


Statement of



WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:



Gender: Male

Father's Name:



Mother's Name:



Place of Birth: BANGUI, CAR

ID No:



Date of Birth:




Nationality(s): Central African Republic

Ethnicity:



Religion: Roman Catholic

Language(s) Spoken: French, Sango,





Language(s) Written: French, Sango

Language(s) Used in Interview: English & French


Occupation:



Place of Interview: BANGUI, CAR



CAR-OTP-2063-0050



Statement of [REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview: Investigator [REDACTED]

Associate Investigator [REDACTED] Interpreter [REDACTED] and witness [REDACTED]

Signature(s): [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I was told that they are Investigators with the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and I was told that he is an interpreter for the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from 1st August 2012 until present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and French. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.

ICC RESTRICTED

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Statement of [REDACTED]

8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Education and background

11. I was born in BANGUI [REDACTED] Since my father was a [REDACTED] our family moved to [REDACTED] where I attended primary school. I left [REDACTED]
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]
16. In 2010 I moved to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] neighbourhood. I was living in this area when the crisis started in 2013.
17. Before the arrival of the Seleka there was a perfect co-existence between Muslims and Christians. In BIMBO there was only one mosque across the prefectural school of BIMBO. I do not remember if there was a specific name for this mosque.



Statement of [REDACTED]

The Seleka period

18. The Seleka came to BANGUI in 2013. The majority of the Seleka were Muslims and many local Muslims supported them. Some Mbororo people were saying in Sango 'Mbororo Aga Zo Awe' which means that the Mbororo have become important now.
19. I have seen the Seleka giving weapons and uniforms to local Muslims who then joined the Seleka. I have specifically seen Colonel MOUSSA, a Seleka commander who was responsible for the area around BIMBO and PK9, giving weapons and uniforms to local Muslims. Even the Muslims who were traders in PK5 became militaries.
20. I saw Mbororo people with weapons and uniforms in [REDACTED]. These Mbororo were performing bodyguard duties in different places. The wife of DJOTODIA was living in BEMBE II and she also had some bodyguards. DJOTODIA was renting a house for his wife in that area when the Seleka were in power. [REDACTED]
21. The Seleka committed a lot of crimes. I know that they took over a house at PK9 that used to belong to a FACA colonel and they made it their base. This house was located across the street from the MOCAF beer brewery. The Seleka were torturing people in this place. [REDACTED] was tortured there.
22. [REDACTED] was married to a Seleka. I think that she had a monetary dispute with [REDACTED] and this is why he was arrested and tortured in this place. The Seleka tied him up and tortured him. I saw [REDACTED] when he was released and his eyes, his face and his hands were swollen and he was sick. [REDACTED] is still alive and he lives in [REDACTED].
23. I also know of an incident where a girl who was selling porridge was killed by a stray bullet during an exchange of fire between Seleka elements of NOURREDINE and Seleka elements of [REDACTED]. The incident took place on the route towards the church St Antoine de Padoue in BIMBO around the end of July 2013. The name of the victim was [REDACTED].
24. The Seleka also killed a civil servant named [REDACTED] who had said that the Seleka were not going to last for a long time. [REDACTED] heard about this comment and ordered his men to kill him. [REDACTED] was killed in PK9 and his body was thrown in the MPOKO River. His body was recovered from the river and his parents buried him. I saw the body and it was decomposed. [REDACTED] house is [REDACTED]. I heard about [REDACTED].



Statement of [REDACTED]

this incident as people were coming to [REDACTED] and were talking about the incident. This killing had occurred around the end of July, or beginning of August 2013.

25. A Seleka General named General MOUSSA was based in the Sapeurs Pompiers in BANGUI. When the Seleka left from BANGUI [REDACTED] a FACA, went to clean the Sapeurs Pompiers and he found some photographs of General [REDACTED] and of his elements. [REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED]

27. [REDACTED]

- 1) Photograph 1: The man with the khaki headscarf holding a mobile phone is [REDACTED]. The other persons in the photograph are his elements but I do not know their names.
- 2) Photograph 2: The man with the khaki headscarf is [REDACTED]. The other persons in the photograph are his elements but I do not know their names.
- 3) Photograph 3: The third person from the right in a white shirt is General MOUSSA. I do not recognize the other persons.
- 4) Photograph 4: The man with the khaki headscarf is General MOUSSA. The other persons are his elements but I do not know their names.
- 5) Photograph 5: Unknown Seleka elements
- 6) Photograph 6: Unknown Seleka elements
- 7) Photograph 7: Unknown Seleka elements
- 8) Photograph 8: Unknown Seleka elements
- 9) Photograph 9: Unknown Seleka elements. In this photograph there is also a vehicle. I have seen this type of vehicle patrolling in PETEVO and in PK9.
- 10) Photograph 10: The man with the khaki headscarf is General MOUSSA. The other persons are his elements but I do not know their names.
- 11) Photograph 11: Unknown Seleka elements.



Statement of [REDACTED]

The Anti-Balaka period

[REDACTED]

28. The violence perpetrated by the Seleka had caused many people to run away, especially young men. Since the Seleka were committing crimes, the youth of the different neighbourhoods were gathering together. It was in such gatherings that I heard about the existence of group led by [REDACTED] away joined [REDACTED] in the bush in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was a nickname. His actual name was [REDACTED] and he was a [REDACTED] FACA. [REDACTED]

Madame Anne-Marie KOYARA was the Minister of Defence at the time.

29. I also joined [REDACTED] group and I was in the bush with them from time to time. Sometimes I also returned to my house to check on my children and to learn what was happening in BANGUI regarding crimes committed by the Seleka. We were in the bush from September to November 2013.

30. [REDACTED] was the commander of the group that I had joined. This group was called [REDACTED]. There were also about [REDACTED] FACA soldiers within [REDACTED] would also come and visit us in the bush from time to time. [REDACTED] later became [REDACTED]

31. This group of about [REDACTED] FACA were permanently with [REDACTED] from the time that the group was created until DJOTODIA resigned. [REDACTED] had a list of the names of the FACA in his group. [REDACTED]

32. [REDACTED] had about 200 elements both from BANGUI and from the provinces. When we came out of the bush more people joined the group and we were a total of about 700 elements.



Statement [REDACTED]

33. [REDACTED] was a politico-military organization with the objective to overthrow the government of President DJOTODIA. [REDACTED] was created by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was created in the period between the end of March 2013 and September 2013. I do not know the exact date.
34. [REDACTED]
35. [REDACTED] discussed how the different groups could come together. [REDACTED] We heard about different Anti-Balaka groups but we were all located in different areas. This was during the period between September and November 2013.
36. From September to November 2013 we stayed in the bush preparing to overthrow the Seleka regime. I was not part of the leadership so I am not aware what the strategy was in order to achieve this goal. The FACA who were part of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were training the civilians in combat strategies and on how to use weapons. The elements of the group were using traditional weapons while the FACA of the group- who were like managers- had automatic weapons. The FACA who were with us had their own weapons and some also had grenades. Some of the civilians from the group had their own traditional weapons.
37. We did not have any uniforms because we did not have anybody to finance us. Since we were not too many in each group, we knew each other and we knew who belonged to each group.
38. Concerning food, there were people who were civil servants and when they received a pay check they bought food for the rest of us. In general we survived by eating cassava leaves and manioc.
39. There was a [REDACTED] group that came from PISSA on foot and they set up a base at YANWARA School in BOEING. These were the elements of ROMBHOT. His full name is Alfred YEKATOM. YEKATOM was actually the name of his adoptive father who was a FACA. ROMBHOT's real name is Alfred SARAGBA. ROMBHOT was a Chief Corporal in the army.



Statement of [REDACTED]

5 December 2013

40. On 4th December 2013, [REDACTED] Many Anti-Balaka from BOY RABE were there as well as the local Anti-Balaka from [REDACTED] was doing the mobilization there because [REDACTED] was planning to attack BANGUI on 6th December 2013.
41. When the attack of 5th December 2013 took place I was in [REDACTED] and we were caught by surprise. We did not know what was happening. [REDACTED] ROMBHOT's elements and Anti-Balaka from BOY RABE had attacked BANGUI.
42. There were a lot of victims from both sides, Muslim and Christians, as everyone was caught by surprise by the attack. There were also some traders who were on their way to buy things early in the morning and they were caught up in the attack.
43. [REDACTED] would sometimes sleep in the area around PK5. He was there on the 5th December 2013 and he was injured when a Muslim hit him on his arm with a machete. [REDACTED] was transferred to MSF by some of his friends.
44. [REDACTED] was not attacked on this day but there was a lot of fear and chaos since people could hear the detonations coming from BANGUI. People were running away towards the villages and the bush, carrying their sick relatives. It was a very sad situation.
45. I remained in [REDACTED] on that day [REDACTED] We remained calm and we did not participate in the fighting since we had not received any orders [REDACTED]

6 to 30 December 2013

46. On 6 December 2013, [REDACTED] plans had failed because of ROMBHOT's attack [REDACTED] said that we would prepare for an attack in the coming weeks. [REDACTED] never attacked since at the end of December 2013 there were some meetings and coordination for the unification of all the groups as I will explain later in my statement.
47. From the 6th December 2013 on, we were setting up checkpoints around the area of [REDACTED] in the evenings so as to protect this area from the Seleka elements of [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who was stationed at PK9. There was never a clash between us and [REDACTED] elements.

48. In the evenings we were setting up the checkpoints and in the mornings we returned to our base [REDACTED]. Sometimes I was also present in the checkpoints in the evenings. There was no looting or stealing taking place in these checkpoints.

49. We were the only ones who had checkpoints in [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] chief in the area.

50. There were incidents of theft and looting on checkpoints on the road to MBAIKI where ROMBHOT's elements were based. ROMBHOT's elements had checkpoints at SEKIA village and also at the intersection between the river OUBANGUI and MPOKO. They had more checkpoints [REDACTED]. We heard rumours that people had been victimized in these checkpoints. Some of the victims would also call [REDACTED] to inform him about these incidents. Some of the victims also went to the gendarmerie of PK9 to file complains about the incidents at these checkpoints.

51. Between the 6th and 30th December 2013, [REDACTED] had visited ROMBHOT a number of times at the YANWARA School. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and ROMBHOT are both FACA militaries and they knew each other from the past.

52. [REDACTED] was also coming to our base from time to time and there were also some meetings between [REDACTED] and Sangaris in our base. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The topic of the discussion was about the security of the area especially between our elements and the Seleka elements [REDACTED] at PK9.

[REDACTED]

53. Before the 5th December 2013 attack there was no communication and coordination between [REDACTED] group and other Anti-Balaka groups. Since there was no coordination and the different Anti-Balaka groups were dispersed, it was decided to have some meetings in [REDACTED] so as to unify and coordinate the Anti-Balaka movement.

54. [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

55. [REDACTED]

56. [REDACTED]

57. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the BOY RABE Anti-Balaka and ROMBHOT did not want Captain KAMEZOLAI to be their Coordinator. They were BOZIZE supporters and wanted the return of former President BOZIZE. NGREMANGOU, MOKOM, and the Anti-Balaka from BOEING, COMBATTANTS and BOY RABE were all pro-BOZIZE. They wanted BOZIZE's return to power. BARA-DESSI told them that BOZIZE would not be accepted by the international community and attempted to change their minds.



Statement [REDACTED]

58. [REDACTED]

59. During this time 2nd Lieutenant [REDACTED] was based at the YANWARA School with the group of ROMBHOT. [REDACTED] he joined Captain NGREMANGOU in BOEING. I do not know what his role with ROMBHOT or with NGREMANGOU was.

60. WENEZOU I was with the group of BOEING. When the Seleka were in power WENEZOU I and NGREMANGOU mobilized people to prevent planes from landing at the airport. For about two to three days many people were on the runway of the airport preventing planes to land. I think that the objective of this action was to destabilize and overthrow the government of DJOTODIA. WENEZOU I was not a military and he was working for the Ministry of town planning when BOZIZE was President. BOEING was WENEZOU I's area of control and he had his base near the airport. He had a lot of elements but I do not know the exact number. ROMBHOT and OUANDJO had their base in the YANWARA School but they were only in transit there. KAMEZOLAI was a senior officer who was also based for a period of time at YANWARA School. ROMBHOT's zone of influence was LOBAYE and he came to BOEING only for the BANGUI attacks. After the attacks he left and he returned to LOBAYE. I am not aware of any tension or conflict between WENEZOU I and ROMBHOT.

61. [REDACTED]

62. [REDACTED]

63. I heard that Maxime MOKOM would also communicate with BOZIZE. MOKOM was based in BOY RABE [REDACTED] MOKOM was a uniformed officer and he was either a police officer or a gendarme. He is a close relative of President BOZIZE.



Statement < [REDACTED]

64. After the BRAZZAVILLE summit in July 2014, MOKOM flew to ANGOLA and former President BOZIZE was in ANGOLA at the time. I assume that MOKOM went to ANGOLA to meet BOZIZE.
65. Additionally at the beginning of 2015 there were peace negotiations in NAIROBI. NGAISSONA was invited but he did not go since he believed that the BRAZZAVILLE agreements still had to be implemented and there was no need for further negotiations. But MOKOM said that he was the leader for the Anti-Balaka, he gathered some elements and he went to NAIROBI. BOZIZE was also present in NAIROBI and there was a meeting between BOZIZE and DJOTODIA there. The above also show the connection and communication between MOKOM and BOZIZE. The NAIROBI peace negotiations lasted from March to April 2015 and MOKOM came straight from there to the BANGUI Forum.

DJOTODIA's resignation

66. On 11 January 2014 DJOTODIA was asked to resign during a summit in NDJAMENA. Leopold BARA-DESSI was present in this summit as a representative of the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]
67. On 18 January 2014, BARA gave a speech at the Parliament as the representative of the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]

15 May 2014: Anti-Balaka meeting; Division between North and South Anti-Balaka

68. On 15 May 2014, the Anti-Balaka had a general meeting in the house of Mr. PISMIS, located near the bridge at PK9. Mr. PISMIS was a former civil servant at the time of President BOKASSA. I do not know anything else about him. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WENEZOU was appointed as the general coordinator of the Anti-Balaka. This created tension between WENEZOU and NGAISSONA as NGAISSONA wanted to be the Anti-Balaka coordinator.
69. This tension created a division between what we called the North and South Anti-Balaka. The North Anti-Balaka included MOKOM, 12 PUISSANCES, ANDJILO as well as the Anti-Balaka from COMBATTANTS, BOY RABE, PK12, PK13 and PK15 and they were headed by NGAISSONA.
70. The South Anti-Balaka included MBOMON, ROMBHOT, the Anti-Balaka from BOEING and they were headed by WENEZOU.



Statement of [REDACTED]

Unification of North and South Anti-Balaka

71. On 16 June 2014 the North and South Anti-Balaka were united under one coordination. NGAISSONA took the leadership of the Anti-Balaka as the coordinator and WENEZOUÏ became his deputy.
72. An NGO named MOUDA had also assisted in this effort to unite the Anti-Balaka. MOUDA was a local NGO and its President was the daughter of then President Catherine SAMBA-PANZA. I do not remember her first name but she was the CAR Ambassador to GUINEA. When the Anti-Balaka were divided between the North and South sections, MOUDA tried to facilitate the integration of all the different groups under one single Coordination. I am not sure what the interest of the NGO on this matter was. MOUDA had meetings with Anti-Balaka leaders from different areas and organized meetings amongst these leaders. It was due to these efforts that it was decided to have the general meeting of the Anti-Balaka on 16 June 2014.
73. When the North and South Anti-Balaka groups came together there was no tension and things were working well.
74. When the Anti-Balaka united under NGAISSONA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The Coordination was a political structure and the ComZones could not be part of it. [REDACTED] could not be a member of the Coordination himself but he could have representatives. Within the Coordination there was someone in charge of operations (*chargé des opérations*) and this person was in contact with the ComZones. Maxime MOKOM was the *chargé des opérations* initially and Sylvestre YAGOUSSOU (deceased) was his deputy.
75. The following people were representing ROMBHOT within the Anti-Balaka Coordination: General Secretary Romaric VOMITIANDE (VOMITIANDE had been appointed as Minister of Tourism with the Transition government but he was later accused of rape); General Treasurer Vivien BEINA and Mediation Advisor Paleon NZILABO.
76. The meetings of the Coordination were held at Hotel AZIMUT under NGAISSONA's authority. Sometimes ROMBHOT, [REDACTED] and the other leaders would also participate.

ROMBHOT

77. ROMBHOT did things that we did not understand. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] MBOMON controlled the

Statement of [REDACTED]

areas of BIMBO, CARMEL and ISLE DE SINGES. CARMEL and ISLE DE SINGES are within the zone of BIMBO.

78. There were some of MBOMON's elements based around the CARMEL market which was situated at the entrance of the Carmelite church compound in BIMBO. I do not know the names of MBONON's elements that were based there.
79. ROMBHOT's elements had a checkpoint near the PK9 Bridge at Mr. PISMIS' place. The Gendarmerie manned a checkpoint at the PK9 Bridge on the BIMBO side.
80. ROMBHOT was the perpetrator of what happened to the Muslims in his area of control. After the attack of the 5th December 2013, the Muslims could not move freely and go wherever they wanted. Muslims could not go to the areas controlled by ROMBHOT's elements because they would be killed. Some Muslims who used to live in areas controlled by ROMBHOT managed to run away. I do not know what has happened to the rest of the Muslims. I heard this from rumours as the rumours in BANGUI are running faster than people. [REDACTED]
81. ROMBHOT was smart and would look after the cattle of the rich Muslims for payment. The Muslims had fled as they were afraid of the insecurity that was created by ROMBHOT and his elements. ROMBHOT then took advantage of this situation to make money. He would be in contact with the Muslims by phone. Some of the Muslims fled to BANGUI and others to other places. [REDACTED]
82. ROMBHOT did not speak much during meetings. I had seen him giving orders and threats. It seemed to me that people, even FACA, were afraid of him. His elements were also afraid of him and his orders were obeyed without question. Even though KAMEZOLAI was his senior and older, ROMBHOT was not afraid of him. [REDACTED]
83. When DJOTODIA resigned ROMBHOT and his elements left from YANWARA School. Some of his elements went on the route to MBAIKI and mostly to a village called SEKIA while others went to BODA. The leader of the BODA elements was OUANDJO who died later in the front line in this area. When OUANDJO died a lot of his elements who were FACA returned to BANGUI and the remaining elements had another leader. His name was SOSSOU. I think that SOSSOU is still in BODA. I do not have his phone number.



Statement of [REDACTED]

84. Some of ROMBHOT's elements left from YANWARA School [REDACTED] they also departed and they set up their base in KOGBOKOU School which is located near the intersection of rivers OUBANGUI and MPOKO. This is the area where the old town hall of BIMBO used to be. The chief of these elements was Aristide BEINA who left for GHANA later on. Rodrigue MOMOKAMA then became their leader.

85. ROMBHOT himself was moving around and he was not permanently in any of these bases. ROMBHOT had a lot of other houses located in KALANGOE, BOSSONGO, PALM D'OR and PISSA.

86. Around the same time that ROMBHOT left YANWARA School, [REDACTED] we moved to a new base in BIMBO. [REDACTED] Our new base was across the street from the house of FACA General GAMBI. [REDACTED] We were around 700 persons. [REDACTED]

87. During that period [REDACTED] ROMBHOT [REDACTED] was coming to our new base.

88. It was during the period after ROMBHOT had left from YANWARA School that I heard that he had killed his three bodyguards near the house of PISMIS. One of the bodyguards was named Vianney KOBONDA and he was a FACA; another bodyguard was named Cedar and he was also a FACA and the third bodyguard was a civilian but I do not remember his name. The two bodyguards died on the spot but Cedar was taken to the hospital where he died two days later. Cedar used to live in the area of the Grand Seminaire in BIMBO and as soon as this incident happened we got to know about it. It is possible that [REDACTED] could provide you more information on this incident since he had become a member of ROMBHOT's group.

89. [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

90. [REDACTED]

91. Another incident involving ROMBHOT's elements took place after DJOTODIA resigned. I am not sure about the date of the incident but it must have been in January 2014. The son of FACA General LAPO was killed behind the airport by ROMBHOT's elements. He was a bodyguard of DJOTODIA's wife. I do not remember his first name but his last name was LAPO.

92. [REDACTED]

93. I heard that ROMBHOT tried to kill another son of FACA General LAPO, whose nickname was 'BODIOS'. 'BODIOS' was one of ROMBHOT's elements under the command of OUANDJO. When OUANDJO died in BODA, 'BODIOS' returned to BANGUI. He went to Mr. PISMIS house where he met with ROMBHOT. ROMBHOT wanted to kill him but 'BODIOS' managed to escape by showing a grenade and pulling out the safety pin. [REDACTED]

94. [REDACTED] 'POTO' was one of ROMBHOT's elements and [REDACTED] wanted to leave from ROMBHOT's group because elements who did not obey him were killed. Also if one of the elements was accused of being a traitor they would be killed. These elements were killed at the YANWARA School. They would be tied up and killed at night and their bodies buried in different locations around the base. Since the French Army, Mercy Corps and other NGOs would patrol the areas, they didn't make a single large grave site. [REDACTED]



Statement [REDACTED]

95. I also know of another incident involving ROMBHOT and his elements. This incident took place after the forum of BRAZZAVILLE. FACA Lt KONZI was driving around PK9 and he was arrested by elements of ROMBHOT. He was taken to PISSA where he was stabbed on the thigh and his small finger was amputated.

96. NGAISSONA appointed a delegation to talk to ROMBHOT and negotiate the release of Lt KONZI. [REDACTED]

97. [REDACTED]

98. This is why they arrested Lt KONZI so as to put pressure on the FACA in order to release their elements from prison. ROMBHOT did not release Lt KONZI on that same day but a couple of days later, whilst his (ROMBHOT's) elements remained in prison. They were not released later. [REDACTED]

99. NGAISSONA sent this delegation to negotiate Lt KONZI's release because KONZI was a FACA officer and NGAISSONA thought that the killing of a FACA officer would be a serious issue.

100. Another incident occurred on the night of 21 June 2014. ROMBHOT and his elements went to the Gendarmerie at PK9, they disarmed the gendarmes and they seized 6 weapons. KAMEZOLAI called ROMBHOT and placed pressure on him to return the weapons.

101. [REDACTED]

102. [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NGAISSONA

103. NGAISSONA had returned to BANGUI before DJOTODIA resigned and he soon proclaimed himself Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka. I do not know who was in contact with NGAISSONA before he returned to BANGUI. Maybe his peers from BOY RABE were in contact with him but I do not know anything specific.
104. NGAISSONA was like a President who has different members of cabinet. Amongst them there are those who will obey and those who will disobey. Most of the Anti-Balaka were under NGAISSONA's instructions but there were those who disobeyed. MOKOM, for example, did not obey NGAISSONA. At the time of the NAIROBI peace negotiations there were two Coordinations that were functioning in parallel. The one was NGAISSONA's Coordination and the other MOKOM's Coordination. MOKOM proclaimed himself the Anti-Balaka leader and those who were on MOKOM's side were not obeying NGAISSONA. ChikiChiki, the leader of BERBERATI and Basil, the leader of BOZOU, were following MOKOM and they also went with MOKOM to NAIROBI.
105. There was tension between MOKOM and NGAISSONA. This was caused by the fact that NGAISSONA did not want the return of BOZIZE to power while MOKOM wanted BOZIZE to return. At the beginning however NGAISSONA and MOKOM would get along but I think that MOKOM was already thinking that he should be the leader of the Anti-Balaka. MOKOM would visit the Anti-Balaka in the Provinces without NGAISSONA's orders. He would for example visit BERBERATI, BOZOU, BOSSEMBELE and BOSSANGOA. NGAISSONA became aware of these visits but he did not confront MOKOM. He reacted instead by sending NDOMATE and Judicael to the Provinces. This was happening at the time when the Anti-Balaka North and South were already unified.
106. Within NGAISSONA's Coordination, the *charge des operations* was responsible for the planning of military operations in the field but NGAISSONA would have to agree with his decisions. Maxime MOKOM was the *chargé des opérations* initially but when he created his own Coordination he was replaced by Dieudonne NDOMATE.
107. NGAISSONA could discipline people by replacing them as he did when he replaced MOKOM with NDOMATE.



Statement of [REDACTED]

108. [REDACTED]

109. If a ComZone misbehaved, the *chargé des opérations* would bring the matter to the Coordination and then a decision would be taken. NGAISSONA could take such a decision either alone or in the presence of other ComZones. He had this discretionary power since he was the leader. I do not know of any case where NGAISSONA had disciplined a ComZone.

110. I know of the case of MAZIMBELE who was a ComZone in BOY RABE. MAZIMBELE was terrorizing the population in BOY RABE and he was stealing vehicles. NGAISSONA would call him to advise him and he had meetings with him where he (NGAISSONA) gave MAZIMBELE money. MAZIMBELE however continued the same behaviour even after the meetings with NGAISSONA.

111. MAZIMBELE is now deceased. He was killed while he attacked the central office of the gendarmerie. MAZIMBELE was an uncontrollable element of the Anti-Balaka.

112. When NGAISSONA was the Coordinator, Judicael and NDOMATE or elements from the Anti-Balaka in BOY RABE would travel to the provinces on missions under NGAISSONA's orders. They went to check on how the Anti-Balaka were doing in BOSSANGOA, BOUAR, NOLA, and BERBERATI. I remember that ROMBHOT went on such missions to MBAIKI, SCAD and BODA himself. These locations are in LOBAYE which is under ROMBHOT's control.

113. OROFEI was part of a delegation that went on mission to BOSSANGOA. I do not remember his first name but he was in the mission under the instructions of NGAISSONA. OROFEI was also a member of the Coordination.

114. When there was an issue in the provinces, members of the Coordination were designated to go and sort out the problem. This was happening when NGAISSONA was the Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka. Such issues on the field could be problems with power sharing, power struggles and territorial issues.

115. In BOY RABE there were small groups who could have 4-6 elements each and their leaders would call themselves ComZones.

116. I know of the following persons who were ComZones:

- 1) ROMBHOT (YANWARA School)
- 2) NGREMANGOU (BERCAIL neighbourhood near the airport)
- 3) Sgt. MBOMON (BIMBO)

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Statement

- 4) Lt. HEMTENOU (BOY-RABE)
- 5) 12 PUISSANCES – THIERRY (PK15)
- 6) Sgt. Narcisse BENZI (OUANGO)
- 7) MODIBO (BOEING)
- 8) Sgt. NDOTOYE (DON BOSCO)
- 9) Lt. GOUGA (DON BOSCO)
- 10) Adj. NDAKASSA (DON BOSCO)

117. The Investigators showed me extracts of a video without sound. The video is marked CAR-OTP-2012-0523. They asked me if I recognized any person or location in the video. I recognised the following persons and locations:

- 1) From 08:55-09:13:
At 09:08 – I recognise ROMBHOT. He is wearing a white shirt and brown jacket.
- 2) From 09:17-11:30:
At 09:29 – I recognise ROMBHOT.
At 09:32 – I recognise Rodrigue MOMOKAMA. He was one of ROMBHOT's elements and a leader at the Anti-Balaka base, at KOGBOKOU School, which is located at the intersection of the OUBANGUI and MPOKO rivers.
At 10:18 – I recognise her but I do not know her name. She was one of ROMBHOT's elements and I saw her at the YANWARA School.
At 10:45 – I recognise ROMBHOT. He is sitting down dressed in a military uniform. Rodrigue MOMOKAMA is on the left on the screen wearing an orange shirt.
- 3) From 11:40-12:03:
At 11:46 – I recognize President DJOTODIA.
- 4) From 13:42-15:27:
At 15:27 – The man in the front dressed in the suit is the former Prime Minister Nicolas TIANGAYE.
- 5) From 15:32-16:08:
At 15:39 – President DJOTODIA summoned Prime Minister Nicolas TIANGAYE to Camp De Roux to show him the Muslim victims injured during the attack by the Anti-Balaka on the 5th December 2013.
- 6) From 16:30-17:56:
No comment
- 7) From 18:20-19:10:



No comment

8) From 19:20-23:00:

At 19:59 – The location is at the MPOKO River towards CATTIN.

9) From 27:00-27:08:

No comment

10) From 27:16-28:00:

No comment

11) From 35:32-37:36:

At 35:37 – These are ROMBHOT's elements.

At 35:58 – I recognise Sylvestre YAGOUSSOU. He was Maxime MOKOM's deputy and in the Anti-Balaka coordination in charge of operations. He died of an illness.

At 26:20 – I recognise Lt. Yvon DONON seated on the left on the screen in a chair and dressed in blue jeans, khaki sweater and a woollen hat. ROMBHOT is seated on the right dressed in black clothes.

At 36:28 – I recognise Rodrigue MOMOKAMA. He is wearing a beige jacket. I think the location is in the bush near the YANWARA School in BOEING.

At 36:54 – I recognise ROMBHOT. He is wearing a black shirt. Rodrigue MOMOKAMA is on the right on the screen dressed in a beige jacket. On the left on the screen I recognise Gendarme 1st Class NGAIGANAM Jean Nestor. He is dressed in camouflage trousers and a black shirt.

At 36:56 – I recognise Lt. Yvon DONON dressed in blue jeans, khaki sweater and woollen hat.

At 37:10 – I recognise Lt. Yvon DONON dressed in blue jeans, khaki sweater and woollen hat.

At 37:15 – I recognise ROMBHOT.

At 37:36 – I recognise ROMBHOT.

12) From 37:45-39:22:

At 37:57 – I recognise Rodrigue MOMOKAMA on the left on the screen and ROMBHOT on the right.

At 38:54 – I recognise Sylvestre YAGOUSSOU wearing a red jacket and white hat. He has a cigarette in his mouth.

13) From 39:27-40:55:

At 39:27 – The location is the MPOKO Airport.

14) From 43:44-45:09:

At 43:46 – I recognise ROMBHOT on the right on the screen wearing a red jacket.



Statement of [REDACTED]

15) From 45:22-46:15:

At 45:22 – I recognise Captain NGREMANGOU.

At 45:53 – I recognise Captain NGREMANGOU on the left on the screen wearing a black jacket and ROMBHOT on the right wearing a red jacket. The man walking in front of Captain NGREMANGOU and RHOMBOT carrying a firearm is the bodyguard of Captain NGREMANGOU. His name is Sidoine PEKIAN. After DJOTODIA resigned [REDACTED] robbed and killed a Muslim named [REDACTED] were on their way from PK5 to the airport.

16) From 49:52-51:28:

At 49:57 - I recognise ROMBHOT. He is talking on a mobile phone.

At 50:26 – The location is at the YANWARA School, BOEING.

At 50:57 - I recognise ROMBHOT on the left on the screen wearing a red shirt and on the right is OUANDJO wearing a yellow shirt.

At 51:12 – This is an example how ROMBHOT and his elements would treat anyone they suspected of being a traitor. The person would be beaten and killed. I do not know this person.

Closing Procedure

118. I was informed that individuals, who according to the judges, qualify as victims will be entitled to participate in future Court proceedings and potentially to receive reparations. I was informed of the existence of the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section and its function, as well as of the procedure for applications. I consent to my personal data being shared with the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section.
119. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
120. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.



Statement of [REDACTED]

121. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
122. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.
123. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
124. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in English with interpretation in French and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

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Statement of [REDACTED]

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by [REDACTED] that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence [REDACTED] who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. [REDACTED] has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

