

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [01/18] PRV

Gender: [01/18] PRV

First Name: [01/18] PRV

Father's Name: [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

Other names used:

Mother's Name: [01/18] PRV

Place of Birth: [01/18] PRV

Passport / ID number: [01/18] PRV

Date of Birth/Age: [01/18] PRV

Nationality(s): [01/18] PRV

Ethnicity:

Religion: Christian

Language(s) Spoken: [01/18] PRV

Language(s) Written: [01/18] PRV

Language(s) Used in Interview: [01/18] PRV

Occupation: [01/18] PRV

Place of Interview: [01/18] PRV

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview: 21.11.2016 from 12:50 to 16:00
22.11.2016 from 11:20 to 12:25 and 13:40 to 16:30
23.11.2016 from 10:50 to 12:35 and 13:50 to 17:00
24.11.2016 from 13:10 to 18:00

Witness statement of: [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

CAR-OTP-2041-0600



[01/18] PRV

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

Names of all persons present during interview:

[01/18] PRV	Associate Investigator	[01/18] PRV	Associate Analyst
[01/18] PRV			
Signature(s):	[01/18] PRV	[01/18] PRV	

WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [01/18] PRV and [01/18] PRV and told that they are investigator and analyst respectively with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Present during the interview was also a UN Legal Representative, André OSSOHOU, as per the cooperation agreements between the ICC and the UN.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in the Central African Republic since August 2012. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English. I fully understand and speak English.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Professional Background

11. The OTP investigators asked me to give an overview of my educational and professional background. I provided a copy of my CV which can be found attached as Annex 1 in my declaration. I will therefore concentrate on my work employments relevant to Central African Republic (CAR).

12. [01/18] PRV

13. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

14. [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV The work involved looking at current human rights related events within that same timeframe.

My work in Bangui as a [01/18] PRV with OHCHR

15. When I arrived in Bangui on [01/18] PRV 2013, my role was to produce an assessment relating to the needs requirements for capacity building in the country. To be able to do this task, I had meetings with persons who had knowledge on the topic of [01/18] PRV technical assistance, such as Ministers, members of local and international human rights organizations and civil society mostly based in Bangui.
16. I also read many reports to gain contextual knowledge of the situation in the country. This is how I learned that the Anti-Balaka had attacked Bossangoa in September 2013, but I do not have first-hand knowledge for this incident.
17. At some point during my work, I also found on the internet information about an incident that took place in Bangui on 31 May 2011 where two children were reportedly killed. This incident had caused reactions against the Muslim community. I do not remember the exact information for this incident but I thought it was an indication of potential underlying tensions in the country. I was surprised that I only found out about this information on the Internet and that no one talked to me about it.
18. I do not have personal knowledge about events that took place in the country before my arrival in Bangui in November 2013.
19. [01/18] PRV after I arrived in Bangui towards the end of [01/18] PRV 2013, there was an attack on 05 December 2013 in Bangui. I will come back later in my statement for details relating to the 05 December 2013 attacks. I lived at the [01/18] PRV at that time and we were all blocked there for about a week following the attack. After this first week, critical UN staff managed to go back to the BINLICA office. I also went back in the office to continue [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV
20. [01/18] PRV from [01/18] PRV 2013 until about [01/18] PRV 2013. At that time, Seleka officers used to live at the Ledger but I do not know who exactly. Usually the Seleka were in uniform and some of them wore a turban either around their shoulders or on their head. I did not see or hear of Seleka meetings taking place at the Ledger. [01/18] PRV I only heard that this was their base. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV I saw that there were Seleka soldiers who were guarding

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Witness statement

[01/18] PRV

the entrance of the hotel, the area between the gate at the road and the entrance of the hotel building. It seemed to me that these Seleka guards were permanently there. I don't remember how many guards there were but I think it was less than 20 at a time. They were armed with Kalashnikovs but I do not remember if they had any other weapons.

21. Following the attack of 05 December 2013, the situation was very volatile and it was hard to do my work because many people I wanted to meet were not accessible. It was therefore not really possible to get information from them. The BINUCA [01/18] PRV did not have real capacity to monitor what was happening in the provinces since all the [01/18] PRV were relocated in Bangui throughout the Seleka period. Based on information I received after I arrived, the BINUCA staff returned to Bangui because the field offices were looted by the Seleka. In consequence, our capacity to know what was happening in the provinces was very limited. Our [REDACTED] provided us with information through their local networks outside Bangui. At that time, this was the main source of information available for the situation in the provinces. Even Human Rights NGOs did not really know what was happening at the time because many of their staff had to seek safety.
22. OHCHR in New York and Geneva wanted to stay informed on what was happening in CAR at the time but we had limited resources both in the provinces and in Bangui. We were sending short daily reports to keep them informed, but we did not produce any major reports. These short daily reports were sent from the BINUCA [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV to the OHCHR in Geneva. Some of the daily reporting was done verbally through conference calls. I believe it would be easier to retrieve these daily reports from OHCHR in Geneva. The minutes of these phone calls could potentially be retrieved from the Desk Officer for CAR at OHCHR.
23. A special four-member team from OHCHR in Geneva was sent to Bangui from 12 to 24 December 2013 to specifically investigate what happened on 05 December 2013. This investigation mainly focused on events that had occurred in Bangui and Bossangoa. The team stayed for about 10 days in Bangui and they published a report on their mission findings. Their report titled "CAR Preliminary Findings" and dated 14 January 2014 covers the period from August 2013 until mid-December 2013.

24.

[01/18] PRV

with the General Hospital and to review their patient registry. This registry was a handwritten book of all patients which also included persons who were injured during this period. I do not remember if this book also included the casualties. I believe there was one main book to register the patients as it's the only one I saw.

[01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

However, I know that the [REDACTED] were also helping in that hospital and I don't know if they maintained their own records or if they wrote in the same registry used by the hospital.

25. It is important to note that during the period of crisis, mainly December 2013-January 2014, some people were buried by their families and were not taken to the hospital or the morgue due to the volatile security situation. For example, I know that one or two people were buried in the quartier of Lakouanga around the church in that period. I believe, however, that the majority of the bodies were either brought to the *Hôpital Communautaire* or the mosques. I know that many bodies taken there were picked up from the streets by the [REDACTED]. I think that in the UN COI database there must be pictures of the bodies taken at the *Hôpital Communautaire*.
26. I know the investigating team deployed in Bangui inspected the patient's registry and asked to make copies, but I am not sure if they actually made copies of it. To find out if they took copies, the OTP investigators could ask OHCHR to have access to all the evidence collected by the team about any of the facts that they have investigated during that mission.
27. During my visits to the *Hôpital Communautaire*, I also visited the morgue as a way to monitor the situation. I did not go there to investigate any specific case. I compiled some statistics, which I gave to that same investigative team who deployed in Bangui. I did this for about one to two weeks after the 05 December attack. At some point after the 05 December 2013 attack and based on the information within the hospital registry, I realized that there was a shift in the type of wounds sustained by the victims: there were more injuries caused by machetes than by gunshots than previously. The bodies from the 05 December 2013 attack and following days predominantly had bullet wounds while the bodies from later on predominantly had machete wounds.
28. After the main attack of 05 December 2013, the security situation in Bangui appeared to have improved. In order to verify whether things had indeed calmed down, I went several times for about one or two weeks to the General Hospital (*Hôpital Communautaire*) in Bangui to find out if people continued to be injured or killed. I went there for monitoring purposes to verify and check the security situation. I found out that many people were killed and many of them by machetes, which would explain the fact that I was not hearing gunshots. I did not write any specific reports about these visits. I used this information in order to update people on the conference calls with OHCHR. I used these visits as a monitoring tool.

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I hereby certify that this document is true and correct.

CAR-OTP-2059-0089

Witness statement of:

[01/18] PRV

Attack on Bangui on 05 December 2013

29. [01/18] PRV on 05 December 2013. Around 06:00 or 07:00 on that day, I received a phone call from [01/18] PRV who asked me to come to the [01/18] PRV. A UNDSS officer from BINUCA came [01/18] PRV and told all UN staff to stay on standby [01/18] PRV and not to go outside. I did not know what was happening at the time. It is just later during the day that I heard gunshots. I do not remember exactly at what time I heard these gunshots.
30. A couple of days after the 05 December 2013, a lot of international media were [01/18] PRV and doing their reporting from there. France 24 was one of these international media.
31. I do not remember exactly when, but at some point I talked to one of the journalists [01/18] PRV and he told me that he had seen the Seleka kill someone by shooting at him. I do not remember more details about this incident.
32. I did not personally witness any crimes. I heard from the media and other sources that the Anti-Balaka had attacked different neighbourhoods in Bangui and that this had been their main attack which took place on the 05 December 2013.
33. Later on while working as a [01/18] PRV in the UN COI, I found out that on 05 December 2013, the Anti-Balaka attacked the Camp Kassai where the Seleka were training new recruits. The UN COI received information indicating that there could have been as many as 180 recruits in Camp Kassai at the time. They also attacked other areas of Bangui such as the National Assembly and the Boy-Rabe and Fough districts. My recollection is that most of the Anti-Balaka commanders who participated in the 05 December attack on Bangui were not in Bangui just before the attack; that although they had ties to Bangui, they came from outside the city at the time of the attack. The UN COI also obtained information about the persons who were responsible for this attack. This information can be found in the Confidential List of Perpetrators that was produced by the Commission.
34. From what I have learned later about this attack, it was clear that it was well-coordinated and the targeted locations were well designated in advance. I believe that the targets were not individuals but rather specific locations.
35. The Anti-Balaka was comprised of different groups including former FACA and persons from self-defence groups. They used Kalashnikovs and traditional weapons such as machetes and arrows. I do not remember the exact number of Anti-Balaka.

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

36. The UN COI obtained privileged information from an [REDACTED] who had been interviewed a number of times. The information received from this [REDACTED] can likely be accessed through OHCHR.
37. The Anti-Balaka attack on 05 December 2013 was repelled by the Seleka and people believed that they had failed to do what they had set out to do.
38. In the following days after 05 December 2013, there were other sporadic attacks by the Anti-Balaka but these attacks were much smaller. In the same period, the Seleka were attacking the non-Muslim population.
39. It was publicly known that the French forces were going to arrive in CAR since a UN resolution on this topic was to be voted on 05 December 2013. French SANGARIS forces arrived in the CAR shortly after.

[01/18] PRV

40. [01/18] PRV

41. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV bodies that had been discovered at the [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV but I was told that the [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV I also know that the SANGARIS were also aware of the situation.

42. I think the SANGARIS soldiers may have been told about the [01/18] PRV because the [01/18] PRV the time.

43. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV which meant that [01/18] PRV because it was guarded by the Seleka. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) at the time was General Babacar GAYE. I believe that it is through him or his office that this [01/18] PRV the CAR authorities. It took [01/18] PRV

44. [01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

45 [01/18] PRV

46 [01/18] PRV

47. There were three more locations where bodies were found. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

48 [01/18] PRV

sketch is attached to my statement as Annex 2.

49 [01/18] PRV

50 [01/18] PRV

51 [01/18] PRV

52 [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

53. I believe that the Bangui Prosecutor, Mr GRESENGUET, [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

54. I found out that the [01/18] PRV on the same day or the day after, but I do not remember the exact date. I also do not know about the procedure they followed to [01/18] PRV

55. I believe that there were a total of [01/18] PRV from that incident and that they were all put in a [01/18] PRV. I do not know whether the [01/18] PRV by the fact that [01/18] PRV

56. [01/18] PRV briefly spoke with a CAR national working as a [01/18] PRV at the French Ambassador's residence who said that he had seen Seleka vehicles going [01/18] PRV vaguely remember that he gave the example of having seen the foot of a person coming out of the back of a Seleka vehicle. I don't know the name of this [01/18] PRV I am not sure but my vague recollection is that he was not wearing a uniform and that he did not have anything which would indicate of being attached to a specific [01/18] PRV company.

57. I believe that the UN COI had found a link between people who were [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV This incident was investigated by the UN COI investigation team working on crimes committed by the Seleka and is likely included in the COI's final report.

58. [01/18] PRV I think that Mr GRESENGUET, CAR's Prosecutor in Bangui, may have issued a press statement on the situation. I know that [01/18] PRV also provided documentation about the bodies found at the [01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

59. The [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV would also be potentially holding pertinent information.

60. I also believe that President DJOTODIA made reference to this incident since the [01/18] PRV but I am not sure of what he said exactly. I think I remember that DJOTODIA did not challenge the fact that Seleka could do something like that but he asked whether people thought they would be so stupid so as to [01/18] PRV

61. I also believe that OHCHR must have issued a statement in relation to this incident but I am not sure about this.

62. The [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

63. [01/18] PRV which was not made public to my knowledge. It would therefore be an internal report that would have been filed on that same day.

[01/18] PRV

64. The investigators asked me if I saw any Seleka checkpoints when [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV or if I know of any checkpoints around that area. I do not have any specific knowledge of Seleka checkpoints and I do not remember of any checkpoints around the area. [01/18] PRV

Shooting Incident in Bangui around 04-14 January 2014

65. Around 04-14 January 2014, I was [01/18] PRV in the city centre of Bangui. Sometime after 20:00 during the late evening, I heard gunshots coming from close by in the street while I was in my room. I went to hide in my bathroom because I was afraid that stray bullets could hit me. I could hear the movement of many vehicles. I cannot really know how long this fight lasted, perhaps 15 minutes, because we could hear shooting and attacks continuously from other parts of the city. Because of this, I initially thought that this shooting may have been part of a coordinated attack, but I realized later based on the information I heard that it was more of an individual incident.

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

66. I did not know what was happening at the time of the shooting, but I found out later that the Seleka had tried to take the weapon from a MISCA soldier and the soldier resisted and called for backup. More MISCA soldiers joined him and it resulted in a fight between the Seleka elements and the MISCA soldiers. These MISCA soldiers had come from their base which was located close to the [01/18] PRV. The person who told me all this also said that a hand grenade was also thrown at some point.

67. I also heard that the Seleka had a detained person, probably a civilian, in the 4x4 vehicle they had come with and that the person escaped during the fight. I came to know about this incident from what I was hearing in general. I do not know more details on the Seleka elements' names, clothing, vehicle or provenance at the time of this attack. I did not investigate this incident, I just heard about it after the fact.

68. I left Bangui on [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV

My work in Bangui as a [01/18] PRV with the UN COI

69. I returned to Bangui in [01/18] PRV with the UN Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI).

70. The UN COI consisted of one Co-ordinator, one Military Advisor, one Analyst, one reporting officer and two investigation teams. The first investigation team investigated crimes allegedly committed by the Anti-Balaka and it consisted of [01/18] PRV. The second investigation team investigated crimes allegedly committed by the Seleka and by BOZIZE before the fall of his government. This team consisted of [01/18] PRV. [01/18] PRV The UN COI had three Commissioners. There were also a total of three contractors who worked shortly on issues related to sexual violence. The Commission also conducted some investigations on crimes allegedly committed by international forces.

71. While the UN COI had two teams that worked on crimes committed by Seleka and Anti-Balaka, when the investigation teams deployed in the provinces, all the investigators were taking statements for crimes committed by any these groups.

72. As I said, I was working with the UN COI [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV. At that time in March 2014, most of the Muslim population had left the country since they were being persecuted after the Seleka lost power.

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[REDACTED]

Witness statement

[01/18] PRV

73. Initially, the UN COI did a desk review of reports on CAR incidents and talked with mayors, chef des quartiers in Bangui and Human Rights' organizations so as to determine which the most prominent attacks were. We then did a selection of the most important incidents and we tried to visit all these places.

74. As a first stage, the UN COI conducted interviews in Bangui. The investigation team on crimes allegedly committed by the Anti-Balaka spoke with victims and witnesses mostly in PK5, where Muslims still resided. From [01/18] PRV the UN COI went on mission to Cameroon to speak with the Muslim population that was displaced and living in the refugee camps there. The mission lasted for 10 days and [01/18] PRV many victims and witnesses in the refugee camps.

75. The UN COI investigators were taking statements and were subsequently putting this information in a database. The witnesses were providing their permission orally for this but they did not write or sign any document.

76. The UN COI missions to the provinces started in [01/18] PRV 2014. [01/18] PRV Since there was no Muslim population in Bossangoa at that time, [01/18] PRV focused on crimes committed by the Seleka. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV targeting of persons allegedly connected to the Anti-Balaka by the Seleka between 08-18 September 2013. During this period several non-Muslim men were killed by the Seleka. To my knowledge the first attack by the Anti-Balaka was in Bossangoa in September 2013 where an imam and his family, including his 4-5 children, were killed. By April 2014 all the Muslims had left from Bossangoa. [01/18] PRV at investigating the incidents in Bossangoa [01/18] PRV to find Muslim witnesses who lived there at the time of the attack. To my recollection, [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV people from Bossangoa [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV in the refugee camp in Cameroon.

77

[01/18] PRV

78. The UN COI went on missions mostly in the west of CAR. [01/18] PRV areas in the east and north such as Vakaga initially due to security concerns and later on due to time constraints. The UN COI also tried to talk to the refugees in the camps in Chad but we were not authorized to go to these camps.

79. In the final report of the UN COI, there is a list of the attacks and incidents that have been investigated by the Commission. The report also includes some patterns of behaviour such as attacks against convoys.

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement [01/18] PRV

80. Crimes allegedly committed by the Seleka included summary and arbitrary executions and persecutions of persons who were considered to have served under BOZIZE, including FACA soldiers and gendarmes. The UN COI also investigated a torture centre in Bangui that was under the control of Nouredine ADAM. This centre was called the CEDAD which refers to the "Comité Extraordinaire pour la Défense des Acquis Démocratiques".

81. The UN COI also investigated incidents that took place during the BOZIZE regime such as the Bossembele prison, where Francois BOZIZE kept his political dissidents. It also reviewed BOZIZE's hate speech against Muslims and possesses a recording of this speech which should appear under the title 'Discours de Haine de l'ex-Président BOZIZE'. I also know of another recording in the possession of UN COI that is linked to this issue of hate speech and it is a conversation between ex-President BOZIZE and Anti-Balaka Lieutenant KOKATE. Both recordings are in Sango.

82. [01/18] PRV I also found out about a case of killing of women accused of witchcraft by the Anti-Balaka. These killings have allegedly taken place in May 2014.

83. [01/18] PRV

information on this incident.

84. Regarding crimes allegedly committed by international forces, the UN COI investigated an incident that took place in March 2014 when MISCA Chadian soldiers allegedly attacked civilians in a market in FK12, Bangui. [01/18] PRV to PK12 and interviewed several people in relation to this incident. [01/18] PRV interviewed a member of the Chadian forces in Kagabandoro in relation to this incident. The investigation of this incident took place about a week or two after it occurred.

85. Another incident the UN COI investigated was the enforced disappearance of 12 persons in Boali by MISCA soldiers from the Republic of Congo contingent in March 2014. [01/18] PRV interviewed relatives of the victims in Boali.

86. The UN COI also investigated a case of death after torture in Bossangoa allegedly perpetrated by MISCA forces in 2014. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV related to this incident.

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

My work as a MINUSCA [01/18] PRV

87. As mentioned before my work as a [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV Two of these incidents were attributed to international forces and four incidents were attributed to the Anti-Balaka.

88. One of these incidents took place at the end of January 2014 in Carnot, where 17 people were killed and several injured by Anti-Balaka when they launched an attack in Carnot. A specific report on this incident came from [01/18] PRV to MINUSCA HR section. The date of the internal report should be about August-September 2016. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

89. Another incident took place in the areas around Carnot in the villages of Zaorossoungou. Four women accused of witchcraft were allegedly killed by the Anti-Balaka in April 2015. There was another case of a man accused of witchcraft and killed by civilians on 10 June 2015. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

90. Another incident occurred on 2 May 2015 in Mambere Kadei prefecture, in the area between Amada Gaza and Gamboula when there was fighting between Fulani herders from Cameroon and Anti-Balaka. Armed elements attacked villages and killed 40 civilians. Additionally, 87 families fled to Gamboula. This incident has not

[01/18] PRV

91. Another incident occurred in Nola at Sangha Mbaere prefecture, in February 2014 in which attacks took place against villages and locations where Peuhl people were living. It resulted in 17 casualties and several injured. The attacks were allegedly perpetrated by Anti-Balaka. People who were able to escape from the attack went to Yokadouma in Cameroon. A specific report on this incident came from [01/18] PRV to MINUSCA HR section. The date of the report should be about August-September 2016. This is likely an internal report. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

92. Another incident occurred at Sangha Mbaere prefecture, at Mambele on 26 February 2014. Allegedly MINUSCA soldiers from Republic of Congo killed 2 Anti-Balaka in the main area of the town. A specific report on this incident came from [01/18] PRV to MINUSCA HR section. The date of the report should be about August-

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[01/18] PRV

Witness statement of: [01/18] PRV

September 2016. This is likely an internal report. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

93. Another incident occurred in Sangha Mbaere on 10 June 2015. MINUSCA soldiers from Republic of Congo allegedly arrested four persons and severely beat them up. Two of these persons died of their injuries. The [01/18] PRV drafted an internal report on this incident and registered the case in the database. I recommend to the OTP investigators to ask information from the database on this incident.
94. These incidents were investigated for the purpose of a mapping project by the MINUSCA [01/18] PRV. This mapping exercise is an ongoing project looking into crimes committed in CAR since 2003. The project is now coming to an end. I believe they are in the drafting process of the report. I believe that the report will be made public sometime in 2017. Their standard of proof is lower than that of the UN COI because they only need to establish that the incident actually occurred.
95. [01/18] PRV with the mapping work. This mapping exercise will likely help the Special Court, which is currently being established in CAR, decide which cases to investigate once in operation.
96. There is a MINUSCA Human Rights and Justice Section based in all the places where MINUSCA has an office, namely in Bambari, Bangui, Berberati, Birao, Bossangoa, Bouar, Kagabandoro, Ndele and Paoua. These Human Rights Field Offices produce daily and weekly reports which are sent to the Human Rights division at MINUSCA HQ in Bangui. They also produce specific reports for specific incidents.
97. The Human Rights and Justice Section in the MINUSCA HQ in Bangui produces daily, weekly and monthly reports which are sent to the OHCHR and to the SRSG. Human Rights division at MINUSCA HQ also produces specific reports.
98. The Human Rights and Justice Section at the MINUSCA HQ in Bangui also has a mobile team who deploys across the country to investigate specific events. This team assists as back-up wherever there is a need. They produce specific reports for their missions. This MINUSCA mobile team did not exist during the BINUCA period.
99. There is a Human Rights database at the MINUSCA HQ which contains names of persons and identified incidents connected to these persons. The reports that are produced by the field offices do not contain any names. In order to get access to the information from this database, permission should be requested from the sources (i.e. victims, witnesses etc.)

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Witness statement of: [01/18] PRV

CEDAD

100. I know that [01/18] PRV in the UN COI investigated what occurred at CEDAD [01/18] PRV directly on this issue. Apart from Nouredine ADAM, I do not know any other Seleka who were associated with it or any victims of CEDAD.

101. The investigators asked me if I was familiar with UN Flash Reports. I know that Flash Reports are drafted from the field offices of the Human Rights and Justice Section in order to notify the OHCHR HQ about something important that has taken place. It could require some form of reaction from HQ.

102. The investigators showed me Flash Report titled 'Illegal Detention and Torture Centre: CEDAD premises', with OTP registration number CAR-OTP-2009-4980. I have never seen this Flash Report. The UN COI did not have access to all the documentation from the MINUSCA Human Rights section.

103. The investigators showed me an OHCHR public Press Release titled 'Pillay warns violence in Central African Republic may spin out of control' dated 08 November 2013 with OTP registration number ERN CAR-OTP-2001-0191. I do not know what the background information for this OHCHR Press Release was. I believe that the information might have come from the Human Rights Officer of BINUCA at the time or from local NGOs.

Seleka Military Bases

104. The investigators asked me if I was familiar with the location Camp de Roux. I remember to have visited this location.

105. At the end of [01/18] PRV to Seleka military locations in Bangui as part of a launch of a UNICEF campaign to withdraw children from the armed groups. [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV This campaign was jointly conducted by UNICEF, the national authorities and other organizations. The purpose of this campaign and visit to the Seleka military locations was to sensitise armed groups on the issue of child soldiers. There must have been press coverage of this UNICEF campaign but I am not certain about it.

106. Part of the group that visited the sites was the UNICEF representatives and [01/18] PRV

107. [01/18] PRV 5 different Seleka military locations, namely Camp de Roux, Sapeurs des Pompiers located close to Ledger Hotel, Camp [01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

Beal, a naval base near the Oubangui River and another location. [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV in all the military bases [01/18] PRV the Seleka were in
uniform. [01/18] PRV the Camp de Kotto was very well guarded and was
located close to a hill.

108. In one of these military locations there was a big number of female Seleka. Their
hair was shaved and most of them were in military uniforms. [01/18] PRV they
were not armed. There were about 50 women and they were standing in the open
space of the compound.

109. [01/18] PRV persons who were relatively young and could
be under the age of 18, but it was hard to tell the age. [01/18] PRV
military location specifically. [01/18] PRV Considering the purpose
of this visit, members of the delegation were surprised to see so few young persons
in the Seleka camps.

Other locations

110. The investigators asked me about a number of other locations. They asked me if I
had knowledge of OCRB, SRI and a place referred to as [01/18] PRV I do not
have any knowledge of these places

111. They also asked me about [01/18] PRV I remember the name but I do not have any
further recollection.

112. They also asked me about Camp Kassai, I think that this must be one of the
places targeted by the Anti-Balaka on 05 December 2013. This knowledge comes
from the UN COI but [01/18] PRV

Mass graves

113. [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV I know that two other sites were discovered.
On 21 January 2014, twelve bodies were found near PK12. The second site was
allegedly discovered between 12-13 February 2014 by MISCA in which 12 bodies
were found at Camp BSS. I believe that there must be two or three more mass
graves in Bangui but I do not have any further recollection. This information is from
media sources.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

Boy Rabe Attacks

114. The investigators asked me if I knew of any crimes committed in Boy Rabe in 2013. I recall that the Anti-Balaka attacked Boy-Rabe on 05 December 2013.

Hôpital de l'Amitié

115. The Hôpital de l'Amitié was attacked by the Seleka on 05 December 2013. It was attacked as a means of reprisals for the Anti-Balaka attack of 05 December 2013 or maybe in order to look for Anti-Balaka who were injured during the fight. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV investigate this incident. To my knowledge some people were brought out of the hospital and were killed there. I believe that between 10-20 people were killed there. I do not remember anything further on this incident.

116. I heard about this incident while I was in Bangui from colleagues, from the press, human right reports and also from the UN COL [01/18] PRV a specific report on this incident. The BINUCA Human Rights section might have put information on the daily report but [01/18] PRV

Leadership and Financing of the Seleka

117. The investigators asked me if I had any knowledge on leadership and financing of the Seleka. I do not have any knowledge on the structure or financing of the Seleka.

Looting by Seleka

118. The Seleka have looted a lot of places while they were marching from Vakaga to Bangui. They have also looted many places in Bangui. NGOs, churches, shops, houses and 4x4 vehicles were extensively looted by Seleka.

Killings and Violence Against Anti-Balaka In Bangui and the Provinces

119. While working in Bangui from [01/18] PRV I became aware of attacks against Muslims and destruction of their properties and mosques.

120. [01/18] PRV with the UN COL [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV which revealed that the attacks were targeting the Muslim civilian population in many places in Bangui where Muslim communities lived. It was difficult to ascertain whether the perpetrators were only Anti-Balaka elements at the time of the attacks. I remember that on 05 December the quarters of Boy-Rabe and Fohu were attacked by Anti-Balaka.

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

121. It would appear that it was not always Anti-Balaka committing the looting after the attacks since civilians were seen arriving in the attacked areas soon after. I believe that the actions of the Anti-Balaka created a favourable environment for other people to commit such crimes.
122. The traditional Anti-Balaka were wearing gris gris. The FACA who were part of the Anti-Balaka were not wearing gris-gris. It is difficult to distinguish who was Anti-Balaka and who was not. During the attacks the Anti-Balakas were not all dressed the same. Some were in civilian clothing, some in military outfits, some in the gendarme uniforms and some in the FACA uniforms. It depended on the location of the attack.
123. I believe that the attacks against Muslims were systematic because the perpetrators attacked all the quarters where Muslims were living in Bangui and they used the same modus operandi. This was documented in the UN COI report. Not only they attacked Muslims but also they destroyed their houses and shops completely. In many cases Muslim houses and shops were burned to the ground beyond usage, probably in an effort to oblige Muslims to move away and not be able to return. The Anti-Balaka did not discriminate between men, women and children during their attacks.
124. In the provinces as well there was a continuous attack of Muslim population in numerous villages and towns and complete destruction of their properties. It was not one single incident but numerous incidents that took place on an extensive geographic area. This continued attacking was probably a way of pushing them out of their communities and out of the country.
125. The attacks against Muslim herders were particularly damaging as in addition to the destruction of their properties, their cattle and livestock were also stolen, depriving them of their source of income.
126. I believe that there was a plan to push Muslims out of their locations and also out of the country. The Anti-Balaka were even attacking the Muslims who were leaving their houses to hide in the bush. This is why I believe that this was part of an organized and systematic plan.
127. Additionally, the Anti-Balaka were not only killing men that they thought were associated with the Seleka but also women and children. They were attacking the civilian population in general. Most of the time when the Anti-Balaka attacked there was no Seleka presence in the area. Their target was the civilian population.

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

128. The Seleka had already left when the Anti-Balaka attacked in different locations. It was easy to know that the Seleka were not in the area because they used pick-ups to move and therefore they were visible. People knew whether the Seleka were in an area or not.
129. Another indicator that the Anti-Balaka were specifically targeting Muslim civilians was they would attack convoys of fleeing civilians. The UN COI documented these incidents which occurred in Bangui and other locations in the provinces.
130. The UN COI investigated crimes committed by the Anti-Balaka in Berberati (February 2014); Ndinguiri (February 2014); Carnot (January 2014); Boali (January 2014); Guen (January 2014). To my recollection the Anti-Balaka killed a lot of persons in Guen. I think that the Anti-Balaka asked persons to lie down and then shot them. The Anti-Balaka cut the ears of the dead men and showed them to their widows.
131. These attacks usually took place either in the evening or in early morning, before sunrise. In most of these places there was a Muslim area and the Anti-Balaka knew where to attack.
132. I recall that during the Anti-Balaka attack in Boali Muslims, some with weapons took refuge in a building and they fought back. The Anti-Balaka entered the building and killed them. But this is an exception of civilians fighting back. Sometimes people were asleep and their houses were burned down. The aim of these attacks was to kill the civilian Muslim population. It was not a military fight because in most cases the attacked Muslims did not have weapons.
133. In some cases Muslims felt threatened by what was happening in the area and they started fleeing as soon as they heard that the Anti-Balaka were coming. People were killed with guns and with machetes. In some cases people were cut to pieces.
134. In Bangui it was well known that this type of treatment was happening and pictures of body parts and cut heads were circulating. There was also the case of someone referred to as Mad Dog who had reportedly eaten body parts of a Muslim man in Bangui. I am not sure if he was an Anti-Balaka. I know that a colleague in BINUCA had received an email with such pictures, [REDACTED] should have such photos.
135. To my knowledge sexual violence was not part of the Anti-Balaka modus operandi when attacking the villages and towns in the provinces. Personally I did not receive information of sexual violence during these attacks but I cannot exclude that it took place. I do not think that children were specifically targeted during these attacks but they were not spared either.

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

136. The bulk of the Anti-Balaka attacks against the Muslim population in the provinces took place from mid-January to end February 2014 since the Seleka had left and the Anti-Balaka gained control of the territory. When the Anti-Balaka attacked the Seleka had already left so the attacks were really targeting the civilian population.
137. The attacks were followed by destructions of Muslims houses, shops and religious locations. In some cases the destructions happened during the attack and in other cases after the attack.
138. I do not remember any further details about the attacks in the provinces. The UN COI received most of the information for these attacks from statements taken at the UNHCR refugee camps in Cameroon.
139. I do not have any recollection of Anti-Balaka attacks in Bohong (December 2013), Bossemptele (January 2014) and Baoro (January/February 2014).
140. At some point I realized that it was dangerous for a Muslim to take a taxi since there had been instances where Muslim people were killed while doing so. For example, a Muslim ex-Health Minister under BOZIZE, was killed in Bangui while getting out of a taxi on 24 January 2014. This must have occurred in the period between 05 December 2013 and 21 January 2014. There must be a mention of this in some of the BINUCA Human Rights reports. This ex-Health Minister was a well-known person and this killing was a blow to the Muslim community.
141. When the Anti-Balaka attacked, the Muslim population sought refuge in churches in different towns. By July 2015 all Muslims who were displaced in the church compound of Berberati returned to the Poto Poto quartier in Berberati. In Nola about 50-60 Muslims who were displaced in the church had gradually left their refuge. In Carnot about 400-500 people had been displaced in the church. [01/18] PRV [01/18] PRV there were still about 100 IDPs in the church compound. I found out that most IDPs started leaving around March-April 2016.

Destruction of Mosques

142. The destruction of mosques in Bangui started in December 2013. In Bangui one of the first mosques to be destroyed was in the Foub Quartier. Most of the mosques in Bangui were destroyed. This information should appear in the BINUCA Human Rights daily reports.

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Witness statement of: [01/18] PRV

143. A list of the mosques can be found through Muslim representatives in PK5 or at the UN COI database.

144. After the 05 December 2013 attack in Bangui, many Muslims who could not flee moved to PK5. There were numerous IDPs living in the area around the mosque and they had a representative: [01/18] PRV the list of mosques.

145. To the best of my knowledge the Ali Babolo mosque was a place where bodies were being brought during the 05 December 2013 attack. There are pictures of bodies of Muslim victims piled in Ali Babolo mosque. The team from OHCHR who came to Bangui in December 2013 could have some pictures from these bodies at the mosque.

Structure of the Anti-Balaka

146. The Anti-Balaka had zone commanders who had control of certain areas in different parts of the country. Edward NGAISSONA was considered as the main Anti-Balaka co-ordinator for the whole country at the period that the 05 December 2013 Bangui attack started. I believe that later on his leadership was challenged but I do not have any further information on this topic.

147. In Bangui there was a com-zone named Rhambot. I am not sure if this is a nickname.

148. There was also a com-zone in Bossangoa named Andjilo as far as I remember. One thing I remember about him is that around September-October 2014, when Samba Panza was President of CAR, there was some movement by the Anti-Balaka and tension in Bangui. At that time Andjilo allegedly moved from Bossangoa to Bangui to join the rest of the Anti-Balaka.

149. I do not know the internal functioning or the structure of the Anti-Balaka. Probably the UN COI [01/18] PRV could have a better knowledge on this topic.

150. I believe that there was a connection between the Anti-Balaka in the provinces and the ones in Bangui since the pattern of the attacks is the same: all the civilian Muslims were attacked continuously, in all the Muslim quarters and villages in the area; many of them were killed and their properties were destroyed to the ground.

Anti-Balaka Meetings

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Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

151. The investigators asked me if I had any knowledge of Anti-Balaka meetings. The confidential source of the UN COI had said that some Anti-Balaka meetings took place in Cameroon and in CAR before the 05 December 2013 with the purpose of planning the attack, amongst other things. I do not remember who participated in these meetings.

Financing of the Anti-Balaka

152. I do not have any specific knowledge of how the Anti-Balaka was financed. My recollection is that the [REDACTED] said that the money came from BOZIZE. This is not first-hand knowledge. I did not [01/18] PRV [REDACTED] myself.

Hate Speech

153. The investigators asked me if I had any knowledge on any hate speech. I believe that Francois BOZIZE issued a statement about a month before the Seleka came to Bangui in which he said that they should not trust the Muslims. I think he talked on the radio and that the speech appeared in the press as well. If I remember correctly the UN COI collected this material.

First conflict between Seleka and Anti-Balaka

154. Chronologically Bossangoa was the first town to be attacked by the Anti-Balaka in September 2013. This was not a fight with the Seleka but rather an attack against Muslim civilians, specifically the Imam and his family as mentioned above. Before this attack people did not really know about the Anti-Balaka.

155. The 05 December attack of Bangui by the Anti-Balaka was their first big attack. This triggered many attacks against Muslim civilian population. DJOTODIA's resignation in January 2014 triggered another big wave of attacks against Muslim population, especially outside Bangui.

156. I have some recollection of another attack against a group of Seleka vehicles by Anti-Balaka in Bossangoa. [REDACTED] did a mission to this area between 14-16 September 2013 and then they reported about the attack.

Crimes of Sexual Violence

157. The investigators asked me if I have any further information on Sexual Based Violence Crimes. I do not remember of specific cases of sexual violence being

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[REDACTED]

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

perpetrated by Anti-Balaka. It is possible that they did happen but I do not know about them. When it comes to the Seleka, I know that such crimes did take place but I cannot remember of specific cases.

158. I believe that when the Seleka attacked the civilian population in Bangui there were some cases of sexual violence. I do not remember the dates and locations of such incidents.

Child soldiers

159. The investigators asked me if I had any knowledge about young people as part of either group. Aside from what I already said about the sensitization campaign done at the Seleka camps, I do not have any specific knowledge on this topic.

Abduction and Illegal detention

160. [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV: I know that the Seleka were known for cases of abduction and illegal detention. Camp de Roux comes to mind as a possible place of illegal detention by the Seleka but I am not sure about it.

161. Concerning the Anti-Balaka I have only heard of two cases of abduction and illegal detention of people. In the first case a Muslim woman and her family were abducted by Anti-Balaka. In the second case some other people were abducted because they were considered to be close to DJOTODIA. They were not Muslims and I do not know what happened to them. This incident took place when [01/18] PRV in the period December 2013-January 2014. I am not sure if this incident is included in a BINUCA Human Rights report.

162. [01/18] PRV Ngaragha prison at the end of December 2013. [01/18] PRV There were no detainees in the prison had been attacked by the Anti-Balaka, who had allegedly killed four or five Muslim inmates there. I do not remember the date.

Other incidents of killings

163. On 3 December 2013 five men were killed by Seleka in Boali. The Seleka were systematically targeting males who were considered to have ties to the Anti-Balaka. The UN COI had investigated this incident. Investigators could request for the 17-22 September 2014 mission report or the statement with the UN COI database.

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

164. The Seleka killings were mostly targeting males who they thought were connected to the Anti-Balaka while the Anti-Balaka were killing Muslims indiscriminately.

165. Another incident took place at ENAM (*Ecole Nationale d'Administration et de Magistrature*). When SAMBA PANZA became President, she asked the FACA to return to the country. In February 2014 there was a big gathering of the FACA at ENAM. One man who was there was perceived to be Muslim or Seleka and he was killed in public in front of national and international authorities. [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV

166. There was also a number of attacks against humanitarian staff which have been documented by the UN COI.

Recruitment or training of Seleka and Anti-balaka

167. The investigators asked me if I had any knowledge about recruitment or training of Seleka and Anti-balaka. I do not have any information on this issue.

Leads

168. The investigators asked me if I could provide them with any additional leads for their investigation.

169. The [01/18] PRV started to work between December 2013 and January 2014. This section was active until MISCA was replaced by MINUSCA. Some people from the MISCA Human Rights section came to MINUSCA. I do not believe that any documentation or archive was transferred to MINUSCA. [01/18] PRV

170. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] might have documentation and material of interest for the OTP investigation.

171. The [REDACTED] might also have some documents of interest especially in relation to crimes and attacks against them since they were the first ones to raise concerns on what had happened, especially crimes committed by the ex-Seleka.

172. Members of the [REDACTED] could be useful sources of information.

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[REDACTED]

Witness statement of [01/18] PRV

173. The [01/18] PRV has a lot of information in relation to protection and they might have background information of interest. They might also have a list of incidents that can be of use.

ANNEXES

174. Annex 1 - [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV

175. Annex 2 - Handwritten sketch signed and dated [01/18] PRV
[01/18] PRV

Closing Procedure

176. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

177. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.

178. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview, provided that a UN legal representative is present or involved.

179. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

180. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

181. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

[01/18] PRV

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[01/18] PRV

[01/18] PRV

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I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL

Witness statement of: [01/18] PRV

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have read over this statement and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed: _____

[01/18] PRV

Dated: _____

[01/18] PRV

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