



Original: **English**

No.: **ICC-01/18**
Date: **24 July 2025**

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Judge Nicolas Guillou, Presiding Judge
Judge Reine Adélaïde Sophie Alapini-Gansou
Judge Beti Hohler

SITUATION IN THE STATE OF PALESTINE

Public

Finding under article 87(7) of the Statute on Hungary's non-compliance with the Court's request to cooperate in the provisional arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu and referral to the Assembly of States Parties

Decision to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the *Regulations of the Court* to:

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| ☒ The Office of the Prosecutor | ☐ Counsel for the Defence |
| ☐ Legal Representatives of the Victims | ☐ Legal Representatives of the Applicants |
| ☐ Unrepresented Victims | ☐ Unrepresented Applicants (Participation/Reparation) |
| ☐ The Office of Public Counsel for Victims | ☐ The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence |
| ☒ States' Representatives
Hungary | ☐ Amicus Curiae |

REGISTRY

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- | | |
|---|---|
| Registrar
Mr Osvaldo Zavala Giler | ☐ Counsel Support Section |
| ☐ Victims and Witnesses Unit | ☐ Detention Section |
| ☐ Victims Participation and Reparations Section | ☐ Other |

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I (the ‘Chamber’) of the International Criminal Court (the ‘Court’), acting under article 87 of the Rome Statute (the ‘Statute’), hereby decides whether Hungary failed to comply with the request by the Court to provisionally arrest Benjamin Netanyahu (‘Mr Netanyahu’), thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute, and, if so, whether the matter should be referred to the Assembly of States Parties (the ‘ASP’ or the ‘Assembly’).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. On 21 November 2024, the Chamber issued a warrant of arrest for Mr Netanyahu (the ‘Warrant’). Whereas the Warrant remains classified as secret, its existence was made public on the same day through a detailed press release issued by the Court.¹

2. Throughout March 2025, multiple media outlets reported that Mr Netanyahu might travel to Hungary in April 2025 at the invitation of the Hungarian government.²

3. On 21 March 2025, the Registry contacted Hungary with a view to organising a meeting to verify whether the aforementioned media reports were accurate and to inform Hungary about the relevant applicable procedures before the Court. The Registry followed up on its request to hold a meeting again on 24 and 26 March 2025, emphasising, *inter alia*, that it is a neutral organ, responsible for answering open questions and providing guidance to ICC States Parties. Despite this, Hungary did not proceed to meet and did not consult with the Court in any other manner.³

4. On 31 March 2025, Hungary officially announced that Mr Netanyahu would pay an official visit to Hungary from 2 to 6 April 2025 upon the invitation of Hungary’s Prime Minister.⁴ On the same day, the Presidency of the ASP sent a letter to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (the ‘Letter of ASP Presidency’), recalling the existence of the

¹ ICC-01/18-377-SECRET. The issuance of the arrest warrants was made public on the same day. *See* Press Release – Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, 21 November 2025.

² Report of the Registry on the Status of the Execution of the Request to Hungary for the Provisional Arrest of Benjamin Netanyahu pursuant to article 92 of the Rome Statute, 11 April 2025, ICC-01/18-420-US-Exp, (the ‘Registry Report’), para. 8.

³ Registry Report, paras 8-9.

⁴ Registry Report, para. 11.

Warrant and reminding Hungary of its obligations under the Statute.⁵ The Presidency noted that under article 89(1) of the Statute, States Parties have a specific obligation to comply with requests from the Court for arrest and surrender and that the Court's ability to fulfil its mandate is dependent on States meeting their cooperation obligations, in particular when they concern the arrest and surrender of individuals subject to arrest warrants.⁶

5. On 3 April 2025, based on public information that Mr Netanyahu had arrived in Hungary in the early morning of that day, the Registry transmitted a request for the provisional arrest of Mr Netanyahu to the Hungarian authorities (the 'Request').⁷ The Request was accompanied by a *note verbale*, inviting Hungary to avail itself of the possibility to initiate consultations with the Court pursuant to article 97 of the Statute (which was also mentioned in the Request itself) and consult with the Court without delay should the authorities identify any problems that might impede or prevent the execution of the Request.⁸ The Hungarian authorities did not respond or request consultations.⁹

6. On 3 April 2023, during the visit of Mr Netanyahu, Hungary's Prime Minister publicly announced that the Government had submitted a bill before Hungary's National Assembly authorising it to withdraw from the Statute.¹⁰

7. On 11 April 2025, the Registry filed the Registry Report about the transmission of the Request to Hungary, in which it, inter alia, informed the Chamber that Mr Netanyahu had been present on Hungary's territory from 3 to 6 April 2025 .

8. On 16 April 2025, the Chamber opened proceedings pursuant to article 87(7) of the Statute and invited Hungary to provide submissions on its apparent lack of cooperation in accordance with regulation 109(3) of the Regulations of the Court ('Regulations').¹¹

⁵ Letter by President of the Assembly of States Parties H.E. Päivi Kautkoranta on behalf of the Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties to H.E. Mr Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary, dated 31 March 2025, ASP/2025/07. This letter was made public by the President of the ASP on X on 3 April 2025.

⁶ Letter of ASP Presidency.

⁷ Registry Report, para. 16.

⁸ Registry Report, para. 16.

⁹ Registry Report, para. 19.

¹⁰ Registry Report, para. 20.

¹¹ Invitation to Hungary to provide submissions for the purposes of proceedings under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 16 April 2025, ICC-01/18-421.

9. On 23 May 2025, the Registry transmitted into the record Hungary's submissions dated 22 May 2025 ('Hungary's Submissions').¹²

10. On 2 June 2025, the United Nations Secretary General, acting in his capacity as depository, publicly announced that Hungary is withdrawing from the Statute and that the withdrawal will take effect for Hungary on 2 June 2026.¹³

11. On 13 June 2025, the Prosecution filed its observations on Hungary's Submissions (the 'Prosecution's Observations').¹⁴

II. DETERMINATION

12. Pursuant to article 87(7) of the Statute, where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of the Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the ASP. As established by the Appeals Chamber, the factual prerequisite for a referral under article 87(7) of the Statute is twofold: (i) the State concerned failed to comply with a request to cooperate; and (ii) this non-compliance is grave enough to prevent the Court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute.¹⁵ Only when both conditions are met can the Chamber consider the question whether or not it is appropriate to refer the non-cooperating State to the ASP.¹⁶

A. Whether Hungary failed to comply with the request to provisionally arrest Mr Netanyahu thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute

13. The Chamber recalls that, pursuant to article 86 of the Statute, States Parties are required to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. They must do so in good faith, consistently with the object and purpose of the Statute.¹⁷ One of the specific obligations States Parties have is to (provisionally)

¹² Transmission of Hungary's submission in response to Pre-Trial Chamber I's 'Invitation to Hungary to provide submissions for the purposes of proceedings under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute', 16 April 2025, ICC-01/18-421, 23 May 2025, ICC-01/18-344. Hungary's Submissions are contained in ICC-01/18-433-AnxII.

¹³ C.N.225.2025.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depository Notification)

¹⁴ Prosecution's Observations on Hungary's Submissions for the purposes of proceedings under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute (ICC-01/18-433-AnxII), 13 June 2025, ICC-01/18-442-Red.

¹⁵ Appeals Chamber, *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir*, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, 6 May 2019, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr, (the 'Jordan Appeals Judgment') para. 184.

¹⁶ Jordan Appeals Judgment, para. 184.

¹⁷ Jordan Appeals Judgment, paras 11, 202.

arrest persons sought by the Court.¹⁸ As article 59(1) of the Statute makes clear, a State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender, must take *immediate* steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws and the provisions of Part 9 of the Statute. Article 88 of the Statute further stipulates that States Parties have to enact the necessary procedures under domestic law to enable them to comply with their obligations under the Statute. Additionally, article 97 of the Statute obliges States Parties to consult with the Court *without delay* when they identify problems which may impede or prevent them from executing requests for cooperation from the Court. Moreover, rule 195(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the ‘Rules’) indicates that States which have identified a problem of execution in respect of article 98 of the Statute must notify the Court thereof and must provide any information relevant to assist the Court in the application of said article.

14. With regard to Hungary’s withdrawal from the Statute, the Chamber notes that, in accordance with article 127(1) of the Statute, the withdrawal will only take effect on 2 June 2026.¹⁹ Until that time, Hungary remains, for all intents and purposes, a State Party to the Statute with the same rights and obligations as all other States Parties.²⁰ The Chamber further notes that the events under review took place two months before Hungary initiated its withdrawal from the Statute. There is thus no reason to treat Hungary differently on account of its (subsequent) withdrawal from the Statute.

15. The Chamber notes that Mr Netanyahu was invited to visit Hungary by the Prime Minister and was present on Hungary’s territory for several days, between 3 and 6 April 2025. As soon as concrete and credible information was available that Mr Netanyahu would be visiting Hungary during a specific period, the Court immediately took steps to engage with Hungary, even before a formal request for cooperation was made, in order to anticipate as much as possible any issues that could arise in terms of Hungary’s obligation to provisionally arrest the suspect. In its communications with Hungary, the Registry emphasised that it is a neutral organ, responsible for answering open questions and providing guidance to States Parties. Despite this, Hungary did not engage with the Court and, it did not execute the Request.

¹⁸ Articles 59(1), 89(1) and 92 of the Statute.

¹⁹ C.N.2255.2025.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification)

²⁰ Pre-Trial Chamber II, *Situation in the Republic of Burundi*, Public redacted version of Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, 9 November 2017, ICC-01/17-9-Red, paras 24-26.

16. Hungary does not contest the fact that it did not execute the Request. In its Submissions, made in the context of the article 87(7) proceedings, Hungary for the first time communicates its reasons for failing to arrest Mr Netanyahu, albeit in a cursory manner. *First*, Hungary states that it was unable to comply with the Request because it adheres to the dualist model and has not adopted the necessary legislation that would allow its law enforcement agencies to do so.²¹ Moreover, Hungary argues that Mr Netanyahu was protected by ‘State immunity’ under international law. Hungary submits, in this regard, that article 27 of the Statute ‘only applies to States Parties that have incorporated this waiver of immunity into their domestic legal systems. As Hungary has not enacted the Statute into domestic law, article 27 has no legal effect within Hungarian jurisdiction.’²² *Second*, Hungary claims that, since Israel is not a State Party and has not waived Mr Netanyahu’s immunity, the latter was ‘fully protected by State immunity against Hungarian legal or law enforcement action during his visit in April’ and that the Court was therefore not allowed to ask it to arrest Mr Netanyahu by virtue of article 98(1) of the Statute.²³ *Third*, Hungary states that the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be established under article 12 of the Statute and that the Warrant cannot be regarded as an impartial and objective legal act.²⁴

17. The Chamber will now consider whether Hungary can invoke these arguments as justifications for not arresting Mr Netanyahu whilst the latter was present on its territory.

1. *Whether the absence of domestic legislation provides a justification for non-compliance*

18. The Court has consistently held that the absence or inadequacy of implementing domestic legislation cannot justify non-compliance with States Parties’ obligations under the Statute.²⁵

²¹ Hungary’s Submissions, second paragraph.

²² Hungary’s Submissions, third paragraph.

²³ Hungary’s Submissions, fourth paragraph.

²⁴ Hungary’s Submissions, final paragraph.

²⁵ Trial Chamber V(B), *The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta*, Decision on the Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 31 March 2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-908, para. 47; Pre-Trial Chamber II, *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 13 December 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr, paras 20-21. Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, 11 July 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, para. 10.

19. *First*, the carefully crafted language and solutions adopted in Part 9 of the Statute on international cooperation and judicial assistance make it clear that domestic procedures are to be used to meet, not to defeat, the obligation to comply with requests for cooperation. The Statute recognizes the need for domestic procedures and in article 88 of the Statute obliges States Parties to ensure that there are procedures available under their national law *for all of the forms of cooperation* specified in the Statute, which therefore includes (provisional) arrests. The Chamber notes that the obligation to cooperate is the same for all States Parties and cannot be qualified through domestic law.²⁶ To the extent that domestic legislation would in fact have been a prerequisite for Hungary to be able to execute the Request, it was Hungary's responsibility to ensure that such legislation was in place.²⁷

20. *Second*, pursuant to article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 'a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'. Hungary has not pointed to any argument as to why this principle would not apply in this instance.

2. *Whether Hungary can rely on article 98(1) of the Statute to justify non-compliance*

21. In relation to Hungary's invocation of article 98(1) of the Statute, the Chamber observes that Hungary did not raise this provision until *after* the opportunity to provisionally arrest Mr Netanyahu was no longer present. It does so now, in a cursory manner, in the context of the present non-cooperation proceedings, stating that the provision provides that the ICC may not require a State Party to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law and that Mr Netanyahu was 'fully protected by State immunity against any Hungarian legal or law enforcement action during his visit'.²⁸ Hungary does not elaborate beyond this one paragraph in its Submissions.

22. The Chamber notes that although article 98(1) of the Statute prevents the Court from proceeding with a request for surrender or assistance under certain conditions, it is incumbent

²⁶ Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, 'Article 88', in Kai Ambos (ed.), *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Article-by-Article Commentary*, 4th ed., (2022), Beck, p. 2493.

²⁷ Trial Chamber III, *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Decision on Mr Bemba's preliminary application for reclassification of filings, disclosure, accounts, and partial unfreezing of Mr Bemba's assets and the Registry's request for guidance, 18 October 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3660-Red2, para. 10.

²⁸ Hungary's Submissions, fourth paragraph.

upon the requested State Party to provide the necessary information to establish the obstacle(s) it faces. This follows from the wording of rule 195 of the Rules, which envisages a four-stage process: (i) the Court transmits a request for surrender or assistance; (ii) the requested State identifies a legal obligation *vis-à-vis* a third State within the meaning of article 98 of the Statute that would have to be violated in order to comply with the request for cooperation; (iii) the requested State informs the Court of this conflicting obligation and provides any information relevant to assist the Court in the application of article 98 of the Statute; (iv) the Court considers the information and decides whether to proceed with the request for cooperation or whether to withdraw it. It is not the responsibility of the Court to surmise whether or not the requested State may be facing conflicting legal obligations. On the contrary, States Parties bear the primary responsibility to provide the Court with information establishing the existence of the alleged conflicting legal obligation. They also have an obligation to act in good faith and to provide this information in a timely manner so that the matter can be resolved whilst the execution of the request for cooperation is still possible.²⁹

23. The Chamber notes that Mr Netanyahu visited Hungary upon the invitation of the Hungarian government. His visit was therefore not a surprise. The Court first invited Hungary to engage in consultations on 21 March 2025, *i.e.* more than ten days before Mr Netanyahu's arrival, and the Presidency of the Assembly contacted the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade several days before Mr Netanyahu's visit to remind Hungary of its obligations under the Statute, including the obligation to comply with the Court's requests for arrest and surrender.³⁰ By the time Mr Netanyahu arrived in Hungary, the latter therefore had to be aware of both the urgency of the matter and of the purported legal obstacles it now raises, after the fact, in its Submissions. Moreover, Mr Netanyahu remained in Hungary for several days after his arrival. Hungary therefore had every opportunity to engage and consult with the Court or, at the very least, to inform it of any obstacles to comply with the Request. Yet, Hungary decided not to engage with the Court. In light of this, the Chamber can only conclude that Hungary deliberately made no effort to inform the Court about the claimed conflict of obligations when it received the Request. In any event, as previously held by the Court, article

²⁹ Jordan Appeals Judgment, para. 202.

³⁰ Letter of ASP Presidency.

98(1) of the Statute does not entitle States Parties to unilaterally suspend cooperation with the Court whenever they consider it to be applicable in relation to a specific request.³¹

3. *Whether Hungary's disagreement with the Court's decisions provides a justification for non-compliance*

24. As regards Hungary's argument that the Court's jurisdiction cannot be established under article 12 of the Statute and that the Warrant cannot be regarded as an impartial and objective legal act,³² the Chamber notes that a State Party's disagreement with the Court's decisions does not undermine its obligations relating to international cooperation and assistance set out in the Statute. As a State Party to the Statute, Hungary accepted to be bound by the Court's decisions and cannot unilaterally decide whether or not to comply with requests for cooperation on the basis of its views and opinions about some of those decisions. The validity of the Court's decisions can and should be challenged in accordance with the procedures set out in the Statute. The Chamber accordingly rejects Hungary's argument.

25. To the extent that Hungary relies on the alleged lack of jurisdiction to justify its non-compliance, the Chamber recalls that it is currently considering Israel's challenge to the Court's jurisdiction and has already ruled that this challenge does not suspend the validity of the Warrant.³³

26. In conclusion, Hungary failed to provisionally arrest Mr Netanyahu and has not advanced any valid justification for its breach of statutory obligations. Therefore, pursuant to article 87(7) of the Statute, the Chamber finds that Hungary failed to comply with a request to cooperate contrary to the provisions of the Statute. The Chamber further finds that Hungary's non-compliance prevented the Court from exercising an important power and a fundamental function, namely securing the presence of the suspect before the Court.³⁴

³¹ Pre-Trial Chamber II, *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, 11 July 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, paras 110-121.

³² Hungary's Submissions, final paragraph.

³³ Decision on the State of Israel's request to have arrest warrants withdrawn, vacated, or declared of no force or effect and to suspend the Prosecutor's investigation, 16 July 2025, ICC-01/18-457.

³⁴ See Jordan Appeals Judgment, para. 190.

B. Whether referral of the matter to the Assembly of States Parties is warranted

27. A finding of non-compliance does not automatically result in a referral to the ASP. Chambers have a measure of discretion when deciding whether or not to refer an instance of non-compliance to the Assembly.³⁵ In exercising this discretion, the Chamber must be guided by the object and purpose of article 87(7) of the Statute, which is to foster cooperation.³⁶ The Chamber must consider all factors that may be relevant in this regard, including whether referral would provide an incentive for cooperation by the requested State.³⁷ Chambers of the Court have, *inter alia*, taken into consideration whether the requested State was acting in good faith, engaged in timely consultations, and remained committed to cooperating with the Court,³⁸ and whether the authorities of the violating State (retroactively) recognised the failure to comply with its obligations under the Statute.³⁹ Significantly, referral to the ASP is not limited to instances where intervention by the Assembly might still bring about the requested cooperation. A referral may also be appropriate if it is likely to promote future cooperation, both by the requested State or more generally.⁴⁰

28. Bearing in mind these factors, the Chamber finds that it is necessary and appropriate to refer this instance of non-compliance by Hungary to the ASP.

29. First, the obligation to cooperate was sufficiently clear to Hungary. Second, failure to arrest suspects severely undermines the Court's ability to carry out its mandate.⁴¹ Third, as

³⁵ Appeals Chamber, *The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta*, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal against Trial Chamber V(B)'s "Decision on Prosecution's application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute", 19 August 2015, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, (the 'Kenyatta Appeals Judgment'), para. 49.

³⁶ Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, para. 51.

³⁷ Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, para. 53.

³⁸ Pre-Trial Chamber II, *The Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein*, Decision on the Cooperation of the Republic of Chad Regarding Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 13 November 2013, ICC-02/05-01/12-20, para. 18.

³⁹ Pre-Trial Chamber II, *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir*, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, 6 July 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09-302, paras. 136-7.

⁴⁰ Trial Chamber V(B), *The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta*, Decision on the Prosecution's application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, 3 December 2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-982, para. 84.

⁴¹ Pre-Trial Chamber II, *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 09 April 2014, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, para. 34; Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan, 09 March 2015, ICC-02/05-01/09-227, para. 19; Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, 11 July 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09-267, para. 16.

noted above, Hungary made no effort to inform the Court in a timely manner of any purported legal or other difficulties related to the execution of the Request, despite being invited to do so on several occasions. Indeed, Hungary did not engage with the Court before or during Mr Netanyahu's visit and, instead, decided to unilaterally withhold cooperation.

30. The Chamber is mindful that Hungary's opportunity to provisionally arrest Mr Netanyahu no longer exists and that further consultations between Hungary and the Court on the matter may be futile in light of Hungary's decision to withdraw from the Statute. However, the Chamber considers that a State Party's neglect of its substantive and procedural obligations under the Statute cannot be ignored just because it has decided to leave the Rome Statute system. In this regard, the Chamber recalls that Hungary's withdrawal will only take effect on 2 June 2026. Until then, as noted above, Hungary remains bound by the Statute. In other words, the Chamber does not consider Hungary's withdrawal to be a circumstance militating against a referral.

31. Finally, the Chamber considers that the referral to the ASP is necessary to enable the Assembly to take any action it deems appropriate to ensure that States Parties fulfil their obligations towards the Court and that future opportunities for arrest and surrender in this and other situations before the Court are not equally lost.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE CHAMBER HEREBY

FINDS that Hungary failed to comply with its international obligations under the Statute by not executing the Court's request to provisionally arrest Mr Netanyahu while he was present on Hungarian territory between 3 and 6 April 2025; and

REFERS the matter of Hungary's non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties through the President of the Court in accordance with regulation 109(4) of the Regulations; and

ORDERS the Registry to reclassify filing ICC-01/18-420-US-Exp as public.




Judge Nicolas Guillou

Presiding Judge



Judge Reine Adélaïde Sophie

Alapini-Gansou



Judge Beti Hohler

Done in English. A French translation will follow. The English version remains authoritative.

Dated this Thursday, 24 July 2025

At The Hague, The Netherlands