Ihneish, the southern sector (Sabha) under Colonel Masoud Abdul-Hafith, the Benghazi sector under Misbah Abdul-Hafith, and the Tobruk sector under Ahmad Qaddafi al-Damm.

A failed coup attempt in February 1995 prompted General Qaddafi to make changes that gave his cousins even more encompassing powers. Ahmad Qathaf al-Damm's territory was expanded to include all of the Cyrenaica. Khalifa Ihneish was appointed the commander of armaments and munitions, Massoud Abdul-Hafith was promoted to commanding officer of military security in Libya, and Al-Barani Ishkal was assigned to command domestic military security. Ali al-Kilbo, who was given the sensitive post of protecting Qaddafi's residence, was made the commanding officer of the Azazia barracks guard. Leadership of the revolutionary committees was given to Mohamad al-Majthoub al-Qaddafi, and information and propaganda was assigned to Colonel Sayed Qathaf al-Damm.

As is quite apparent, all of the assignments overlap to ensure that even members of Qaddafi's own tribe find the task of toppling him difficult. The Libyan leader learned the necessity of such a situation the hard way when, in the early 1980s, his cousin and confidant Hassan Ishkal—to whom he had entrusted not only domestic security and oil issues but the command of Libya's forces in Chad—attempted to overshadow him. Ishkal's strong personality and unwillingness to adhere to Qaddafi's orders brought him into direct conflict with the Libyan leader. He was killed in a firefight with General Qaddafi's

supporters. Rumors persist that the Libyan leader gave the order to end his cousin's life after capturing him alive.

Other important but less strategic posts were filled by individuals loyal to Qaddafi but not from the Qathathfa tribe. Most new recruits primarily come from the large Warfala tribe. The Qathathfa have blood ties to Warfala and hence until recently appeared to trust Warfala more than others did. The third side of this triangle of security was formed by Major Jaloud's Magharha tribe, from whose midst recruits were sometimes chosen. Their appointments, predominantly to junior positions in the hierarchy, went a long way toward consolidating alliances, guaranteeing security, and simultaneously giving the regime an aura of plurality. Ahmad Awn was appointed as chief of military operations, Al-Hadi Imberish chief of popular defense. Ahmad al-Mugasibi was given the post of secretary of general command, Abdul-Rahman al-Saeed became responsible for military administration, and Al-Mahdi al-Arbi was appointed as commander of border forces. The important position of commander of the air force went to Qaddafi's longtime ally (Ali) al-Rifi al-Sharif.

Until very recently it was assumed by Libyan experts that Major Abdul-Salam Jalloud was Qaddafi's right-hand man and second-in-command. But like all the other members of the Revolutionary Command Council, Major Jalloud has been marginalized and currently finds himself—along with the remaining members of the original RCC, Khweildi al-Humeidi, Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, and Mustapha al-Kharoubi—struggling for his political survival, if not his life.

Khweildi al-Humeidi's duties have been reduced to the occasional carrying of Qaddafi's messages to other Arab capitals. Abu Bakr Yunis Jaber continues to head the joint chiefs of staff, a ceremonial position lacking any real power. He is an honest, decent man of little intelligence but extremely loyal to General Qaddafi. Mustapha al-Kharoubi is currently the head of military intelligence. Jalloud, who belongs to the Magharha tribe, has been stripped of his power by the Libyan leader and replaced by Abdula al-Sanusi, another member of the Magharha tribe. While Jalloud brought a great deal of benefits to his tribe in the form of jobs, wealth, and opportunity, his family's standing within the Magharha tribe is inferior to that of Abdula al-Sanusi's family. Colonel Abdula al-Sanusi is married to Safia Farkash's sister. Safia Farkash is General Qaddafi's wife and the mother of his children. That marriage made Qaddafi's and al-Sanusi's children first cousins. The marriage also enabled Qaddafi to replace Jalloud with al-Sanusi without offending the Magharha tribe. Indeed, it linked in a round-about way the Magharha with the Qathathfa. Abdula al-Sanusi is currently Qaddafi's right-hand man and second-in-command. He is the de facto internal and external security chief and the Libyan leader's confidant. He is thought to be the mastermind behind the Lockerbie



affair and the kidnapping of the Libyan human-rights dissident Mansur Kikhia from Egypt in December of 1993.

Although the information is unsubstantiated, General Qaddafi is thought to be creating what is termed as the Permanent Command Committee for the Revolutionary Committees. Indications are that the new committee is made up of five members, three of whom are Ali Mansour al-Qaddafi (information), Ahmad Ibrahim al-Qaddafi (ideological consolidation), and Mohamad al-Majthoub al-Qaddafi (relations). The other two members are rumored to be Abdulsalam al-Zadmah (internal organization) and Abdula al-Sanusi (external affairs). Another emerging force that is making itself felt on the Libyan scene is Sayf al-Islam, the first-born son of Qaddafi's second wife, Safia Farkash. There is no doubt that Sayf al-Islam is being groomed, as are the first-borns of other Arab leaders, to assume a position of prominence in Libyan politics. How much prominence will ultimately depend on how much his father trusts him. It is extremely difficult to know who is assigned what in Libyan politics, where neither position nor title really matters. But one thing is certain: as far as General Qaddafi is concerned, blood is much, much thicker than water.

ECONOMICS

Libya's fragile economic system proved to be far more vulnerable to disorder than the political system. Qaddafi's regime has tried but has not been able to deliver on its many promises. The Libyan economy remains almost totally dependent on oil exports, and few serious attempts have been made to reduce that dependence. Less than twenty percent of the GDP is independent of oil and the oil sector.¹⁸ The economy continues to be that of an import-based, parasitic, rentier state, where domestic industrial production is insignificant. Most of the industrial plants bought by the central government after the revolution, at great cost to the Libyan taxpayer, remain inactive, for reasons ranging from poor maintenance and lack of spare parts to inefficient management and pilfering of industrial resources. Even the Misurata steel complex that Qaddafi touts as exemplifying the drive towards industrialization has proven itself to be a white elephant. Chronically unprofitable, the plant might have to shut down.¹⁹

Although it has survived, another project hobbled by the credit crunch is the Great Man-made River. Designed to bring underground water from deep in the desert to the parched coastal regions for agricultural use, the project has proven more expensive than even free-spending Libya can afford. Water from the project started flowing to the city of Benghazi on September 1, 1993, but there is still no guarantee that there will be enough water to make the project cost-efficient.²⁰ To illustrate the price of putting politics above economics, the

project will continue on schedule regardless of cost. Qaddafi has invested too much political capital in it.

Most Libyan cities have no renewable sources of fresh water. During the hot summer months, some cities receive fresh water once a week, others once a month. The water rations distributed to the inhabitants of the capital, Tripoli, for example, are salty, useless for washing and bad for the health. People cannot bathe regularly, a situation increasing the likelihood of disease. Most of Libya's hospitals, referred to by a *Wall Street Journal* journalist as "dirty death traps," constantly experience water shortages and have to rely on imported water for their daily needs. The same article reports that new eye hospital in Tripoli has had no water since it opened in 1990.²¹ In a country with over 2,000 kilometers of shoreline, few can comprehend why the government has not spent money on desalination plants and instead has spent billions of dollars on a dubious project that will not alleviate its misery any time soon. For the first time and at great risk to life and livelihood, many are beginning to openly question Qaddafi's motives.²²

Of all the Libyans, the Cyrenaicans, who inhabit eastern Libya, are perhaps the most cynical. They say that Qaddafi dreamt up the Great Man-made River as an excuse to take Cyrenaica's water and irrigate his extremely arid home district of Sirte, which has been outfitted with a brand new thirsty city paid for with Cyrenaica's oil. Gossip and a little complaint can do no harm to a thriving and popular government, but they threaten any government perceived as tyrannical and cruel. In a country like Libya, where societal integration has not fully taken place and separatist tendencies lie dormant, dissatisfaction warns of separatist dangers ahead, with devastating consequences to all the inhabitants of Libya and the region.

The only sector spared chaos is agriculture, due largely to the regime's hands-off policy. Belatedly realizing the failure of his former agricultural policy, Qaddafi decided to end government involvement in the failed Kufra and other projects of the 1970s. Fearing tribal rivalry and intertribal bloodbaths over land ownership, he left that issue in limbo, merely stating that "land belongs to God and anyone plowing it should benefit from its fruits." He left land in the hands of its original owners without actually having to give it back to them. As the regime began in 1978 to nationalize private property and industry as well as other aspects of commercial life, farming became the only area unregulated by government. Yet even this relative agricultural freedom and the heavy governmental subsidies that accompanied it were not enough to spur agricultural production. Farmers did produce, but there was no market for their products. They had to sell to government agencies at fixed prices. It was not long before farmers discovered that it was more profitable to live off

the subsidy than to produce. The result showed in the growth rate of agriculture, which plummeted from approximately twelve percent annually from 1965 to 1978, to less than four percent annually from 1978 to 1988 (table 5.1).²³

Agriculture was not alone. During the same period, industry sharply declined, from an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent to an annual growth rate of 11 percent, and manufacturing from a rate of 15 percent to less than eight percent. The service sector, once one of the most vibrant in developing countries, experienced the sharpest decline in annual growth, from 18 percent to negative five percent.²⁴

Libyans call the years from 1978 to 1988 the "dark decade" because of the political repression and the extreme economic hardship.²⁵ It was a decade of shortages, when Libyans were forced to make do with less of everything. Particularly harsh were the years from 1983 to 1988, when the per capita real gross domestic product declined by 41.9 percent. World Bank statistics show an annual decline of three percent in Libya's growth rate since 1969.²⁶ Rarely in the world's economic history has a country with Libya's liquid surpluses demonstrated such a decline in growth and standard of living in such a short period of time (table 5.2).

Only the revolutionary committees and their leadership experienced no shortages. Goods were imported for them through special warehouses catering to their needs while the average citizen had to wait in long lines for commodities that were seldom available. Italian firms erected huge government-financed department stores throughout the country, at great cost. After the first few months of operation, the towering structures came to symbolize the First of September Revolution and its ideology: they were huge and attractive but hollow within. Some were burned to hide embezzlement; the rest still remain empty.

Shortages of all commodities and goods continued. The revolutionary elite got whatever they wanted; the rest of the people continued to fend for themselves. Particularly troubling was the shortage of medical supplies. Often doctors could not operate on critically ill patients for the lack of vital items such as sutures.

Since General Qaddafi assumed power in 1969, approximately \$50 billion of foreign exchange earnings cannot be accounted for.²⁷ The regime has never been known for its frankness, and the disappearance of Libya's wealth remains a mystery.²⁸ In all probability much of the missing funds were directed towards Libya's newly created military industrial complex for the development of nonconventional weapons.

For the past decade, Libya has actively been seeking to upgrade its nonconventional military capability. In addition to the highly publicized Rabta chemical plant, major secret projects for the production of chemical and bio-

Table 5.1. Annual average growth rates of total and per capita agricultural and food production, 1961–91 (percentages)

Year	Agricultural production		Food production	
	Total	Per capita	Total	Per capita
1961–1970	7.5	3.4	7.4	3.4
1970–1980	6.8	2.4	6.9	2.4
1980–1991	4.6	0.5	4.6	0.5
1987–1988	3.1	-0.6	3.1	-0.5
1988–1989	5.6	1.9	5.6	1.9
1989–1990	4.6	0.9	4.6	1.0
1990–1991	4.6	0.9	4.6	0.9

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993); *World Development Report* (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993).

logical weapons are underway. With technology provided by the German firm Imhausen, research and development of biological weapons are currently being undertaken in the little known town of Taminhint, northwest of the city of Sabha in south-central Libya. Taminhint is also the site of the OTRAG Project.²⁹ OTRAG, a private German firm, was involved in long-range missile technology development during the 1980s. Under intense American and German pressure the firm withdrew from Libya in 1988. Since then, General Qaddafi has been able to reactivate the project with the help of teams of German scientists and computer experts.

China and North Korea have also been actively assisting Libya's missile development. The Chinese, in particular, have received a first installment of two billion American dollars in 1990 to coproduce with Libya an accurate missile capable of striking targets over 1,500 kilometers in range.³⁰ The China Project is located in the city of Sabha, where another chemical plant is currently being built. North Korea, on the other hand, has been instrumental in upgrading Libya's old Soviet-made Scud missiles to carry larger warheads and travel longer distances.³¹ A third project code-named Al-Fateh is located in Waddan, 500 kilometers southeast of Tripoli. The city of Waddan has emerged as the newest site for ballistic missile research and development, as well as the location of a proposed chemical-producing plant.

Such ambitious projects consume a great deal of capital, but the popular belief is that what has not been spent on military hardware and foreign adventures, or on white elephants and regime glorification, has been appropriated for personal use by General Qaddafi and his close supporters.³² Caught in



Table 5.2. Annual average growth rates of total and per capita real GDP at market prices, 1960-96 (percentages)

Year	Real product		Inflation rate
	Total	Per capita	
1960-90	4.3	0.0	—
1960-70	24.8	20.0	—
1970-80	3.2	-1.1	—
1980-90	-4.4	-8.1	—
1970-75	-5.6	-9.5	—
1975-80	9.0	4.3	—
1977-86	-2.6	—	10.9
1983-84	-3.7	-7.6	—
1984-85	-8.8	-12.4	—
1985-86	-8.7	-12.2	—
1986-87	-3.2	-6.8	—
1987-88	-23.6	—	4.4
1988-89	-10.2	—	3.1
1989-90	7.2	—	1.3
1990-91	7.0	—	8.6
1991-92	2.9	—	11.7
1992-93	-2.9	—	15.0
1993-94	-4.7	—	20.0
1994-95	-3.0	—	30.0
1994-96	-8.2	—	76.4

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993); author's calculations.

a web of insecurity, the regime has found itself isolated with few domestic, regional, and international friends.

Most damaging to the Libyan economy is the thriving black market. As individuals, Libyans are no longer permitted to import goods and thus have to rely on a variety of illicit sources. The main source is government-owned shops where enterprising individuals buy goods and electronics at subsidized prices and sell them for what the market can bear. Another source is smugglers—foreign workers who purchase cheap products overseas and sell them in Libya, in Libyan dinars, charging the black-market U.S. dollar-dinar exchange rate. Foreign nationals with work permits can exchange ninety percent of their




Figure 5.1. Libya



Table 5.3. Balance of payments summaries I: 1970-90 (millions of dollars)

Year	Export of goods	Import of goods	Balance of trade	Total services debt	Total services credit	Private transfers (net)	Balance
1970	2,397	-674	1,723	-964	139	-140	758
1973	3,528	-2,011	1,517	-1,237	216	-273	223
1975	6,418	-4,424	1,994	-1,553	375	-260	556
1980	21,919	-10,368	11,551	-3,650	1,446	-1,089	8,258
1984	11,028	-8,464	2,564	-3,420	720	-1,240	-1,376
1985	10,353	-5,754	4,599	-2,314	526	-859	1,952
1986	5,814	-4,434	1,380	-1,638	629	-490	-119
1987	5,828	-5,391	437	-1,801	845	-470	-989
1988	5,644	-5,753	-109	-2,071	889	-496	-1,787
1989	7,283	-6,517	766	-1,871	566	-472	-1,011
1990	11,362	-7,582	3,780	-1,880	784	-446	2,238

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993); *World Development Report* (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990).

Libyan currency earnings at the official rate.³³ The net result is a minimum of 800 percent profit in the exchange alone. Those without work permits usually buy subsidized products to sell in their countries of origin. Over 50 percent of Libya's labor force is foreigners, many with black-market incomes dwarfing their official wages. The country is inundated with foreigners and their dependents whose sole purpose is to sell on the black market. The lure of such huge profits has encouraged a few select revolutionary committees to indulge in the black market. With fortunes to be made overnight, these select members are becoming a major source of hard-currency in the Libyan market.³⁴

Shaken by international isolation, declining oil prices, capital flight, and a crumbling economy (see tables 5.3 and 5.4), General Qaddafi, fearing a popular uprising, decided in 1992 to permit people to open small businesses to supplement their incomes.³⁵ The change in policy was too little too late, however, because economic deterioration had already set in. Libya had become the most expensive country in the world to live in, and no one felt that fact more than the Libyans themselves. Economic conditions remain bad, and the underground economy continues to gain strength. Even though many Libyans have reestablished small businesses, they are still unable to import products. The shoddy products that fill their stores have to be bought from governmental agencies, which import them either from neighboring countries in the name of Arab solidarity or from the former Eastern bloc. Russian and Polish industries need hard currency and are willing to reduce prices to create markets. The quality of many of these goods is so dismal that many Libyans have returned to the underground economy where European, American, and quality Asian goods can be found. In 1993 many of the government purchasing agencies began importing limited quantities of consumer goods from Libya's former trading partners, Italy, Germany, and France.

Libya has emerged as a transit area for Eastern European products. Poor Egyptians, Tunisians, Sudanese, and Chadians, unable to buy expensive Western products in their countries, depend on these subsidized goods to make ends meet. In Cairo and Alexandria, for example, there emerged in 1991 Libyan *souks* (markets) where inexpensive, subsidized, duty-free products imported for the Libyan market by the Libyan government are sold. These thriving souks have been very helpful to the cash-strapped Egyptian government, and as long as Libya continues the indirect subsidy, the Egyptian government is unlikely to shut them down.

On the western front, Tunisians are also profiting from Libya's economic mismanagement. Annually, Libya buys millions of dollars worth of Tunisian foodstuffs and other products. Yet very little is ever sold in Libya. Tunisians and enterprising Libyans buy many of the subsidized commodities in Libya

Table 5.4. Balance of payments summaries II: 1970-90 (millions of dollars)

Year	Govt. transfers (net)	Total long-term capital	Direct investment	Short-term capital (net)	Errors and omissions	Overall balance	Changes in reserves
1970	-113	139	139	13	-100	697	-697
1973	-156	-510	-147	485	-1022	-980	980
1975	-164	-1524	-614	305	-1070	-1897	1897
1980	-46	-1372	-1089	-331	-104	6405	-6430
1984	-81	180	-17	651	-1096	-1722	1722
1985	-45	91	119	693	-328	2363	-2363
1986	-36	-238	-177	-192	798	213	-213
1987	-56	-2784	-98	2657	172	-1000	1000
1988	-37	-430	98	593	270	-1391	1391
1989	-16	88	125	1102	130	293	-293
1990	-35	-507	159	-500	-37	1159	-1159

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993); *World Development Report* (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990).

Table 5.5. Tentative terms and trade estimates for Libya, 1970-90

Year	Imports			Exports			
	Value	Unit value	Quantum	Value	Unit value	Quantum	Purchasing power of exports
1970	11	5	212	8	31	27	35
1973	18	10	175	27	44	61	42
1975	31	33	95	52	61	86	51
1979	73	59	124	78	89	88	83
1981	66	111	59	124	94	132	70
1982	64	99	64	106	91	117	70
1983	56	86	65	110	89	124	63
1984	51	84	60	92	87	106	59
1985	56	83	68	61	87	70	65
1986	35	41	87	62	96	65	37
1987	40	54	74	70	102	68	39
1988	30	46	66	87	110	79	28
1989	31	55	56	75	112	67	27
1990	36	71	50	83	120	69	30

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993).

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and re-export them back across an unguarded Tunisian border where they are sold at a lower cost than the same product is sold in Tunis.

One of the pillars of Islam is charity, on which Muslims are mandated to spend a certain percentage of their income. Yet while it is not considered wrong to support neighboring economies, charity still begins at home. Libya's official economy is crumbling, and the prices of goods on the black market are fast rising beyond the reach of even the well-to-do. Many Libyans today are finding themselves unable to make ends meet. Prices increase daily, and terms of trade deteriorate (see table 5.5) as Libyan currency weakens against the United States dollar, which serves as the exchange medium.

SOCIETY

In the future, Libyans may forgive Qaddafi's quixotic management of the economy. They might even forget his brutality. But it is doubtful they will forgive him for the damage he has inflicted on the Libyan character. Unlike some leaders in less-developed countries who assume power for the sole purpose of enriching themselves, Qaddafi has other aims. No longer satisfied with merely modifying the Libyan political and economic system, he has been intent upon remolding the Libyan character. By constantly agitating Libyan society the regime has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of the unusual, in which people commit acts that under normal circumstances they would not contemplate. General Qaddafi does not order people to commit immoral acts, but he has provided them with the opportunity to do so by contesting the traditional and religious norms that have served as a basis for self-censorship. Furthermore the absence of civil laws and courts for the preservation of human rights have enabled many to make use of the opportunity. To those few, "revolutionary right" has become a carte blanche for immoral behavior, including taking over a neighbor's home or business. It has emerged as a password for upward mobility in a structurally perverted tribal society.

Yet while General Qaddafi is partially responsible for the state of chaos, the larger responsibility must fall upon the shoulders of Libya's citizens. In the chaos there has been opportunity for old tribal conflict and personal grudges to resurface and become active—a situation coinciding perfectly with the regime's divide-and-conquer plan. It was in the regime's interest to have business interests embroiled in conflict with employees, landlords with tenants, students with teachers. The regime saw in squabbles the opportunity for greater division, extending beyond the perimeter of the relationship. For example, a student angry at a teacher for a bad grade need not contest the grade by existing rules. Armed with "revolutionary right," a disgruntled student can occupy the teacher's home and live in it or send a relative to live there. There are

no institutions or laws to prevent such lawlessness from redefining relationships.

In Orwellian fashion, "Big Brother" General Qaddafi consolidated his hold on every aspect of life. According to Lisa Anderson, General Qaddafi's "continued interference in the details of government" is a primary reason for a number of failed coup attempts against the regime.³⁶ Living under such circumstances the majority of Libyans became passive. They no longer produced. They went to work but did nothing except drink coffee and read books and newspapers. Some went to work only to hang spare jackets up conspicuously before going off to visit friends, wait in lines for scarce consumer goods, or see to other personal affairs. Many people held two jobs, a morning job and an afternoon job, usually in agriculture, where they could grow food for their own consumption and earn extra income in the underground economy.

Huge government-built shopping complexes now permeate the country. Most are half-empty, the employees nowhere to be found. A citizen wanting a simple document such as a birth certificate can wait more than a week to find an application processing clerk. Any issue requiring government approval or involvement takes years to resolve. Libyans have ceased to work for the public good because they have lost faith in the concept. All public projects continue to be mostly staffed by foreigners.

The government imports foreign labor because well-paid foreigners tend to be docile and because Libyans do not want to work. Whenever the government needs a political demonstration, which is quite often, revolutionary committees organize foreign workers and chaperon them from one location to another. As members of the armed forces and/or militia service, all Libyans above the age of eighteen and under the age of fifty-six have to comply when ordered to be at a certain place at a certain time. Obviously, valuable production time is wasted. Less apparent is the impact of this waste on education—students have for the past decade attended school for less than six months annually. Their school year was usually interrupted by government-ordered demonstrations or military service beginning daily at midday. The average school day is now less than four hours. To make matters worse, the regime has proposed the closing of all elementary schools and the shifting of elementary education to the home. Such a proposal in a country where illiteracy among women exceeds fifty percent is educational suicide.

To many Libyans seeking stability, the logical solution is a return to the sanctity and safety of the tribe. The result appears in the elections to people's committees. A large number of candidates run and are elected along tribal affiliation, and bloody battles between tribes have taken place over land or political posts. Paradoxically even General Qaddafi, while denouncing tribal-



ism, has enhanced the standing of his own tribe, surrounded himself with its members, and appointed them to key positions in the country.³⁷ Libya still exhibits some characteristics of traditional society even though it has evolved beyond a traditional tribal structure. However, in the absence of democratic political institutions such a tribal undercurrent can in the long run prove to be detrimental to the process of modernity.

Again, it might be easy to blame Qaddafi; it is only fair to say that Libyans also share the blame for this state of affairs. Their passivity in the face of adversity, their unwillingness to work hard, and their dependence on the government for handouts has left them vulnerable to the minutest changes in the political and economic milieus. Moreover their unwillingness to sacrifice for rights and liberty provides ample opportunities to present and future regimes to survive and to dominate every aspect of their lives.

THE STATE OF THE MASSES

While the political system established by General Qaddafi continues to metamorphose, it remains one of the most restrictive of such systems. Political participation outside the narrow limits established by the regime is a capital offense.³⁸ The media are tightly controlled, and free speech is nonexistent. Government intervention devoid of the rule of law pervades all aspects of life. All laws were suspended in 1974, and the ensuing political structure could only operate in an environment without laws.

When laws were suspended, all individual rights vanished, including the right of individuals to adjudication. The regime did not abolish the courts, for that would appear too undemocratic. It did, however, deprive the courts of the only thing that makes them function: a set of criminal, commercial, and civil laws.³⁹ The exception was all the revolutionary dicta on coercion for use by Qaddafi's vanguard, the revolutionary committees. Yet even these dicta could not be used by the regular court system. The volume containing them was written as a concise guide for the use of revolutionary committees to mete out punishment to anyone suspected of counterrevolutionary activity.

Televised trials in the late 1970s and in the 1980s left another sour taste of revolutionary justice. Revolutionary committees, cloaked with the garment of revolutionary legitimacy acted as judges, jurors, and executioners. To the amazement and horror of the television audience, a number of young men were summarily hanged after hasty trials in which they were denied right to counsel.⁴⁰ To the majority of Libyans, public hangings were both barbaric and non-Islamic. Older Libyans compared the hangings to those committed by Italy's Fascists under Mussolini. The hangings, however, did achieve their purpose of increasing the level of fear and insecurity, and hence instability. People learned to expect collective punishment.⁴¹

The only protective laws enforced in Libya are those protecting the rights of non-Libyans. Foreigners get paid on schedule, whereas Libyan government employees sometimes are forced to endure four or five months without pay. A foreigner can sue the Libyan government, but a Libyan cannot. A foreigner can engage in trade and move freely with the government's blessing, but a Libyan cannot. When General Qaddafi officially changed Libya to a *Jamahiriyah* (state of the masses), he invited all Arabs to acquire the "Arab citizenship," settle in Libya, and benefit from the Libyan welfare state. Libyans were told to emigrate to Egypt, Sudan, or Chad, because there was nothing for them in Libya.⁴² Qaddafi offered each family of Libyan emigrants an annual \$30,000 stipend.⁴³

Much of General Qaddafi's thought and politics is a product of a different era and thus appears senseless from a twentieth-century perspective. For example, the policy of authenticity adopted over the past quarter of a century served to rid Libyan traditions and the Arabic language of "external contamination."⁴⁴ All public and private signs, as well as travel documents, were Arabicized. Foreign nationals wishing to enter Libya had to translate their passports into Arabic to accommodate an Arabic visa. Public sector employees were encouraged to wear traditional Libyan dress or military fatigues. Those within the media were required to wear traditional clothes, and it was mandated that newborns take authentic Arab names. Even the Gregorian calendar has been replaced with a new solar calendar that begins with the migration of the Prophet Mohamad in 622. The names of the Gregorian months have also been replaced with names invented by General Qaddafi. The traditional Lunar Islamic calendar used by all Muslim countries has also been changed to begin with the death of the Prophet rather than his migration. Hence, the simple task of determining the day and date has become confusing because Libya neither follows the standard lunar Islamic calendar nor the global solar calendar. Every year a new set of rules and regulations telling Libyans what to wear, eat, say, and read is enacted by the regime. The country has become one of the most restrictive in the world.

CONCLUSION

To appreciate the full scope of Libya's predicament one must experience General Qaddafi's rule firsthand, by living in Libya—and only for a short period of time. Books and scholarly journal articles provide only part of the picture of what Libyan society is currently undergoing.

In this chapter I attempt to provide the reader with a true, unbiased representation of events in the Libyan polity. But because fact and fiction sometimes blur in Libyan politics, I might be accused of exaggeration and even polemicizing. The domestic policies of the Libyan regime have often bordered



on fiction. A case in point is a 1977 edict whereby the Libyan leader suggested that in order to achieve self-sufficiency every Libyan family had to raise chickens in the home. The cages and birds were imported and, for an obligatory fee of fifty-seven Libyan dinars (\$150 at the 1977 exchange rate), were distributed by the government to Libyans. To many city dwellers in small apartments, raising chickens in their kitchens was a difficult if not an impossible affair. The result was that many ate the birds and found other uses for the cages.

The point of this example is not to ridicule General Qaddafi but merely to demonstrate that the decision-making process in Libya has always been haphazard and rarely follows any given theory or ideology. General Qaddafi's declaration that Libya must achieve food self-sufficiency was justification enough for his aids to institute that controversial plan of raising chickens in the home. The Libyan leader found the idea novel enough to encourage its implementation. On another occasion the General commented on the high cost of new automobiles. Soon after, the government agency entrusted with importing and selling cars to the public began to import only used cars and ironically sold them at new car prices. The policy was reversed only after a great number of people complained. He remarked about the proliferation of Western musical instruments in the country. The result was the gathering and burning of musical instruments. While driving through an area in the suburbs of the city Benghazi, he wondered whether the area would be suitable for agriculture. Within a month all residential buildings in that area were demolished. As odd as it may appear, many of the policies impacting Libyan society are initiated and implemented in this same fashion.

The General has initiated other policies that have specific and clear objectives. Reconfiguring the Islamic calendar is one example, and replacing the Western names of the months of the Gregorian calendar with Libyan names is another. On the whole Qaddafi is rarely precise about the type of policy he desires and prefers to see the potential policy implemented before he intervenes and modifies it. Even *The Green Book* is general enough to permit different interpretation and experimentation by the revolutionary committees. Ultimately, however, all policies need the blessing of General Qaddafi.

It is imperative to emphasize here is that General Qaddafi, his ideology, and his rule are unique. What makes them even more singular is that the three operate simultaneously yet independently of each other. All are constantly changing, sometimes in different directions. General Qaddafi has the upper hand and permits the other two to be experimented with according to limits that he alone determines. Therefore, attempts to classify him, his ideology, or the Libyan polity according to some existing theory of personality or development will ultimately lead to wrong conclusions. Qaddafi must be judged on his own merit and on his own accomplishments.

Six

Foreign Affairs

As strange and incoherent as Libyan foreign policy might appear to be today, certain popular attitudes that were present during the monarchy became even more pronounced after 1969: a bitter resentment against the establishment of the State of Israel, a strong support for Arab causes and unity, a fervent attachment to Islam, and a degree of xenophobia. These inclinations, manifested in a "revolutionary" mold in 1973 when Qaddafi unleashed his Third International Theory for "the salvation of mankind," were soon replaced in 1978 by a new set of sentiments that emphasized the glorification of General Qaddafi and his revolution at the expense of all else, including Libya's national interest as well as its future political and economic well-being.

GEOGRAPHY AND BUSINESS

Today oil is the source of General Qaddafi's power and a major basis for Libya's intercourse with other nations. However, the real source of Libya's wealth has been its geography, and long after oil is depleted, geography will continue to play an important role. History has demonstrated the importance of Libya's location over the centuries—a location that the Qaddafi regime has chosen not to take advantage of during the past fifteen years.

Two thousand kilometers of southern shores on the Mediterranean made Libya a valuable strategic property at the end of World War II. By arrangement with the British, the United States established and used two bases on the outskirts of the main cities of Tripoli and Benghazi during the North African campaign. After the war, the U.S. returned the second of these bases to Britain but kept the first. Under the "collective trusteeship" plan proposed by the United States,¹ Libya would come under the jurisdiction of the United Nations for a period of ten years, after which the country would be granted independence. The U.S.S.R. and France opposed that proposal. The French feared the impact Libyan independence might have on Francophonic Africa. The Soviet Union's foreign minister Molotov coveted the western part of Libya as the long-sought-after Russian warm-water port on the Mediterranean. De-



spite the Soviet foreign minister's assurances that "the Soviet system would not be introduced into the territory, apart from the democratic order that is desired by the people,"² neither Britain nor the United States trusted the Soviet Union.

As a result of such an opposition Molotov modified the Soviet position and, during the Paris Conference of April 1946, proposed the division of Italy's colonies into four equal units, each to be jointly administered by Italy and one of the big powers. Tripolitania, according to Molotov, was to be administered by Italy and the U.S.S.R.³ That plan was also rejected by the other powers, who then referred the problem to the United Nations in accordance with article 3 of annex 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy.⁴

Soviet intentions became clear on the eve of the postwar Italian elections. In an attempt to boost the Italian Communist Party's fortunes, the U.S.S.R. declared that it favored entrusting Italy with trusteeship over all its former colonies. That kind of action only reinforced in the minds of U.S. policymakers the need to maintain some sort of presence in that area. Mellaha Airfield (renamed Wheelus Air Force Base), on which the U.S. had spent \$100 million, served that purpose.⁵ Moreover, the Soviet attitude made an agreement with the United States more palatable to Libyan policymakers when contrasted with the prospect of coming under the Italian yoke again.

While the Libyan problem was being debated in the United Nations, the United States and Britain were able to sign separate notes with the pre-independence Libyan government. A few months after independence these notes became treaties and formally allowed the stationing of U.S. and British troops in western and eastern Libya, respectively. By throwing its lot in with the West, Libya was able to use the Allies' power, influence, and pressure successfully to prevent any "intrusion of the Soviet camel's nose into the Libyan tent."⁶ However, Libyan policymakers had no intention of being drawn into the cold war. Quite early in their relations with the United States, they made it clear that the idea of a Libyan contribution to the collective defense of the "Free World" was "sentimental" at best. To the average Libyan, defense against French or British "aggression" was much more comprehensible than defense against Soviet imperialism, which was scarcely understood and seldom mentioned.

Soviet-Libyan relations were established in 1955. The Soviets offered "generous" aid to the poverty-stricken country,⁷ but Libyan policymakers refused it for two reasons. On the one hand, accepting aid from the Soviets at that time might have antagonized the United States, the largest contributor of foreign aid to the Libyan treasury. On the other hand, their refusal stemmed from a deep psychological and religious hatred of communism. The term *communist* has in the past been and continues to be equated with the term *kaafir*

(pl. *kufaar*) or "nonbeliever." Traditional dealings with *kufaar* have been limited to two choices—converting them or using the sword on them.⁸ Thus to the Muslim mind in general and to the Libyan mind in particular, any political affiliation can be tolerated, except communism. Christians and Jews for example are considered to be *ahl-al-kitab*, or "people of the book," and are therefore allowed to maintain their laws and autonomy within Muslim society.⁹ But relations with the Soviets were insignificant until 1969 when Muammar al-Qaddafi came to power.

The Libyan monarchy owed a great deal to the United States and Britain during the first decade of its existence. It was totally dependent on these two powers for economic and military aid. For reasons serving their individual interests, both powers pushed for Libyan independence even though the fragmented country had none of the basic ingredients that constitute a viable nation-state. The most important factor that drew both powers to the barren war-torn area was the country's strategic location. Luckily for Libya the issue of its independence coincided with the emergence of the cold war. The Truman administration, having enunciated the Doctrine of Containment, was willing to go to any length to deny the Soviets North Africa. Giving Libya independence and providing for its security by stationing bases there and providing for some of its welfare was seen by U.S. policymakers of the time as a bargain and a worthwhile investment in the security of the United States.

For its part, the Libyan leadership was more interested in keeping the fragmented country together and providing for the survival of an impoverished, malnourished, and uneducated population. Leasing bases to Britain and the United States was viewed as a business venture necessitated by the prevailing economic and political conditions. There was, however, opposition to the bases by some Libyans who feared that their existence would embroil the country in the East-West conflict at the expense of its relationships with other Arab states, particularly its eastern neighbor, revolutionary Egypt. Nonetheless Libya's stark economic reality and the promise of security and a better life as well as money and aid in various forms pushed the government of Mustafa Ben-Halim to sign the leases.¹⁰

Wheelus Air Base, near Tripoli, emerged as the largest U.S. base outside the continental United States. It not only served as a strategic staging area for American forces but also became an important training center for U.S. and NATO pilots. Libya's sparse population and year-round sunshine provided the best alternative to a congested European airspace and a physically remote United States. Domestically the air base had a profound impact on Tripoli's economy in that the infusion of money into the city by base employees and general purchases brought about an economic reconstruction in the city's economy. The base was also effective as a propaganda machine through which televi-



sion, American music, and newspapers were introduced. However, the most important by-product of the base was the American oil multinationals. In conjunction with their British and Dutch counterparts, these American multinationals established a profitable relationship with Libya that continues until today, unimpeded by Qaddafi's political rhetoric and economic restructuring.

THE POWER OF OIL

The Middle East had, by the end of the 1950s, emerged as the primary source that powered the post-World War II European economic boom. Unfortunately, it also emerged as a major crisis area. The 1952–53 Iranian crisis, the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict focused world attention on the region. Multinationals did not mind the crises as long as the situation did not impede the flow of oil; however, when frequent interruptions ensued, the oil giants began to search for alternate energy sites. Libya proved to be the most logical choice for exploration. Removed, but not too far, from crisis locations, Libya was close to Europe and had a small population with a stable pro-Western monarchy, and most importantly, it was a place where the physical presence of Western forces could provide for the security and interests of Western firms operating there.

The discovery of oil soon followed, and by 1961 the country had emerged as one of the largest oil producers in the Middle East.¹¹ This newfound wealth freed the poor country for the first time in its history from reliance on hand-outs and from dependence on the military-tied subsidies of the foreign powers, including the United States. More important was that this wealth created in a very short time a new merchant class that closely allied itself with the American multinationals and indirectly with Western interests in and outside the country. The political and economic influence exerted by this new segment of society made it extremely difficult for the monarchy to end its military ties to the United States and Western Europe. The economic argument that the government had until then employed to keep the bases had been very effective in countering criticism from within and without, but with wealth steadily accumulating, cracks began to develop in the government's argument. However, none of the criticism was more damaging than that launched by Nasser of Egypt, who accused the monarchy of making Libya a foothold for imperialism. Ultimately Nasser dislodged American and British influence and replaced it with an Egyptian seed that germinated in the person of General Qaddafi. The country continued to serve as a major source for European energy needs even after the revolution (table 6.1).

Table 6.1. Destination of Libya's oil, 1984–91 (1,000 barrels per day)

Destination	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
North America	3.8	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Canada	3.8	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Latin America	8.0	7.0	5.0	—	—	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	51.1	55.0	175.0	52.0	28.0	28.0	85.0	50.0
Western Europe	826.7	787.3	850.0	745.0	825.0	836.0	994.0	1,130.0
Austria	7.5	7.8	30.0	31.6	32.0	20.0	28.6	10.0
Belgium	30.6	1.0	34.7	47.9	28.9	25.0	22.8	37.3
France	120.7	68.9	46.4	35.6	66.4	46.0	57.7	77.6
West Germany	115.5	110.0	95.0	128.5	202.0	217.0	232.1	247.7
Italy	258.0	284.9	297.4	271.3	311.5	366.0	489.2	521.5
Netherlands	56.8	60.1	35.0	15.6	7.2	12.0	6.5	9.1
Spain	77.0	80.4	133.0	76.8	80.8	79.0	107.5	109.7
Switzerland	17.8	15.0	14.0	31.1	26.9	9.0	22.8	38.0
United Kingdom	9.3	9.2	6.0	1.4	—	—	4.7	—
Middle East	17.2	15.0	16.0	6.0	8.0	4.0	—	—
Africa	1.2	6.2	6.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	5.0	20.0
Asia	21.6	19.0	15.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	6.0	20.0
OECD	830.5	792.4	850.0	745.0	825.0	824.0	970.0	1,080.0
Total	929.6	894.6	1,067.0	810.0	890.0	872.0	1,090.0	1,220.0

Sources: OAPC Bulletin (1989-cv-92); OECD quarterly oil and gas statistics (1993); OPEC Annual Statistics Bulletin (1993).



THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY

In addition to geography and oil, Libya's foreign policy was impacted by Qaddafi's temperamental personality. Initially his intense attraction to Egypt and to Nasserist thought influenced much of his global and regional perceptions. Even his relations with the United States and the Soviet Union were influenced by his intercourse with Egypt. Since 1978, General Qaddafi had been forced by the policies of President Sadat and, more recently, President Mubarak to relinquish the Egyptian option. However, Egypt's influence on Qaddafi could still be discerned in Libya's foreign policy.¹² In one sense Egypt had a stabilizing effect on Qaddafi and provided his foreign policy with a degree of predictability. Based on how Egypt acted, Qaddafi acted. His reaction depended on what type of policy emanated from Cairo, what effect it would have on Arab Nationalism, and whether it conformed to what he perceived to be Nasserist thought. He saw himself as the ultimate authority on Nasserism.

Since 1978, Libya's foreign policy has been in disarray. Most analysts find the Libyan regime's foreign policy difficult to fathom because it appears to lack logical and lucid frameworks with which to identify mechanisms and priorities in Libyan foreign-policy formulation. General Qaddafi has never enunciated any major foreign policy doctrines, nor has he identified any salient foreign policy goals. Libyan foreign policy has been fashioned along incremental lines. However, even this incremental decision-making process does not fully explain why the policy is in such disarray.

Some policymakers pursue incremental decision-making models to limit the complexity and uncertainty of long-range policy planning and making. The absence or vagueness of general goals obliges the adoption of benign and limited policies aimed at bringing about short-term marginal consequences and limited learning. This process of "muddling through," while useful for short-range objectives, has had long-term disastrous consequences for Libya.

In many instances Libyan foreign policy has been opportunistic. Decisions have been made incrementally, but many of the decisions were neither limited nor benign. On the contrary, many of the foreign-policy decisions made by General Qaddafi have been quite radical. On more than one occasion, opportunistic decisions have succeeded in shifting the center of gravity of Libyan foreign policy altogether. That discrepancy can best be explained by the existence of two foreign policy-making bodies, each employing an incremental approach to achieve different goals. The first is the foreign ministry, the official foreign policy-making branch of government. For many small countries the foreign ministry serves as the liaison between the internal and the external and is thus bound by the rules and regulations of the international community. Libya's foreign ministry also finds itself in that position. However, it also

finds itself in the unenviable position of trying to improvise ways to reconcile what General Qaddafi wants and does with what Libya's national interest happens to be and with what the international political and economic order permits. The Libyan leader frequently changes his mind, and hence the foreign ministry has had to adopt an incremental decision-making approach to accommodate many of the changes.

The second organ is the unofficial instrument for foreign policy formulation, revolutionary committees. Like Qaddafi, these committees have little respect for the international order and even less for international law and diplomacy. Even Libya's national interest does not rank high on their agenda. "revolutionary right" as defined by General Qaddafi serves as their guideline, and they make and execute foreign policy without consulting the foreign ministry. Indeed these committees manifest Qaddafi's ego in foreign policy formulation and serve as a barometer to indicate any changes in Qaddafi's interpretation of revolutionary right.

Thus Libya's foreign policy manifests a certain degree of dualism reflecting General Qaddafi's need for order and chaos in the same policy. It also reflects the prevalent dualism in Libya's interaction with other countries: officially with individual foreign governments to reflect perceived Libyan national interest, and unofficially with certain sectors of the host societies to reflect the preponderance of Qaddafi's personality. Since 1978 the two have rarely coincided.

QADDAFI AND THE SUB-SAHARA

Few areas in the world have been as vulnerable to political, economic, and societal manipulation as sub-Saharan Africa. Traditionally, trade and Islam have bound North Africa, including Libya, with the rest of the African continent. However, Europe's intrusion into the area during the age of colonialism, spearheaded by France and Britain, severed many of the economic and political links between the Arab and Berber north and the black South. Spiritually, the Christian church with all its branches and denominations soon followed to confront and eradicate Islam from all areas in which it had taken root. Qaddafi discovered his African links soon after coming to power, and since that discovery, the cornerstone of his sub-Saharan policy has been by and large an attempt to halt and reverse all three "colonial and imperial" trends.¹³

To counter missionaries operating in predominantly Muslim African countries, Qaddafi established in 1970 the Islamic Call Society (*Jamiyet ad-Dawa al-Islamiya*). The creation of the society coincided with Qaddafi's Islamic phase and was intended to continue the missionary work of the Sanussiyya movement he had overthrown a year earlier. Its primary task was not to convert Africans to Islam but to reinforce Islamic principles in existing Muslim com-



munities actively targeted by well-financed French and American Christian missionaries.¹⁴ In the early years of his rule General Qaddafi believed the struggle to be a *jihād*: a physical, sociological, political, religious as well as an ideological struggle to preserve the Muslim community (*Ummah*) from attempts to inflict harm upon it by non-Muslims.

Qaddafi was initially very successful in mobilizing Africa's dispossessed Muslim community. He provided funds for housing projects, mosques, and schools to teach Islam and Arabic, as well as scholarships for African students to study at Libyan schools and universities. Few Libyans objected to funds spent on Islamic projects in Africa, because much like other Muslims around the globe, Libyans had to struggle very hard to preserve their religious identity in the face of unending assaults by the church in a variety of forms. The memory of the massacre of Muslims during the Crusades in Palestine and the Inquisition in Spain, which continues to be vivid in the minds of many Muslims, was reinforced by the brutality of British, French, and Italian colonialism. Much of Islam's modern political literature, rightly or wrongly, perceives colonialism as another form of Christian hegemony over the Islamic *Ummah*. The French in Algeria, Tunisia, and other parts of Francophonic Africa, and the Italians in Libya, Somalia, and Eritrea went to great lengths to convert Muslims to Christianity at great cost to Muslim property and life. The French in particular, according to Qaddafi, owe the greatest debt. Muslims from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Senegal, and other parts of Francophonic Africa made up the bulk of the Free French Forces that joined the United States in liberating France from the Germans. Muslims from the Indian subcontinent also were part of the British army that fought the Germans in Europe and the Japanese in Asia during the Second World War. Qaddafi has always used these symbols to mobilize young African and Asian Muslims.

During the first few years of his revolution, there was nothing to indicate that General Qaddafi was not sincere in his call for racial, social, and economic equality among the Muslims of Africa. He cleverly used the existing hostility against perceived European political and economic exploitation of African resources, and British and Western inaction against the policy of apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), to mobilize Africa's youth against the status quo. Qaddafi's early success in the sub-Sahara was initially limited to countries with large Muslim populations. Libyan aid flowed freely, and Libyan-African joint stock companies were established to complement the increase in Libyan-financed investment banks.¹⁵ By 1986 approximately one-third of Libya's foreign investment went into international investment banks and joint stock ventures operating in all sub-Saharan Africa. There are no exact figures on how much of Libya's money was spent in the form of aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Ronald Bruce St. John has estimated that at least \$500 million

Table 6.2. Total Libyan financial flows to developing countries and multilateral agencies, 1973–89 (millions of dollars)

Year	Concessional	Non-concessional	Total
1973	218.3	195.6	413.9
1975	267.5	166.2	433.7
1980	382.0	-504.5	-122.5
1983	80.2	—	80.2
1984	64.3	—	64.3
1985	130.2	12.6	142.8
1986	9.3	—	9.3
1987	56.6	—	56.6
1988	17.4	—	17.4
1989	174.6	14.2	188.8

Sources: IMF Balance of Payment Tapes; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* (1993); *World Development Report* (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990).

were spent from 1973 to 1980 by Libya in sub-Saharan Africa in the form of foreign aid.¹⁶ Over half of that sum went to Zaire and Uganda.¹⁷ The remainder went to more than twenty sub-Saharan countries. Libyan aid, while not amounting to much (see table 6.2 below), was very successful in dislodging Israeli influence in much of the African continent from 1973 to 1980. Since 1980, a decline in oil prices and the blatant mismanagement of the Libyan economy forced the Libyan regime to drastically cut all official development assistance (ODA).

Africa's large Muslim community and its dire need for development funds insured the early success of Qaddafi's cultural and economic thrust in the region. His emphasis on Islam and his willingness to spend a small amount of Libya's vast petrodollar reserves on foreign aid expanded Libya's sphere of influence far beyond the traditional "Libyan Hinterland" developed by the Sanussiyya religious movement during the nineteenth century.¹⁸ Emboldened by that limited success, Qaddafi saw little reason why African society, with little effort, could not be molded along the same lines of development employed in Libya.

Qaddafi initiated the policy of chaos in Libya with the Zvara Five Point Speech in 1973. Inaugurating the first cultural revolution, the Libyan leader abolished all laws and, having created disorder, was thus able to inject his own brand of local idiosyncratic ideologies in Libyan society. The operational suc-



cess and ease with which the policy was instituted in Libya convinced the General of the merit of its replication in Africa, where the political, cultural, and economic climate was ripe for its implementation. The obvious fragmentation of the modern African state, created and nourished by European colonialism, did not go unnoticed by Qaddafi. Indeed he depended on the existing fragmentation, which proved ideal for amplifying his politics of chaos. In his African policy Qaddafi has rarely initiated instability, but he has always preferred to take advantage of existing cleavages and divisions.

With the exception of Chad, Libya's involvement in the sub-Saharan remained passive and was limited to economic and cultural interaction. A change took place in 1977 when Qaddafi dispatched Libyan troops to Uganda to shore up the regime of the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin. The mutation of that passive policy coincided with the publication of *The Green Book*, the establishment of the jamahiriya in Libya, and finally the inauguration of the second cultural revolution. With Libya firmly under his control, Qaddafi took a closer look at new opportunities in Africa and found the turmoil in Uganda well suited for a new adventure.

The other African adventure undertaken by General Qaddafi was in Libya's southern neighbor, Chad. In 1973, Qaddafi occupied the Aouzou Strip, a disputed area between the two countries, but he did not launch a full-scale invasion of Chad until 1980 when Libyan troops moved south and occupied the Chadian capital of Njamena at the request of the Transitional National Unity Government (GUNT). Libya's entanglements in both Uganda (1977-78) and Chad (1980-87) led to disastrous defeats for Libya, with more than 5,000 Libyans dead and millions of dollars in military hardware lost.¹⁹ However, even those losses have not stymied the Libyan leader's desire for influence in Africa. Indeed, his activity until 1987 was on the increase in many regions of the continent.²⁰ Only recently, and as a result of the decline in Libya's income, has the degree of Qaddafi's intervention somewhat declined.

The list of Libyan involvements in Africa is very long, but Libya's involvement in Liberia stands out as testimony to the recklessness of Libyan foreign policy-making.²¹ Few civil wars in Africa have been as brutal as the war in Liberia. Libya's military and financial support for the National Patriotic Front (NPF), which is headed by Charles Taylor, led to one of Africa's most bloody and destructive wars. Taylor's forces were armed, trained, and financed by Libya, and they continue to be supplied through Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. President Blaise Compaore, a disciple and friend of Qaddafi, allowed Libyan advisors to train Taylor's forces in Burkina Faso in 1990.²² The Liberian conflict was so destabilizing to the region that Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia formed a West African peacekeeping force and intervened in Liberia to put an end to the conflict. Taylor's troops confronted the peacekeepers and

ceased hostility only after the foreign ministers of the West African nations visited Tripoli in November of 1990 and convinced Qaddafi to help arrange for a peace summit in Mali during the same month.

Yet in spite of all this, Qaddafi's involvement in African affairs should come as no surprise. The African continent as a whole is perhaps the least economically developed of the planet's continents. Excluding the Republic of South Africa, the continent's per capita gross domestic product was, at the end of 1989, a mere \$583. This figure drops to \$479 if the four Arab countries of North Africa are excluded.²³ Today the picture is even gloomier for sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past four years an average 3 percent increase in population coupled with an average annual GNP decline of 1.4 percent has reduced the per capita income in the region to \$350.²⁴ However, the per capita income does not fully illustrate the degree of the region's calamity. People in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from all 109 categories of diseases classified by the World Health Organization (WHO). Based on WHO's *disability-adjusted life years* (DALYs) index, which measures the impact of disease on the quality of life, out of every 1,000 males in the region, over 600 are burdened with disease. The figure for females is 550 per thousand. Seventy-one percent of the sick are afflicted with communicable diseases.²⁵

All other socioeconomic indicators are not much better than those regarding the region's physical health. Indeed, the years of neglect and exploitation of so many of these countries by the colonial powers—and, since independence, by abusive and corrupt leaderships—have provided the ideal milieu for General Qaddafi to operate freely in the region. His adventures in Africa have in most cases been limited to those poor African countries with subsistence economies—countries that time and the rest of the world have forgotten. Not surprisingly, as long as the wealthy nations of the world continue to neglect Africa, General Qaddafi will ultimately win the war, even if he loses all the battles. A case in point is Chad, which after expelling Qaddafi, has in 1992 decided to invite him back. Qaddafi was the only global actor willing to invest in the poorest country in the world. Given a choice between economic survival or collapse, Chad's new leaders opted for survival even though that meant having to put up with Libya's idiosyncratic leader. The same argument is valid for Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda, and several other impoverished African countries that have welcomed Qaddafi's involvement in their politics and economies.

THE POLITICS OF DISUNITY

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Arab, unity has been an unattainable goal for many Arab intellectuals and political movements. Like many Arab males of his generation, Qaddafi assimilated the concept of a Pan-Arabism



from the ideology of his mentor, President Nasser. Since coming to power in 1969, the Libyan leader instigated, formed, and entered into no less than six Arab unions. Yet in modern Arab history, no Arab leader has done more harm to the concept of Arab unity than General Qaddafi. All his attempts at unity with other Arab leaders proved to be disastrous and, in all instances, failed soon after their inception. General Qaddafi was so mesmerized by the concept of Arab unity that he failed to realize that for Arab unity to succeed, some sacrifices would have to be made, sacrifices that might include his relinquishing power to a larger governing superstructure. None of the Arab unions were unions of the people; rather they were unions of Arab regimes. Nasser learned the same lesson in 1961 after the dissolution of the United Arab Republic with Syria. Unfortunately he never passed that insight on to his disciple.

As far as General Qaddafi is concerned, Libya's relations with the other twenty Arab regimes rotate around the concept of unity and all the political and economic entanglements that accompany it. Over the past twenty years he has proven his willingness to go to any length to achieve that elusive goal. It mattered little to him that his attempts at unity were contradictory: a country with political parties cannot unite with a country that prohibits them; a monarchy will not unite with a military dictatorship. Qaddafi's goal has always been unity on Qaddafi's terms—a fact rejected by all Arab regimes. Besides that, one is able to extract two other main reasons to explain Qaddafi's failed attempts at unity with other Arabs, even though Pan-Arabism is very much alive among the Arab masses.

The first of these reasons is psychological and reflects an intrinsic contradiction in Qaddafi's concept of unity. The Libyan leader is not to blame, since like a good disciple, he took the ideals and frameworks handed down to him by Nasser and pursued the same policy. The problem can be found in Nasser's formulation of the concept of Arab unity. Nasser was first and foremost an Egyptian nationalist, and to him a united Arab entity in which Egypt would be dissolved was never an option. His "three circles" doctrine provided a pivotal role for Egypt.²⁶ Indeed Nasser envisioned all other Arab entities dissolving into Egypt since the Egypt of the 1950s was the most populous, most developed, most progressive, and most Arab of all Arab states. Hence Nasser's Pan-Arabism of the 1950s was in reality Egyptian nationalism in disguise. Nasser's attempt at unity with Syria in 1951 merely pitted Egyptian nationalism against Syrian nationalism, and in 1961 the ultimate result was failure. Failure also met Nasser in his adventures in the Yemens in the early 1960s. Nasser involved Egypt in Yemen, in the name of Arab solidarity, after the withdrawal of Britain from Aden. In the Yemeni Civil War, he was confronted by North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Spearheading that opposition was King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who was more of a Pan-Islamist than a Pan-Arabist.

Nasser himself became disillusioned with the concept and abandoned it until Qaddafi, in 1969, presented him with Libya on a platter—a gift he could not refuse.

Qaddafi's enchantment with Egypt is thus not coincidental. To him Egypt is the prize to be won and no Arab union would be complete without it. Indeed Qaddafi unconsciously epitomizes the Egyptian nationalist of the Nasserist era. A full analysis of Egypt's impact on Libyan foreign policy is discussed in a later chapter of this work, and it suffices here to say that because Nasser's ideology was local and idiosyncratic in nature, it died with its creator in 1970. Without Nasser's charisma and physical presence, the ideology could not support itself and was thus easily dismantled by Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat. Qaddafi has neither the charisma nor the intellectual abilities of Nasser and was unable to revive Pan-Arabism in Egypt, let alone in Libya.

The second reason for the failure of Qaddafi's attempts at Arab unity can be found in the nature of Arab politics. Since 1970, countries of the Arab world with the exception of Lebanon have been ruled by a kaleidoscope of nondemocratic regimes composed of absolute monarchies, absolute military dictators, and benign military rulers in civilian garb. Where political activity is permitted, it is narrowly defined and controlled. General Qaddafi was never able to legitimately or successfully penetrate the veil of security imposed on these societies by their rulers. All modern Arab rulers paid lip service to Arab unity, but no Arab regime favored it. Indeed there seems to be a tacit understanding among Arab regimes to talk about the concept but simultaneously to do everything possible to thwart its achievement. Arab unity would mean an end to their individual power and influence. The destruction of Lebanon is a prime example of that tacit understanding.

Lebanon and Arab Unity

Scholars studying the Middle East will continue to provide many reasons for the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90) and the destruction of the country. Few, however, will attribute it to a deliberate policy of destabilization by other Arab regimes. Before the civil war, Lebanon emerged as a sanctuary for the dispossessed intellectuals of the Arab world. Beirut, the capital, became a center of learning and ideas. In its coffee shops, the Ba'thist, the Nasserist, the communist, the fascist, the capitalist, and the Islamic Fundamentalist coexisted, mingled, argued, and learned from and taught each other. The profusion of academic institutions of higher learning as well as newspapers representing all ideologies provided Arab youths, for the first time in many centuries, with a rare opportunity to learn about what unites them—history, religion, economics, language, society, food, clothes, entertainment, and customs. All that activity took place in an atmosphere of relative freedom, far away from the



secret police of Arab rulers. During this period, opposition groups—organizations opposed to many of these regimes—began to emerge in Lebanon. Such groups from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Sudan—to name only a few—made their home in Lebanon and engaged in all activities denied them in their individual countries. Freedom in Lebanon provided Arab women, for the first time since the tenth century, with a unique opportunity to discover themselves and to taste many of the freedoms denied them by rigid patriarchal systems that kept them confined within four walls. In Lebanon they were able to drive, to move about unchaperoned, to go to theaters and cinemas, to wear clothes of their choice, and most important of all, to acquire a modern education that equipped them with the means to intellectually engage Arab men and governments on issues that concern women and their aspirations. In short, prior to 1975, Lebanon was a hotbed of political, ideological, social, and cultural activity that threatened the foundations of the Arab status quo.

None of the Arab regimes were willing to permit that renaissance to take place. If they could not control it, they had to destroy it. The destruction of Lebanon was not difficult. Its major strength, the absence of a strong government, also proved to be its Achilles heel. The Lebanese political system was based on a confessional balance. The influx of Palestinian refugees and the growth of Lebanon's Muslim minority since independence strained the system, leading ultimately to an outbreak of hostility between different religious groups. The resilient Lebanese have in the past contained these outbreaks and modified the system to absorb new realities. What was most baffling, however, was the Arab response. Almost instantly, different Arab regimes began supporting different factions. Syria supported the Syrian Ba'thists, Iraq the Iraqi Ba'thists, Libya the Nasserites and the Druze, Saudi Arabia the Christian Maronites and the Sunnis. Iran, which is non-Arab, also joined the fray after toppling the shah in 1979 and supported the Shi'ites. Israel, also non-Arab, found in the Lebanese Civil War an excellent opportunity to eradicate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and thus lent its support to any group fighting the Palestinians. The destructive frenzy tore Lebanon apart and ended the beginning of what could have been a political, cultural, and social Arab revival.

Response to Rejection

It was only natural that Arab regimes would shun all of Qaddafi's bid for Arab leadership and unity. They all sought that leadership role and were infuriated when he responded to their rejection by using terrorism to destabilize them. After 1975, the more he was shunned, the more he resorted to violence in the Arab world. He hired assassins, trained dissidents, and used his military might

when possible to destabilize other Arab regimes. Perhaps no one felt the wrath of Qaddafi more than Libya's immediate neighbors. Libyan-supported terrorists blew up railway stations and government installations in Egypt. These events ultimately led to a border skirmish between the two countries in 1977. In the Sudan, Qaddafi sponsored at least two coup attempts against President Numeiri since 1975. Furthermore in 1983, a Libyan Tu-22A Blinder bombed the radio station at Omdurman.²⁷ The Libyan opposition used the radio station for anti-Qaddafi broadcasts. Qaddafi offered Numeiri a large amount of cash for the heads of his Libyan opponents, but Numeiri refused, further souring the relations between the two regimes. Sudanese nationals were recruited by Qaddafi for Libya's Islamic Legions, which were used by Qaddafi to create mischief in sub-Saharan Africa including Sudan. Yet perhaps the most contemptible of all of Qaddafi's acts in the Sudan has been his financial and military support for separatist movements in the south of the impoverished African country. Qaddafi's fanning of the fires of separatism has left Sudan, during the last decade, reeling from a civil war that has bankrupted its coffers, impoverished and decimated its population, destabilized its institutions, and brought to power in Khartoum a fanatical Islamic government bent upon turning the political system into a theocracy along the Iranian model.

Even peaceful Tunisia was not spared Qaddafi's wrath. The Djerba Treaty, which united Tunisia with Libya in 1974, was dissolved one month after its inception. In the treaty, Qaddafi offered the presidency to the aging Tunisian leader, Habib Bourguiba, but insisted on retaining the ministry of defense. Bourguiba, a shrewd politician in his own right, concluded that Qaddafi was not inaugurating a union but a coup d'état. Qaddafi, furious with Tunisia, expelled Tunisian workers from Libya and initiated a plan to destabilize the Tunisian government. In 1980, a group of dissident Tunisians, trained and financed by Libya, launched an attack on the city of Gafsa.²⁸ The attack, although thwarted by the Tunisian authorities with little loss to life and property, proved to be very much destabilizing to the Tunisian government. Qaddafi kept up the pressure through yet another raid by Tunisian dissidents in 1982 on the city of Kasserine. Ill-equipped to face Libya, Tunisia turned to the United States for military and financial support. President Reagan, already irked by Qaddafi and sympathetic to Tunisia's plight, increased U.S. aid to the Tunisian government and provided its armed forces with some American military defensive hardware. Qaddafi stopped the raids but began to harass European and American oil companies probing for oil on the Libyan-Tunisian border. He was suspected in 1984 of being behind the vandalizing of a Tunisian oil pipeline running parallel to the border.²⁹

In Algeria, Qaddafi supported Berber separatists and religious fundamentalists after the demise of the Hassi Messoud Accords, which had united Libya



and Algeria in 1973. The treaty between the two countries was a marriage of convenience that was never consummated.³⁰ The Algerians needed Qaddafi's financial and military support in their attempt to prevent neighboring Morocco from annexing the Western Sahara, which was to be vacated by Spain. Qaddafi's ego in turn needed another union as his relations with President Sadat of Egypt began to sour. He also needed to vent his frustration with Arab politics on the person he regarded as one of the most reactionary leaders in the Arab world—King Hassan of Morocco, whom he hated. In 1976, General Qaddafi joined with Algeria in throwing support behind the Polisario Front, which represented the approximately 60,000 inhabitants of the Western Sahara in their struggle for independence. King Hassan accepted Qaddafi's challenge and in 1979 offered Morocco as a base of operations for Libya's embryonic opposition movement.

Perhaps the oddest union that the Libyan leader has ever pursued was with the king of Morocco at Oujda in 1984.³¹ The marriage lasted less than two years, to be followed by the inevitable divorce. The Oujda Treaty between Morocco and Libya raised a few eyebrows in Washington and Paris—both of whom provided and still provide much of Morocco's foreign aid—but it was not surprising to most Arab leaders. While the treaty promised close economic and political cooperation between the two regimes, it was widely known that King Hassan needed to bring the war in the Western Sahara to an end, and he could not do that without Qaddafi's assistance. Qaddafi needed to shed the international pariah status and outmaneuver his external opposition. The sacrificial lambs of the accords were the Polisario, which Qaddafi promptly abandoned, and a few Libyan political refugees in Morocco, whom King Hassan promptly handed over to Qaddafi's henchmen. With both sides satisfied, the treaty came to an abrupt end.³²

Today a union with Qaddafi is a liability, and most Arab regimes want nothing to do with him. Indeed, within the past few years the countries of the Maghrib (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania) along with Libya have reached a number of economic and political accords within the Magharibi Union but have found it increasingly difficult to maintain close links with Libya. The Tunisian-Libyan and Algerian-Libyan borders have been closed to traffic on more than one occasion during the latter part of 1994 and the early part of 1995. The main reason for the closings was Libya's neighbors' unhappiness with Qaddafi's support for what they perceived to be radical Islamic factions in their societies. Algeria accused Qaddafi of financially supporting Abbasi Madani's Islamic Salvation Front, commonly known as the FIS, and Tunisia accused Qaddafi of funding Rashid al-Ganushi's al-Nahda movement. Not wanting to escalate the issue but still desiring to show its displeasure, the Tunisian government closed its boarder and claimed that there was a plague in

Libya. Libya retaliated by also closing its border and claiming cholera in Tunisia. Algeria was less diplomatic and accused Libya of interfering in its internal affairs and violating the Magharibi Union Charter. Most worrisome to Qaddafi's Maghribi partners has been his insistence on including Egypt in the organization. General Qaddafi perhaps expects to increase his power in the Magharibi Union and, by recruiting Egypt, to form a block within the organization. Egypt's application was vetoed by Tunisia and Morocco, who have shown little love or respect for Egypt. Yet, in a characteristically Qaddafiesque manner, while the General was applying on Egypt's behalf for membership in the Magharibi Union, he was financially supporting the banned al-Jamaa al-Islamia, one of Egypt's most dangerous and radical Islamic groups. According to the Libyan opposition, a few Egyptian scholars, and Egyptian government officials, two Libyan revolutionary committee members were caught by Egyptian security with \$3 million destined for al-Jamaa al-Islamia. Usama al-Baz, President Mubarak's advisor, went to Libya on April 17, 1995, and confronted General Qaddafi with the information. According to the Egyptians the Libyan leader denied any knowledge and promised an investigation. The irony in all of this is that while supporting Islamic movements outside Libya, General Qaddafi has brutally suppressed all forms of Islamic expressions within Libya.

In the eastern Arab world, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) emerged. The GCC, composed of all the conservative Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf, has the primary function of protecting the participants from actors such as Qaddafi. Even Egypt has entered into negotiations with Syria, Jordan, and Yemen to coordinate economics and politics. Here again, Qaddafi was not invited to attend, even as an observer. The only two other countries he can approach for a union are Iraq and Sudan. Saddam Hussein has never forgiven Qaddafi for supporting non-Arab Iran against Arab Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, and Sudan has never forgiven him for fanning the fires of separatism within its borders.

Since 1991 when the Libyan regime was implicated in the bombing of an American airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland, the United Nations demanded that Libya deliver two suspects, both Libyan agents, to be tried in either Scotland or the United States. Qaddafi refused and the Security Council of the United Nations placed an air travel and trade embargo on Libya. Since then, anyone wishing to leave or enter Libya must go through Egypt, Tunisia, or Malta. Qaddafi has been isolated internationally and regionally, with few friends to help him.



panies continued their contacts with Libya's National Oil Company. The five companies involved—Continental Oil (Conoco), Marathon, Amerada Hess, Occidental Petroleum, and W. R. Grace—continued their operations due to a number of "giant loopholes" approved by the Reagan and Bush administrations. Both administrations argued that forcing U.S. companies to abandon their operations in Libya "would result in a substantial windfall for Libya." The Bush administration, citing "U.S. interests," kept the loopholes open well after the United Nations' embargo went into effect. Today American companies continue to operate in Libya through subsidiaries, and some such as Boeing are already anticipating the lifting of the embargo to sign a multibillion-dollar deal with the Libyan government for new passenger carriers. In spite of the rhetoric and hostility, America's policy towards Libya since 1986 has been inconsistent with a policy of punishing Libya for its support of terrorism. This fact can perhaps be attributed to America's national interests and powerful lobbyists.⁴³

However, what cannot be easily explained are Libya's actions. General Qaddafi disliked the Reagan but not the Bush administration, and his attempts at reconciliation through American oil companies seemed to be working. In view of the reconciliation attempts, why would he permit Libyan agents to blow up an American passenger plane and end that process? While General Qaddafi is quite capable of ordering the destruction of the airplane, there is one important fact that must not be overlooked: members of revolutionary committees must constantly undertake such acts if they are to remain in favor. Although highly unlikely, it is possible that the operation was undertaken by over-zealous revolutionary committee members trying to anticipate Qaddafi's need for revenge over the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. This is not, of course, to exonerate the Qaddafi regime but merely to emphasize the fact that creating chaos is embedded in the structure of present-day Libyan society.

Eight

Epilogue

In one of his sermons to his followers Mohamad, the Prophet of Islam, once said *kama takunu yuwala alaikum* (you will be governed by what you are). It is not very difficult for any scholar with a some profound understanding of Libyans, their history, culture, and psychology to see that Mohamad's words do, in the case of Libya, hold true.

Since 1951 the Libyan state has been ruled by two regimes, neither of which has succeeded in ruling the Libyan people. Isolated and fiercely independent, Libya's inhabitants accepted the first of the two regimes because it appealed to their conservatism and because it lacked the power to intrude on their lives. The monarchy was tolerated because it lay claim to Islam, a religion that has had a magical hold on Libyans since it penetrated the African continent in the seventh century. The monarch's character exhibited much of the Libyan character: its shyness, its indecisiveness, its austerity. Idris displayed the prevalent conservatism of Libya's society with all its complexity. The political system that he adopted was not Libyan in origin, but it embodied a culmination of the experiences of no less than twenty-one countries. Its forgers in the United Nations hoped that a checkered constitution would provide a basis for the future development of an indigenous Libyan political system.

In many ways the monarchy fell victim to its own success. Eighteen years of constitutional rule taught a large number of Libyans the value of political participation and the virtues of self-government. The political system of the monarchy was not perfect and needed to evolve and overcome the tribal nature of the regime. King Idris's unwillingness to let the system develop beyond narrow parameters ultimately led to the demise of the system. He can, however, be credited with preserving much of what the United Nations had planted. During the monarchy, Libyans had semi-independent political institutions and laws that guaranteed a degree of political participation, individual freedoms, rights to property, and most important of all, a right to congregate and dissent. Many used of these rights to vote, demonstrate, write and pub-



lish in a vibrant local media, trade, and go about their daily lives in relative safety, free from harassment or arrest.

Economically, surpluses generated by the oil wealth enabled the regime to forgo the reliance on international handouts and unpopular domestic taxes. Consistent with its paternal nature, the regime provided for the well-being of the population. During the six years that preceded the revolution, Libyan society underwent a phenomenal economic change. Public spending was evident in a rapidly growing foreign-built infrastructure, with its universities, roads, hospitals, schools, airports, and public housing. By 1969, a large number of Libyan students were granted scholarships to study in American, European, and Egyptian universities. It was a period of unhindered economic growth.

It was only a matter of time before economic demands were translated into political ones. Economically, Libya in 1969 was vastly different from what it had been in 1964, yet politically, it had not changed since 1951. The traditional ruling circles remained the same, and all calls for political reform from the newly emerging middle class and intelligentsia were either rejected by the monarch or met with promises that were never fulfilled. For some, the political legitimacy of the monarchy eroded because it could not keep up with the process of modernization. Libya's youth, like all youths worldwide, needed to rebel and experiment with life but found the political system too confining and dominated by old men who saw no room for experimentation. By 1968 the popular slogan of some Libyan demonstrators was *Hukm Iblis wla Idris* (Lucifer's rule rather than Idris's). Yet in spite of the occasional unrest the popular sentiment favored evolution rather than revolution.

THE DEMISE OF THE STATE

The coup leaders that toppled the monarchy took over an existing state with political institutions, a young population, security forces, a new and expanding infrastructure, and a full treasury intact. The September coup was peaceful and devoid of any bloodshed. The traditional structure fell within a few hours of the arrest of its leaders. The coup leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, was young and appealed to Libya's restless youth, who saw him as a potential candidate for expanding political participation and revamping the political and economic structure along more democratic lines.

General Qaddafi did represent a popular aspiration for change, yet very few in Libya could have anticipated the perpetual agitation he was to cause for the next quarter of a century. He unseated an unpopular but legitimate government that had until the coup succeeded in containing a tribally fragmented society. By hastily dismantling the political and economic system of the monarchy, General Qaddafi merely unleashed the forces of fragmentation. Furthermore his lack of legitimacy increased the pressure on his regime to resort

to coercion as a means of keeping these forces under control. Three years after the coup all traces of the previous political and economic structures had disappeared. These were replaced by experimental and ephemeral institutions developed by General Qaddafi to guarantee the survival of his regime and reshape Libyan society in his own image. General Qaddafi has, over the past twenty-five years, planned and constructed a stateless society that, when reduced to its simplest form, resembles a modern variation of the tribe. Libya resembles a large tribe where precedent and custom have been replaced by General Qaddafi's ideology. Ownership in the *jamahiriya* and in the tribe is collective ownership. Authority structure in General Qaddafi's stateless society, as in the tribe, is based on consensus and not elections. Trial and punishment is dispensed in the *jamahiriya* either by a revolutionary or a popular committee, while in the tribe by peers chosen by tribal elders. This is to suggest not that General Qaddafi's *jamahiriya* and the tribal system are identical but that there are indeed many similarities between the two systems. Moreover, General Qaddafi displays a lifestyle of modernity and tradition combined. He lives in a Bedouin tent erected in an army barrack. He wears French and Italian tailored suits under traditional Bedouin robes. When he travels overseas on official visits, he is sometimes accompanied by a she-camel to provide him with milk.

As odd as it might appear, General Qaddafi has proven that under certain conditions a tribal structure can indeed be reshaped to accommodate a modern society. How well the system can function without coercion and without his ideology to run it is an open-ended question that no one can presently answer. However, judging by the rising tide of domestic opposition, including three coup attempts during the past few years, it is highly unlikely that many Libyans given the freedom to choose will opt for General Qaddafi's stateless society. To many, the eighteen years of semi-democratic rule is still a fresh memory. Now middle-aged, Libyans born in the late '40s and early '50s still vividly remember the days when humans were respected in Libya. That knowledge can be now found in their children, who also see the contradictions in their domestic environment, public life, and future opportunities.

A FOREIGN POLICY LED ASTRAY

Libyan foreign policy has by and large been influenced by General Qaddafi's character and ideology and hence is subject to the same idiosyncrasies prevalent in the domestic policy-making arena. During the past two decades the national interest has often been relegated to a secondary position by the regime's foreign policy-making apparatus. This fact is particularly evident when a choice has to be made between the General's ideology and the country's interest. A case in point is Libya's relations with its neighbors. Since assuming

power, General Qaddafi has been relentless in his attempts to export the Third International Theory. Ultimately he plunged Libya into armed conflict with five of its six neighbors. The sixth, Niger—too weak, vulnerable, and poor to confront its belligerent northern neighbor—has opted for a policy of accommodation towards General Qaddafi's regime. Libya continues to occupy territory in northeastern Niger, adjacent to territory it occupies in northern Chad. Libyan forces were also at one time involved in preserving Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. Without exception, the setbacks and defeats which Libya experienced in all of these conflicts have resulted in loss of Libyan life, wealth, or prestige.

Within the Arab world Libya's foreign policy proved to be even more idiosyncratic than in Africa. Analysts were rarely able to discern General Qaddafi's friends from his foes. His fluid foreign policy enabled him simultaneously to characterize a regime as vile and reactionary and, as in the case of Morocco, to join the regime in a union. Another more telling example is perhaps General Qaddafi's reference to Sheik Zaid Ibn Sultan of the United Arab Emirates as a progressive revolutionary while having on an earlier occasion referred to all the regimes of the Arab peninsula as "pigs" and "stooges of the United States." His support of non-Arab Iran in the Iran-Iraq war at a time when he championed Arab unity is a further indication of a foreign policy highly influenced by idiosyncratic leadership values.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this idiosyncratic foreign policy is the regime's covert and sometimes indiscriminate support for a host of legitimate and illegitimate political movements worldwide, including the ANC in South Africa, the Red Brigade in Germany, and the IRA in Britain. The ultimate result of that policy was Libya's ostracism by the Arab world and by Europe. Most countries have limited their relations with Libya to simple commercial activity. Those who import Libyan oil provide an opportunity to the Libyan regime to remedy the balance of trade by importing consumer products. The United States halted trade with Libya in 1980 and discouraged countries from permitting Libyan government investment in their markets. Since then, the U.S. government has prohibited all companies and banks with more than seven percent Libyan ownership from operating in the United States and engaging in business activities with U.S. companies. Italy's FIAT and the Arab-African Bank were two of the many businesses forced to sell their Libyan-owned shares at a great cost in order to operate in the world's market. The Reagan administration also prohibited third-party exports to Libya of commodities manufactured with American-made components.

Contrary to popular belief the former Soviet Union was not Libya's patron. Soviet leaders understood the regime of General Qaddafi. They knew they could not control him and hence made the most of the situation by limit-

ing their relationship with him to a purely commercial exchange. They provided him with weapons, and they received cash in return. When Qaddafi requested technical advisors, they provided him with technical advisors on a purely commercial basis. There has never been anything to indicate that General Qaddafi has ever sought Soviet help in his foreign adventures. The Soviets on their part were unwilling to engage in Libya's sideshow wars and never did.

Libya's foreign policy has been influenced by neither East nor West, by neither neighbors nor region, but by General Qaddafi's ideology, which constantly reflects the idiosyncratic nature of Libya's leadership. Perhaps the only influencing factor on General Qaddafi has been Egypt, but that influence ended with the death of his mentor, President Gamal Abdul-Nasser. Since then Qaddafi has sought to influence others rather than to be influenced by them. In most cases the only factor thwarting his aims has been strong leadership in the countries he targeted. Tunisia, under a weak Habib Bourguiba for example, was constantly coerced and intimidated by General Qaddafi. Zain al-Abiddin Ben Ali, a much stronger leader, deposed the aging Bourguiba and assumed the leadership of Tunisia. Since then General Qaddafi has pursued a cautious relationship with his North African neighbor.

Now with an insignificant foreign-investment return from the country's invested petrodollars, Libya continues to be in the forefront of those producers affected by any disturbance in the international oil market. During the past five years, Libya's inability to attract customers has forced it to rely on barter—a situation that has led to a shortage in Libya's hard currency reserves as well as the inability to finance food purchases. To make matters worse, the country's \$6-billion debt, incurred in the years prior to 1986, has increased dramatically during the past five years to more than \$10 billion. Much of that is owed to Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and Italy.

When Libya was a major oil exporter with an ample cash inflow, it could do what it wanted. General Qaddafi was able "to fly as high as his imagination could take him." It is possible but highly unlikely that the present cash shortage, which is expected to continue until the end of the decade, will ground Libya to reality. As the shadow of poverty, which the country has successfully eluded for the past three decades, reemerges, a more realistic foreign policy will not be a matter of choice; it will be a necessity. A foreign policy that reflects an understanding of the country's needs and capabilities, and one that serves Libya's long-term developmental schemes, will be required. Small countries in general and Libya in particular can least afford to "place all their eggs in one basket," nor can they afford to antagonize all the military or economic world powers. Indeed, their foreign policies must be less ideological and more pragmatic to be effective.




CONCLUDING REMARKS

Development has always been very painful. Few societies in the world undergoing the development process do not experience political and economic dislocations. Even the advanced industrial societies have had their share of turmoil in the early stages of their development. Britain during Cromwell's revolution, France in the aftermath of 1789, and the America after the Civil War are but a few examples of societies whose basic fabric has been torn asunder from within. More recent examples of such events are the Russian revolutions of 1917 and 1991 as well as the Chinese revolution of 1949. None of these societies emerged from their domestic turmoil without a fundamental change in their political and economic structures.

Hence from this perspective, General Qaddafi's revolution is not abnormal. A certain degree of turmoil and change was to be expected. However, what is peculiar to the Libyan revolution is that more than a quarter of a century has passed and the revolution has not evolved beyond the revolutionary stage. Most developed societies have quickly learned from their revolutions and have thus gone on to de-emphasize ideology and emphasize those institutions that are capable of softening the impact of ideological changes within their cultures. General Qaddafi's ideology is still too ephemeral and underdeveloped. Furthermore, the absence of effective governmental democratic institutions have left Libyan society vulnerable to the sharp and painful adjustments that inevitably accompany the constant changes in the leadership's thinking. Most dangerous, perhaps, is the fact that the constant agitation has prevented Libyan society from learning the process of self-government. Whether General Qaddafi will acquire enough wisdom as he grows older to learn from the successes and the shortcomings of his system and to put in place firm democratic foundations for the inevitable post-Qaddafi era is a question that only General Qaddafi himself can answer.

Appendix: Power Positions of the Qathatha Tribe and Allies



NAME	RANK	DUTIES
AL-KAHOUS		
Mansour Daw	Major	Commander Presidential Guard 72nd Armored Battalion
Ali Abu Baker	Captain	Operations officer 72nd Armored Battalion
Ali Ibrahim al-Qaddafi	Captain	72nd Armored Battalion
Jamal al-Din Ali al-Mabrouk	Captain	Deterrent Battalion
Abdulah Mohammad Masoud	Lt. Colonel	Commander of the Deterrent Battalion
Bulbieda al-Ghanai	Captain	Mohammed abu-Miniar Battalion
Hamed Ali Ahmad	Captain	Mohammed abu-Miniar Battalion
Ghaith Hamid	Lt. Colonel	Assistant to Commander of Hawari Bu-Madian Battalion
Qathaf al-Dam Mahmoud Masoud	Lt. Colonel	9th Armored Battalion
Musa Abu-Suba	Captain	Assistant to Commander of 123 Battalion (Special Forces)
Shneib al-Firjani	Lt. Colonel	Assistant to Commander of Imhimad Magarief
Abdul Rahman Miftah	Captain	Presidential Guard
Al-Mabrouk Musa	Captain	Presidential Guard
Muhamad Abdul-Rahim al-Saadi	Captain	Presidential Guard
Al-Saadi Abdul-Rahim al-Saadi	Captain	Presidential Guard
Ali Abdul-Salam	Captain	Presidential Guard
Al-Saadi Abdul-Salam	Captain	Presidential Guard (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Bu Jarir Khamis	Captain	Presidential Guard
Mahmoud Abdul-Hamid al-Atraash	Captain	Jamahiriya Security (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Abu Jahl al-Hilbu	Captain	Jamahiriya Security (Qaddafi's Nephew)

NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Ahmad Qathaf al-Damm	Colonel	Commander of Security Battalion in Tobruk
Abdula al-Saklul	Lt. Colonel	Faris al-Sahra Security Battalion
Abdula Saeed	Captain	al-saadi security Battalion
Mansour Rheel	Captain	al-saadi security Battalion
Abdul Rahman Abdul-Rahim al-Atrash	Captain	Hussein al-Jueifi Battalion at Beida (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Abdul Qadir Saeed	Captain	Hussein al-Jueifi Battalion at Beida (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Ajaj Hamid	Captain	Body Guards (Qaddafi's Constant Companions)
Khamis Hamid	Captain	Body Guards (Qaddafi's Constant Companions)
Abdul Rahim al-Hilbu	Captain	Military Intelligence
Qrain Saleh Qrain	Colonel	Commander of the Revolutionary Guard
Al-Hadi Abdul Salam	Qaddafi's nephew	Jamahiyria Security (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Al-Hamali Abdul Hamid	Qaddafi's nephew	Jamahiyria Security (Qaddafi's Nephew)
Jumah Zayed	Flight Colonel	Commander of Kurthabia Air Base
Sayed Qathaf al-Dam	Colonel	Director of the Information Agency
Ahmad Ibrahim Mansour	Ministry of Information	Minister of Information
Muhamad Abdul-Salam	Oil Drilling Co.	Director of oil exploration company
Ibrahim Abdul-Salam	Information Office	Information office
Uwaydat al-Majthub	Information Office	Information office
Masoud Khamis Abdu-Minyar	Construction	Transportation Company
Saleh Hamid	Construction	Construction Company



NAME	RANK	DUTIES
AL WAMLAT		
Khalifa Jamaa	Major	Deputy Commander 72nd Armored Battalion
Saeed Ghaith	Captain	72nd Armored Battalion
Ali Abu-Bakr	Captain	72nd Armored Battalion
Mohamed al-Mahtout	Major	72nd Armored Battalion
Al-Wafi Uwhaida	Captain	72nd Armored Battalion
Shahat Izbaida	Captain	al-Rigeibi Battalion (Souk al-Jumma)
Shaibani	Captain	123 Army Battalion
Omar al-Rugubi	Colonel	90th Artillery Battalion
Salem al-Wadani	Captain	Commander of 90th Battalion
Abdul Jalil al-Mahtout	Captain	Deterrent Battalion
Mustapha al-Mahtout	Captain	Presidential Guards
Rahil Jbail	Captain	Presidential Guards
Ali Nasr Ramadan	Captain	Presidential Guards
Ali abdul-salam Ikshaiba	Captain	Presidential Guards
Al-Amin al-Sakloul	Major	Presidential Guards
Ramadan Nasr	Lt. Colonel	Presidential Guards
Abdul Jalil Hamed	Lt. Colonel	Presidential Guards
Ali Issa	Captain	Jamahiriya Security
Abdul Jalil Nasr	Major	Jamahiriya Security
Dakhil Daw Ramadan	Colonel	Jamahiriya Security
Abdul-Rahim al Faituri	Captain	Jamahiriya Security

NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Ghaith al-Taieb	Captain	Jamahiriya Security
Khalifa Groom	Colonel	Jamahiriya Security (Jufra)
Milad al-Sudani	Major	Jamahiriya Security (Jufra)
Dabnoon abdul-Nabi	Lt. Colonel	Central Security Committee and Commander of the Gulf District
Ali Tlak	Major	Agricultural Project (Sirt)
Hussein al-Rifi	Lt. Colonel	Burkina Faso
Rajab abu-Zaid	Colonel	Guard Inspector (Kufra)
Younis Rtaima	Major	Libyan Arab Airlines
Hnaish Nasr	Sergeant	Qaddafi's Former Driver
Zeed al-Zawam	Captain	Revolutionary Guard

AWLAD OMAR

Imhimad al-Zintani	Captain	72nd Guard Battalion
Muhamad Milad	Lt. Colonel	72nd Guard Battalion
Al-Zanati Mansour	Captain	72nd Guard Battalion
Daw al-Zanali	Lt. Colonel	Commander Assistant Abu-Miniar Battalion (Sirte)
Abdul-Salam Hwaidi	Captain	Commander Assistant Abu-Miniar Battalion (Sirte)
Naji Harir	Lt. Colonel	Naval Base (Khums)
Muhamad abdul-Rahim Abdula	Captain	Deterrence Battalion

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NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Saeed Muhamad Uwaidat	Colonel	9th Brigade
Omran Uwaidat	Captain	Commander of 123 Battalion (Special Forces)
Ariq Abdul-Aziz al-Zintani	Lt. Colonel	
Adel Sharaf Omar al-Fakhri	Lieutenant	Deterrence Battalion (Tripoli)
Omran al-Mualif	Major	Commander of Imhimad Magarief Battalion
Alarabi Ishkal	Colonel	Presidential Guard
Muhamad al-Nadab	Captain	Presidential Guard
Shelwan Harir	Captain	Presidential Guard
Miftah Beleed	Captain	Presidential Guard
Khamis al-Ghanay	Captain	Presidential Guard
Awad Misbah Hanaish	Captain	Presidential Guard (Khalifa Ihneish's nephew)
Abdula Sbaie	Captain	Jamahiriya Security
Muhamad abu-Shwaish	Major	Jamahiriya Security
Faraj Abdul-Mawla	Captain	Jamahiriya Security
Abdul-Salam al-Nadab	Captain	Jamahiriya Security (Tobruk)
Al-Sidiq Shtaiwie	Captain	Jamahiriya Security (Jufra)
Ali al-Kilbu	Major	Faris al-Sahra Battalion Commander
Hassan al-Kabir	Lt. Colonel	Al-Saadi Battalion Commander
Khalifa Ihneish	Colonel	Central Security Committee (Sirte)
Ahmad al-Kailani	Colonel	Military Intelligence (Sirte)
Ali al-Kailani	Major	Liaison Office (Security of Revolutionary Committees)
Imhimad Hwaidi	Lt. Colonel	Liaison Office Revolutionary Committees

NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Al-Zawam al-Sakloul	Major	Jamahiriya Security
Salem al-Nadab	Flight Colonel	Air Force (Kurthabia)
Zaid Abdul Daiem al-Mudir	Fl. Major	Air Force (Special Squadron)
Omar Ukhwaiddi	Fl. Major	Air Force (Kurthabia)
Abdul Kadir al-Zintani	Fl. Major	Air Force (Kurthabia)
Al-Zintani Khalifa al-Zintani	Fl. Major	Revolutionary Committee Secretary Peoples Congress
Omar Ishkal	Fl. Major	Revolutionary Committee Secretary Peoples Congress

AL KHATRA

Masoud Abdul-Hafith	Colonel	Special Operations Room
Tahir Bubnaina	Captain	72nd Battalion
Muhamad Omar Beleed	Lt. Colonel	Deterrence Battalion Commander
Muhamad Bubnaina	Major	Financial Officer Deterrence Battalion
Swaisi Abdul-Hafith	Captain	Presidential Guard
Shtaiwi Hassan	Captain	Presidential Guard
Mansour Abdul-Hafith	Captain	Syria Liaison Office

AL MJATHABA

Muhamad al-Majthoub	Colonel	Liaison Officer Revolutionary Committees
Misbah Abdul-Hafith Izbak	Major	Deputy Commander of Fatheel Bu-Omar Battalion

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NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Naji Abdul-Hafith	Captain	Jamahiriya Security
IN-LAWS		
Al-Jarih Farkash	Colonel	Hussein al-Juweifi Battalion Commanding Officer (Safia Farkash's uncle)
Busha'ria Farkash	?	Jamahiriya Security
Saleh Farkash	?	Jamahiriya Security
Muhamad Farkash	?	Jamahiriya Security
Khairi Abdul-Hamid Khalid	Colonel	Commander of Prisons to Military Police (Brother of Qaddafi's first wife).
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES		
Omar Mohammed Ashqal	Q	Secretary People's Congress, Liason Office
Azloud Ahmed Jaloud	M	Brother of Abdul Salam Jaloud
Mohammad A. Almajzoub	Q	Captain, Personal Liason between Qaddafi and Revolutionary Committees
Ibrahim Aljady	W	Deputy Chair of Socialist & Progressive Organizations of the Mediterranean
Hoda Ben Amer	W	Member of Revolutionary Court. Close association with Qaddafi, Revolutionary Nun.

NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Mesbah al-Wirfally	W	Chief of the Revolutionary Committee. in Europe
Abdel Hady Abdel Salam	Q	Son of Qaddafi's Sister, (dubbed Crown Prince)
Alhamali Abdul Hamid	Q	Son of Qaddafi's Sister. R.C. in Sirte. Runs Agricultural Project
Mohammed Khalifa Ahnish	Q	Son of Khalifa Ahneish. R.C. in Tripoli
Jamal Ahnish	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Omar Ahnish	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Akreen Saleh Akreen	Q	People's Congress
Abdul Jalil Abo Menia	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Abdullah Alamory	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli) Propagandist
Mossa Mesbah	W	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Yunis Alama	W	Revolutionary Committee
Abdul Karim	Q	Revolutionary Committee Tripoli, Propagandist
Abdulrahman A. Abu Meniar	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Aly Erhab	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Zaidan Manna Alzerky	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Amhammed M. Albahlil	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli)
Alfarjany Alharary	W	Revolutionary Committee (Tripoli and Spain)
Ibrahim Aly Mansour	Q	Leading member of Revolutionary Committee, Popular Committees in Sirte
Ibrahim Ams'eed	Q	Majthobi brother of Mohammed Ams'eed Almajthoub
Alhamali Ali Alhamali	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sirte)
Mohammed Aly Alsakhloul	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sirte)



NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Essza Moftah Awidat	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sirte)
Yunis Abdul Nabi	W	Revolutionary Committee (Sirte)
Abo Bakr Daboub	Q	Cousin of Hassan Eshkhal (dead), Sirte
Hussein Alrifly	Q	Captain, Associated with ES served in Rome '86
Mohammed Alsakhloul	Q	Chief of Revolutionary Committee in Sabha
Mohammed Hussein Nasr	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sabha)
Almorabet	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sabha)
Moftah Saad Aldelio	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sabha)
Abrini	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Sabha)
Abdul Rahim Alferjani	Q	R. C. Sabha, Associated with JS
Almahdy M. Mansour	M	Revolutionary Committee (Sabha)
Abdullah Hassayer	Q	Liaison of the R.C. in Benghazi
Abdullah B. Alamory	Q	Revolutionary Committee (Benghazi)
Ahmed Saleh	Q	R. C. Benghazi, Dir. Wadi Alghazala Project
Idriss Muammar	W	Revolutionary Committee (Benghazi)
Hassan Ben Yunis	W	Prosecutor People's Court
Salwa Fathy Ben Amer	W	Revolutionary Nun (Benghazi)
Fa'za Mohammed ben Amer	W	R. N. Benghazi
Salem Ibrahim Ben Amer	W	Revolutionary Committee (Journalist)
Jamila Ben Amer	W	Revolutionary Nun
Sakina Ben Amer	W	Revolutionary Nun
Alsenussi Ibrahim Ben Amer	W	University Professor
Ahmed Ramadan	Q	Revolutionary Committee

NAME	RANK	DUTIES
Salem Abdul Rahman	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Mohammed Hemida Alkehssy	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Milad Abdul Salam	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Gaith Oydat	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Daw Sa'ad Moftah Aldelaw	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Salma Almosraty	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Aisha Abdullah	W	Revolutionary Nun
Yunis Mana	W	Revolutionary Nun
Khairia Sa'ad	W	Revolutionary Committee
Alorify Mass'oud	W	Revolutionary Nun
Abdul Hamid Massoud	W	Revolutionary Committee
Abdullah Othman	Q	Revolutionary Committee
Najib Toliba	W	Revolutionary Committee (Brika)
Hany A. Khalid	W	Revolutionary Committee (Alkhoms)
Mohammed Alfaleh	W	Revolutionary Committee
Abdulkader	W	Revolutionary Committee
Zain Mohammed Abu Aisha	W	Revolutionary Committee
Ahmed Qorjy	W	Revolutionary Committee
Sa'id Gaith	W	Revolutionary Committee
Abdul Jalil Abdul Dayem	M	Revolutionary Committee
Aisha Jaloud	M	Revolutionary Nun.

Note: Ranks and duties as of 1993. All are subject to change. Q = Qaddafi; W = Warfala; M = Magharha.



NOTES

CHAPTER ONE: THE POLITICS OF CONTRADICTION

1. Although Qaddafi is a major general who likes to be called "leader," for simplicity I shall refer to him as General Qaddafi, or "the General."

2. See chap. 3 below for a full analysis of the "Third International Theory."

3. The group of nations controlled by military power includes a number of African and Asian countries, as well as some Latin American countries, such as Paraguay and Ecuador. Both of these latter countries can be classified as "neotraditional," but power is shared by military juntas and large landowners. See Rouquie, "Military Revolution and National Independence in Latin America."

4. On the need to develop an ideology in less-developed countries, see Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative*, 129-45.

5. There are many examples, but perhaps the most interesting is the use of religion in Peru and Iran. Iran was attempting to establish an ideal Islamic state, in accordance with Khomeini's ideology, which was based on Islamic socialism. Peru, on the other hand, prior to President Fujimori, was ruled by a military junta which sought to devise a new left-oriented ideology that drew heavily on Latin American Catholic doctrines and traditions. See Stepan, *The State and Society*.

6. See Nyerere, "Ujamaa": *The Basis of African Socialism*, 304. Also see Nyerere, *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism*.

7. See Nyerere, "Ujamaa": *The Basis of African Socialism*.

8. The real wielder of power in Burma since 1962 has been Ne Win, who exercised influence over his successor, U Nu, until he removed him. Ne Win continues to exercise influence over the military junta that came to power in 1990. During his thirty-one-year tenure, Ne Win has managed to inflict unbelievable havoc on Burma's economy and politics.

9. Lissak, "Military Roles in Modernization," 452-67. See also Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* and "The Army in Burmese Politics," 231-53.

10. A spectacular example is South Korea, where the military regime has pursued a distributive economic policy within the framework of a market economy that allows substantial government intervention. However, unlike many military leaders, the South Korean officer corps has no explicit political ideology. Its incentives seem to be primarily a mix of nationalism, service, loyalty, power, and patronage. The country's vast growth in industrialization, urbanization, and education has taken place at the expense



of stable political parties, trade unions, and consensual political culture. The former military regime of President Park accorded broad, almost dictatorial powers to the presidency and provided no limits on the number of presidential terms. That policy was still in effect under the former president, Chun-Du Hwan. For more, see Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*, 378-81; Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution*; Jonngwon A. Kim, *Divided Korea*; and C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, *Party Politics and Elections in Korea*, part 1.

11. See Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-Patrimonialism*, chap. 4; and Roth, "Personal Rulership," 194. See also Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers," 246.

12. Good examples are the oil kingdoms and sheikdoms of the Middle East. The control that the elites in these countries have exerted over a scarce and valuable resource has enabled them to attain an extraordinarily high rate of economic growth and to follow policies of rapid technical modernization that are often accompanied by distributive and mass welfare policies. They were able to do this without revolutionary changes in either ideology or political structure by combining traditional patrimonial patterns of rule with bureaucratic organization staffed by foreign experts and native, foreign-trained technicians. There is no doubt that, in the long run, conflict between surviving traditionalism and "technocratic-rational" tendencies will arise. However, in the short run and as long as there is the oil windfall to draw upon, the traditional elites will continue to be in a position to respond to popular demand and expectations and to co-opt the new technocratic elites into the ruling circles. Without the luxury of plentiful liquidity they will face the problem much sooner. See Bill and Leiden, *The Middle East*, chaps. 5 and 6.

13. A popular joke on the streets in Libya tells the story of an atheist who decided to renounce atheism after visiting Libya. When asked why he had had a change of heart, he responded that any society that undergoes such constant chaos and upheaval and still remains intact as a society must be controlled by a supernatural force.

14. A full analysis of *The Green Book* can be found in chapter 3 below.

15. On women in Libya see Marius K. and Mary-Jane Deeb, *Libya since the Revolution*, chap. 3.

CHAPTER TWO: THROUGH THE EYES OF HISTORY

1. Since independence, Libya has been through a number of name changes. The United Kingdom of Libya was followed by the Kingdom of Libya. That was changed by the revolution of 1969 to the Libyan Arab Republic, only to be replaced by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1978 after the second cultural revolution. In the latest change, which occurred in 1986, the word "Great" was added, making the official name of the country the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya the Great. The term *Jamahiriya* is equivalent to "state of the masses."

2. See *World Development Report*, 1985. Libya's three main cities—Tripoli, Benghazi, and Zawia—grew vastly as a result of the urbanization that accompanied the discovery of oil. A detailed account of this process of migration can be found in Elkabir, *Migrants in Tripoli*.

3. See Rinehart, "Historical Setting."

4. See Rinehart, "Historical Setting," and First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, 31-45.

5. 9-10. For a history of Leptis, see Al-Kib, *Sabratah Fi Falak al-Ta'rikh*.

6. Rinehart, "Historical Setting," 12.

7. For a historical analysis of the first Arab invasion of Libya, see Miftah, *Libya Mundhu al-Fath al-Arabi Hatta Intiqal al-Khilafah al-Fatimiyah ila Misr*.

8. Rinehart, "Historical setting," 9.

9. First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, 34.

10. Rinehart, "Historical Setting," 16.

11. A number of reasons have been given for the expulsion of these two tribes. However, the most plausible explanations are the overpopulation of Arabia on the one hand and the declining Arab influence in North Africa on the other. The Fatimids must have felt that relocating the Bani Hilal and Bani Sulaim would lessen the economic and environmental pressures on Arabia and simultaneously increase Arab influence in North Africa.

12. There are a number of conflicting views regarding the effect of the tribes' relocation. The most prominent among them were presented by Ibn Khaldun, who maintained that the second Arab invasion brought an end to large-scale farming and the process of urbanization. The conquering nomads, according to Ibn Khaldun, sacked cities and reduced them to grazing grounds for their sheep. The process of converting farmlands into pasturage not only brought an end to agricultural production but also enabled the steppe to intrude into the coastal plain. If that is true, then it is quite correct to state that the process to reverse the effects of events that took place during the eleventh century did not begin until the mid-twentieth century.

13. For more on the role of Tripoli see First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, 3-35.

14. On the history of this period see Braudel, *The Mediterranean* 1:1-50.

15. See Dearden, *A Nest of Corsairs*.

16. See Rinehart, "Historical Setting," 34.

17. See Braudel, *The Mediterranean* 1:150.

18. Among the acts attributed to Ahmed al-Karamanli was the slaughter of the leaders of all the Janissary opposed to him in Tripolitania after inviting them to a banquet. For more on Ahmed al-Karamanli and his struggle for the throne see Dearden, *A Nest of Corsairs*, 27-41.

19. *A Nest of Corsairs*, 154.

20. *A Nest of Corsairs*, 152.

21. *A Nest of Corsairs*, 208.

22. Tripoli's economic survival was dependent on its commercial position, as a link between Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa and Europe on the one hand, and on credit from European financial institutions on the other. Tariffs or "piracy" was also important as a source of income, yet credit and commerce provided the main revenue. With the end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe and the subsequent emergence of the Pax Britannica and the economic expansion that accompanied it, trade moved away from the Mediterranean Basin. The final blow came when the West African trade routes became important for European trade. That negated Tripoli's position as a transit center and thus deprived it of an important source of income. With no trade income Tripoli

