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TRIAL CHAMBER V

Before: Judge Beti Hohler , Presiding Judge
Judge Joanna Korner
Judge Keebong Paek

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC II

IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR v. ALFRED YEKATOM AND PATRICE-EDOUARD
NGAISSONA

Public

**Public redacted version of “Registry Victim Mapping Report and Observations on
Reparations”, ICC- 01/14-01/18-2905-Conf, dated 13 April 2026**

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....	4
I. Procedural History.....	4
II. Classification.....	5
III. Submissions	6
A. Methodology.....	6
1) Preparatory steps.....	6
2) Data Collection	10
B. Mapping results	13
Preliminary remarks.....	13
1) Bangui (Boeing; Cattin) events	13
2) Bossangoa events.....	17
3) PK9–Mbaïki axis events.....	20
Summary	24
C. Types and Extent of Harm.....	24
1) Harm resulting from attacks against the civilian population	25
2) Harm resulting from forced displacement	26
3) Harm resulting from killings	28
4) Harm resulting from imprisonment.....	29
5) Harm resulting from destruction of property	29
6) Harm resulting from torture.....	30
7) Cross-cutting harms.....	30
D. Eligibility matters	32
1) Potential Eligible Victims of reparations	32
2) Standard and burden of proof.....	36
3) Presumptions of harms.....	38
4) Eligibility process	39
E. Reparations types and modalities.....	39
1) Compensation and material support.....	39
2) Housing, land and property (HLP)	41
3) Livelihood support and income-generating activities.....	41
4) Educational support and youth-centred interventions	42
5) Medical care and psychosocial support	43
6) Measures related to cultural, religious, and collective identity	43
7) Collective and community-benefit measures.....	44

8)	Support for social cohesion and guarantees of non-repetition.....	45
F.	Additional observations	45
1)	Prioritisation.....	45
2)	Prior compensation/reparations.....	46

Annex I: Summary mapping report

Annex II: Overview of data from victim applications

Annex III : CAU-VWS report assessment

Introduction

1. Pursuant to Trial Chamber V's "Order for Submissions on Reparations"¹ (respectively "Chamber" and "Order"), issued on 8 October 2025, the Registry hereby submits its observations, including its victims mapping report, on reparations in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona* ("Case").

I. Procedural History

2. On 24 July 2025, the Chamber, in its previous composition, convicted Mr Alfred Yekatom and Mr Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona for the commission of a total of 27 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes ("Trial Judgment").²

3. On 8 October 2025, the Chamber issued the Order, instructing, *inter alia*, the Registry, by 27 March 2026, to i) undertake a comprehensive mapping of direct and indirect victims potentially eligible for reparations in the Case (respectively "Victim Mapping" and "Potential Eligible Victims"),³ and ii) provide observations on any or all of the issues listed in paragraph 6(i) of the Order.⁴

¹ Trial Chamber V, "Order for Submissions on Reparations", 8 October 2025, ICC-01/14-01/18-2821, para. 6, (i) and (v).

² Trial Chamber V, "Trial Judgment and Sentencing Decision", 24 July 2025, ICC-01/14-01/18-2784-Red.

³ Order, para. 6 (v). The Mapping should identify: "(a) the main categories of victims; (b) their current location; and (c) all data that [the Registry] may be able to obtain regarding the victims' gender, age group, and particular vulnerabilities which may need to be taken into account by the Chamber when deciding on the reparations to be awarded".

⁴ In para. 6(i) of the Order, the Chamber listed the following issues for submissions: (a) the estimated total number of direct and indirect victims potentially eligible for reparations; (b) factual or legal issues

4. On 28 November 2025, the Registry submitted its progress report on the Victim Mapping Report (“Progress Report”).⁵

5. On 18 February 2026, the Registry sought authorization to access a number of confidential documents on the record of the Case for the purposes of its mapping report.⁶ On 27 February 2026, the Chamber granted this request.⁷

6. On 5 March 2026, following a request from the Common Legal Representatives of Victims of Other Crimes (“CLR”) seeking an extension of time to submit their observations on reparations, the Chamber extended the Registry’s deadline for the submission of the Mapping Report and its observations to 13 April 2026.⁹

II. Classification

7. In accordance with regulation 23bis(1) of the Regulations of the Court, the present submission, together with Annexes I and II, is filed as confidential, and Annex III¹⁰ as confidential *ex parte*, available only to the Registry and the CLR, since they contain sensitive information relating to the safety of victims. A public redacted version of the filing will be filed in due course.

relevant to identifying eligible victims; (c) any victims or groups requiring prioritisation; (d) the types and extent of harm suffered by victims of the crimes of conviction; (e) whether recourse to factual presumptions should be considered; (f) the types and modalities of reparations appropriate to address the harm; (g) estimates of the costs of repairing the harms; (h) whether victims have received any form of compensation or reparations; (i) considerations relevant to assessing each convicted person’s liability; (j) information on the number of members of the Muslim population residing at the relevant time in Bangui (including Boeing and Cattin), Bossangoa (including Boro), and villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis; and (k) any additional information relevant to reparations.

⁵ Registry, “Registry Progress Report on Victim Mapping”, 28 November 2025, ICC-01/14-01/18-2849-Conf.

⁶ Email from Registry to Trial Chamber I on 18 February 2026, at 12:58.

⁷ Email from Trial Chamber I to parties, participants and the Registry on 27 February 2026, at 13:53

⁸ CLR, “Common Legal Representative of Victims’ Request for a limited extension of time limit to submit observations on reparations”, 23 February 2026 ICC-01/14-01/18-2883-Conf.

⁹ Trial Chamber I, “Decision on the Common Legal Representative of Victims’ request for extension of time to submit observations on reparations”, 5 March 2026, ICC-01/14-01/18-2889.

¹⁰ Annex III contains information provided by the Registry’s Country Analysis Unit and the Victims and Witnesses Section, pertaining to the safety and security of the victims during the reporting period

III. Submissions

8. The Victim Participation and Reparations Sections of the Registry (“VPRS”) hereby presents (i) the results of its victim mapping (“Mapping Report”), and (ii) its observations on the issues listed in paragraph 6(i) of the Order, to the extent of the Registry’s mandate and expertise. The estimated total number of potential eligible victims under paragraph 6(i)(a) of the Order (“Potential Eligible Victims”) is set out in the conclusion of the Mapping Report section.¹¹

9. The VPRS does not provide observations on the cost of repair (paragraph 6 (i) (g) of the Order), and on the assessment of the liability for reparations of each convicted person (paragraph 6 (i) (g) of the Order), as the parties (Victims and Defence) and the Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”) are best placed to address these two issues.

A. Methodology

1) Preparatory steps

10. As highlighted in its Progress Report, the VPRS conducted its activities in a context marked by widespread displacement and a complex political and security environment.¹² Building on the steps taken following the closure of the victim application process for participation in the proceedings, the VPRS designed a targeted, time-bound collection plan, calibrated to these contextual realities and applicable deadlines.

Prior knowledge of victims’ whereabouts

11. Prior to the issuance of the Order, the VPRS had already carried out targeted activities to locate Potential Eligible Victims in the Central African Republic (“CAR”) and in Chad, and has established working contacts with key stakeholders in [REDACTED] to monitor returns and community movements.

¹¹ See *infra* paras. 98 and 99.

¹² See also Annex III.

12. [REDACTED].

Assessment of available documentation

13. Already during the victim application process at the trial stage, the VPRS observed a lack of contemporaneous official records regarding the size of the Muslim population in Bangui (including Boeing and Cattin), along the PK9–Mbaïki axis, and in Bossangoa at the time relevant to the Case, as well as the extent of the harm suffered by participating victims. The most recent national census predates the events (2003),¹³ and no updated or disaggregated population data are available for the affected neighbourhoods during the relevant period.

14. During the CAR 2013-2015 crisis, the administrative infrastructure degraded sharply: by mid-2014, few civil servants reportedly served at their posts,¹⁴ and civil-status registries and local archives were destroyed or became inaccessible - undermining institutional memory and hindering verification of identity, residence, family links, and ownership.

15. At the neighbourhood level, VPRS interlocutors explained that, following the abolition of the capitation tax in 1993, the *chefs de quartier* no longer exercised coercive or registry-keeping functions and were not involved in national census operations. As a result, they did not maintain population rolls, and the documentation that remains is fragmentary and largely informal. Religious leaders likewise did not keep systematic membership or population registers. Only *ad hoc*, non-nominal headcounts were carried out during certain humanitarian movements or evacuations, typically for logistical rather than administrative purposes.

16. [REDACTED].

¹³ The last population census was carried out in 2003. In 2025, the CAR launched its fourth General Population and Housing Census (RGPH4), RFI, “*En Centrafrique, un grand recensement ‘pour permettre aux autorités de mieux organiser leurs politiques’*”, 12 December 2025: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251212-en-centrafrique-un-grand-recensement-pour-permettre-aux-autorit%C3%A9s-de-mieux-organiser-leurs-politiques>; (accessed on 31 march 2026]

¹⁴ A UNDP rapid needs assessment conducted in mid-2014 found that only 9% of government officials remained deployed to their posts, compared to approximately 60% prior to December 2012. See, Norwegian Refugee Council, Displacement and Housing, Land and Property Rights in the Central African Republic (Dec. 2014), Executive Summary, p. 6

17. During the consultations, survivors and community leaders explained that the evacuations of Muslim population in 2013–2014 were often conducted in emergency conditions and under acute insecurity, without standardised procedures for registration or systematic recording of the evacuees' precise places of origin. Lists generated during these movements were frequently partial, or organised by order of evacuation rather than by identity or geographic provenance. Subsequently, some host authorities classified displaced Central African nationals as "returnees" solely on the basis of ancestral or historical links with the host country, notwithstanding valid civil documentation issued in the CAR or long-standing residence within Bangui or other affected areas.

18. Lastly, VPRS interlocutors described under-reporting of harms that carry stigma or protection risks (e.g., conflict sexual related violence). They further noted that many displaced households outside formal sites (with hosts, in rented or abandoned homes, or in the bush) were never systematically captured.

19. In view of these limitations, the VPRS relied on alternative methodologies, rather than formal documentation, prioritising data collection from primary sources such as community leaders, civil society actors and survivors with direct knowledge of the events, and seeking corroboration across other sources.

Design of consultations / methodology

20. The collection of information was primarily conducted through consultations with victims, which served: (i) to identify, estimate and map the number of Potential Eligible Victims in the absence of reliable contemporaneous population data (see above); and (ii) to collect information on victims' harms, needs, current situation, priorities and expectations concerning reparations.

21. While operational constraints required prioritising individuals able to provide information responsive to the Chamber's instructions, the VPRS sought to ensure that the consultations captured the diversity of incidents, harms and affected localities relevant to the case. To this end, it consulted victims and community members from different neighbourhoods and displacement sites, reflecting varied experiences and

crime patterns, and obtained information from multiple, independent sources (including survivors, community leaders, [REDACTED]).

22. In accordance with the Order,¹⁵ the VPRS and the TFV agreed on a common consultation framework. The respective teams planned joint missions where feasible in order to avoid multiple consultations with the same individuals, minimise the burden on affected communities, and ensure a coherent and streamlined approach to information-gathering. Joint deployments also enabled both entities to share their respective experience and expertise on reparations-related matters and apply aligned tools and criteria when engaging with victims, authorities and community representatives. Consistent with this approach, the teams adopted a shared methodology covering: (i) the sequencing and scope of victim's meetings; (ii) the composition of victim's consultation groups; (iii) [REDACTED]; and (iv) the means of collecting information in a coherent, accurate, and context-sensitive manner.

23. The VPRS and the TFV developed structured, open-ended questionnaires for group consultations with victims and interview guides for meetings [REDACTED].¹⁶ The VPRS collected information from multiple sources and compared them: it cross-checked what victim groups reported with [REDACTED], with materials identified through a desk-based review and with the findings of the Trial Judgment.

24. To identify and organise meetings, the VPRS relied on information shared by survivors, selected local intermediaries, the Trial Judgment [REDACTED]. Group discussions were segmented by age (typically 16–40 years old and 40+ years old), and ensured – to the extent possible- inclusive participation—women, older persons, young people, female-headed households, persons with disabilities, and refugees or returnees. Private one-to-one spaces were offered for participants wishing to raise sensitive or personal matters.

¹⁵ Order, para.8.

¹⁶ [REDACTED].

2) Data Collection

25. The VPRS' direct engagement with victims included [REDACTED]. Where available, the VPRS sought corroboration from secondary sources, including reports produced by international and regional organisations, research institutions and humanitarian agencies.

Consultations with survivors, community leaders and local communities

26. In total, the VPRS conducted 50 group discussions, which included survivors, [REDACTED] and community leaders.¹⁷ Most of the group discussions were conducted jointly with the TFV. The VPRS notes, however, that time and resource constraints limited the geographic scope of the consultations. In particular, the VPRS was not able to conduct meetings with victims currently residing in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, or in other locations within the CAR beyond the areas covered by the field missions.¹⁸ While the present findings are based primarily on information obtained from survivors consulted during the relevant period, the VPRS considers that they provide a representative and reliable picture of victims potentially affected by the events of the Case.

Counts related to Boeing and Cattin¹⁹

27. [REDACTED],²⁰ [REDACTED].²¹ [REDACTED].

Counts related to Bossangoa²²

28. [REDACTED].

29. [REDACTED],²³ [REDACTED].

30. [REDACTED]²⁴ [REDACTED].

¹⁷ In total, the VPRS met 911 individuals.

¹⁸ [REDACTED].

¹⁹ [REDACTED].

²⁰ [REDACTED].

²¹ [REDACTED].

²² [REDACTED]

²³ [REDACTED].

²⁴ [REDACTED].

31. [REDACTED].

Counts related to PK9–Mbaiki axis ²⁵

32. [REDACTED],²⁶ [REDACTED]²⁷ [REDACTED].²⁸

33. [REDACTED],²⁹ [REDACTED]. [REDACTED],³⁰ [REDACTED],³¹
[REDACTED],³² [REDACTED],³³ [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].³⁴

Individual identification of Potential Eligible Victims

Operability of using electronic data collection tools

34. As indicated in the Progress Report,³⁵ the Registry tested the feasibility of using an electronic data-collection form, and for this purpose developed incident-specific questionnaires (“Questionnaire(s)”) to support the Victim Mapping Exercise. The Questionnaires sought to record, in a consistent manner, incident and locality identifiers (for geographic scope), time markers (for temporal scope), crime and harm typology (for material scope), household composition, vulnerabilities and current whereabouts.

35. [REDACTED], the Registry conducted initial field tests of the Questionnaire. While the results were promising, the Registry further assessed that the full roll-out of the Questionnaire would require additional training and close supervision of the intermediaries administering it—necessitating additional missions [REDACTED] that could not be scheduled before the filing deadline of the present report. [REDACTED],³⁶ [REDACTED]. The Registry further notes that under appropriate conditions

²⁵ [REDACTED]

²⁶ [REDACTED].

²⁷ [REDACTED].

²⁸ [REDACTED].

²⁹ [REDACTED].

³⁰ [REDACTED].

³¹ [REDACTED].

³² [REDACTED].

³³ [REDACTED]

³⁴ [REDACTED];

³⁵ Progress Report, paras. 17 and 18.

³⁶ [REDACTED]

(including security, logistics, and supervision), this approach could support a future individualised victim eligibility process, should the Chamber so order.

Identification and registration of Potential Eligible Victims

36. [REDACTED].

37. [REDACTED].³⁷

38. In addition, the Registry recorded the names and contact details of participants and key interlocutors met during the above-mentioned sessions³⁸ to facilitate follow-up, and any future individualised eligibility steps should the Chamber so order.

39. [REDACTED].

Desk research

40. The VPRS also conducted desk-based research drawing on multiple sources, including: (i) the Trial Judgment;³⁹ (ii) materials from the confidential case record to which the Registry requested access pursuant to the Chamber's directions; and (iii) reports issued by international relevant to displacement patterns, current locations of survivors, and the broader context of the events. These included humanitarian situation updates on refugee and returnee sites, and analytical studies—such as assessments relating to HLP in the CAR displacement context and to displacement dynamics impacting the affected communities.

The VPRS Victim Database

41. The VPRS reviewed the information contained in the 1673 reparation applications submitted by victims admitted to participate at trial ("Victim

³⁷ [REDACTED].

³⁸ See *supra*, paras 27 to 33.

³⁹ The VPRS relied on the Trial Judgment's findings to identify what the Chamber has already established, including incident-area estimates and the characterisation of harm.

Applications”), all of whom met the applicable *prima facie* standard at the trial stage.⁴⁰ While this figure of 1673 may be adjusted once the Chamber determines the eligibility criteria applicable at the reparations stage, it nevertheless provides, at this stage, a representative basis for understanding relevant victims’ profiles and the harms reported.

42. The Victim Applications contained relevant information regarding the nature of the harm suffered, victims’ geographical locations, survivor’s profiles, household compositions and the types of reparations sought.

B. Mapping results

Preliminary remarks

43. The Registry recalls that this Mapping Exercise was conducted in a context characterised by the absence of contemporaneous documentation,⁴¹ large-scale displacement, and continuing obstacles to return for many Muslim survivors. Given these constraints, and the limited reliability of available administrative records, the VPRS has adopted a conservative approach, which should be assessed in conjunction with any additional information that may be brought to the Chamber’s attention by the parties (CLRVs and Defence), or the TFV.

1) Bangui (Boeing; Cattin) events

44. The Chamber found Mr Yekatom and Mr Ngaïssona guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in and around Bangui in the context and aftermath of the Anti-Balaka attack against the civilian population on 5 December 2013 (the “Bangui 5 December 2013 Attack”), including in Boeing and Cattin (the “Boeing and Cattin events”).⁴²

⁴⁰ In addition to the 1673 Applications, approximately 450 additional applications were received but were not transmitted to the Chamber for participation (e.g., due to persisting incompleteness or because they were reparations-only applications)

⁴¹ See *supra*, paras. 13 to 17.

⁴² See Trial Judgment, para. 4847. The Trial Judgment records, inter alia, that: (i) following the attack, the entire Muslim population of Boeing and Cattin was displaced to PK5 and other areas; although no

Boeing⁴³

Estimates and Profile

45. Based on the consultations, the Muslim population of Boeing comprised between 200 and 300 households, mainly of “Arabes” (families of Chadian origin), Hausa and Fulbe/Fulani, with an average household size of approximately 8 to 10 people. More than half of Muslim households in Boeing were owner-occupiers, while Muslim shopkeepers typically rented commercial units around Boeing Market. Applying a conservative method (households × household size), the VPRS estimates that at least 1600 to 2400 Muslims resided in Boeing prior to 5 December 2013. The upper range, using the highest household and size values, is between 2000 to 3000 Muslims.

Identification of Potential Eligible Victims so far⁴⁴

46. [REDACTED]

47. Through the Victims Applications, the VPRS identified approximately 280 participating victims who claim to have been harmed in Boeing.⁴⁵

Current situation of Potential Eligible Victims

48. [REDACTED]⁴⁶ and [REDACTED]⁴⁷ [REDACTED]

precise headcount was established, the Chamber noted evidence that around 100 Muslim families lived across both neighbourhoods before the events; (ii) seven persons were unlawfully imprisoned and tortured at the Yamwara School, and one of them was murdered (“Yamwara events”) ; (iii) the Nour Alyaguin (Boeing) Mosque was burned; and (iv) three persons were killed at the Boeing Market.

⁴³ According to [REDACTED], the Boeing sector comprises 45 sub-neighbourhoods (*quartiers*). The principal sub-neighbourhoods in which the Muslim population resided before and during the December 2013 events are, in descending order of concentration: Kokoro 1, Kokoro 2, Kokoro 3, Ketté Goussa, Cité de la Paix 1, and Gbakassa .1

⁴⁴ The preliminary identification of Potential Eligible Victims for the purpose of the present Report may lead to further follow-up, including for the purpose of subsequent consultations, mapping and/or further eligibility processes.

⁴⁵ More detailed information regarding the profiles of the participating victims identified, including their sex and age distribution as well as the types of harm alleged, is set out in Annex II.

⁴⁶ [REDACTED].

⁴⁷ [REDACTED].

49. [REDACTED].

Cattin

Estimates and Profile

50. Based on the consultations, the Muslim population of Cattin prior to the crisis was estimated at 150–200 households, with an average household size of 8–10 persons. The principal livelihoods of the Potential Eligible Victims were: commercial activities, transport, and roles in the mining value chain (notably as “collectors”). Most households were tenants, while at least 20% were owner-occupiers, often with higher-value homes—particularly among collectors and transport operators. As for Boeing, the population was composed mainly of “Arabes”, Hausa and Fulbe/Fulani. Applying a conservative method (households × household size), the VPRS estimates that between 1200 and 2000 Muslims resided in Cattin prior to 5 December 2013.

Identification of Potential Eligible Victims to date

51. [REDACTED]

52. Through the Victims Applications, the VPRS identified approximately 230 participating victims who claim to have been harmed in Cattin.⁴⁸

Current situation of Potential Eligible Victims

53. [REDACTED].

54. [REDACTED].

Adjacent Neighbourhoods to Boeing and Cattin

55. Based on the information collected and the Application Forms received, several neighbourhoods located immediately adjacent to, or bordering, Boeing and Cattin formed part of the same continuous urban block of the 3rd arrondissement that

⁴⁸ See also Annex II.

experienced the mass displacement of Muslim civilians during the Bangui 5 December 2013 Attack.

56. The VPRS notes that no pre-crisis census or administrative dataset provides a religious breakdown for the 3rd *arrondissement* of Bangui. Nevertheless, community-based assessments conducted between 2015 and 2019 consistently describe PK5, within this *arrondissement*, as the main Muslim residential and commercial centre of Bangui prior to December 2013, with a high concentration of Muslim households, and adjacent neighbourhoods of the 3rd *arrondissement* as mixed-composition areas with identifiable Muslim clusters.⁴⁹

57. To provide a conservative lower bound estimate of the affected population in the neighbourhoods adjacent to Boeing and Cattin, the VPRS limited its assessment to the neighbourhoods directly bordering these areas and relied on the following assumptions:

- Ten neighbourhoods bordering Boeing and Cattin⁵⁰ were among the first and most immediately affected by the 5 December 2013 attack, prompting many Muslim residents to seek refuge in other parts of PK5 (including around the Central Mosque) or, in some cases, at the Mpoko Airport IDP camp.
- These neighbourhoods were of mixed composition, often with a non-Muslim majority, but with identifiable Muslim clusters along main roads and

⁴⁹ According to the DRC community-based analysis, PK5 corresponds to a cluster of 16 neighbourhoods, including Camerounais Yaoundé, Camerounais Nord, Camerounais-Douala, Sénégalais, Foulbé, Yalao, Issongo, Sangha-Bibalé, Bea-Rex, Baya-KM5, Gbaya-Dombia, Fondo, Yambassa, Ouham-Guida, Ramandji, and Boulata, which together formed the principal Muslim commercial-residential block of the 3rd *arrondissement* prior to December 2013, hosted 20% of the Bangui population (around 150 000 inhabitants). (Danish Refugee Council (DRC), “Analyse à base communautaire des perceptions des dynamiques conflictuelles des populations du PK5”, conducted in 2015 and published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 15 January 2016, (“DRC report”) pages 8, 50-55.

⁵⁰ The ten neighbourhoods directly bordering Boeing and Cattin, and therefore considered for this lower-bound estimate, are: Boulata, Makambo, Fondo, Ramandji, Yambassa, Gbatouri, Fatima, Gbaya-Dombia I, Gbaya-Dombia II, and Kina. See. ACTED / AGORA, “Préfecture de Bangui – 3^{ème} Arrondissement: Profil de Référence Local (PRL)”, May 2019, available at: <https://www.acted.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/agora-car-report-prl-3eme-may2019-1.pdf> (last accessed on 01-04-2026).

commercial axes. (the VPRS estimates that between 40 to 50% of the population was Muslim).⁵¹

- The average pre-crisis population in these neighbourhoods can be conservatively estimated at approximately 1000 inhabitants per neighbourhood.⁵²

58. Based on these assumptions, the ten neighbourhoods adjacent to Boeing and Cattin would have had a combined pre-crisis population of approximately 10000 inhabitants, of whom 4000 to 5000 would have been Muslim. The VPRS therefore estimates that at least 4000 to 5000 Muslim individuals suffered harm in the context of the Boeing and Cattin events, including through their forced displacement to other parts of PK5 or to other locations.

2) Bossangoa events

59. The Chamber found Mr Ngaïssona guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Anti-Balaka attack against the civilian population in Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 (“Bossangoa 5 December 2013 Attack”) and, with its immediate aftermath (“Bossangoa events”).⁵³

Estimates and profile

60. Information from consultations [REDACTED] indicates that, prior to 5 December 2013, the Muslim population of Bossangoa was concentrated in the Arabe,

⁵¹ See DRC report, pages 50 -55; ; and AGORA (IMPACT Initiatives)/ACTED, “Bangui Neighbourhood Response Plans, published in May 2017”, (“2017 AGORA report”), pages 16-17 and 22-23, available via the UNHCR Operational Data Portal: <https://data.unhcr.org> (last accessed 26 March 2026)

⁵² See the estimates made on 17 neighbourhoods of the 3rd *arrondissement* in 2019 (AGORA (IMPACT Initiatives)/ACTED, “Plan de Relèvement Local du 3^{ème} Arrondissement de Bangui (PRL)”, published in May 2019, available at: <https://www.acted.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/agora-car-report-prl-3eme-may2019-1.pdf> (last accessed 26 March 2026), (“2019 AGORA report”) page 8)

⁵³ See Trial Judgment, para. 4847. The Judgment records that i) prior to the 5 December attack, “several hundred to a thousand” Muslims were already staying at the *École de la Liberté* (Trial Judgment, para. 2957) and ii) the Muslim civilian population who further fled to the *École de la Liberté*, “rose into the several thousands” (Trial Judgment, paras. 2970, 4069, 4760). Contemporaneous reporting cited in the record of the case places the figure between 4000 to 8500 persons displaced in mid-to late December 2013 (Trial Judgment, paras. 2959 - 2969 & fns. 7353 – 7355). The Chamber further recorded widespread destruction of residential structures in Bossangoa (paras. 2920, 2922), as well as the killing of at least 18 persons (Trial Judgment, para. 4747).

Boro, Foulbé and Sembé neighbourhoods. Survivors consistently described the community as numbering in the thousands. The Muslim population of Bossangoa was primarily engaged in commercial activities and livestock-related activities. Many households operated shops, traded goods, transported merchandise or combined petty commerce with small-ruminant herding. A smaller number worked in artisanal mining or gold/diamond trading. Participants described the community as predominantly composed of merchants, with many families owning shops, participating in regional trade networks, or dealing in essential goods and agricultural products.

61. Participants [REDACTED] estimated that at least 650 households resided in Bossangoa (with approximately 250 households in the Arabe neighbourhood, between 100 and 150 in Boro, between 150 and 200 in Foulbé, and 100 in Sembé) before the attack, with typical household sizes ranging from 10 to 12 people. Applying a conservative household-multiplier method, the VPRS estimates between 6500 and 7800 Muslim residents across these neighbourhoods prior to 5 December 2013. Consultations further indicate that approximately 1000 displaced persons were already sheltering at the École de la Liberté before the attack. Taken together, the VPRS therefore considers reasonable to estimate that at between 7500 and 8800 individuals were present in, or displaced toward, the École de la Liberté area during the events of 5 - 6 December 2013.

Identification of Potential Eligible Victims so far

62. [REDACTED].

63. Through the Victims Applications, the VPRS identified approximately 280 participating victims who claim to have been harmed in Bossangoa.⁵⁴

Current situation of Potential Eligible Victims

64. [REDACTED].

- *Situation of Bossangoa survivors residing in Chad*

⁵⁴ See also Annex II.

65. [REDACTED], FDG participants explained that the majority of displaced persons were transported through convoys escorted by Chadian forces and administratively categorised as “returnees”—a designation implying return to a country of origin (Chad), despite nearly all holding Central African identity documents. This classification has limited their access to protection frameworks available to formally recognised refugees. Initial humanitarian assistance diminished substantially by 2014–2015, and subsequent budget reductions by international organisations such as the World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have resulted in minimal institutional support. Survivors rely predominantly on informal labour, domestic work in [REDACTED], small-scale agriculture and low-return commercial activity.

66. [REDACTED].

67. FDG participants reported that displacement trajectories reflected two principal waves: an initial unregistered evacuation under Chadian military escort, and a later UNHCR/IOM-supported movement of 517 persons who were formally counted on arrival. [REDACTED].

68. More than a decade after their displacement, survivors report that conditions [REDACTED] remain marked by chronic precarity. Housing consists largely of temporary structures with limited access to cultivable land. Humanitarian presence is minimal, and access to water and healthcare is inconsistent, with reports of elevated mortality linked to the absence of medical facilities. Education relies on parents financing volunteer teachers, and many children have never been enrolled or have dropped out. Survivors continue to face economic marginalisation, unresolved HLP loss and long-term psychosocial harm, with most unable to envisage sustainable return to the CAR in the absence of security guarantees and reintegration support.

- *Situation of Victims from Bossangoa who remain in Bangui*

69. FDG participants reported that a smaller portion of victims from Bossangoa sought refuge in Bangui rather than fleeing to Chad. [REDACTED]. Many arrived

between late December 2013 and early February 2014, some travelling directly from Bossangoa with the support of Christian neighbours, while others moved first to intermediary locations such as Bimbo or Pissa. Their arrival in Bangui coincided with the broader displacement triggered by the December 2013 Anti-Balaka attacks on Boeing, Cattin and surrounding areas.

70. [REDACTED], these victims face persistent economic insecurity and unresolved property loss. Many reside in rented accommodation, often at significant cost relative to their limited income, following the loss of homes and assets in Bossangoa.

- Situation of Victims from Bossangoa who returned to Bossangoa

71. [REDACTED].

72. [REDACTED].

73. [REDACTED].

74. [REDACTED].

75. [REDACTED].

76. [REDACTED].

3) PK9–Mbaïki axis events

77. The Chamber found Mr Yekatom guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Anti-Balaka advance and takeover of localities along the PK9–Mbaïki axis between on or about 10 January and on or about 6 February 2014 (the “PK9–Mbaïki Axis events”).⁵⁵

⁵⁵ See Trial Judgment, para. 4847. The Chamber found that these events resulted in the dislocation of the Muslim population from Sekia, Ndangala, Bimon, Kapou, Bossongo, Pissa and Mbaïki (Trial Judgment, para. 4303). Muslims present in Mbaïki at the time comprised three distinct groups: (i) long-term residents of Mbaïki; (ii) Muslims fleeing villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis; and (iii) Muslims originating from other parts of the Lobaye prefecture (Trial Judgment, para. 4317). At least 1000 Muslim civilians fled toward Mbaïki during this period, substantially increasing a pre-existing Muslim population estimated at 2000 individuals by the end of 2012 (representing roughly 10 - 15% of the overall population (Trial Judgment, paras. 3447–3448; fn. 8471.) The Chamber also confirmed the killing of Djido Saleh, the second deputy mayor of Mbaïki, on 28 February 2014 in the context of Anti-Balaka operations targeting Muslim civilians (Trial Judgment, paras 3643 to 3648)

Mbaïki

Estimates and Profile

78. Information collected during the VPRS mission [REDACTED] indicates two affected groups. First, between 1000 and 1500 persons originating from the PK9–Mbaïki axis who fled toward Mbaïki as Anti-Balaka elements advanced along the route. Second, between 3,000 and 4,000 Muslim residents of Mbaïki centre and its surrounding villages - Nzanga, Ndolobo, Bélou and Machado -, who were directly impacted during the same period.

79. Consultations indicate that the Muslim population of Mbaïki at the time of the events formed a socially and economically heterogeneous community, whose livelihoods spanned commercial activities, agricultural production, coffee-buying, small-scale transport, artisanal gold and diamond mining, and limited livestock ownership (with interviewees noting that livestock activities were constrained by the presence of the tsetse fly in the area). Households were described as large and extended, commonly comprising 8–10 members, and reaching 12–20 persons in polygamous households or in wider kin arrangements that included uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, or children taken in by relatives.

80. The community was described as largely indigenous or locally integrated, consisting of Peul/Fulani, Haoussa and locally Islamised families, with a smaller number of families of Chadian origin. This locally anchored profile was cited as a factor facilitating relatively greater acceptance of return. Some individuals—particularly those from mixed families—never left Mbaïki and took temporary refuge with relatives or under international protection before returning to their neighbourhoods.

81. Household-level estimates provided by *chefs de quartier* collectively point to a pre-crisis population of at least 1550 - 1700 Muslim residents in Yerima, Baguirmi,

Bornou, Gbaté neighbourhoods alone,⁵⁶ with additional households residing in surrounding village.

Identification of Potential Eligible Victims so far

82. [REDACTED].

83. Through the Victim Applications, the VPRS identified, approximately 360 participating victims who claim to have been harmed in Mbaiki in the course of the PK9-Mbaiki axis events.⁵⁷

Current Situation of Potential Eligible Victims

84. [REDACTED].

85. [REDACTED].

Other localities including Pissa, Kapou,, Bimon, Ndangala and Bossongo

86. The Trial Judgment did not provide estimates for the Muslim population of the PK9–Mbaïki villages. As reflected in the Chamber’s Order, this absence of contemporaneous data led the Chamber to request information on “the numbers of the members of the Muslim population residing at the relevant time [...] in the villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis.”⁵⁸

87. The Trial Judgment identifies several villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis, including Sekia, Ndangala, Bimon, Kapou, Bossongo and Pissa.⁵⁹ Through the participation process, the VPRS has identified additional villages from which victims admitted in the Case originate.⁶⁰ For the purposes of the present filing, however, the

⁵⁶ Yerima counted 60–70 households (800–900 persons), Baguirmi 33 - 36 households (about 300 persons), Bornou 30 - 35 households (300 - 350 persons), and Gbaté 13 households (at least 150 persons).

⁵⁷ More detailed information regarding the profiles of the participating victims identified, including their sex and age distribution as well as the types of harm alleged, is set out in Annex II.

⁵⁸ Order, para. 6 (j).

⁵⁹ Trial Judgement, para.113.

⁶⁰ These include: Zila, Kpalongo 1, Kpalongo 2, Sakpa, Gbolika, Yombo, Yamboro, Bimon 1, Bimon 2, Zondo, Boumou, Kapou 1, Bossongo Plantation, Bossongo 2, Gboudokoro, Pesséré, Kpékéto, Tongolo, Bogbaté, Sakoulou, Bombé, Boyama 3, Boyali 2, Boyali 1, Pissa 2, Bongombé, Diligban, Boyama, Bobangui, Botoko, Nzéngué, Bossébo, Bonguere, Mbi, Sabé and Gbatombé

Registry has focused on the villages mentioned in the Judgment,⁶¹ and was not in a position to collect reliable demographic information on the composition of the other villages during the reporting period, due to time and resources constraints.

Estimates and Profile

88. For the villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis identified in the Judgment—Sekia, Ndangala, Bimon, Kapou, Bossongo and Pissa—the Registry gathered indicative population estimates through group discussions with survivors and local leaders. Across the six localities, the Potential Eligible Victims formed small, predominantly rural Muslim communities. Their livelihoods relied on a combination of petty trade, small-scale agriculture, livestock rearing, and, in some localities, butchery or artisanal mining-related activities.

89. In Bimon (PK35), participants estimated around 80 Muslim households, with an average household size of 8–10 persons, composed primarily of Haoussa, Foulbé, Arabes and Islamised autochthonous families; most residents fled together on 11 January 2014 toward Mbaïki, before being evacuated to Bangui (Mosquée centrale), [REDACTED] (Tchad) or [REDACTED] (Mali).

90. In Pissa (PK70), the Muslim population at the time of the events was estimated at 70–100 households, also averaging 8–10 persons, with livelihoods centred on commercial activities, agriculture and livestock; the majority displaced alongside Kapou residents toward Mbaïki and later departed with the Chadian convoy.

91. In Kapou (PK40), which survivors consistently described as hosting a large Muslim community, estimates range between 100–200 households of similar ethnic composition; the entire community displaced toward Pissa and Mbaïki before splitting between evacuees to Bangui, [REDACTED] (Tchad) and those who later reached [REDACTED] (Cameroon).

92. For the remaining localities - Ndangala (PK30) and Bossongo (PK50) - participants estimated approximately 30 households in Ndangala and 60 households in Bossongo, with household sizes of approximately 8 persons. Both communities

⁶¹ With the exception of Sekia.

displaced first to Mbaïki, before evacuations separated families between Bangui, [REDACTED] (Tchad), [REDACTED] (Cameroon) and [REDACTED] (RDC).

93. Taken together, these indicative estimates suggest that between 340 and 470 Muslim households resided across the five villages prior to the attacks, though no official household lists or population registers existed at the time.

Identification of Potential Eligible Victims so far

94. [REDACTED].

95. Through the Victim Applications, the VPRS identified approximately 60 participating victims from PK9-Mbaiki axis villages who claim to have been harmed in the course of the PK9-Mbaiki axis events.⁶²

Current situation of Potential Eligible Victims

96. [REDACTED].

97. [REDACTED].

98. [REDACTED].

Summary

99. Across all relevant locations assessed in this Mapping Exercise — namely Boeing, Cattin, the adjacent neighbourhoods of the 3rd arrondissement, Bossangoa, the PK9–Mbaïki axis villages and Mbaïki — the Registry estimates that the affected Muslim population is between approximately 20,000 individuals and 26,700 individuals.

100. A consolidated presentation of the above estimates, identification figures, geographic distribution of survivors, and return dynamics is provided in Annex I.

C. Types and Extent of Harm

101. Information collected during the consultations as well as information extracted from victims' application forms for participation and/or reparations indicates that

⁶² See also Annex II.

Potential Eligible Victims across all incident locations—Bangui (Boeing, Cattin), Bossangoa, Mbaïki, and the PK9–Mbaïki axis villages—suffered multiple, cumulative and interrelated harms affecting their physical integrity, psychological well-being, livelihoods, social cohesion and long-term prospects for recovery.

1) Harm resulting from attacks against the civilian population

102. The 5 December 2013 attacks in Bangui, including in Boeing and Cattin, gave rise to multiple forms of harms, including violations of the rights to life, physical and psychological integrity, material security, and family unit.

103. Survivors across Bangui and Bossangoa described the violence and fear associated with the attacks carried out against Muslim civilians. Many recounted episodes of panic, threats, and the breakdown of safety in their neighbourhoods and villages. These attacks created an environment of intense psychological suffering, marked by fear, insecurity, and long-lasting emotional distress. Information in the Victim Applications further shows that individuals were killed, others suffered physical violence and that their belongings were systematically looted during the attacks.⁶³

104. FDG participants stressed that the attacks also led to immediate family separations, with parents and children fleeing in different directions, some seeking refuge in PK5, others in local churches, and others escaping into the bush or to neighbouring towns. For extended households—which often included multiple wives, children, elderly relatives, and dependents—the sudden dislocation caused major destabilisation of household structures and long-term vulnerabilities.

105. The attacks also caused long-term insecurity and altered the way survivors perceive their home communities. In multiple focus groups, interviewees described persistent fear linked to what they witnessed during the attacks, including the knowledge that “even small problems could escalate quickly” in the current environment, as tensions remain underlying in some localities.

⁶³ See Annex II.

2) Harm resulting from forced displacement

106. Forced displacement in all locations caused severe physical, emotional, material and socio-economic harm across all affected populations. Survivors repeatedly described harm to identity and belonging. Being uprooted from ancestral neighbourhoods and community landmarks (including places of worship and burial) disrupted collective memory, religious practice and social status, and prolonged family separations diluted household identity over time. In host areas, administrative labels (e.g., registration as *retournés* despite Central African nationality) and residual stigmas (including perceptions of “foreign” origin) further undermined victims’ sense of being recognised members of their own society. Together, these factors compounded a felt loss of home, dignity and acceptance, persisting even where physical security had improved.

107. Survivors emphasised that, before the events, they had lived peacefully alongside their neighbours. Being forced to leave their birthplaces—and those of parents and grandparents—was repeatedly described as producing a lasting sense of loss in addition to the trauma already noted.

108. Survivors described fleeing in large, unstructured waves, often at night and under imminent threat from Anti-Balaka fighters. Many were forced to abandon all possessions: as one participant explained, the Chadian soldiers escorting them insisted that evacuees travel “without any luggage—either you climb without your things, or you stay behind”, resulting in total loss of household assets. The extent of the material loss reported by survivors in their Application Forms illustrates the scale of dispossession, including the loss of essential household items, houses, land, valuables, and other livelihood asset.⁶⁴

109. The conditions of flight were described as traumatic. Convoys could not stop even for breakdowns, leaving those in distress behind. Travelling through hostile zones—such as Gobongo, Boy-Rabe and PK12—was described as terrifying, with participants explaining that if the convoy stopped in these areas, “it was a death

⁶⁴ See Annex II.

sentence.” Many households arrived in Chad or Cameroon exhausted, traumatised and without any belongings.

110. As both FDG participants and information from the Victim Applications highlight, the flight triggered immediate family separations, with parents and children fleeing in different directions, some seeking refuge in PK5, others in local churches, and others escaping into the bush or to neighbouring towns. For extended households—which often included multiple wives, children, elderly relatives, and dependents—the sudden dislocation caused major destabilisation of household structures and long-term vulnerabilities. Displacement led to further systemic family fragmentation. It was common for one parent to return first to assess security while the other parent and some children remained in Chad or Cameroon. In other cases, wives stayed behind with elderly parents or because husbands had fled earlier. These patterns produced multi-year household separations, with significant emotional and financial consequences.

111. FDG participants stressed that life in displacement, particularly in sites and camps, imposed chronic precarity. [REDACTED].

112. Moreover, refugees and returnees reported:

- lack of clean water and adequate shelter;
- limited food and healthcare;
- closure of NGO-supported schools due to funding cuts;
- for some victims, dependence on daily labour (domestic work, agricultural day labour) earning 500–1000 FCFA per day;
- for most victims, widespread unemployment and extreme poverty.

113. Displacement caused durable HLP harms that persisted upon return. As reflected in VPRS meetings, in Mbaïki [REDACTED], the *chef de quartier* introduced documents such as “*attestations de gardiennage*” as pragmatic arrangements to facilitate re-entry of returnees into their homes—often coupled with a small allowance (approximately 35 000 FCFA⁶⁵)—[REDACTED].

⁶⁵ This represents approximately 50 euros.

114. [REDACTED].

115. Overall, those consulted identified several obstacles preventing remaining displaced families from resettling in their places of origin, including: insufficient financial means to cover transport and basic reconstruction; unresolved housing, land and property disputes (occupied or sold houses/plots, lengthy, costly legal processes); the absence of stable livelihood opportunities and residual tensions that require sustained reconciliation measures and visible signals of acceptance before families feel able to return safely and with dignity.

3) Harm resulting from killings

116. Aside from the violation of the right to life, the killings produced severe emotional, social and economic harm. The death of a household member—particularly a primary breadwinner or key decision-maker—produced long-term emotional suffering, destabilised extended family structures, and generated economic hardship and intergenerational trauma

117. As the Victim Applications illustrate⁶⁶ and FDG participants explained, many households lost husbands, sons, fathers or brothers—individuals who played central roles in the economic survival and governance of extended households. Women described becoming heads of household “overnight”, with responsibility for many dependents and no resources. The loss of adult men destabilised entire household units; in polygamous households, this meant multiple wives and children became immediately vulnerable, while elderly parents also lost their support. Survivors described the killings as events that “broke the family completely”.

118. During FDG consultations with families of persons killed, participants emphasised that it was the first time they had ever spoken about what happened, not even within their own family circles - having carried the trauma in silence for more than a decade. The grief expressed was collective, not only individual: in extended households, the death of one member disrupted the lives of many. Survivors described inter-generational trauma affecting children who grew up without fathers or older

⁶⁶ See Annex II

male relatives, and how the community's traditional family structures collapsed under the weight of violence and displacement. The VPRS noted that the group's emotional reaction demonstrated an absence of any prior psychosocial support and the lingering depth of unresolved mourning.

4) Harm resulting from imprisonment

119. Aside from the violation of the right to liberty, these crimes produce diverse types of harm, including violations of the rights to psychological integrity, dignity. The confinement under coercive and life-threatening circumstances generated severe emotional and psychological suffering, especially in children, and long-term trauma linked to fear, loss of autonomy, and exposure to violence or distressing condition.

120. Victims of the Bossangoa events recounted in particular the experience of having been forcibly confined at the École de la Liberté in Bossangoa. Many had already taken refuge there before the attack, but after 5 December 2013, the site effectively became a place of involuntary detention, with thousands "unable to leave" under threat of death. FDGs participants stated that confinement also caused psychological trauma in children and adults, many of whom viewed the school as a "prison" during that period. Conditions described include:

- severe overcrowding,
- fear of imminent attack,
- limited access to water, food and sanitation,
- emotional suffering linked to confinement with no autonomy,
- constant exposure to the suffering of others

5) Harm resulting from destruction of property

121. The Destruction of property in Bossangoa gave rise to material, economic and moral harm, violating the survivors' rights to property, livelihood, housing and depriving households of assets essential for their survival and long-term recovery.

122. Survivors reported the destruction and looting of their homes, shops, agricultural fields and livestock. They described returning to find houses burned,

razed, or occupied, with all movable property lost. As illustrated by the Victim Applications, the destruction included, houses, household goods, commercial stock, agricultural tools, coffee-trading equipment, animals, transport vehicles.

6) Harm resulting from torture

123. Torture produced acute and long-term harm, including physical harm, profound psychological trauma, and violations of dignity.

124. The Trial Judgment established that seven persons were abducted and unlawfully detained at the Yamwara School around 24 December 2013, where they were subjected to severe physical and mental injury, including death threats, beatings, tying-up, and, in at least one instance, mutilation (cutting of an ear) and stabbing; one victim (Saint-Cyr Lapo N’Gomat) was killed. Female captives were subjected to forced undressing and other forms of humiliating or degrading treatment.

125. Based on the Application Forms collected, victims of the Yamwara events suffered a combination of interrelated harms, including physical injury; psychological harm such as depression, anxiety, trauma-related symptoms and recurrent nightmares; and material and economic loss resulting from loss of income and inability to work. Several victims also experienced bereavement and disruption of family life following the death of close relatives, leading to increased dependency burdens and enduring social and economic vulnerability.

7) Cross-cutting harms

Transgenerational harm

126. Regarding the children born after the events, including those who were born during their parents’ displacement and/or return, the Registry notes, as what stated in *Ongwen* Case, “the importance of acknowledging the existence of the phenomenon of transgenerational harm and recognising that children of victims of unimaginable

atrocities may also experience personal suffering, even if they did not personally experience the atrocities that caused their parents' trauma".⁶⁷

Rupture of social cohesion and loss of belonging

127. Across all locations, consulted survivors consistently emphasised a deep rupture in the social fabric that pre-existed the 2013–2014 violence. Victims described communities that were formerly characterised by high levels of social mixing, intermarriage, kinship ties, and everyday coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim families. In numerous FGDs, participants explained that prior to the events, they used to be together, neighbours were "*cousins*," families sometimes shared the same ancestors, and daily life was shaped by interwoven social, economic, and cultural relations.

128. The attacks and mass displacement profoundly disrupted this cohesion, producing what survivors repeatedly described as a "tearing apart" of previously blended communities. The violence was experienced not only as a threat to physical integrity but as an assault on a shared history and identity. For many, the shattering of this communal bond resulted in a long-lasting loss of belonging, altering how victims relate to their neighbourhoods, their social environment, and, in some cases, their own perception of identity. This erosion of belonging was further compounded for displaced families in Chad, who reported having been suddenly labelled as "returnees"- a category usually applied to nationals returning to their country of origin—even though they had never lived in Chad before, reinforcing the perception of being "out of place" both in displacement and upon considering return.

129. The erosion of social belonging, continues to affect victims' emotional well-being, social identity, and prospects for reintegration more than a decade after the events.

⁶⁷ Trial Chamber IX, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, "Reparations Order", 8 February 2024, ICC-02/04-01/15, para. 207.

D. Eligibility matters

1) Potential Eligible Victims of reparations

130. In accordance with the Court's jurisprudence at the reparations stage⁶⁸, the direct and indirect victims of the crimes falling within the scope of the Trial Judgment may be considered as Potential Eligible Victims of reparations in the Case.

131. The categories of indirect victims may include:

- the family members of the direct victims or those with a close relationship;
- individuals who attempted to prevent the commission of one or more of the crimes under consideration;
- individuals who suffered harm when helping or intervening on behalf of the direct victims;
- and other persons who suffered personal harm as a result of these offences.⁶⁹

132. Based on the Chamber's findings in the Trial Judgment, as well as the decisions on victim participation issued during the trial stage⁷⁰, the VPRS understands that the below categories of victims would be potentially eligible for reparations.

Boeing and Cattin events

133. Potential Eligible Victims would include:

⁶⁸ Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, "Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations", 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06; Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, "Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute", 24 March 2017, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728; Trial Chamber VI, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, "Reparations Order", 08 March 2021, ICC-01/04-02/06-2659; and Trial Chamber IX, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, "Reparation Order", 28 February 2024, ICC-02/04-01/15.

⁶⁹ See also Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, "Amended Order for Reparations (Annex A to the Judgment on the Appeals against the 'Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations' and the 'Order for Reparations'", ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, para. 6(b); Trial Chamber VI, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, "Decision on the First Report on Reparations", 15 December 2020, ICC-01/04-02/06-2630, paras 52–56; Trial Chamber VI, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, "Reparations Order", ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, paras 124–128; and Trial Chamber IX, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, "Reparations Order", ICC-02/04-01/15-2082, para. 128.

⁷⁰ Trial Chamber V, Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings, 23 November 2020, ICC-01/14-01/18-738; "Eleventh Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings (Group C)", 8 September 2021, ICC-01/14-01/18-1104; "Seventeenth Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings (Groups A, B and C)", 21 November 2022, ICC-01/14-01/18-1672; and "Nineteenth Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings (Groups B and C)", 13 March 2023, ICC-01/14-01/18-1795.

- i) individuals⁷¹ present in Cattin or Boeing at the time of the Bangui 5 December Attack other indirect victim who have suffered personal harm as a result who sustained personal harm as a result of the Bangui 5 December Attack by Anti-Balaka, including from their forced displacement;⁷²
- ii) individuals⁷³ present in the neighbourhoods bordering Cattin and Boeing at the time of the Bangui 5 December Attack who sustained personal harm as a result of the Bangui 5 December Attack by Anti Balaka, including from their forced displacement;⁷⁴
- iii) individuals⁷⁵ detained and tortured at the Yamwara school;⁷⁶
- iv) Boeing Mosque, as a victim under rule 85(b) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;⁷⁷
- v) individuals who have suffered personal harm as a result of the murders committed by Anti-Balaka in the context of the Bangui 5 December Attack or in the context of the Yamwara school;⁷⁸ including, but not limited to the XX individuals killed identified in the Trial Judgment⁷⁹
- vi) Any other indirect victim who has suffered personal harm as a result of the harm inflicted upon a direct victim of the crimes listed in i) to iv).

PK9-Mbaiki events

134. The Potential Eligible Victims would include:

⁷¹ Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁷² Trial Judgment, Counts 1, 4, 5 and 8.

⁷³ Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁷⁴ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 1, 4, 5 and 8. In its decisions on victims' participation at Trial, the Chamber held that neighbouring or bordering neighbourhoods of Boeing and Cattin may fall within the geographical scope of the Bangui 5 December 2013 Attack where the victim's account clearly relates to that attack (Trial Chamber V, *Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings*, 23 November 2020, ICC-01/14-01/18-738, paras 28–33). The Chamber reaffirmed this approach in its later ruling, admitting applicants residing in neighbourhoods adjacent to Cattin when the description of events demonstrated a prima facie link to the 5 December 2013 Attack (Trial Chamber V, *Eleventh Decision on Victims' Participation in Trial Proceedings (Group C)*, 8 September 2021, ICC-01/14-01/18-1104, paras 17–23).

⁷⁵ Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁷⁶ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 11 - 14 and 17.

⁷⁷ Trial Judgment, operative part, count 6.

⁷⁸ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 2, 3, 8, and 15 - 17.

⁷⁹ Under Counts 2 and 3, Mr Yekatom and Mr Ngaïssona are charged with murder as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute, and murder as a war crime pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute of five to 13 persons, including Hassan Mahamat, at the Boeing market, four Muslim persons in Cattin, and Nina Pascal at the Boeing market, in the context of the attack on Bangui, including Boeing and Cattin, on 5 December 2013.

- i) the individuals⁸⁰ present in localities along the PK9–Mbaiki axis at the time of the Anti-Balaka advance and takeover who sustained personal harm as a result of the PK9-Mbaiki events, including from their forced displacement;⁸¹
- ii) the individuals⁸² present in Mbaiki (residents and those who had sought refuge in Mbaiki) at the time of the Anti-Balaka advance and takeover who sustained personal harm as a result of the PK9-Mbaiki events, including from their forced displacement;⁸³
- iii) the individuals who have suffered personal harm as a result of the murder of the second deputy mayor Djido Saleh (killed on 28 February 2014);⁸⁴
- iv) Any other indirect victim who has suffered personal harm as a result of the harm inflicted upon a direct victim of the crimes listed in i) to ii).

Bossangoa events

135. The Potential Eligible Victims would include:

- i) the individuals⁸⁵ present in Bossangoa at the time of the Bossangoa 5 December 2013 attack who sustained personal harm as a result of that attack by Anti Balaka, including from forced displacement to the *École de la Liberté* and other locations;⁸⁶
- ii) the individuals imprisoned at the *École de la Liberté*—who were prevented from leaving and subjected to severe deprivation of liberty in the weeks and months following the attack;⁸⁷
- iii) the individuals present in Bossangoa at the time of the Bossangoa 5 December 2013 attack whose homes/structures were burned or destroyed by Anti Balaka in the course of the attack;⁸⁸
- iv) the individuals who were forcibly displaced from Bossangoa as a result of the Bossangoa 5 December 2013 attack by Anti-Balaka, including those displaced until at least April 2014;⁸⁹ and
- v) the individuals who have suffered personal harm as a result of the murders committed by Anti-Balaka in the context of the Bossangoa 5 December Attack;⁹⁰

⁸⁰ Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁸¹ Trial Judgment, counts 24, 25 and 28.

⁸² Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁸³ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 24, 25 and 28.

⁸⁴ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 26, 27 and 28.

⁸⁵ Whether they were Muslims and/or perceived as supporters of the Seleka.

⁸⁶ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 30 and 42.

⁸⁷ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 39 and 42.

⁸⁸ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 39 and 42.

⁸⁹ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 37, 38 and 42.

⁹⁰ Trial Judgment, operative part, counts 31, 32 and 42.

including, but not limited to the individuals killed identified in the Trial Judgment;⁹¹ and

- vi) Any other indirect victim who has suffered personal harm as a result of the harm inflicted upon a direct victim of the crimes listed in i) to vi).

Cross-cutting categories

Children born in the camps

136. This category includes individuals who allege personal harm intrinsically linked to the circumstances of their birth in displacement, having been born in conditions directly resulting from the crimes of forcible transfer, deportation or displacement. The VPRS notes that, in this Case, the Chamber held that such individuals may fall within the scope of the Case where the applicant demonstrates, on a *prima facie* basis: (i) that one parent was a direct victim of the crimes of forcible transfer, deportation or displacement charged in connection with the 5 December 2013 Attack; (ii) that the kinship between the child and the displaced parent is sufficiently established; and (iii) that the child was born in displacement conditions directly resulting from the parent's flight (e.g. in refugee camps immediately after evacuation).⁹²

Next of Kin

137. Beyond the eligibility of indirect victims who suffered harm as a result of the murder or injury of a close relative, ICC Chambers have also addressed the situation of deceased victims and their next of kin in reparations proceedings.

⁹¹ Trial Judgment, paras. 2871 to 2895.

⁹² The Chamber has held that applications from individuals born after their parent's forced displacement may fall within the scope of the Case where the applicant demonstrates, on a *prima facie* basis: (i) that the parent herself was a direct victim of the crimes of forcible transfer, deportation or displacement charged in connection with the 5 December 2013 Attack; (ii) that the filial relationship between the child and the displaced parent is sufficiently established; (iii) that the child was born in displacement conditions directly resulting from the parent's flight (e.g. in refugee camps immediately after evacuation); and (iv) that the child alleges personal harm arising from those circumstances, causally linked to the same displacement events already recognised by the Chamber (Trial Chamber V, Seventeenth Decision on Victims' Participation, 21 November 2022, ICC-01/14-01/18-1672-Red, paras 20–22; Nineteenth Decision on Victims' Participation, 13 March 2023, ICC-01/14-01/18-1795, paras 9–12).

138. In the Addendum to the Reparations Order in the *Ntaganda* case, Trial Chamber II held that the death of a beneficiary does not extinguish reparations rights, and that reparations may be transferred to designated family members upon satisfaction of specific conditions.⁹³

139. In light of this jurisprudence—and noting that ICC Chambers have consistently found that the death of a victim should not bar consideration of their views, concerns,⁹⁴ or reparations rights⁹⁵ - the VPRS considers that the next(s) of kin who can meet the above conditions should be eligible to resume the action and receive reparations on behalf of a deceased victim, irrespective of whether he/she was already assessed as a beneficiary at the time of death.

2) Standard and burden of proof

140. The VPRS recommends that the Chamber apply, in the present reparations' proceedings, the standard of proof recognised in established ICC case law as applicable at the reparation stage—namely, the balance of probabilities.⁹⁶ Under this standard, an applicant must show that it is more likely than not that he or she suffered

⁹³ See Trial Chamber VI, Addendum to the Reparations Order, which held that the death of a victim or beneficiary does not extinguish reparations rights, and that reparations may be transmitted to a designated family member once four conditions are met: (i) confirmation of the beneficiary status of the deceased victim (identity; status as direct or indirect victim; harm; causal link); (ii) proof of the death of the victim; (iii) proof of the successor's family relationship with the victim; and (iv) evidence of the family's appointment authorising the successor to act on the victim's behalf. Where a victim has already been found eligible, only conditions (ii)–(iv) must be shown. These elements may be established through official or non-official documents, including statements of two credible witnesses or certification by a local authority (ICC-01/04-02/06-2858-Red, paras 137–139).

⁹⁴ The trial Chamber admitted deceased victims as participants in the proceedings, ICC, *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Trial Chamber III, Corrigendum to the Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by victims to participate in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr, 12 July 2010, paras. 78-85. The Trial Chamber also set a system for the resumption of actions initiated by victims authorized to participate in the proceedings. ICC-01/05-01/08-3346, paras 23 and 49.

⁹⁵ See fn.82 *supra*,

⁹⁶ For example, Trial Chamber VI, "Reparations Order", 8 March 2021, ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, para. 136; Trial Chamber I, "Amended Order for Reparations (Annex A)", 3 March 2015, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, para. 65; Trial Chamber II, "Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute", 24 March 2017, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG, paras 49–51; Trial Chamber VIII, "Reparations Order", 17 August 2017, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, para. 44; see also Appeals Chamber, "Judgment on the Appeal against the Reparations Order", 18 March 2020, ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red, para. 42

harm as a result of one or more of the crimes for which Mr Yekatom and Mr Ngaïssona were convicted.

141. The VPRS further recommends that the Chamber adopt the flexible evidentiary approach endorsed in the *Ongwen* case, where the Chamber expressly held that “where applicants lack direct proof, factual presumptions may be relied upon” to establish the relevant facts to the requisite standard of proof.⁹⁷

142. The VPRS observes that these circumstances are directly mirrored in the present Case. Consultations with Potential Eligible Victims confirm that large numbers of victims experienced:

- burning of homes, resulting in the loss of identity papers, land documents, and personal archives;
- forced and chaotic flight, often at night or under imminent threat, preventing victims from gathering documents;
- destruction or collapse of local administrative structures, making it impossible to retrieve civil status records;
- multi-year displacement, including in foreign jurisdictions where they were registered under provisional categories and faced significant barriers to legal documentation; and
- long-term family separations, further impeding the ability to reconstruct documentary history.⁹⁸

143. In light of these constraints, the VPRS submits that the Chamber may, consistent with the *Ongwen* Reparations Order, accept that applicants can meet the standard of proof even in the absence of direct documentation, where their accounts are:

- i) credible,
- ii) coherent and sufficiently detailed,
- iii) consistent with other victims’ accounts in relation to the facts alleged, and

⁹⁷ The Chamber recognised that victims of mass atrocities often face serious, structural barriers to producing formal documentation and noted that, in some instances, “the events themselves caused the destruction of the documentation” that could otherwise have supported their requests. These observations are directly relevant to the present case.

⁹⁸ Most of these conditions arise directly from the crimes established in the Trial Judgment.

- iv) consistent with the established pattern of the crimes reflected in the Trial Judgment and supported by the information available on the record.⁹⁹

3) Presumptions of harms

144. In light of the Trial Judgment's findings and consistent with the Court's jurisprudence in the *Ntaganda* and *Ongwen* cases,¹⁰⁰ the VPRS respectfully proposes that certain limited presumptions of harm may appropriately apply in this case, in order to reflect the inherent, cumulative and well-documented impact of the crimes committed in Bangui (Boeing, Cattin), Bossangoa, Mbaïki, and along the PK9–Mbaïki axis.

145. In particular, once an applicant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she is a direct victim of crimes falling within the scope of the Conviction, the VPRS submits that the Chamber may presume the forms of harm that are intrinsic to each crime. This includes:

- psychological harm for persons who personally experienced the attacks, forced displacement, imprisonment or discriminatory targeting,
- material harm for victims of forced displacement, destruction of property, given that these crimes inherently entail economic loss; and
- physical harm for victims of forced displacement, confinement, torture, beatings or attacks, consistent with the *Ntaganda* approach to crimes that, by their nature, cause bodily injury.

146. The VPRS further notes that close family members of persons killed or tortured may be presumed to have suffered psychological harm, and, where they assumed care for surviving dependants, material harm as well, in line with the *Ntaganda* case framework for indirect victims.

⁹⁹ Trial Chamber IX, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, "Reparations Order", 28 February 2024, ICC-02/04-01/15-2074, paras 425, 462.

¹⁰⁰ Trial Chamber IX, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, "Reparations Order", 28 February 2024, ICC-02/04-01/15-2074, paras 556 and 557; and Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, "Addendum to the Reparations Order", ICC-01/04-02/06-2858-Red, paras 123–130, 256, 267.

147. Finally, and drawing on the *Ongwen*, the VPRS submits that children born during or immediately after displacement may be presumed to have suffered harm linked to the conditions of birth and prolonged instability, and that the Chamber may recognise, where established, transgenerational harm arising from the enduring effects of the crimes on the parent-child relationship.

4) Eligibility process

148. At the outset, the VPRS notes that providing comprehensive observations on the eligibility process at this stage may be premature, as the final approach will depend on the modalities of reparations that the Chamber decides to adopt in its Reparations Order.

149. The VPRS considers that the groundwork established through the present mapping exercise and since the outset of the Case would inform the implementation of any eligibility process subsequently determined by the Chamber, and remains available, if so requested, to provide further information or observations on this matter. It further posits that, for purposes of readiness and efficiency – and irrespective of the specific reparations modalities and measures ultimately ordered, the victim tracing efforts following the mapping should, to the extent feasible, continue in the coming months, with a view to pre-identifying and structuring information on the universe of Potentially Eligible Victims. The VPRS stands ready to continue this work should the Chamber so order.

E. Reparations types and modalities

150. Across all consultations, Potential Eligible Victims described needs corresponding to sustained harm, loss of livelihood, family fragmentation, compromised cultural and religious life, and persistent social vulnerability.

1) Compensation and material support

151. FGD participants consistently identified financial compensation as a key need across all locations. In both Bossangoa-origin communities in Chad and in Bangui, as

well as among returnees to Mbaïki and Bossangoa, households indicated that prolonged displacement, destruction of property, and the end of humanitarian assistance had left them with no viable economic base.

152. Where monetary amounts were discussed, many women cited five to eight million FCFA as the minimum required to “restart life”, while men referenced a broader range, reflecting variation in prior livelihoods, with some citing amounts as high as 10–15 million FCFA. These figures were not presented as precise calculations but rather as indicative of the scale of loss endured, particularly by traders, livestock owners, and café/cacao producers.

153. Many victims also described openness to in-kind compensation, notably among Peulh households or former livestock-keepers, for whom packages such as “3 cows and 1 bull” were described as realistic equivalents for reconstituting livelihoods. Some indicated that this form of reparations would only be acceptable if procurement occurred locally, allowing animals to be adapted to the local environment and market structures.

154. Across Bossangoa and Mbaïki, returnees raised the need for materials to rebuild homes, especially where houses were destroyed, vandalised, or left to deteriorate after years of absence. Victims returning to Bossangoa described entire neighbourhoods (Boro, Arabe) as destroyed or empty, with several parcels occupied, sometimes informally or under contested circumstances. In Bangui, refugees from Bossangoa explained that renting accommodation for the equivalent of 20 EUR/month constitutes a major economic burden and expressed a need for support to secure durable housing.

155. In Chad, displaced households in [REDACTED] reported relying on “subsistence cycling”: informal labour in [REDACTED] (laundry work, domestic work, day labour), rudimentary commercial activity (selling manioc flour, small trade), and agriculture on small rented or borrowed parcels. They described this as “survival, not a livelihood”, expressing a need for long-term income-generating support rather than intermittent humanitarian relief.

2) Housing, land and property (HLP)

156. Victims expressed concerns related to the loss of land, the occupation of plots, or the inability to re-enter their parcels, often due to the passage of many years, changes in occupancy, or the lack of documentation. Among returnees, many reported finding their parcels occupied, abandoned, or partially reallocated, with no impartial mechanism to address claims. The absence of accessible or trusted HLP dispute resolution processes led victims to express a need for support in recovering land¹⁰¹ or, where not feasible, assistance to secure alternative housing or cultivable land.

157. In Mbaïki, several mechanisms have existed informally at the community level—such as “*attestations de gardiennage*” -and were used by temporary occupants who returned houses to Muslim owners upon their return. Victims viewed such frameworks positively but noted inconsistencies and lack of formal recognition. Those who had lost commercial buildings or storage spaces emphasised a need for support in re-establishing business premises, which were central to their pre-conflict livelihoods. In Bossangoa, FGDs participants suggested that any HLP-related measure should include options for households unable or unwilling to reclaim parcels in their former neighbourhoods, due to current patterns of dispersed settlement.

158. Victims from the PK9–Mbaïki axis and nearby villages described returning to villages where mosques, shops, and sometimes entire clusters of houses had been destroyed or replaced, resulting in a mixture of confiscation, informal resale, and abandonment. They indicated that assistance with HLP resolution, [REDACTED].

3) Livelihood support and income-generating activities

159. Many victims, particularly women heading households in Bossangoa, Mbaïki, and Chad, described the need for income-generating activities (IGA) capable of providing stable, predictable income. The reparations forms most frequently mentioned include:

¹⁰¹ Victims highlighted the need for a neutral, trusted HLP dispute resolution mechanism able to address long standing land occupation or resale, including in neighbourhoods formerly inhabited by Muslim families.

- support for petty trade (foodstuffs, soap, clothing, small household items);
- assistance in purchasing agricultural tools, seeds, and equipment;
- capital to restart coffee bars, cacao, or groundnut activities in areas where such crops remain viable;
- support for small animal husbandry (goats, sheep, poultry); and
- equipment for tailoring, sewing, mechanics, bicycle repair, and other practical trades.

160. Women's groups in [REDACTED] reported high levels of household fragmentation and dependence ratios due to widowhood, death, or separation during displacement, making livelihood support an essential condition for survival. In [REDACTED], survivors explained that humanitarian programmes had ended by 2014–2015, leaving them dependent on intermittent agricultural day labour and domestic work; they described a need for sustained, structured livelihood interventions, not emergency relief.

4) Educational support and youth-centred interventions

161. Across all sites, victims emphasised that their children's education had been interrupted for multiple years due to displacement, lack of means, and the departure of NGO-funded teachers. In [REDACTED], displaced families described schools operating solely with volunteer teachers paid by parents, making education inaccessible for many. Others noted that entire cohorts of children—those who were infants in 2013–2014—have never entered formal schooling.

162. Victims requested:

- support with school fees, materials, and uniforms;
- rehabilitation or support for community schools, especially in Chad;
- vocational training for adolescents and young adults who aged into adulthood in displacement;
- programmes aimed at preventing youth idleness and aggressive behaviour, [REDACTED].

163. [REDACTED]. Parents expressed a need for support to ensure safe and non-discriminatory schooling, including sensitisation activities for teachers and students.

5) Medical care and psychosocial support

164. Victims across locations described persistent psychological distress, linked to:

- traumatic conditions of the 2013–2014 displacement;
- prolonged precarious living conditions;
- fear of discrimination or rejection;
- loss of family members;
- inability to bury relatives according to religious rites (notably in Bossangoa).

165. In [REDACTED], victims reported also high mortality rates, linked to the lack of medical facilities, ageing or damaged wells, difficulties reaching [REDACTED] hospital and deteriorated living conditions over twelve years. Many described the need for primary health care, maternal health services, improved water access, and trauma-informed psychosocial support.

166. Returnees in [REDACTED] described similar needs, noting that economic hardship prevented access to care. Victims with disabilities—including those whose impairments resulted from attacks or from the hardships of displacement—expressed the need for targeted medical support, mobility aids, and training adapted to their capacities.

6) Measures related to cultural, religious, and collective identity

167. Victims repeatedly emphasised the central role of places of worship in signalling acceptance, restoring dignity, and enabling community life. This was particularly acute among:

- [REDACTED].
- Displaced survivors in Chad, whose ability to consider returning is conditioned on the existence of a mosque in their place of origin.
- Villages along the PK9–Mbaïki axis, [REDACTED].

168. Because the destruction of certain mosques is not always within the material scope of the case, victims did not always present mosque reconstruction as a formal “reparations claim”, but rather as a condition for return, safety, and dignity, and as an indication that the local community accepts their presence.

169. Victims [REDACTED] also highlighted the absence of burial grounds for Muslim funeral rites, describing this as a deep cultural injury and requesting that solutions be identified to enable dignified religious practice.

170. Several focus groups (especially women’s groups) and local leaders expressed the need for measures of satisfaction, including:

- recognition of the suffering endured;
- support for collective cultural spaces or dialogue spaces where both communities could meet, contributing to symbolic and practical rebuilding of social ties, and
- the establishment of a psycho-social care centre, to be named in memory of the victims and survivors.

7) Collective and community-benefit measures

171. Victims in [REDACTED] repeatedly emphasised that reparations should avoid isolating Muslim victims or reinforcing perceptions of exclusivity, given the intercommunal tensions that persist. They expressed a preference for a mix of individual and community-wide measures.

172. Examples of such measures proposed by victims include:

- community pharmacies accessible to all;
- water points managed jointly by youth from both communities;
- mixed youth vocational centres;
- small health posts staffed by trained community members from different groups.

173. These were seen as measures that could improve daily life while reducing risks of stigmatisation and strengthening coexistence.

8) Support for social cohesion and guarantees of non-repetition

174. Victims in [REDACTED] described a continuing context of latent or explicit mistrust, sometimes visible in everyday interactions, marketplace tensions, and the stigmatisation of children. They noted that social cohesion programmes in 2014–2016 - such as EU-funded Cash-for-Work initiatives and activities by the inter-religious platform - were helpful but not sustained.

175. Moreover, victims - particularly those in Chad - reported that return depends on:

- the presence of a mosque or recognised place of worship;
- visible signs of safety and acceptance from the local community;
- restitution or access to land and housing;
- availability of livelihood means;
- [REDACTED] and fair land dispute management.

176. Victims expressed the need for:

- dialogue mechanisms involving religious and community leaders;
- sensitisation campaigns in schools and neighbourhoods;
- support for mixed community initiatives, avoiding any appearance of privileging one group;
- mechanisms to address land and property disputes amicably, where judicial pathways are lengthy or inaccessible.

177. Victims also noted that the inter-religious platform remains symbolically important, even if inactive due to lack of resources.

F. Additional observations

1) Prioritisation


178. Victims did not, as a rule, identify formal categories to prioritise; most insisted that needs were widespread and cumulative. However, when prompted, several groups in [REDACTED] mentioned a need to prioritise:

- elderly women heading households, especially widows;

- persons with disabilities, including those injured during the events or whose impairments worsened in displacement;
- women heading households due to family separation, widowhood, or polygamous households dissolved during displacement.

2) Prior compensation/reparations

179. Across all consultation sites, FDG participants stated unanimously that they had never received any form of compensation or reparations in relation to the harms suffered during the events. Participants reported that no financial support, material assistance, symbolic measures, or community-level reparations had ever been provided by national authorities, local structures, or international actors specifically in connection with these crimes. Several noted that humanitarian assistance received during displacement could not be considered reparations, as it was short-term, needs-based, and unrelated to acknowledgment of harm.



Marc Dubuisson, Director, Division of Judicial Services,
on behalf of
Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Registrar

Dated this 18 May 2026

At The Hague, The Netherlands