

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

OTP INTERVIEW SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

This summary pertains to the un-redacted portions of the following interview transcripts from 7 to 11 July 2020:

CAR-OTP-2124-1204 ICC Statement – A/V recording

- **CAR-OTP-2122-7517** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7554** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2124-1205 ICC Statement – A/V recording

- **CAR-OTP-2122-7576** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7600** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7626** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7653** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7684** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2124-1206 ICC Statement – A/V recording

- **CAR-OTP-2122-7740** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7781** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7825** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7872** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7919** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2124-1207 ICC Statement – A/V recording

- **CAR-OTP-2122-7962** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-7992** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8002** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8036** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8079** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2124-1208 ICC Statement – A/V recording

- **CAR-OTP-2122-8112** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8146** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8194** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement
- **CAR-OTP-2122-8230** ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

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THE 2012-2013 EVENTS IN THE CAR

The Situation in CAR and genesis of the crisis

1. P-0889 was born in [REDACTED] in the CAR. Throughout his childhood, he witnessed successive rebellions and *coup d'états* every 5 to 10 years,¹ which he believes was due to the country's leaders' thirst for power.²

The Arrival Seleka in BANGUI

2. P-0889 [REDACTED] when the Seleka arrived in BANGUI, and saw that people were cheering them on.³ The reaction was different to what he witnessed later on, when the Anti-Balaka emerged.⁴
3. The day before the Seleka arrived in BANGUI, at around 4pm, people started hearing that they were already at the barriers at PK12.⁵ P-0889 hoped that international and South African forces would intervene.⁶
4. The Seleka, along with the youth from certain neighbourhoods pillaged houses, taking televisions, mattresses, freezers.⁷ P-0889 explains that on 29 March 2012, people were applauding the fact that pillaging had started.⁸ [REDACTED] and went around the *Lycée BOGANDA*, P-0889 would see Seleka vehicles driving by, and people carrying pillaged goods around.⁹
5. P-0889 states that at first the Seleka did not go to BOY-RABE.¹⁰ There are at least 4 axis – to get there; either by CITE, the FOUH neighbourhood, or the BOGANDA entry, or by KASSAI.¹¹

Context of the Seleka's arrival

6. P-0889 explains that Francois BOZIZE ('BOZIZE') won his second term promising to recruit youth into the army if they voted for him.¹² Once BOZIZE won the election, he initiated the recruitment of at least 3,000 people, but imposed a mandatory administrative application fee of 5,000 CFA.¹³ Although people struggled to pay the fees,¹⁴ there were over 15,000 applicants for only 3,000 places.¹⁵ It later became apparent that in various areas, where of all the applicants no one got a place, the incumbent Officers were choosing their relatives.¹⁶

¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7533-7534, 1.662-673.

² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7533-7534, 1.662-673.

³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558, 1.145-149, 158-159.

⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558, 1.127-143.

⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558, 1. 150-153.

⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558, 1. 153-158.

⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558-7559, 1. 159-163.

⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 163-165.

⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 165-168.

¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559-7560, 1. 172-175, 230-232.

¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 169-172.

¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 175-184.

¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 186-191.

¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 191-194.

¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 105-196.

¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559, 1. 203-204.

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7. According to P-0889, the youth who had applied took to the streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with BOZIZE,¹⁷ and cheered the Seleka's arrival.¹⁸ Some even joined them,¹⁹ as did some soldiers.²⁰ The same thing happened in BOZIZE's time – when he first took power by force, by the same means – that's how and why some people joined the military.²¹ The Seleka would also take anyone who knew how to drive, because they had taken almost all of the vehicles in the country.²² So, the youths in their ranks would become drivers.²³

The population fleeing BOY-RABE

8. When the Seleka entered BOY-RABE via the market,²⁴ they began committing crimes, including pillaging.²⁵ The BOY-RABE population fled to safe places, including the *Hôpital de l'Amitié* in the 4th *arrondissement*,²⁶ behind the hill,²⁷ or other neighbourhoods, such as FOUH or the 5th *arrondissement*.²⁸
9. According to P-0889, BOY-RABE was excessively targeted by the Seleka, referred to as "EPS Professors".²⁹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁰ P-0889 believed that the Seleka's crimes eventually led to a now known as the Anti-Balaka.³¹
10. In the beginning, in some provinces, there was a bit of resistance within the army to the Seleka.³² But later, the Seleka successfully advanced, and managed to cross the "red line" situated 95 km away from BANGUI.³³ There was no direct confrontation between the Seleka and the army; they were able to arrive freely and take power.³⁴ There were no soldiers to defend the population.³⁵ They changed out of their military uniforms and into their civilian clothing, and went into hiding.³⁶
11. P-0889 states that when the Seleka arrived in BOY-RABE, they were looking for men in general, not of any specific ethnicity.³⁷ This is because, as everyone was dressed in civilian clothing they could not identify the soldiers. So they considered males civilians as soldiers.³⁸

¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 207-215.

¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7559-7560, l. 206-207, 215-216.

¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 216-218.

²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7595, l. 688-698.

²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 218-221.

²² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 222-228.

²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 228-230.

²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 232-235.

²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 235-236, 240-241.

²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560-7561, l. 248-254.

²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 254-260.

²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 260-264.

²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 265-272.

³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 272-275.

³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7560, l. 240-241.

³² CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7595, l. 699-700.

³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7595, l. 700-703.

³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7594-7595, l. 675-676, 698-704.

³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7595, l. 704-705.

³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7594-7595, l. 676-687, 705-707.

³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7595-7596, l. 723-738.

³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7596, l. 738-755.

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12. P-0889 believes that the Seleka mostly targeted the men in the 4th *arrondissement* because it was a pro-BOZIZE neighbourhood with the largest number of soldiers.³⁹ The members of the Presidential Guard in BOZIZE's entourage were favoured compared the others.⁴⁰

Mobilisation against the Seleka

Youth setting up a self-defence group in BOY-RABE

13. P-0889 explains that the youth in BOY-RABE tried to mobilise to counter the Seleka,⁴¹ leading to the first attack against the Seleka, in April 2013.⁴² This was led by soldiers living in the neighbourhood.⁴³ RFI even reported on the gunfire.⁴⁴
14. P-0889 explains that Emotion NAMSIO ("NAMSIO") and the youth in BOY-RABE set up a self-defence group in reaction to the Seleka's crimes.⁴⁵ He recalls a particular in which the Seleka went to NGAISSONA's warehouse in BOY-RABE and began pillaging. The youth started stoning the Seleka before calling the SANGARIS,⁴⁶ who helped them chase the Seleka out, killing one.⁴⁷ When the SANGARIS left however, the Seleka returned in number for revenge, causing carnage and making people flee.⁴⁸
15. P-0889 explains that the youth self-defence group was not organised to carry out attacks, but just used whistles distributed by international forces to warn the population of the Seleka's presence in the neighbourhood.⁴⁹ Their purpose was to bring awareness to the youth to have whistles and to make noise with pans and pots to annoy and frustrate the Seleka if they saw them.⁵⁰ NAMSIO would try to warn as many people as possible – with pots and whistles.⁵¹ Although his name was mentioned in connection with this group, NAMSIO did not really have a particularly important role.⁵² Also, as the group involved the whole neighbourhood,⁵³ it was difficult to estimate their number.⁵⁴
16. P-0889 explains that the resistance against the Seleka in BOY-RABE did not last long,⁵⁵ as no one could stand against them.⁵⁶ There were two main efforts: the counterattack by the armed military in front of NGAISSONA's warehouse; and a time when one of theirs was stoned at the BOY-RABE market.⁵⁷ It always started in front of NGAISSONA's warehouse

³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7596-7597, l. 756-758, 759-775.

⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7597, l. 783-785.

⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 276-280.

⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562, l. 293-298.

⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 282-289.

⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7561, l. 286-292.

⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562, l. 300-311.

⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562, l. 311-313.

⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562, l. 313-321.

⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562, l. 321-325.

⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7562-7563, l. 327-346.

⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7563, l. 351-356.

⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7565, l. 446-452.

⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7565, l. 442-445.

⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7563, l. 347-351, 357.

⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7563, l. 359-363.

⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7565, l. 453-455.

⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 455-457.

⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 457-460.

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because that's where they would pillage.⁵⁸ But those were the only occasions.⁵⁹ Every other time, everyone would flee.⁶⁰

Group of FACA fighting back against the Seleka in BOY-RABE

17. P-0889 explains that [REDACTED], there was a group of trained military who were supposed to defend the country.⁶¹ [REDACTED] two of these FACA: one of them was called Tino BAROZA ("BAROZA"), the other was named ZILO.⁶² Rumours went around that ZILO and BAROZA were retaliating against the Seleka.⁶³ People would say: "When you hear weapons coming from there – that's Tino BAROZA".⁶⁴ He explains that there were specific areas in which, when you heard gunfire, you would be able to say: "That's ZILO", or "That's Tino BAROZA".⁶⁵ Everyone in the neighbourhood was talking about it and the news would travel around.⁶⁶ In two instances, they tried retaliating, but ended up also fleeing.⁶⁷ According to P-0889, people did not stay to see any damage cause by the retaliation as they fled the gunfire.⁶⁸ P-0889 thinks that the FACA's counterattacks against the Seleka were not organised, as it only happened twice.⁶⁹

EMERGENCE OF THE ANTI-BALAKA

18. Before the crisis broke out in 2012, the country was in peace.⁷⁰ There was business, civil servants received their salary at the end of each month, and everyone lived well, in harmony – even with their Muslim brothers.⁷¹ It has been said that it is a religious crisis, but from P-0889's point of view, in the past Christians and Muslims were living in peace in the CAR – even in the predominantly Muslim neighbourhood "PK5".⁷²

19. Although Muslims – whether from the CAR, CHAD, SUDAN or NIGERIA – enjoyed a monopoly on trade in the CAR, there were never any problems.⁷³ Everyone minded their business as long as there was peace.⁷⁴ Muslims have been in the CAR for years, and Muslims and Christians maintained a perfect relationship in the CAR up until 2012 and the so-called Muslim-Catholic crisis.⁷⁵ Since the country's independence in 1960, there had never been anything like the crisis in 2012.⁷⁶ It's true that there have been rebellions and *coups d'états*, but they were always led by Christians.⁷⁷ Muslims never got involved in

⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 460-461.

⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 461-163.

⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 463.

⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7563, l. 364-371.

⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7564, l. 381-395.

⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 560-563.

⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 561-563.

⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 569-572.

⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 564-573.

⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 573-574.

⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7564, l. 397-406.

⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7568, l. 545-554.

⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 723.

⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 724-725.

⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 726-729.

⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, l. 748-755.

⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, l. 755-757.

⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, l. 757-761.

⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, l. 761-763.

⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, l. 763-764.

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military crises before 2012.⁷⁸ P-0889 believes that Muslims were a minority as there were many more Christians, but does not know the exact percentages.⁷⁹

20. The Seleka coalition's take-over led to chaos.⁸⁰ The crisis escalated in CAR because the Seleka coalition was predominantly made up of foreign mercenaries⁸¹ who came in numbers from foreign countries and were the source of the atrocities.⁸²

BOZIZE's speech at POINT ZERO

21. P-0889 explains that before the Seleka arrived in March 2013, BOZIZE was spreading the message that there were manipulations going on — that there were foreigners advancing to take over.⁸³ He once spoke about this at POINT ZERO.⁸⁴

Context in which the speech was given

22. Around August 2012, rumours surfaced about a coalition at DAMARA, some 95km from BANGUI, ready to move down to BANGUI to take power.⁸⁵ P-0889 heard that the African Union put in place a red line to stop the two sides from launching attacks.⁸⁶ That was when the situation deteriorated and the atmosphere changed for the worse – and lasted until the Seleka entered BANGUI on 29th March [*sic*].⁸⁷
23. At that time, the presence of armed groups near the capital, and the fear of the population, prevented people from travelling and supplying BANGUI with essential provisions.⁸⁸ Even finding food to eat became difficult.⁸⁹ There is only one axis along which supplies are transported into the capital from CAMEROON.⁹⁰

Attendance to the meeting

24. P-0889 states that he was present among the crowd when BOZIZE spoke at POINT ZERO rally.⁹¹ He arrived around 10am and left around 12pm.⁹² People from every level of society came: elderly women, mothers, fathers, people from every walk of life came to stand against weapons.⁹³ The idea of taking a stand against weapons was what motivated people; they wanted to show the international community that Central Africans were fed up with dealing with weapons every 5, 6, or 7 years.⁹⁴

P-0889 claims that he did not see any members of BOZIZE's government at the meeting,⁹⁵ but saw only BOZIZE, who was escorted from the presidential palace to POINT ZERO in

⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536, 1.764-765.

⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535-7536, 1.745-747, 766-778.

⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, 1.732-733.

⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, 1.737-741.

⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, 1.733-737.

⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7536-7537, 1.779-792, 799-802.

⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.801.

⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.793-797.

⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.797-799.

⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.803-806.

⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.814-816.

⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.816.

⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537, 1.819-821.

⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7537-7538, 1.824-840.

⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, 1.852-856.

⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, 7542, 1.841-844, 1014-1016.

⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, 1.844-848.

⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, 1.924-926.

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a pickup truck.⁹⁶ He spoke to the crowd from the back of a pickup truck so that people could see him.⁹⁷

25. According to P-0889, the unarmed population could not and should not have to deal with the armed group, the Seleka, that was ready to cross the red line because the population is not the army.⁹⁸ He believes that the motivation of the population was to make cardboard signs to draw the foreign press' attention and put pressure on the international community to intervene and try to stop the gunfire.⁹⁹

Content of the speech

26. P-0889 explains that BOZIZE must have organised the rally because he wanted to speak to the Central African people.¹⁰⁰
27. BOZIZE told the crowd to stay vigilant, that things were going wrong, and that they were already approaching BANGUI, so one had to be extra careful.¹⁰¹ According to him, many of them were already in the capital – hiding in houses.¹⁰² He again told everyone to stay vigilant.¹⁰³ P-0889 explains that BOZIZE was obviously talking about the Seleka elements being in the capital, hidden in houses, etc. so the population needed to be extra vigilant.¹⁰⁴ BOZIZE spoke in Sango.¹⁰⁵
28. BOZIZE talked about the Janjaweed, Muslims who do not originate from CAR,¹⁰⁶ saying that many were among those attempting to take power.¹⁰⁷ He said that foreigners were coming to kill them, so the Central African people have to say no; they have to stop them.¹⁰⁸ He called upon the crowd to speak up and express their disappointment to the international community, and to say that they are fed up.¹⁰⁹ P-0889 points out that BOZIZE repeated the words “fed up” and repeated that there were many foreigners present, and that foreigners did not forgive; they were coming to kill them.¹¹⁰ P-0889 quotes BOZIZE saying: “Myself, BOZIZE, I will stay; I will die with you. I am not going anywhere. We will stay here, they are coming to kill us, I will die with you”.¹¹¹
29. BOZIZE alluded to the Seleka when talking about the Janjaweed.¹¹² In his view, they were pitiless because they were not Central Africans.¹¹³ P-0889 believes BOZIZE used this word to characterise foreigners; Muslims who are not from CAR and part of the Seleka.¹¹⁴ People

⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 926-928.

⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 932-936.

⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540-7541, l. 937-949.

⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 943-947.

¹⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, l.849-851.

¹⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, l.861-862.

¹⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, l.862-863.

¹⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538, l.863-864.

¹⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7538-7539, l.865-868.

¹⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.869-872.

¹⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7541, l. 965-970.

¹⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.873-882.

¹⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.882-883.

¹⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.883-885.

¹¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.886-887.

¹¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l.887-890.

¹¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7544-7545, l. 1099-1120, .

¹¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7545, l. 1119-1120.

¹¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7545, l. 1128-1130.

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believed the Janjaweed were from CHAD or SUDAN, but not CAR.¹¹⁵ But, BOZIZE was speaking about Muslims.¹¹⁶ P-0889 confirmed that BOZIZE was assimilating the Seleka to Muslims, the Janjaweed to the Seleka, and therefore the Janjaweed to Muslims.¹¹⁷

30. P-0889 cannot provide a *verbatim* transcription in Sango of what BOZIZE said but he can give the general idea of what was said.¹¹⁸ P-0889 says that people have recordings on their phones.¹¹⁹

Reaction to the speech

31. P-0889 explains that after the speech, people were motivated.¹²⁰ Central Africans were sick and tired of going through recurrent *coup d'état* and they all wanted to turn the page with everything that has to do with weapons because weapons do not decide who to kill.¹²¹ P-0889 further explains people wanted the international community to block the Seleka.¹²² This is what he noticed because he saw people in the crowd with placards saying “no”, “enough is enough”, “we’re fed up”.¹²³

Mobilisation of youths through COCORA

Creation of COCORA

32. P-0889 remembers that Levi YAKETE (“YAKETE”) founded an organisation called COCORA.¹²⁴ Since he made a good living during BOZIZE’s time, YAKETE wanted BOZIZE to remain in office.¹²⁵ YAKETE began mobilising youth, saying that watchmen were needed to check the cars that passed through to search if there were any Janjaweed.¹²⁶ YAKETE and Steve YAMBETE (“YAMBETE”), a captain in the CAR army, began mobilising the youth and printing out banners with COCORA and YAKETE written on them,¹²⁷ some of them even had COCORA written on white bandanas,¹²⁸ identifying them to the public as the ones looking for those smuggling weapons in their cars.¹²⁹ People started hearing about COCORA.¹³⁰

Checks and searches of the population conducted by COCORA

33. There were many inactive youth who were told that they would be given coffee and to keep watch at night.¹³¹ P-0889 explains that whenever you would be driving around, especially late at night, you would end up finding a group of youth who would stop and try to identify you; to check that you are not Janjaweed.¹³² Before letting you through in BANGUI, they

¹¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7545, l. 1121-1132.

¹¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7545, l. 1133-1140.

¹¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7546, l. 1143-1156.

¹¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539-7540, l. 891-907.

¹¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7539, l. 902-904.

¹²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 908-910.

¹²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 910-915.

¹²² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 918-920.

¹²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7540, l. 920-923.

¹²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7542-7543, l. 1021-1035.

¹²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1029-1033.

¹²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1035-1037.

¹²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1037-1042.

¹²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7544, l. 1096-1098.

¹²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1062-1065.

¹³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1044-1046.

¹³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1043-1044.

¹³² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1047-1057.

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would try to search the boot of the car, and search underneath the seats and everything to check that you are not hiding weapons.¹³³

34. P-0889 does not know whether the youth had BOZIZE's authorisation to conduct checks and searches¹³⁴ or if they had any government, police, or military authorisation to operate the barriers.¹³⁵ He does not know what the youths did with weapons they found, if at all.¹³⁶

35. The youth at the barriers were looking for Janjaweed and people attempting to pass during the night with weapons.¹³⁷ Any person who was not a military who drove past with a weapon in their car would be stopped.¹³⁸ P-0889 does not know if they targeted specific people,¹³⁹ but he was never stopped at a barrier.¹⁴⁰

36. P-0889 explained that most of the youth conducting the searches were on drugs and would take Tramadol pills.¹⁴¹ He referred to them as "*Tramoleurs*".¹⁴²

Mobilisation of the youths in BANGUI

37. YAKETE and YAMBETE were at the front of the youth movement.¹⁴³ P-0889 recalled a meeting at "*Complexe Sportif Barthélemy BOGANDA de BANGUI*" – which the youth attended – where artists were invited to sing to take a stand against weapons and against *coups d'états*.¹⁴⁴ He thinks this happened in 2012 after BOZIZE's meeting¹⁴⁵ and had heard that YAMBETE and YAKETE organised it.¹⁴⁶ He heard that masses of youth went to the stadium, representing all eight *arrondissements*.¹⁴⁷

38. According to P-0889, COCORA youths were pretty much everywhere, including BOY-RABE, all eight *arrondissements* of BANGUI, plus BIMBO and BEGOUA.¹⁴⁸ On the radio, he heard that the youth referred to themselves as "self-defence" groups.¹⁴⁹

COCORA's objectives

39. P-0889 talked to some young people involved in the youth movement¹⁵⁰ and was told they were just doing it for their voice to be heard, because after, there would be peace.¹⁵¹

¹³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7543, l. 1057, 1060, CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7556, l. 42-45.

¹³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7544, l. 1066-1075.

¹³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7557, l. 107-113.

¹³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7558, l. 120-126.

¹³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7556-557, l. 71-79, 83-85.

¹³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7557, l. 90-99.

¹³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7557, 92, 99-100.

¹⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7557, l. 101-106.

¹⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7544, l. 1079-1084.

¹⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7544, l. 1077-1084.

¹⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7546, l. 1162-1169.

¹⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7546, l. 1169-1173.

¹⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7546, l. 1174-1176.

¹⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7546-7547, l. 1177-1178, 1179-1180.

¹⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7548, l. 1226-1229.

¹⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7547-7548, l. 1216-1226.

¹⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7583, l. 245-246.

¹⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7547, l. 1201-1214.

¹⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7547, l. 1214-1215.

¹⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7548, l. 1230-1245.

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Origins and organisation of the Anti-Balaka

GOBERE

40. P-0889 described GOBERE as a small village near BOSSANGO. ¹⁵³ [REDACTED] that there was a rocky area with a big tree where the villagers went to worship. ¹⁵⁴ According to P-0889's information, this is where the Anti-Balaka were first mobilised. ¹⁵⁵
41. The marabouts at GOBERE began making *gris-gris* and distributed it to the youth so they could defend their villages, ¹⁵⁶ which they did. ¹⁵⁷ Progressively, news of the *gris-gris* spread, and soon the marabouts started travelling around to sell the *gris-gris* to the youth, who would put everything – even their possessions – towards buying them. ¹⁵⁸ P-0889 learned what happened in GOBERE [REDACTED] ¹⁵⁹ According to P-0889, Achille GODONAM (“GODONAM”) was one of the marabouts distributing *gris-gris* to the Anti-Balaka, a relative of MOKOM and BOZIZE. ¹⁶⁰ When he realised that the youth were buying *gris-gris* to defend their villages, GODONAM informed MOKOM of the advantages. ¹⁶¹
42. P-0889 explained that if someone knew how to make traditional *gris-gris*, he would become a leader, and anyone in the village who wanted to join would go to him to be given their *gris-gris*. ¹⁶² He would lead and consider himself superior to the others. ¹⁶³ He would command them. ¹⁶⁴ This is how the Anti-Balaka was born in the beginning. ¹⁶⁵

Youth mobilising to defend their villages

43. P-0889 does not remember when the Anti-Balaka emerged, but it took some time after the Seleka took power to establish itself in CAR. ¹⁶⁶ He first heard about the Anti-Balaka after [REDACTED] in 2013. He heard about the youth mobilising in villages such as BOSSANGO, BOUCA, BATANGAFO in the north, BOUAR in the north-west, and BERBERATI in the south-west. ¹⁶⁷ People started hearing the name “Anti-Balaka” after the local population began mobilising in every village under Seleka control. ¹⁶⁸ The youth in every area, village, city, province, or in the capital, were enduring Seleka violence ¹⁶⁹ and, at a certain point, they had had enough and wanted to get organised to try and defend themselves. ¹⁷⁰ P-0889 heard about youths leading counterattacks against the Seleka, and

¹⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 269-276.

¹⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 281-294.

¹⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 277-280.

¹⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 294-298.

¹⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 298-299.

¹⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7608, l. 302-305.

¹⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7609, l. 308-309.

¹⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 419-424.

¹⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 425-428.

¹⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 405-408.

¹⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 408-409.

¹⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 409.

¹⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 410-411.

¹⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587-7588, l. 413-424.

¹⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7588-7589, l. 425-462.

¹⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, 7589, l. 398-401, 462-465.

¹⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586, l. 363-365, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7966, l. 139-145.

¹⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586, l. 365-366, 372-376, CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 713-715, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7966, l. 145-149.

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progressively people began referring to them as the Anti-Balaka.¹⁷¹ When news would spread about the youth from one village getting organised to defend their village, others villages would also organise a resistance against the Seleka.¹⁷²

44. There was no structure when the movement began.¹⁷³ There was no leader because MOKOM described it as a group of youth defending themselves and villages.¹⁷⁴ But everything changed the moment someone wanted to become the leader.¹⁷⁵ And since someone did want to become the leader, he started to transform the image of the mobilisation of these “self-defence” or “Anti-Balaka” youths who were defending their villages.¹⁷⁶
45. P-0889 explained that the information going around was that the youth were mobilising in the provinces to restore peace *i.e.* to get the Seleka to let them live in peace in their villages.¹⁷⁷ According to P-0889, the objective of the youths was to be able to live in peace, to be able to go about their daily occupations freely. The free movement of persons and goods was the Anti-Balaka’s primary objective.¹⁷⁸ At that time, young people were forced to hide in the bush and were unable to farm, fish or hunt, as they were always being pursued by the Seleka.¹⁷⁹

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P-0889 had to rely on information provided by his friend and relatives. everyone had fled from CAR.¹⁸²

GODONAM and MOKOM’s Role in the mobilisation of youths in the province

47. P0889 further explains that in these villages, the oldest would be the youth leader.¹⁸³ GODONAM tried to get in touch with the village leaders.¹⁸⁴ Once he obtained the leader’s phone number, he would pass it on to MOKOM, who in turn called them.¹⁸⁵ P-0889 insists on the fact that passing on phone numbers and contacts to MOKOM became sort of a mission for GODONAM.¹⁸⁶ Eventually, MOKOM had the numbers of most of these leaders of the groups called the Anti-Balaka, and was therefore in touch with most of the young people in these villages.¹⁸⁷ From that point on, he started discussing and instilling in them the idea that they had to chase out the Seleka.¹⁸⁸

¹⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7589, l. 490-497.

¹⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586, l. 366-371.

¹⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586, l. 348-363.

¹⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 411-415.

¹⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 416-417.

¹⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 417-419.

¹⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7602, l. 62-74.

¹⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7602-7603, l. 74-79.

¹⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7603-7604, l. 81-97, 141-143.

¹⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7605, l. 171-175.

¹⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7605, l. 181-187.

¹⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7606, l. 190-194, 203-225.

¹⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 438-440.

¹⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 436-444.

¹⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612-7614, 7619, l. 444-445, 516-519, 530-533, 560-567, 741-749.

¹⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7614, l. 564-567.

¹⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 444-447, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 42-53.

¹⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 447-451.

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48. In the beginning, these youths wanted to defend their villages and restore peace. But when MOKOM came into contact with them, everything changed.¹⁸⁹ P-0889 does not know what he told them, as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁹⁰ At that point, he was constantly in contact with the Anti-Balaka, making and receiving calls every second.¹⁹¹ And from then on, it started to become structured.¹⁹²
49. Instead of just defending their villages and staying there, they continued to advance and would move around and assist others, and mobilise others elsewhere.¹⁹³ This is how it became more and more popular throughout the whole territory, except in the OUAKA and HAUTE-KOTTO regions – where there were big Seleka coalitions.¹⁹⁴ P-0889 says that they could not conquer those regions, but that now they had conquered the north-west; then the south of the CAR; and then the capital – the part of the capital where the Seleka was, for instance in KM5 and the city-centre.¹⁹⁵ The Anti-Balaka were in the surrounding areas of the capital.¹⁹⁶
50. P-0889 has never heard anyone talk about BOZIZE's involvement, or anyone else's.¹⁹⁷ He explains that [REDACTED] with the local leaders has nothing to do with what Mr. Henri GROTHE ("GROTHE") was posting online.¹⁹⁸ Once MOKOM came into contact with GODONAM, he was in contact with the leaders in every village.¹⁹⁹
51. [REDACTED]
52. P-0889 explains that everyone was following MOKOM's orders, including to delay the 5 December attack.²⁰³ P-0889 describes how MOKOM instructed the groups already in BANGUI for the 5 December attack to wait behind the hills.²⁰⁴ All of these leaders had to wait.²⁰⁵ These include Thierry LEBENE, aka 12 PUISSANCES ("12 PUISSANCES") who was already behind the hill in BOY-RABE,²⁰⁶ Rodrigue NGAIBONA, aka ANDJILO

¹⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 451-453.

¹⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 453-454.

¹⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 454-456.

¹⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 456-457.

¹⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 519-522.

¹⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 522-525.

¹⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613-7614, l. 525-529.

¹⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7614, l. 529-530.

¹⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 515-516.

¹⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7614, l. 534-560.

¹⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7614, l. 560-567.

²⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, 7614-7615, l. 457-461, 567-574.

²⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7615, l. 575-576.

²⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, 7615, l. 467-470, 576-580, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 53-58.

²⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7615, l. 581-595.

²⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, 7615, l. 467-470, 595-596, 606-607, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, 7631, l. 106-108, 189.

²⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7615, l. 599-606, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 190.

²⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7615, l. 602-603, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8086, l. 218-223.

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57. According to P-0889, ANDJILO defended BATANGAFO and BOUCA, freeing these villages from the Seleka.²²⁷ ANDJILO ended up in BANGUI after having freed his village, because someone asked him to go and help others.²²⁸ This “someone” thought that ANDJILO was strong and powerful, and could help getting rid of the Seleka.²²⁹ ANDJILO was used, in that he left BOUCA and BATANGAFO to go and help the others in BOSSANGO and then to go all the way to BANGUI.²³⁰

58. P-0889 also explains that Theophile NDANGBA (“NDANGBA”) from BOSSANGO, and other leaders advanced to OUANGO to help Benjamin OUAPOUTOU chase out the Seleka before helping those in BOSSEMBELE.²³¹ Then those in BOSSEMBELE progressively started to advance toward BANGUI.²³²

Gris-gris and origin of the name “Anti-Balaka”

59. P-0889 says that various kinds of *gris-gris* were made by marabouts.²³³ He does not know exactly what they were made out of, but he explains that *gris-gris* are traditional items that they would wear to avoid being hit by bullets.²³⁴ They were called “Anti-Bullet AKA”.²³⁵ P-0889 explains that they wore them because they did not have weapons, but the Seleka did.²³⁶ So they needed to find a shield against the bullets used by the Seleka, who had automatic weapons commonly known as “AKA”.²³⁷ The *gris-gris* were their anti-bullet AKA shield.²³⁸ They would not be harmed if someone shot AKA bullets.²³⁹

Weaponry used by the Anti-Balaka

60. At some point the Anti-Balaka y used machetes, because they did not have automatic weapons.²⁴⁰ Some used bows and arrows.²⁴¹ Those who used to hunt wild animals in the bush with artisanal weaponry would use their artisanal hunting weapons.²⁴² P-0889 also explains that machetes, bows, and arrows have always been used by the population in the provinces as traditional hunting weapons, fishing equipment, and farming tools.²⁴³ But the Anti-Balaka had started using them against the Seleka, because they felt threatened.²⁴⁴

61. P-0889 adds that most CAR nationals living in the provinces were farmers or hunters and therefore everyone had a macheteto cultivate their fields.²⁴⁵

²²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 85-90.

²²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 90-93.

²²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 93-95.

²³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 95-98.

²³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 98-104.

²³² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 104-106.

²³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586, l. 376-377.

²³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7586-7587, l. 377-385.

²³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 383.

²³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 385-386.

²³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 386-388.

²³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 388-389.

²³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 389-390, 401-402.

²⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 391-392.

²⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 392-393.

²⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 393-396.

²⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7603, l. 100-109.

²⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7604, l. 138-141, CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7587, l. 396-398.

²⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7591, l. 541-552.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

62. When the Seleka arrived in his neighbourhood, P-0889 fled to the hills, where he hid for two days.²⁴⁶ He returned [REDACTED], was shot in the head and killed on [REDACTED].²⁴⁷ He returned to the neighbourhood after the SANGARIS secured the area, saw the dead boy, and realised it could have been him.²⁴⁸ He realised that had he not woken up, they would have taken him.²⁴⁹ P-0889 then decided [REDACTED].²⁵⁰ He left everything behind,²⁵¹ fleeing past military vehicles outside his house in the dark.²⁵² He hid, climbed the hill and remained there for 3 days.²⁵³

63. P-0889 went to the religious compound, where Bishop NZAPALAINGA of the Saint PAUL Catholic Church lived and stayed there while figuring out how to escape.²⁵⁴

64. [REDACTED]

65. [REDACTED]

66. [REDACTED]

²⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 481-490.

²⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7534, l. 698-701, CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566-7567, l. 490-493, 513-518, CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7580-7581, l. 135-169.

²⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7534, l. 701-703.

²⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 493-495.

²⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7566, l. 464-470, CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7581, l. 170-172, 176-177.

²⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7534-7535, l. 703-707.

²⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 707-709.

²⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7517, at 7535, l. 709-711, CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7581, l. 173-175, CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7567-7568, l. 519-520, 575-577.

²⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7567, l. 501-504.

²⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7567, l. 505-512.

²⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 578-586.

²⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7764, l. 824-843.

²⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 587-594.

²⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7609, l. 340.

²⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7609-7610, l. 344-347.

²⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 596-604, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7609-7610, l. 347-356.

²⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 604-613, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, 7614, l. 363-368, 545-558.

²⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569-7570, l. 613-615, 649-650, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 356-363, 387.

²⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569-7570, l. 615-617, 651-653, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 374-378.

²⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 378-379.

²⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 617-619. *See also* CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7581, l. 179-180.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²⁷¹ He was not concerned with the rumours and information of what was going on, because now, he was getting his information directly from the Anti-Balaka who were there on the ground.²⁷² If they had taken a city, or changed position, or taken a village, they would inform him directly.²⁷³ This began at least one month and a half

[REDACTED]

67 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]²⁷⁸
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]²⁷⁹

68. [REDACTED]

69. [REDACTED]

²⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 619, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 379-381.

²⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569-7570, l. 619-621, 655-657, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 381-382.

²⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610-7611, l. 382-384, 387-391.

²⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7610, l. 386-387, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7969, l. 251-254, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647, l. 808-814.

²⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7969, l. 254-262, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646-7647, l. 804-807, 814-815.

²⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647, l. 815-817.

²⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647, l. 817-821.

²⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7968-7970, l. 216-251, 265-278.

²⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569, l. 621-623, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 391-393.

²⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 625-630.

²⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 630-631.

²⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7569-7570, l. 623-625, 632-645, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 393.

²⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 639-640, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 394-400.

²⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 404-407.

²⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 642-643, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 402-408.

²⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 643-644.

²⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 409-410.

²⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 645-647, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 408-409.

²⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 410-411.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

70. [REDACTED]

Anti-Balaka leaders present in ZONGO

71. P-0889 believed that MOKOM crossed to ZONGO the day the Seleka took power, along with most of the military and BOZIZE's sons.²⁹⁶ It was the only way out of BANGUI.²⁹⁷ According to the information, all of BOZIZE's sons were in KINSHASA and went through ZONGO.²⁹⁸ There were DJODJO, RODRIGUE, SOCRATE, and others.²⁹⁹ Apparently Francis BOZIZE and his father passed through ZONGO before they went to CAMEROON, but P-0889 does not really know.³⁰⁰ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These include NAMSIO,³⁰¹ (Abel) DENAMGANAI a military,³⁰² Hervé GANAZOUI ("GANAZOUI"),³⁰³ Lieutenant Thierry TRIBUNAL ("TRIBUNAL") and Samy URBAIN aka BAWA ("URBAIN" or "BAWA"), another military,³⁰⁴ EMTENOU, [REDACTED]

72. [REDACTED]; [REDACTED], another civilian who [REDACTED]

²⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7635-7636, l. 356-369.

²⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7635-7636, l. 366-368.

²⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7767-7768, l. 956-985.

²⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7768, l. 984-986.

²⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7768-7769, l. 997-1005.

²⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 658-661.

²⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570, l. 661-663.

²⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7570-7571, l. 663-665.

²⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 665-666.

²⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 666-667; CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 667-668.

²⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7662, l. 318-335.

²⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7662, l. 324-325.

²⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7662, l. 330-335.

²⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7662-7663, l. 336-350.

³⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7663, l. 350-352.

³⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7742, l. 47-62.

³⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7743-7744, l. 78-110.

³⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7744, l. 111-115.

³⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7745, l. 146-168.

³⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7745-7746, l. 171-183.

³⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7746, l. 193-199.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

apparently [REDACTED],³⁰⁷ [REDACTED]

73. P-0889 did not hear about Sani and Dazoumi YALO [REDACTED] although he knew of them.³¹⁰ [REDACTED]

74. Although [REDACTED] he heard about his return to BANGUI [REDACTED]³¹⁵ [REDACTED] he learnt that YEKATOM had also been in ZONGO. [REDACTED]³¹⁶ [REDACTED] YEKATOM came to ZONGO, but ran into problems with the DRC police in, so he went back to BANGUI.³¹⁷ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that YEKATOM went back to BANGUI to be involved with the problems.³¹⁸

MOKOM's interaction with other Anti-Balaka leaders [REDACTED]

75. [REDACTED] NGAÏKOSSET, who later [REDACTED] for BRAZZAVILLE.³¹⁹ [REDACTED] with MOKOM, including NAMSIO,³²⁰ (Florent) DOKABONA,³²¹ and TRIBUNAL.³²²

MOKOM's Contacts with Anti-Balaka leaders [REDACTED]

MOKOM's communications with Bernard MOKOM

76. According to P-0889, MOKOM's father is Bernard MOKOM, a retired teacher who became the sub-prefect of BERBERATI during BOZIZE's presidency.³²³ [REDACTED] Bernard MOKOM had also fled and was in exile in CAMEROON.³²⁴ Around the time when GODONAM was passing on information about the youth in the villages to MOKOM, [REDACTED]³²⁵ [REDACTED] he was about

³⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7746-7747, l. 200-223.

³⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7747, l. 223-245.

³⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7662, l. 303-317.

³¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7742-7744, l. 69-77, 115-131.

³¹¹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8038, l. 52-62

³¹² CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8038, l. 66-71.

³¹³ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8039, l. 74-75.

³¹⁴ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8037-8038, l. 29-30, 48.

³¹⁵ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8038, l. 38.

³¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7660, l. 244-257.

³¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7659, l. 202-226, CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8037, l. 31-32.

³¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7659-7660, l. 205-208, 227-234.

³¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7655, l. 46-57.

³²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7655, l. 59-66.

³²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7654, l. 26-38.


³²² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7655-7656, l. 67-83.

³²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7619-7620, l. 757-783.

³²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7619, 7621, l. 755, 815-820.

³²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7619-7620, l. 736-739, 785-794.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts



MOKOM's contacts with Local Anti-Balaka leaders in the provinces

77. Once MOKOM was in contact with the Anti-Balaka, he called them a lot.³³³ Through GODONAM, MOKOM came into contact with the self-defence groups.³³⁴ GODONAM told him that he was with the people who were defending their villages and that every village was now defending itself.³³⁵ MOKOM asked GODONAM to put him in contact with some of the influential people among them.³³⁶

78. In the beginning, MOKOM was not in contact with leaders in BOSSANGO, ZERE, OUHAM-BAC, BOUCA, and BENZAMBE.³³⁷ It is only when they started successfully reclaiming and defending their villages that GODONAM informed MOKOM about the youth mobilising in the provinces.³³⁸

³³⁹ GODONAM is a Gbaya from BOSSANGO.³⁴⁰

79.

MOKOM's communication with

P-0889 explained that MOKOM ³⁴² He wanted to make the main Anti-Balaka leader who would pass on MOKOM's orders to the others.³⁴³ more than the others, including ANDJILO, 12 PUISSANCES, or MANDAGO, whom he did not know.³⁴⁴ ANDJILO was strong and more powerful than DEDANE, his little brother did not understand why

³²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7620, l. 795-801.

³²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7620-7621, l. 805-814.

³²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7620, l. 790-794.

³²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7619, l. 749-754, CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647, l. 834-837.

³³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7621, l. 822-828, 836-839.

³³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7620, l. 802-804.

³³² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647, l. 837-840.

³³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7623, l. 892-894.

³³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611-7612, l. 428-434, CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7748, l. 254-268.

³³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7611, l. 429-432.

³³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7967, l. 186-189.

³³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7967, l. 171-178, 189-190.

³³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7967, l. 178-186.

³³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7968-7969, l. 202-214, 254-262.

³⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7749, l. 297-300.

³⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7970-7971, l. 286-289, 307-310, 321-332.

³⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7970, l. 289-294.

³⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7970, l. 295-299.

³⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7971, l. 311-315.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

MOKOM trusted DEDANE more, and this is what led him to kill DEDANE.³⁴⁵ Before his death, DEDANE's sector in BANGUI was BOY-RABE.³⁴⁶

MOKOM's communication with [REDACTED]

80. MOKOM was in contact [REDACTED] who followed NGAISSONA's idea to turn to politics and [REDACTED].³⁴⁷

[REDACTED]³⁴⁸

MOKOM's communication with [REDACTED]

81. MOKOM was also in contact with [REDACTED].³⁴⁹ Before they arrived in BANGUI they were in the provinces, either in ZERE, or OUHAM, BOUCA.³⁵⁰ MOKOM spoke with them on the phone [REDACTED]⁵¹ among the several people he spoke to all the time up until the 5 December attack.

MOKOM's communication with others Anti-Balaka leaders in the province

82. MOKOM was in contact 12 PUISSANCES, ANDJILO, RICHARD, and [REDACTED].³⁵³ He was also in contact with:

- Hippolyte Côme AZOUNOU ("AZOUNOU").³⁵⁴
- Thibaut KPA, an Anti-Balaka leader in BOSSANGO. ³⁵⁵
- Romain FEINDIRI (or FEINDIRO) and NDANGBA, both also from BOSSANGO. ³⁵⁶
- Constant MAHANI, an Anti-Balaka leader either in DAMARA or BOSSEMBELE. ³⁵⁷
- Guy (Gervais) MOKPEM, a military from the 4th *arrondissement*, GOBONGO. ³⁵⁸
- another leader called PHILIBERT. ³⁵⁹

MOKOM's provision of Phone credit to Anti-Balaka leaders in the provinces

83. MOKOM earned the trust of Anti-Balaka leaders in the provinces by sending them phone credit regularly. They were sometimes in the bush and unable to find credit.³⁶⁰ They would sometimes even need to climb high up in the trees to get network access to communicate their positions to MOKOM.³⁶¹ [REDACTED]³⁶² He

³⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7970, l. 289-294, 299-307.

³⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7971, l. 317-320.

³⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7750, l. 320-328.

³⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7971, l. 326-328.

³⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7971, l. 333-345.

³⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7972, l. 352-357.

³⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7972, l. 361-366.

³⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7972, l. 367-374.

³⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7748-7749, l. 270-282.

³⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7749, l. 282-296.

³⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7749-7750, l. 301-319.

³⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7750-7751, l. 331-373.

³⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7752, l. 400-417.

³⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7754-7755, l. 468-490.

³⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7751, l. 373-377.

³⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7979-7980, l. 622-658.

³⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7980, l. 653-656.

³⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7980, l. 658-659.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

sometimes paid up to 15,000 CFA in credit.³⁶³

Usage of orange network

84. The leaders in the villages used the Orange network, which had the best phone plan,³⁶⁹
 [REDACTED].³⁷⁰ He also used Orange.³⁷¹

Language of communication

85. [REDACTED]

Communication devices

86. [REDACTED]

87. [REDACTED]

88. [REDACTED]³⁷⁹ He never
 saw or heard about the Anti-Balaka using THURAYA devices to communicate.³⁸⁰

89. [REDACTED]

³⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7980, l. 659-661.

³⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7980, at 7983, l. 661-663, 769-775.

³⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7983, l. 775.

³⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7980, l. 663-669.

³⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7981-7983, l. 698-765

³⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7983, l. 765-769.

³⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7981, l. 670-678.

³⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7981, l. 678-688.

³⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7981, l. 690-693.

³⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7622-7623, l. 887-982.

³⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7984, l. 776-781, 786.

³⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7984, l. 781-785.

³⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7621-7622, l. 840-853.

³⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7622, l. 873-883.

³⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7623, l. 894-899.

³⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7623, l. 899-901.

³⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7984, l. 790-798.

³⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8093, l. 480-488.

³⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7635, l. 340-356.

³⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7635, l. 342-250.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

[REDACTED]³⁸³ P-0889 explained that the majority of the soldiers had fled because the Seleka had closed everything off when they arrived, and the only way to get out was to cross over to ZONGO.³⁸⁴

Provision of money and ammunition [REDACTED]

90. [REDACTED]³⁸⁵
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁸⁹ He requested 5 million CFA,³⁹⁰
[REDACTED]³⁹¹

91. As far as P-0889 was aware, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁹⁵

92. In the field, when fighting the Seleka, some of the Anti-Balaka recovered automatic weapons; but most used traditional weapons.³⁹⁶ MOKOM bought hunting ammunition because the Anti-Balaka did not have any weapons.³⁹⁷ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]³⁹⁹ MOKOM had instructed the receiver of the package to share it with the others, who were about to arrive to launch the 5 December attack.⁴⁰⁰ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] just days prior to the 5 December attack; but did not know if this had happened before.⁴⁰¹

93. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁴⁰² He also

³⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 369-376.

³⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 376-379.

³⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7616, l. 644-645.

³⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7616, l. 645-666.

³⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7616, l. 647-648.

³⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7616, l. 648-649.

³⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 654-659.

³⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 659-664.

³⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 660-661.

³⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 666-667.

³⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 667-672.

³⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 673-675, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7661, l. 277-296.

³⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7661, l. 297-301.

³⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 676-679.

³⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 675-680.

³⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 680-682.

³⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 682-686.

⁴⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617, l. 686-689.

⁴⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7617-7618, l. 691-700.

⁴⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7618, l. 707-717, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7657-7658, l. 153. 163.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

94. P-0889 did not know how many weapons or ammunition [REDACTED]

Anti-Balaka Attacks in the Provinces [REDACTED]

95. P-0889 knew of fighting at NDJO, BOSSEMBELE, BOSSANGO, BOKANGOLO, DAMARA, and YALOE, and that MOKOM was leading the Anti-Balaka from these areas to BANGUI.⁴⁰⁷

96. 12 PUISSANCES defended his village BOGANGOLO before making his way to BANGUI like the others.⁴⁰⁸ Benjamin OUAPOUTOU (“OUAPOUTOU”) was from NDJO, and also followed MOKOM’s plan to BANGUI.⁴⁰⁹ In DAMARA and BOGANGOLO and along those axes, 12 PUISSANCES led.⁴¹⁰ In YALOE, there was Richard BOZANDO.⁴¹¹ Although he did not know anything about GUEN,⁴¹² Wabilo Guy Blaise BONGARKA (“BONGARKA”) led in GADZI-CARNOT, and there were others whose names P-0889 could not remember.⁴¹³

97. There were attacks in all of these places [REDACTED] and MOKOM was speaking to these people in these regions. When he spoke to the leaders, MOKOM would give the positions of each leader in the same region. [REDACTED]

98. After the 5 December attack, MOKOM continued to be in contact with everyone he had led from the provinces to BANGUI.⁴¹⁷ Even though the others had gone to BANGUI, the youth in the provinces were still mobilising in case the Seleka returned.⁴¹⁸ At that time, [REDACTED]

⁴¹⁹

⁴⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7657-7658, l. 130-153, 163-169.

⁴⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7618, 7624-7625, l. 718-726, 955-976.

⁴⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7657-7658, l. 148-149, 173-182.

⁴⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7660-7661, l. 260-276, 301-302.

⁴⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7977, 7979, l. 599-602, 530-536.

⁴⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7977, l. 537-539.

⁴⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7977, l. 541-550.

⁴¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7977, l. 550-558.

⁴¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7977-7978, l. 558-560.

⁴¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7978, l. 562-567.

⁴¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7978, l. 568-579.

⁴¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7978, l. 580-589.

⁴¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7978-7979, l. 589-595.

⁴¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7979, l. 595-599.

⁴¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, l. 65-73.

⁴¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994-7995, l. 75-80.

⁴¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7995, l. 81-91.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

99. Per P-0889, according to the information in circulation at the time, there was violence on both sides – even if the Anti-Balaka only had hunting weapons, machetes, or bows and arrows.⁴²⁰ National and international NGO reports and radio reported violence and deaths on all sides.⁴²¹ There was always going to be violence because they had decided to defend themselves.⁴²²

100. P-0889 confirmed that before 5 December 2013, there were Anti-Balaka attacks in ROSSANGO and in villages in OUIHAM, such as ZERE and BOUCA.⁴²³ [REDACTED]⁴²⁴ He further explained that he never heard about attacks in BERBERATI, GADZI, and was not informed about the events in BOUAR to BELOKO, and in GAROUA-BOULAI.⁴²⁵

101. [REDACTED] P-0889 heard about the Anti-Balaka's presence in GARAM BOULAYE and BELOKO.⁴²⁶ However, he did not know what was happening there, and whether there were any attacks.⁴²⁷

THE 5 DECEMBER ATTACK

Planning and launching the attack

102. The Anti-Balaka did not launch the attack on BANGUI immediately on their arrival.⁴²⁸ Most were already arriving behind the hill near BOY-RABE.⁴²⁹ There were others, including YEKATOM, arriving near BOEING behind the airport.⁴³⁰ YEKATOM did not get along with MOKOM, and since MOKOM was the one giving the orders, YEKATOM broke away with his elements and took the route that leads to MBAIKI.⁴³¹

103. BEOROFFEI was in charge behind the airport.⁴³² [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
MOKOM's objective was to control the movement, to control these youth defending their villages – and he succeeded, because everyone considered him as the leader.⁴³⁴ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁴³⁶

104. MOKOM's objective was to use the Anti-Balaka to reclaim power for BOZIZE.⁴³⁷ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁴²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7590, l. 523-533.

⁴²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7590, l. 534-537.

⁴²² CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7590, l. 533-534.

⁴²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7966-7967, l. 151-160.

⁴²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7965-7967, l. 114-126, 129-137, 160-170.

⁴²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7993, l. 18-39.

⁴²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7704-7705, l. 756-774, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974-7975, l. 444-456.

⁴²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7975, l. 456-457.

⁴²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 466-467.

⁴²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 470-472.

⁴³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612, l. 472-475.

⁴³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612-7613, l. 475-477.

⁴³² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7612-7613, l. 477-481.

⁴³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 481-482.

⁴³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 482-485.

⁴³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 485-487.

⁴³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 487-488.

⁴³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 494-498.

⁴³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 498-499.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

fighting to bring him back to power.⁴⁴⁰ He intended to pursue his objective until he brought BOZIZE back to power.⁴⁴¹ His and the Anti-Balaka's objective to do so was broadcast, including on RFI during the 5 December 2013 attacks.⁴⁴²

105. While the idea was to chase the Seleka out of BANGUI's *arrondissements*,⁴⁴³ what was even more important for MOKOM was to permanently oust the Seleka.⁴⁴⁴ He wanted to overthrow DJOTODIA, who was managing the transition and to finally restore constitutional order,⁴⁴⁵ meaning BOZIZE's return to power.⁴⁴⁶

Positions of the Anti-Balaka

106. The Anti-Balaka who arrived in BANGUI for the 5 December attack were located in the BOEING area behind the M'POKO airport,⁴⁴⁷ along the MBAÏKI-PK9 axis at the south exit of BANGUI,⁴⁴⁸ behind the hill, near PK11, at the north exit of the country,⁴⁴⁹ and behind the hill near BOY-RABE.⁴⁵⁰ They were already in the capital, waiting for reinforcements so that they could launch the attack.⁴⁵¹
107. According to P-0889, the first person to arrive near BANGUI amongst the leaders in contact with MOKOM, was 12 PUISSANCES ; then came ANDJILO, and Tex TEYEMBE ("TEYEMBE").⁴⁵² YEKATOM was leading the group that was along the MBAÏKI axis.⁴⁵³
108. ANDJILO was in BANGUI for a while before the attack, waiting, and the youth joined him.⁴⁵⁴ Steve Yvon KONATE ("KONATE") was also with them, he was a military.⁴⁵⁵ ANDJILO led one group with other leaders to take the Palace, and another group attacked at camp KASSAI in the 7th *arrondissement*.⁴⁵⁶ ANDJILO's group just had to go straight to get to the Palace, this might have just been described to him by KONATE or MOKOM.⁴⁵⁷
109. P-0889 confirmed that at the time of the attack, the Anti-Balaka were holding the different positions,⁴⁵⁸ where they were a few days prior.⁴⁵⁹ The Seleka knew that the Anti-

⁴³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 499-503.

⁴⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 503-506.

⁴⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 508-509.

⁴⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7613, l. 510-515.

⁴⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 62-63.

⁴⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 63-65.

⁴⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 65-69.

⁴⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7628, l. 70.

⁴⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 115-124.

⁴⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 124-125.

⁴⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 125-127.

⁴⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629, l. 127-128.

⁴⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7629-7630, l. 128 -131.

⁴⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630, l. 137-143.

⁴⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630, l. 145-146, 156-160.

⁴⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7664, l. 380-397.

⁴⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7664, l. 397-399.

⁴⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7664, l. 404-408.

⁴⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7664-7665, l. 408-426.

⁴⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631-7632, l. 209-212.

⁴⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 213-218.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Balaka were in BANGUI but they did not attack because they were scared, as they had already been pushed back from the provinces all the way to BANGUI.⁴⁶⁰

110. [REDACTED]⁴⁶¹ but not with YEKATOM.⁴⁶² P-0889 believes that YEKATOM never spoke to MOKOM.⁴⁶³ It was as if there was a problem between the two of them.⁴⁶⁴ The fact that YEKATOM would never speak to MOKOM was the reason why YEKATOM left the groups gathered in BANGUI which MOKOM was in touch with every day.⁴⁶⁵

111. YEKATOM moved his elements to the YAMWARA school because he did not want to follow MOKOM's orders.⁴⁶⁶ He left the group in which BEOROFEI was, [REDACTED] YEKATOM did not want to listen to what he had to say and left with most of his elements to set up base at the YAMWARA school.⁴⁶⁸ After the YAMWARA school, YEKATOM went out to the MBAÏKI road.⁴⁶⁹ [REDACTED] YEKATOM was occupying the MBAÏKI axis behind the PK9 barrier and was no longer in BOEING.⁴⁷⁰

112. At the end of the 5 December attack, [REDACTED] YEKATOM refused to attack as instructed.⁴⁷¹ He did not attack the Seleka even though the latter was at the barrier at the south exit, where YEKATOM and his elements were positioned,⁴⁷² but instead launched his own attack, and then went back and sought reconciliation.⁴⁷³

Number of elements

113. P-0889 did not know how many elements were under ANDJILO's control when he left BATANGAFO and BOUCA, but there could have been around 800, or 1,000.⁴⁷⁴ All of the leaders had a lot of elements, sometimes over 1,000.⁴⁷⁵ He heard this from these leaders themselves.⁴⁷⁶

114. A leader could start out with 800, but this number would grow as they advanced.⁴⁷⁷ Sometimes, the leaders did not even have the time to count how many had joined the group and would not always know how many elements they had.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 218-225.

⁴⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630, l. 132-136, 148-152.

⁴⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630, l. 153-155.

⁴⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630, l. 160-161.

⁴⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630-7631, l. 163-168.

⁴⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7630-7631, l. 165-170.

⁴⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 170-173, 190-191.

⁴⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 174-176.

⁴⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 176-180.

⁴⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 173-174.

⁴⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 180-184, 191-192.

⁴⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 192-194, 201-205.

⁴⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 194-197.

⁴⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7631, l. 197-198.

⁴⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 226-239.

⁴⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7633, l. 260-272, 277-280.

⁴⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7633, l. 274-277.

⁴⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7634, l. 297-299.

⁴⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7634, l. 299-305.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

115. [REDACTED] MOKOM and other leaders discuss the number of elements under their control.⁴⁷⁹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁴⁸⁰

When talking about ANDJILO, [REDACTED] ANDJILO apparently did not want to have to deal with having a lot of elements behind him.⁴⁸¹ [REDACTED]

ANDJILO did not really use the Anti-Balaka *gris-gris*; he had his own witchcraft which could get him out of any kind of situation.⁴⁸²

Launching of the attack

116. P-0889 was not present when the signal was given to launch the attack on 5 December.⁴⁸³ [REDACTED] he could hear the Seleka firing heavy weapons in BANGUI at around 5 or 6 am.⁴⁸⁵ [REDACTED]

117. P-0889 explained that he knew that the attack was happening on the 5th, but he did not know who was leading and in control in which neighbourhood.⁴⁸⁹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that they had attacked the position of the Seleka.⁴⁹⁰ They had called [REDACTED] they had been able to advance past the National Assembly.⁴⁹¹

They reclaimed the Assembly and the SAPEURS-POMPIERS camp nearby where the Seleka were.⁴⁹² Behind this camp, there was Camp BEAL – which used to be the camp of the French Military Forces, which they also took.⁴⁹³ They were calling MOKOM to tell him that they were in this or that position.⁴⁹⁴ [REDACTED]

118. Later that morning everything changed.⁴⁹⁶ Their advance to take the Palace failed, and they were suffering heavy human losses.⁴⁹⁷ By around 11:00 or 12:00 – [REDACTED] that everyone was retreating because the Seleka were fighting back

⁴⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7633-7634, l. 281-288, 308-311.

⁴⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7634, l. 312-315, 320-321.

⁴⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7634, l. 315-316, 319-320.

⁴⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7634, l. 316-319.

⁴⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 411-415.

⁴⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 415-417.

⁴⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 417-422, 438-440.

⁴⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 422, 440-442.

⁴⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 422-427.

⁴⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637, l. 427-437.

⁴⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7637-7638, l. 443-463.

⁴⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 463-464.

⁴⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 464-466, 483-485.

⁴⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 466-468, 481-483.

⁴⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 469-471, 481-483.

⁴⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 483-485.

⁴⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 471-485.

⁴⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 474-475.

⁴⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 475-477.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

- to defend the palace, and it was heavy and strong.⁴⁹⁸ They did not have the means to resist – they did not really have any automatic weapons, a lot of them were just using traditional things, which meant that they needed to get very close to the enemy.⁴⁹⁹ They explained that they withdrew in a frenzy – with people going in every direction.⁵⁰⁰ The Seleka took back all the positions, including the Assembly and Camp BEAL.⁵⁰¹ Those Anti-Balaka in BOEING also withdrew to their sectors.⁵⁰²
119. At that point and [REDACTED], ANDJILO said that he was not going back to the provinces and would stay for as long as it would take for them to reclaim the Palace.⁵⁰³ He had come with his elements from BATANGAFO and had set up base in BOY-RABE, where 12 PUISSANCES and others were also based.⁵⁰⁴ Some were near CITE, others were at GOBONGO or BOY-RABE.⁵⁰⁵ They had all taken their positions and were not going anywhere – and at that point the Anti-Balaka were everywhere in BANGUI.⁵⁰⁶
120. After the 5 December attack, 12 PUISSANCES was based in BOY-RABE in NGAÏSSONA's house.⁵⁰⁷ When NGAÏSSONA returned, he to go to OUANGO, in the 7th *arrondissement*.⁵⁰⁸
121. KONATE and TEYEMBE were in CITE.⁵⁰⁹ Alex ABOU was near FOUH; (Junior) BAYO – a military man and EDJEZEKANE another FACA were in MISKINE in the 5th *arrondissement*; while URBAIN was in COMBATTANT, the neighbourhood opposite the airport.⁵¹⁰ URBAIN had left ZONGO and gone back to his neighbourhood COMBATTANT when he heard that the Anti-Balaka had reclaimed it from the Seleka.⁵¹¹ Along the MBAÏKI axis there was YEKATOM with his elements.⁵¹² In BOEING there was BEOROFEI and Honoré MODIBO (“MODIBO”), and on the way to COMBATTANT there was Sylvestre YAGOUZOU (“YAGOUZOU”).⁵¹³
122. BEOROFEI and MODIBO were in BOEING with their elements, and they launched an attack to join the others who were making their way from BOY-RABE to the city centre, to the Assembly.⁵¹⁴ On 5 December 2013, BEOROFEI who did not have enough elements was forced to retreat at around KM5, since YEKATOM had taken most of the elements and had left to go along the MBAÏKI axis.⁵¹⁵

⁴⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638, l. 485-488.

⁴⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7638-7639, l. 488-495.

⁵⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, l. 495-496.

⁵⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, l. 497-498.

⁵⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, l. 499-500.

⁵⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, l. 500-503.

⁵⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, 7643, l. 503-507, 657-660.

⁵⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, 7642, l. 507-508, 625-647.

⁵⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639, 7642-7643, l. 508-510, 647-655.

⁵⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8086- 232-233.

⁵⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8086, l. 238-242.

⁵⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7643, l. 661-664, 671-672.

⁵¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7643-7644, l. 675-681, 688-689.

⁵¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7643-7644, l. 680-681, 684-686, 689-690.

⁵¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 690-691.

⁵¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 692-696.

⁵¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639-7640, l. 511-533.

⁵¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7639-7640, l. 526-527, 533-537.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

123. Even though the Anti-Balaka controlled these areas, the Seleka were still occupying zones in BANGUI, the whole of the city-centre up to the Assembly, the BEAL and the SAPEURS-POMPIERS camps in the 1st *arrondissement*.⁵¹⁶
124. The Seleka were also in the 5th *arrondissement* and in MISKINE, where the majority of Muslim civilians lived.⁵¹⁷ KM5, the 1st and 3rd *arrondissements*, were also occupied predominantly by Muslim civilians.⁵¹⁸ P-0889 explained that, since there were Muslims there, the Seleka joined them in these neighbourhoods.⁵¹⁹ The Seleka could be found in the 3rd, 5th, and 1st *arrondissements*.⁵²⁰ The 4th, 8th, and 7th *arrondissements*⁵²¹ were occupied by Anti-Balaka elements.⁵²² [REDACTED] when the Anti-Balaka leaders withdrew to these neighbourhoods.⁵²³

MOKOM's Communication with the Anti-Balaka during the 5 December attack

125 [REDACTED]

126. P-0889 explains that the Anti-Balaka leaders forced to retreat [REDACTED]. They had failed to take the Palace, as desired.⁵²⁹ In the beginning, no one pushed the Anti-Balaka to stand up and defend their villages.⁵³⁰ But while they were doing so, someone entered into contact with them and started talking to them about what to do.⁵³¹ And they eventually started following this person's orders.⁵³² [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁵³⁵

⁵¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 697-700, 707-711.

⁵¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 7011-714.

⁵¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 714-717.

⁵¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 717-719.

⁵²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 719-721.

⁵²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7644, l. 721-724.

⁵²² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 726-729.

⁵²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 730-735.

⁵²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 239.

⁵²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 239-248, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7664, l. 399-403.

⁵²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 248-249.

⁵²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7633, l. 253-259.

⁵²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7632, l. 249-251.

⁵²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 773-778, 788-789.

⁵³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 779-782.

⁵³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 784-789.

⁵³² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 784-789.

⁵³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 789.

⁵³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 789-790.

⁵³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 792-793.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

127. When the leaders [REDACTED] about the wounded elements and the famine, he did not react.⁵³⁶ [REDACTED]⁵³⁷

Civilians' or casualties

128. P-0889 did not know if there were any victims in BOEING during the 5 December attack.⁵³⁸ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not preoccupied with the losses – even when it was the Anti-Balaka who were dying or had been injured.⁵⁴⁰ He would advise the troops to carry on with what they have to do.⁵⁴¹ What he was focused on was ousting DJOTODIA and bringing back BOZIZE.⁵⁴² And because of this, P-0889 did not really know how many victims there were.⁵⁴³

129. P-0889 confirmed that civilians were killed in BOEING when the Anti-Balaka were making their way to the National Assembly and the palace.⁵⁴⁴ He also confirmed that civilians died in the contemporaneous attack around BOEING.⁵⁴⁵ P-0889 does not think that the Anti-Balaka would have informed MOKOM that they had killed civilians.⁵⁴⁶ In their minds, they were killing the Seleka.⁵⁴⁷

130. To P-0889's knowledge, nothing was going on in the provinces on 5 December, as BANGUI was the main focus.⁵⁴⁸ It is only later when it became hard for some Anti-Balaka elements to find food in BANGUI that they started going home to their villages.⁵⁴⁹ But with their return came violence, as things started to deteriorate in their villages because of the Seleka wanting revenge.⁵⁵⁰

AFTERMATH OF THE 5 DECEMBER ATTACK

Anti-Balaka attacks in BANGUI after 5 December

131. P-0889 explained that once in BANGUI after the 5 December 2013 attack, the question became how the Anti-Balaka would survive and find food.⁵⁵¹ The leaders were calling MOKOM and complaining about the lack of food, and that they did not know how to treat the wounded.⁵⁵² For example, 12 PUISSANCES spoke about his wounded elements and

⁵³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 798-802.

⁵³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 794-798.

⁵³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 539-546.

⁵³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 546-548.

⁵⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 550-552.

⁵⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 551-552.

⁵⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 552-553.

⁵⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 553-554.

⁵⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7640, l. 558-570.

⁵⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7641, l. 571-576.

⁵⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7641, l. 593-598.

⁵⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7641, l. 602-603.

⁵⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7641-7642, l. 605-617.

⁵⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7642, l. 617-620.

⁵⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7642, l. 620-624.

⁵⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 735-738.

⁵⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 738-745, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7665, l. 427-437.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

about famine.⁵⁵³ According to P-0889, some stole from the civilian population, to sell items like phones to buy food or cigarettes,⁵⁵⁴ and such cases escalated in BANGUI.⁵⁵⁵

132. Progressively, this led to the majority of them going back to their villages.⁵⁵⁶ But at that point, the youths in BANGUI joined in, and that's when all the disorder started.⁵⁵⁷ The population in BANGUI started seeing systematic and continuous theft.⁵⁵⁸ When the Anti-Balaka were not around, others would make their own *gris-gris*, call themselves Anti-Balaka, and do whatever they wanted: steal and other things.⁵⁵⁹ Everyone started calling themselves Anti-Balaka.⁵⁶⁰

133. P-0889 recalled one attack, which resulted in the death of an Anti-Balaka leader.⁵⁶¹ An important Anti-Balaka leader attempted to attack a neighbourhood next to GALABADJA in the 8th *arrondissement* where the Seleka leader "DONNER LA MORT" lived.⁵⁶² They had planned to attack the Seleka leader's position; but DONNER LA MORT who knew that they were coming and shot at the Anti-Balaka leader.⁵⁶³ [REDACTED]

134. P-0889 confirmed other attacks which took place around December 2013, although he did not know their precise location and exact numbers.⁵⁶⁸ The Anti-Balaka leaders [REDACTED] that the French troops would tell the Anti-Balaka what positions to attack. For instance, French troops would show them the location of the Seleka leaders, inform them if the Seleka were heavily armed, and would give the Anti-Balaka time to attack.⁵⁶⁹ The plan was then that the Anti-Balaka had to flee when they would see the French troops arriving. This is what P-0889 heard about how the attacks after the 5th December were carried out.⁵⁷⁰

Youths in BANGUI joining the Anti-Balaka

135. According to P-0889, when the attacks in the provinces were happening, there were no groups of youths in BANGUI, as the city was completely under Seleka control.⁵⁷¹ The ones leading the attack were the villagers – with their *gris-gris* protecting them.⁵⁷² In BANGUI,

⁵⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 747-748.

⁵⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 756-763.

⁵⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 757-758.

⁵⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645, l. 764-766.

⁵⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7645-7646, l. 766-767.

⁵⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 767-768.

⁵⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 768-772.

⁵⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7646, l. 770-771.

⁵⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783-7784, l. 63-66, 85.

⁵⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783, l. 65-75.

⁵⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783-7784, l. 76-88.

⁵⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7784-7785, l. 89-132, 135-146.

⁵⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7785, l. 133-134.

⁵⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7785, l. 147-151.

⁵⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7786, l. 152-160.

⁵⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7786, l. 161-173.

⁵⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7786, l. 173-180.

⁵⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7786, l. 180-185.

⁵⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7647-7648, l. 841-861.

⁵⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7648, l. 861.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

everyone was hiding.⁵⁷³ It is only when those from the provinces arrived near BANGUI and took their positions in the places he mentioned earlier, like behind the hill in BOY-RABE, and near BOEING – that the youth from BANGUI joined the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁷⁴

136. P-0889 believed that those who joined the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI for the 5 December 2013 attack already supported the ideology of the movement, even though it is difficult to know what people think.⁵⁷⁵ In his view, as that there were rebellions and continuous *coup d'états*, this led to a high percentage of illiteracy among the youth, who would be out on the streets and did not go to school. They all wanted to join the military, because they simply did not have anything else to do. This is what happened when BOZIZE's took power in 2003. Many from the provinces joined the military in support of BOZIZE, and the youth in BANGUI did the same. Becoming a soldier is what all of the young people wanted because at least they would be doing something instead of just wasting time.⁵⁷⁶
137. P-0889 did not know if the youth mobilised by COCORA ended up joining the Anti-Balaka when they arrived in BANGUI for the 5 December 2013 attack. He thinks that this was the case even though he did not hear it said.⁵⁷⁷ But, there were COCORA youth who before anything had happened, already had the courage to get out there, and later joined the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁷⁸

138. [REDACTED]

139. MOKOM's demand for the return to constitutional order was not for there to be elections, but to restore BOZIZE to power.⁵⁸⁴ [REDACTED]

FACA soldiers joining the Anti-Balaka

140. P-0889 did not hear the names of the Anti-Balaka leaders from the provinces as such. He heard about "the youth" from this or that village⁵⁸⁶ He understood that, in the beginning

⁵⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7648, l. 863-869.

⁵⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7648, l. 870-876.

⁵⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7649-7650, l. 882-921.

⁵⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7650-7651, l. 933-1001.

⁵⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7650-7652, l. 1011-1012.

⁵⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7650-7652, l. 1019-1021.

⁵⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7624, l. 935-935.

⁵⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 688-689, 699-700.

⁵⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 685-688, 702-704, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7624, l. 936.

⁵⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 700-702; CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 705, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7624, l. 937-940.

⁵⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 704-705, CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7624, l. 936-937.

⁵⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7600, at 7624, l. 950-954.

⁵⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7554, at 7571, l. 675-678.

⁵⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7591, l. 553-572.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

there were only civilians involved because the soldiers, police, and the *gendarmes* were in hiding.⁵⁸⁷ P-0889 did not know when exactly, but members of the military intervened and joined the ranks of the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁸⁸ P-0889 learned about this in BOY-RABE.⁵⁸⁹ For instance, MAZIMBELET a self-proclaimed Anti-Balaka was a corporal in the FACA.⁵⁹⁰ In the 5th *arrondissement*, there were two well-known military men, called (Junior) BAYO and Andy ZEKANE who joined the ranks of the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁹¹

141. Sometimes after the 5 December attack and after the Anti-Balaka had taken back most of the neighbourhoods, the soldiers who had taken refuge in ZONGO went back to BANGUI,⁵⁹² even though crossing back was illegal.⁵⁹³ They did not return in an organised or structured manner – they all went back individually, on their own.⁵⁹⁴ Amongst these militaries were Lieutenant DOKABONA and TRIBUNAL,⁵⁹⁵ URBAIN (aka BAWA).⁵⁹⁶

ANTI-BALAKA'S CRIMES

Targeting the Muslim population

142. When the Anti-Balaka arrived, they did not distinguish between the Seleka and non-Seleka – in their minds every man was part of the Seleka.⁵⁹⁷ The Seleka had done exactly the same; they had considered everyone as a FACA.⁵⁹⁸ The Anti-Balaka believed that all Muslims took up weapons to support the Seleka, which is why they are also targeted.⁵⁹⁹
143. P-0889 says that the Muslims went to KM5 to defend themselves and to put a system in place to protect themselves.⁶⁰⁰ There were not enough Muslims to face the mass of people who were coming for them if they were scattered out, so they had to regroup.⁶⁰¹ So they all left and went to KM5 to create a resistance.⁶⁰² Those who really were part of the Seleka had left and went back to where they were from in the provinces; the Muslims from BANGUI were all in KM5.⁶⁰³

Massive Displacement of the Muslims Population

144. P-0889 confirmed continuing attacks and other incidents in BANGUI after the 5 December 2013 attack.⁶⁰⁴ Fightings between the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka continued in

⁵⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7591-7592, l. 573-585, 613-615.

⁵⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7592-7593, l. 587-598, 615-618.

⁵⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7593, l. 619-629.

⁵⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7593, l. 631-635.

⁵⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7576, at 7593, l. 635-649.

⁵⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 389-391, CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8075, l. 1331-1333, 1349.

⁵⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 380-389.

⁵⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 392-393.

⁵⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636-7637, l. 396-400, 409-410, CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8075-8076, l. 1362-1365, 1369-1370.

⁵⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7626, at 7636, l. 400-408.

⁵⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 74-75.

⁵⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 75-76.

⁵⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687, l. 80-89.

⁶⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687, l. 93-97.

⁶⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687, l. 93-103.

⁶⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687, l. 103-104.

⁶⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687, l. 105-108.

⁶⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7782-7783, l. 11-35, 61-62.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

BANGUI after the 5 December attack.⁶⁰⁵ Anti-Balaka leaders, including ANDJILO and 12 PUISSANCES, remained in BANGUI and set up base in various sectors around the city.⁶⁰⁶

145. In P-0889's opinion, there were other strategic attacks in the areas where the Seleka were, especially in the 5th *arrondissement* and the 3rd *arrondissement*.⁶⁰⁷ This caused all of the Muslims who were living in the 5th *arrondissement*, including MISKINE, BOY-RABE, and MOUSTAPHA, to abandon their homes and seek refuge at KM5.⁶⁰⁸ Their homes were empty, pillaged, and destroyed.⁶⁰⁹ The Muslims fled their homes in fear for their lives.⁶¹⁰ Had they stayed, they would have been killed.⁶¹¹ Proof of this is the fact that some Muslims were killed who were not Seleka.⁶¹² So, if they wanted to live, they had to hide.⁶¹³ There were also many Muslims in a neighbourhood in the 8th *arrondissement*, after the 5th December attack even though the Anti-Balaka were close by.⁶¹⁴ A mosque was destroyed there.⁶¹⁵
146. The attacks *after* 5 December 2013 generated the massive displacement of Muslims.⁶¹⁶ Some left to CAMEROON, others to CHAD, and even those from SENEGAL were forced to leave BANGUI and to return to their country.⁶¹⁷ P-0889 remembers that SENEGAL and other countries sent airplanes to evacuate nationals from BANGUI.⁶¹⁸ Some CAR Muslims left to go to the provinces, some went to CHAD, some to SUDAN, and others to CAMEROON.⁶¹⁹ There were also some who stayed in PK5 and who are still there today.⁶²⁰ Some have returned to their homes, for instance in GOBONGO, where the mosque has been rebuilt.⁶²¹ P-0889 does not know if any Muslims returned to BOY-RABE, however.⁶²²
147. P-0889 explained that when Muslims left their neighbourhoods, they were escorted mostly by the MINUSCA, but also the SANGARIS.⁶²³ P-0889 did not see any evacuation convoys because [REDACTED] When he came back to BANGUI, things had calmed down, but in the provinces things were starting up again between the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka.⁶²⁴

⁶⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783, l. 46-51.

⁶⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783, l. 38-45.

⁶⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7685-7686, 7690, l. 37-41, 223-227.

⁶⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, 7690-7691, l. 41-57, 77-78, 232-233, 241-255, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7783, l. 51-59.

⁶⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 57-56.

⁶¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 59-66.

⁶¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 68.

⁶¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 69-71.

⁶¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7686, l. 72.

⁶¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690-7691, l. 233-235, 238-241.

⁶¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7691, l. 237.

⁶¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7787, l. 212-215, 219-220.

⁶¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7787, l. 215-218.

⁶¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7700, l. 599-618.

⁶¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7700-7701, l. 618-627.

⁶²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7701, l. 620-621, 628, 639.

⁶²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7701, l. 629-630, 637.

⁶²² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7701, l. 634-637.

⁶²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7701-7702, l. 641-662.

⁶²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7702, l. 663-677.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Pillaging and Destruction of Muslim's Property, including Mosques

148. P-0889 explained that Muslim's homes were pillaged not only by the Anti-Balaka, but also by some young bandits who took advantage of the situation.⁶²⁵ In BOEING only a few Muslims' houses were pillaged, as there really were not that many Muslims in BOEING.⁶²⁶ But, in BOY-RABE, MISKINE, and in AKOUANGA houses were destroyed and pillaged.⁶²⁷ Roofs, windows, and doors were stolen or destroyed, and everything inside was taken.⁶²⁸ This did not happen in KM5 because there was a Muslim resistance there.⁶²⁹ However, the Anti-Balaka in BOEING were saying that the Muslims in the GBAYA neighbourhood in PK5 were pillaging houses themselves: they were taking the wood from the roofs, doors, and windows to cook, because they could not leave to go and buy firewood.⁶³⁰

149. The mosque in BOY-RABE was destroyed, completely demolished – they took down not only the roof and windows, but even the walls.⁶³¹ Several other Mosques were destroyed. These include the mosque in MISKINE,⁶³² in AKOUANGA rebuilt by SAMBA PANZA,⁶³³ the mosque in GOBONGO, BOZIZE rehabilitated after returning from exile,⁶³⁴ the Mosques in BOEING.⁶³⁵ Most people were saying that it was done in revenge, because the Seleka had done the same to churches.⁶³⁶ This is why there was an image of a religious war.⁶³⁷

Anti-Balaka's attacks in the Provinces after the 5 December attack

150. After the Seleka left BANGUI, they committing crimes in the provinces. So, in areas where there were not any Anti-Balaka before, they started emerging day by day in reaction to the Seleka's actions, for instance, in BANDORO, OUAKA, KOUANGO, HAUTES-KOTTO.⁶³⁸

BOSSEMBELE and BAORO

151. P-0889 heard about the Anti-Balaka's presence in BOSSEMBELE and BAORO, as an Anti-Balaka leader from these areas was in contact with MOKOM (P-0889 does not remember his name).⁶³⁹ Many crimes were being committed in BOSSEMBELE,⁶⁴⁰ and MOKOM wanted this to continue.⁶⁴¹ He wanted the violence to go on, to prevent the political side of things from gaining too much traction – and he was using the leaders in BOSSEMBELE to do so.⁶⁴² He did not want stability; he wanted to reinstate BOZIZE, and

⁶²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7687-7688, l. 109-118.

⁶²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7688-7689, l.145-161.

⁶²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7688, l. 126-144.

⁶²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7688, l. 131-137.

⁶²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7688, l. 140-144.

⁶³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7689, l. 162-182.

⁶³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7689-7690, 191-205.

⁶³² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, l. 206.

⁶³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, 7701, l. 206-207, 630-639.

⁶³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, 7701, l. 207-209, 629-630, 637.

⁶³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, l. 209-210.

⁶³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, l. 210-212.

⁶³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7690, l. 212-213.

⁶³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7703-7704, l. 732-753.

⁶³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7973, l. 399-411.

⁶⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7752-7753, l. 396-397, 418-420.

⁶⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7753, l. 420-422.

⁶⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7753, l. 424-451.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

NGAISSONA's political agenda was impeding that.⁶⁴³ MOKOM wanted to undermine NGAISSONA's plan and to make room for BOZIZE's return.⁶⁴⁴

BOUAR

152. [REDACTED] P-0889 did not hear anything about BOUAR. He started hearing about BOUAR [REDACTED]⁶⁴⁵ but does not know what happened there.⁶⁴⁶ He later learned that there were Muslims who had remained in BOUAR.⁶⁴⁷ [REDACTED]

BODA

153. P-0889 heard about attacks in BODA and believed that after 5 December 2013 things calmed down in the provinces,⁶⁵¹ but that the Anti-Balaka there did not listen to anyone – neither NGAISSONA nor MOKOM.⁶⁵²

BERBERATI

154. Chrysostome YAPELE, aka CHIKI-CHIKI ("CHIKI-CHIKI" or "YAPELE") and other Anti-Balaka were in BERBERATI before they came to BANGUI. But he does not know how they attacked.⁶⁵³ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁶⁵⁵ YAPELE was in contact with MOKOM in BANGUI,⁶⁵⁶ but P-0889 did not hear him speak about BERBERATI.⁶⁵⁷ He also met YAPELE in BANGUI [REDACTED]⁶⁵⁸

ANTI-BALAKA FIGURES AND COMMANDERS

Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA

NGAISSONA's return to BANGUI and his leadership in the Anti-Balaka's Coordination

155. At the time of the 5 December attack, P-0889 did not pay attention to NGAISSONA, but later learned that he had been in exile in CAMEROON as were the majority of high ranking members of the BOZIZE's regime, when NGAISSONA returned.⁶⁵⁹ When NGAISSONA arrived at M'PKOKO airport, it was all over the media and there were

⁶⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7753-7754, l. 446-465.

⁶⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7754, l. 464-467.

⁶⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7972-7973, l. 375-383, 388-397, 413.

⁶⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974, l. 421-424.

⁶⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974, l. 416-418.

⁶⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974, l. 418-419.

⁶⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974, l. 438-443.

⁶⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7974, l. 425-437.

⁶⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7993-7994, l. 39-40, 45-48.

⁶⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, l. 40-44.

⁶⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, 7979, l. 49-55, 605-608, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8087, l. 259-265.

⁶⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, l. 56-59.

⁶⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, l. 59-61, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7979, l. 603-604.

⁶⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761-7762, l. 735-773.

⁶⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7994, l. 62-64.

⁶⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7979, l. 610-621.

⁶⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7665-7666, l. 437-439, 441-473.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

crowds there to welcome him – they thought that NGAISSONA would help them and give them money.⁶⁶⁰ [REDACTED]⁶⁶¹

156. The Anti-Balaka were calling upon NGAISSONA because they wanted someone to speak for them and represent them before Catherine SAMBA-PANZA (“SAMBA-PANZA”).⁶⁶² The Anti-Balaka had called MOKOM who said that he could manage things from ZONGO, but they needed someone to be present to bring forward their demands.⁶⁶³

P-0889’s Confusion regarding dates

157. P-0889 thought that NGAISSONA may have returned during the short time that Ferdinand NGUENDE was in office, and that NGAISSONA wanted to lead the transition government, and would have done anything to become President.⁶⁶⁴ He believed that this is why he wanted the violence to stop and wanted to have his own party and for there to be peace, so that he could run in the elections.⁶⁶⁵

NGAISSONA’s being chosen as the Anti-Balaka’s leader

158. According to P-0889, 12 PUISSANCES went with other leaders to ask NGAISSONA to speak for them before the transition government and the international community to find solutions to the crisis in the country, and he accepted.⁶⁶⁶ The injured Anti-Balaka would go to his home to get money, and he would buy them medicine with his own money.⁶⁶⁷ MOKOM was angry about this.⁶⁶⁸ He was not getting calls as usual – they were not reporting back to him anymore.⁶⁶⁹ MOKOM wanted Lin BANOUKEPA (“BANOUKEPA”), the coordinator of FROCCA, to be the Anti-Balaka coordinator and representative.⁶⁷⁰ [REDACTED]⁶⁷¹ NGAISSONA was already representing the Anti-Balaka.

159. The Anti-Balaka was asked who was going to represent them in the transition government.⁶⁷³ NGAISSONA had stood as a candidate to lead the country, but had not been chosen – SAMBA-PANZA had been chosen.⁶⁷⁴ So, instead he named someone to represent the Anti-Balaka in the government.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7666-7667, l. 459-473, 490-493.

⁶⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7666-7667, l. 486-513.

⁶⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7667-7668, l. 514-521, 524-531.

⁶⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7667, l. 521-524.

⁶⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7672, l. 709-720.

⁶⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7672, l. 720-725.

⁶⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 533-539.

⁶⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 540-545.

⁶⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 540-546.

⁶⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 546-549.

⁶⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 549-553.

⁶⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 554-555.

⁶⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 555-558.

⁶⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 558-560, 566-567.

⁶⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 560-566.

⁶⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668, l. 567-569.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Meeting at NGAISSONA's House

160. P-0889 believes that one meeting was held at NGAISSONA's father's house, others were held at the Hotel AZIMUT.⁶⁷⁶ NGAISSONA's father lived in NGOUMBOUTOU in BOY-RABE, and NGAISSONA lived in NGUITO III.⁶⁷⁷

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162. YAGOUZOU, ANDJILO and other Anti-Balaka leaders lived in COMBATTANT. [REDACTED] where they were.⁶⁸⁰ MOKOM sat down with them [REDACTED].⁶⁸¹ They knew these people [REDACTED], but they did not know who was who.⁶⁸² Everyone introduced themselves.⁶⁸³ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].⁶⁸⁵

163. P-0889 explains that MOKOM wanted to introduce himself to NGAISSONA, and show him that he was the one who had been in contact with the Anti-Balaka.⁶⁸⁶ He wanted to show him that he was the one who had led them to BANGUI.⁶⁸⁷ NGAISSONA told him that he knew his father.⁶⁸⁸ They went out to eat together, and returned to NGAISSONA's house.⁶⁸⁹ MOKOM spoke with NGAISSONA about representatives in government, and about the fact that they needed a structure, and that's when MOKOM showed him an organigram of the Committee.⁶⁹⁰ NGAISSONA told him to present it to the other leaders for their approval, and they approved it.⁶⁹¹

164. P-0889 states that the following individuals attended the meeting at NGAISSONA's home: [REDACTED].⁶⁹²

⁶⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7920, l. 13-28.

⁶⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7920-7921, l. 32-42.

⁶⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7774, l. 1201-1209, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669, l. 606-611.

⁶⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669-7670, l. 611-630.

⁶⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7774, l. 1210-1215.

⁶⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, l. 1216-1223.

⁶⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, l. 1229-1231.

⁶⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, l. 1231-1242.

⁶⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, l. 1242-1245.

⁶⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, l. 1246-1249.

⁶⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775-7776, l. 1256-1267.

⁶⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7776, l. 1267-1268, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7791, l. 354-363.

⁶⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7776, l. 1268-1271.

⁶⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7776, l. 1271-1273.

⁶⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7670, l. 631-637, CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7776, l. 1273-1275.

⁶⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7670, l. 637-642, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 399-401.

⁶⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7776-7777, l. 1278-1296, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7671, l. 665-670.

⁶⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7777-7779, l. 1310-1318, 1328-1366.

⁶⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7777, l. 1298-1308.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Charles NGREMANGOU (“NGREMANGOU” or “captain NGREMANGOU”) and YEKATOM were not present.⁶⁹⁵

165. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁰⁶ NGAISSONA was the General Coordinator, and his deputy was YAGOUZOU.⁶⁹⁷ MOKOM named himself the Operations Coordinator, because he coordinated the operations and was in contact with all of the Anti-Balaka.⁶⁹⁸

166. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁶⁹⁹ No one in the Coordination actually did any work, apart from NGAISSONA, who sometimes put out press releases and represented the Anti-Balaka – [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁰²

167. NGAISSONA had already been contacted by the Anti-Balaka, and he therefore already considered himself as the Anti-Balaka Coordinator before [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁰³

168. When MOKOM had arrived back in BANGUI, he wanted all of his efforts to be recognised. He did not want NGAISSONA alone to take the credit for it. So, he created the organigram to expand the leadership.⁷⁰⁴ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] – as he had done for Alexandre DEDE (“DEDE”)’s leaflets (P-0889 points out that DEDE compared the Anti-Balaka to the French Resistance).⁷⁰⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁷⁰⁶ P-0889 adds that the Deputy Coordinator was supposed to be NGREMANGOU.⁷⁰⁷ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁰⁸

[REDACTED]⁷⁰⁹

169. When NGAISSONA saw the organigram [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁷¹⁰ [REDACTED] and the other Anti-Balaka leaders reacted, because P-

⁶⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7775, 7777, l. 1251-1255, 1319-1325.

⁶⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7709, l. 916-920, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793, l. 434-452, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8108, l. 1937-1039.

⁶⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7709, l. 921-939.

⁶⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7709, l. 940-949.

⁶⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7709-7710, l. 950-958, 968-969.

⁷⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7710, l. 958-963.

⁷⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7710, l. 965-967.

⁷⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7710, l. 967-968.

⁷⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7790-7791, l. 334-354.

⁷⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7791, l. 354-363.

⁷⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7791-7792, l. 365-382, 386-394.

⁷⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 382-385.

⁷⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 394-398.

⁷⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7826-7827, l. 31-52.

⁷⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7827, l. 53-63.

⁷¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 401-403.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

0889 was not an Anti-Balaka.⁷¹¹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷¹³

P-0889's Participation in Anti-Balaka Meetings

170. P-0889 was not present at all meetings at NGAISSONA's house.⁷¹⁴ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷¹⁸

171. P-0889 says that the "*restitution des accords*" happened at the Hotel AZIMUT.⁷¹⁹ This was during the transition – it was a ceasefire agreement.⁷²⁰ The other meetings took place later in July 2014.⁷²¹ P-0889 does not know if Bernard MOKOM and the Anti-Balaka coordination had meetings in BANGUI regarding the management of the movement, as he never saw them meet up.⁷²²

NGAISSONA's Political Agenda

172. One day, P-0889 went to meet NGAISSONA who presented his political ambitions.⁷²³ His idea was to convert all of these people into political activists – he wanted them to put down their weapons and to support his political party.⁷²⁴ He wanted to take advantage of this popularity to get votes in the election, so he was trying to bring awareness to the Anti-Balaka.⁷²⁵ At that time there were lots of cases of theft, especially in BANGUI: many started to steal and pretended to be Anti-Balaka.⁷²⁶ P-0889 says that NGAISSONA was going to reward those who would stop and get behind him and support his political agenda.⁷²⁷

173. [REDACTED] to mobilise and to get people behind him and support his plan to bring about peace.⁷²⁸ For there to be peace however, the Anti-Balaka had to calm down and to get behind the idea to go the political route.⁷²⁹ NGAISSONA's idea – and he was not hiding it – was to run in the elections, and he wanted the Anti-Balaka's support.⁷³⁰

⁷¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 403-406.

⁷¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 406-415.

⁷¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793, l. 420-426.

⁷¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1147-1148.

⁷¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1151-1153.

⁷¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1153-1155.

⁷¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1155-1156.

⁷¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904-7905, l. 1157-1166.

⁷¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7906, l. 1195-1200.

⁷²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7906, l. 1201-1205.

⁷²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7906, l. 1207-1214.

⁷²² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7986-7987, l. 874-897.

⁷²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7673, l. 747-765.

⁷²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7673-7674, l. 765-770.

⁷²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 770-773.

⁷²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 772-777.

⁷²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 777-786.

⁷²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7707, l. 867-869.

⁷²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7707-7708, l. 869-887.

⁷³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7708, l. 880-887.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

He therefore wanted to transform them so that they would pursue his political objective.⁷³¹ P-0889 believes that MOKOM was against this agenda because MOKOM wanted to take power by force.⁷³² P-0889 chose to be on NGAISSONA's side.⁷³³

174

[REDACTED]

736

175. Bernard MOKOM was against the idea of NGAISSONA putting in place a political party.⁷³⁷ He and his friend, a magistrate named DEDE, were always together.⁷³⁸ [REDACTED]

because he supported NGAISSONA's political agenda, and his advising the Anti-Balaka politically.⁷³⁹ They said: [REDACTED]

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Mokom Against Ngaissona Having A Political Agenda and [REDACTED]

176

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁴⁰ His relative, BOZIZE, already had a political party, and he had led the Anti-Balaka all the way to BANGUI.⁷⁴⁸ He could not accept that the Anti-Balaka were now going to vote for NGAISSONA because BOZIZE was going to come back and run in the elections.⁷⁴⁹ The possibility of NGAISSONA who was well-known, popular, and influential in the CAR was a serious threat for BOZIZE; as he could defeat BOZIZE in the elections.⁷⁵⁰ MOKOM was failing in his mission to use the

⁷³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7708, l. 884-887.

⁷³² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7708, l. 881-890.

⁷³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7708, l. 896-899.

⁷³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 790-791.

⁷³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 791-801.

⁷³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 800-808.

⁷³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674, l. 804-810.

⁷³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7674-7675, l. 810-811.

⁷³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7675, l. 818-839.

⁷⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7675, l. 826-828.

⁷⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7675, l. 838-839.

⁷⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7677, l. 897-912.

⁷⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7677, l. 901-910.

⁷⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7677, l. 909.

⁷⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7677, 7678, l. 910-917, 939-943, 961-963, 971.

⁷⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7677-7678, l. 923-944.

⁷⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678, l. 944-961.

⁷⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678, l. 963-965.

⁷⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678, l. 965-967.

⁷⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678-7679, l. 967-971, 980-986.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Anti-Balaka to reclaim power for BOZIZE.⁷⁵¹ He needed the Anti-Balaka to stay and vote for BOZIZE instead of supporting NGAÏSSONA's party.⁷⁵²

NGAÏSSONA's financial support

177. The Anti-Balaka did not want to abandon MOKOM because he had led them to BANGUI, but MOKOM did not help them to buy medication or to take care of the injured after the 5th of December. They also did not want to walk away from NGAÏSSONA because he would also give money to those who asked.⁷⁵³ Everyone in BANGUI knows that if one can find NGAÏSSONA – whether Anti-Balaka or not – they will not be walking away empty handed.⁷⁵⁴ People call him FMI, for *Fond Monétaire International*.⁷⁵⁵

178. There were people who did not recognise the benefits that they received from NGAÏSSONA.⁷⁵⁶ Some people that received money from NGAÏSSONA who now talk bad about him.⁷⁵⁷ Alfred Legrand NGAYA (“NGAYA”) for example, received money from NGAÏSSONA but he was never grateful.⁷⁵⁸ P-0889 never attended a cash giving to NGAYA.⁷⁵⁹ He never did any campaign for him or to become a member.⁷⁶⁰ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁶¹

179. Aubin MBOYA who wanted to become an MP in one of the provinces also received envelopes.⁷⁶² He took the money and he left.⁷⁶³ P-0889 would be angry at NGAÏSSONA for allowing this behaviour.⁷⁶⁴

180. P-0889 did not remember the names of the other people NGAÏSSONA gave money to.⁷⁶⁵ People would come and see him with problems and he would give them cash.⁷⁶⁶ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁶⁷

NGAÏSSONA's authority over the Anti-Balaka Coordination

181. P-0889 was shown CAR-OTP-2001-4818 (registered under CAR-OTP-2124-1231 as Annex 17), a press article titled “*Le chef des Anti-Balaka appelle le gouvernement à dialoguer*” dated February 2014 containing an interview of NGAÏSSONA.⁷⁶⁸ P-0889 noted that NGAÏSSONA did not appreciate Joachim KOKATE (“KOKATE”) acting as an Anti-

⁷⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678, l. 971-975.

⁷⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7678, l. 975-978.

⁷⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7848, l. 807-835.

⁷⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7848-7849, l. 831-848.

⁷⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7849, l. 837-845.

⁷⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8053, l. 583-584.

⁷⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8054, l. 606-607.

⁷⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8054, l. 608.

⁷⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8054, l. 611-614.

⁷⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8054, l. 618-619.

⁷⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8054-8055, l. 624-626, 634.

⁷⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8055, l. 634-637.

⁷⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8055, l. 638.

⁷⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8055, l. 644, 655-667.

⁷⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8056, 8057, l. 678-679, 703.

⁷⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8057, l. 706.

⁷⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8036, at 8057, l. 726-729.

⁷⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7907-7908, l. 1233-1264.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Balaka representative in the government and believed that KOKATE had never been appointed as an Anti-Balaka representative.⁷⁶⁹

182. P-0889 was shown references in the media article where NGAISSONA claimed that there is only one Anti-Balaka movement with the elements (“*ses enfants*”) immediately following his orders, and that for there to be peace, there has to be discussions with the coordination and its staff.⁷⁷⁰ P-0889 noted that, in the interview NGAISSONA wanted to show his influence on the Anti-Balaka, but there was not a unique Anti-Balaka – instead, there was MOKOM’s, KOKATE’s, WENEZOUT’s, and (Gilbert) KAMEZOLAI’s.⁷⁷¹ He confirmed however, that NGAISSONA presented himself as the leader of the Coordination,⁷⁷² which P-0889 insists only existed on paper.⁷⁷³ At one point, NGAISSONA’s orders did have an effect on those who followed his ideology.⁷⁷⁴ YEKATOM and KEMA listened to NGAISSONA when he decided to follow the political route.⁷⁷⁵ NGAISSONA thought that everyone followed his orders, but this was not the case because those who did not share the same ideas as him did not follow his orders.⁷⁷⁶

183. P-0889 did not know what the relationship was between the Anti-Balaka Coordination and the transition government.⁷⁷⁷ NGAISSONA’s political ambitions were out of touch with the military reality on the ground.⁷⁷⁸ He was already a well-known figure in the CAR, given his role in football, his position as a Minister, and his generosity.⁷⁷⁹ The Anti-Balaka occupied the majority of the territory in the CAR at that time.⁷⁸⁰ NGAISSONA therefore wanted to benefit from the Anti-Balaka’s popularity, which P-0889 believes is why he made statements such as the statements in this article.⁷⁸¹ But not all of the Anti-Balaka followed him.⁷⁸² There were other political figures who had an Anti-Balaka following, such as MOKOM and BOZIZE.⁷⁸³

NGAISSONA helping Muslims victims of the AB

184. P-0889 recalled a case where an Anti-Balaka leader took and wanted to kill a young Muslim man, considered to be a Seleka. NGAISSONA went to see this leader and asked him to hand over the Muslim man. He took the man to his house, and later to the court.⁷⁸⁴ On another occasion, Anti-Balaka elements locked up a young Muslim woman and children. NGAISSONA told them to let them out, and he kept them in his house for a few days before contacting the authorities and handing them over to the court. He wanted to hand them over in the presence of *Monseigneur* NZAPALAINGA, but they did not want

⁷⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7908, l. 1266-1290.

⁷⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7908-7909, l. 1292-1326.

⁷⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7910, l. 1358-1365.

⁷⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7911, l. 1369-1395.

⁷⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7913, l. 1446-1459.

⁷⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7912, l. 1428-1430.

⁷⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7912, l. 1407-1425, 1433.

⁷⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7912-7913, l. 1436-1438, 1441-1442, 1460-1462.

⁷⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7913-7914, l. 1463-1507.

⁷⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7915-7917, l. 1525-1629.

⁷⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7917, l. 1587-1589.

⁷⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7917, l. 1591.

⁷⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7917, l. 1593-1596.

⁷⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7917, l. 1596-1597, 1602-1604.

⁷⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7917, l. 1597-1602.

⁷⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7849-7850, l. 849- 887.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

to. NGAISSONA treated them well, so they wanted to stay with him.⁷⁸⁵ P-0889 says that [REDACTED].⁷⁸⁶ In another instance, an Anti-Balaka leader who stole a truck from a Muslim man, whom he said was Seleka.⁷⁸⁷ NGAISSONA went to get the truck and brought it back, before handing it over to the authorities so that its owner could have it back.⁷⁸⁸

NGAISSONA's ability to punish the Anti-Balaka in BOY-RABE

185. P-0889 did not know about NAMSIO's arrest or detention.⁷⁸⁹ He remembered however that, after BRAZZAVILLE, Anti-Balaka elements were arrested, some even on NGAISSONA's orders.⁷⁹⁰ NGAISSONA put in place a system with real military elements to track down, arrest, and bring people to the *gendarmerie*.⁷⁹¹ The people arrested were in MAZIMBELET's group.⁷⁹² MAZIMBELET was killed when he tried to take vehicles from the *gendarmerie* where he shot at a Colonel named CELESSION, and tried to steal the 4x4 there to sell them off.⁷⁹³ MAZIMBELET's elements terrorised BOY-RABE with their acts of violence and were arrested by real FACA whom NGAISSONA had instructed to bring peace back to the neighbourhood.⁷⁹⁴ NGAISSONA provided the military with the necessary means, so they got organised and one morning started arresting them.⁷⁹⁵ ZEFEIDOKNA, Maxime DOGO, and many other Anti-Balaka elements were arrested and taken to the *gendarmerie*.⁷⁹⁶

186. The situation was really bad in the neighbourhood.⁷⁹⁷ MINUSCA and the SANGARIS could not enter, when they tried they were attacked. This caused deaths because of the stray bullets.⁷⁹⁸ People were complaining, so NGAISSONA had to call upon the military to track the criminality and stop it.⁷⁹⁹

187. P-0889 explains that they went from house to house and arrested them.⁸⁰⁰ Then they called the *gendarmerie*, who refused to go to BOY-RABE because of the risk of causing more deaths.⁸⁰¹ The military told the *gendarmerie* that they could come, because they had neutralised those responsible.⁸⁰² That is when the *gendarmerie* came, and when MINUSCA, SANGARIS, and NGOs were able to circulate.⁸⁰³

⁷⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7850, l. 900-909.

⁷⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7851, l. 912-913.

⁷⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7851, l. 913-918.

⁷⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7851, l. 918-920.

⁷⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7896-7897, l. 844-871.

⁷⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7897, l. 872-885, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7987, l. 898-906.

⁷⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7897, l. 887-889.

⁷⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7987, l. 908-909.

⁷⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7987, l. 909-927.

⁷⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7897, l. 891-898, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7987-7988, l. 922-925.

⁷⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7897, l. 898-899.

⁷⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7897, 7902, l. 900-902, 1052-1056, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 925-932.

⁷⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7898, l. 905-911, 916-926, CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7987-7988, l. 922-925.

⁷⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7898, l. 927-931.

⁷⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7898, l. 926-932.

⁸⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7898-7899, l. 940-947.

⁸⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7899, l. 947-950.

⁸⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7899, l. 950-952.

⁸⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7899, l. 952-954.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

188. P-0889 could not name any FACA members who came to BOY-RABE because he did not see them.⁸⁰⁴ He also could provide any names of FACA soldiers with whom NGAISSONA interacted.⁸⁰⁵

NGAISSONA dismantling YEKATOM's Barricades along the Mbaiki Axis

189. [REDACTED] P-0889 did not know what was happening in YEKATOM group after 5 December 2013 because MOKOM was not in contact with YEKATOM.⁸⁰⁶ When they arrived to BANGUI, P-0889 heard that YEKATOM and his men had erected barricades all along the MBAIKI axis.⁸⁰⁷ [REDACTED] NGAISSONA told him that people were complaining about YEKATOM and what was going on.⁸⁰⁸ They needed to find a solution, and tried to speak with YEKATOM.⁸⁰⁹ YEKATOM did not want to cooperate with NGAISSONA or with MOKOM.⁸¹⁰ But thanks to an NGO, YEKATOM finally accepted to put an end to what he was doing along that axis and to join NGAISSONA's plan to put down the weapons and take the political route.⁸¹¹ YEKATOM decided to become an MP for the area around the MBAIKI axis under NGAISSONA.⁸¹² NGAISSONA told him that he needed to improve his image to do so, and that he had to therefore dismantle the barricades that he had erected.⁸¹³ This had to be done in an official manner, in the presence of the international community.⁸¹⁴ So NGAISSONA wrote to MINUSCA, and both MINUSCA and the SANGARIS sent teams to go on this mission to dismantle the barricades along the MBAIKI axis – [REDACTED].⁸¹⁵

190. At the beginning of 2015,⁸¹⁶ [REDACTED] They spoke to the elements at the barricades. YEKATOM, who was not there, designated someone to take them from one barricade to the next and instructed his elements to let the people circulate freely, and refrain from taking money from people.⁸¹⁸ They reached near MBAIKI, but did not quite make it,⁸¹⁹ so they told the elements at the barricades to pass the message on to the others to remove their barricades as well.⁸²⁰

191. In reference CAR-OTP-2030-0243 (registered under CAR-OTP-2124-1236, as Annex 19), a “*Communiqué* radio”⁸²¹ P-0889 noted that NGAISSONA put it in place to dismantle once and for all SANGARIS, EUFOR – the international community – and RHOMBOT's

⁸⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7901, l. 1040-1051.

⁸⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7900-7901, l. 986-1028.

⁸⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 274-280.

⁸⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 281-289.

⁸⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 287-293.

⁸⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 293-296.

⁸¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 297-298.

⁸¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 298-303.

⁸¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 303-306.

⁸¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 310-311.

⁸¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 311-313.

⁸¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7692, l. 313-318.

⁸¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7699-7700, l. 578-596.

⁸¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693, l. 320-322.

⁸¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693, l. 322-327.

⁸¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693, l. 327-329.

⁸²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693, l. 329-332.

⁸²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7995, l. 97-114.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

barricades on the road to MBAIKI along the OMBELLA-M'POKO axis, to restore peace and turn the Anti-Balaka to politics.⁸²²

Maxime MOKOM

192. MOKOM was very unhappy about NGAISSONA's designation to represent the Anti-Balaka.⁸²³ [REDACTED] things were going to go badly if he did not go back.⁸²⁵ So he started putting things in place to return to BANGUI. [REDACTED]

193 [REDACTED]

194. At that time, Bernard MOKOM lived with MOKOM, and DEDE lived somewhere else, in the same neighbourhood.⁸³⁰ [REDACTED]

31

Meetings in BANGUI

195 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁸³⁴ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁸³⁵ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] or somewhere in the 5th *arrondissement* at that time.⁸³⁷ Although P-0889 does not remember the month of his return to BANGUI; it was after NGAISSONA's return and the establishment of the transition government, but before the BRAZZAVILLE talks.⁸³⁸

MOKOM and NGAISSONA's Relationship as Operations Coordinator and National Coordinator

196. P-0889 explains that [REDACTED] MOKOM realised that NGAISSONA was going the political route, so he kept on managing operations with those who wanted to follow him.⁸³⁹ P-0889 explained that in the first organigram, NGAISSONA

⁸²² CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7996, l. 127-138.

⁸²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7668-7669, l. 569-574.

⁸²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669, l. 574-582.

⁸²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669, l. 579-581.

⁸²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669, l. 581-582.

⁸²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7656-7657, l. 110-129.

⁸²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7764-7666, l. 849-887, 892-899.

⁸²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7669, l. 587-605.

⁸³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7921-7922, l. 60-88, 103-104.

⁸³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7922, l. 89-102.

⁸³² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7769, 7771, l. 1006-1035, 1123-1129.

⁸³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7773, l. 1153-1159.

⁸³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7770, l. 1036-1040.

⁸³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7770, l. 1049-1060.

⁸³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7774, l. 1194-1196, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7672-7673, l. 726-745.

⁸³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7774, l. 1197-1199.

⁸³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7770-7771, 7779-7780, l. 1061-1075, 1367-1397.

⁸³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7845-7846, l. 709-726.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

did not want an operations coordinator, but MOKOM convinced him that the position was needed not necessarily for combat but for disarmament purposes.⁸⁴⁰ This is how MOKOM presented the document – [REDACTED] and in which [REDACTED] and neither was Vivien BEINA nor Mamadou NGUIGBAM.⁸⁴¹

MOKOM's brothers

197. Rochael, or Roca MOKOM is MOKOM's younger brother.⁸⁴² P-0889 did not know him, but heard of him and [REDACTED].⁸⁴³ He was told that he had died alongside a French journalist, and that they were riding a motorbike when they were shot.⁸⁴⁴ P-0889 does not know where Roca MOKOM was before this happened.⁸⁴⁵

198. P-0889 adds that Aaron OUIILLIBONA is another one of MOKOM's younger brothers, [REDACTED].⁸⁴⁶ P-0889 does not know if they had the same father, but MOKOM called him [REDACTED].⁸⁴⁷ [REDACTED].⁸⁴⁸ He heard the name Aaron for the first time in BANGUI⁸⁴⁹ and only saw him once.⁸⁵⁰

Alfred YEKETOM

Number of YEKATOM elements

199. YEKATOM had a lot of men, but P-0889 could not estimate how many.⁸⁵¹ However, they were all along the MBAÏKI axis – from the PK9 bridge, all along the MBAÏKI axis to BAGANDOU in the south – and in all the villages along the way.⁸⁵²

YAMWARA School

200. P-0889 knew that the YAMWARA school is in a neighbourhood near BOEING, behind the M'POKO airport, but did not know what YEKATOM was doing when he was there.⁸⁵³ [REDACTED] YEKATOM had taken most of his elements and left YAMWARA for the MBAÏKI axis.⁸⁵⁴

YEKATOM's Participation in the Coordination Meetings

201. P-0889 stated that YEKATOM never personally participated in meetings at NGAISSONA's house or at the Hotel AZIMUT.⁸⁵⁵ When YEKATOM wanted to see

⁸⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7846, l. 736-752.

⁸⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7846-7847, l. 753-762.

⁸⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7975, l. 458-461.

⁸⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7975, l. 464-474.

⁸⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7975, l. 477-478.

⁸⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7975, l. 479-483.

⁸⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7976, l. 493-496.

⁸⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7976, l. 497-498.

⁸⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7976, l. 499-501.

⁸⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7976, l. 502-504.

⁸⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7976, l. 505-509.

⁸⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693, l. 334-350; CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693-7694, l. 334-350, 357-362.

⁸⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7693-7694, l. 352-357.

⁸⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7702, l. 679-693.

⁸⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7703, l. 695-717.

⁸⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7937, l. 632-638.

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NGAISSONA he would go alone.⁸⁵⁶ When YEKATOM knew that there would be other Anti-Balaka leaders present at meetings, he would send people from his own coordination that he had previously put in place, and who had also decided to follow the political route – like Vivien BEINA and Paleon ZILABO (“ZILABO”).⁸⁵⁷

YEKATOM and NGAISSONA

202. P-0889 explains that YEKATOM did not follow orders. He had his own structure in place with his own people.⁸⁵⁸ But, he went to NGAISSONA once he had accepted to follow NGAISSONA’s political ideas – that is when he abandoned his own ideas with the barriers, to go down a political path and raise awareness among the elements. Politics brought him to NGAISSONA.⁸⁵⁹ P-0889 saw YEKATOM at a meeting within UNDP, where he came with people of the association MOU-DA.⁸⁶⁰ The objective was to bring YEKATOM so that he could also follow the ideology of bringing peace back.⁸⁶¹ YEKATOM agreed to meet NGAISSONA to discuss the political ideas and they finally agreed.⁸⁶²

203. YEKATOM was a member of NGAISSONA’s political party, and he was elected as an MP for the PCUD, and the same goes for KEMA (of BOSSANGO).⁸⁶³ NGAISSONA must have had six or seven MPs, but P-0889 only knew these two names.⁸⁶⁴

204. When YEKATOM arrived after agreeing to align with NGAISSONA’s political idea and join NGAISSONA coordination,⁸⁶⁵ he had already put in place his own coordination, and some of the members were not Anti-Balaka fighters either.⁸⁶⁶ He introduced his members, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].⁸⁶⁷ VOMITIADE – who had a Master’s degree – ended up representing the Anti-Balaka in the government as Minister of Art and Culture.⁸⁶⁸

YEKATOM’s crimes

205. In respect of *CAR-OTP-2127-0708* (an audio recording), P-0889 explained that refers to YEKATOM and the cessation of hostilities.⁸⁶⁹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].⁸⁷⁰ He would take his elements on the MBAIKI axis where they erected some barriers and demand money from people.⁸⁷¹ As their leader, his elements listened to him.⁸⁷² They were militaries a had a

⁸⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7937-7938, l. 644-650, 669-670.

⁸⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7938, l. 652-664, 675-681.

⁸⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7938-7939, l. 680-702.

⁸⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7940, l. 735-740.

⁸⁶⁰ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8045, l. 307-310.

⁸⁶¹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8045, l. 314-315.

⁸⁶² CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8046, l. 324-327.

⁸⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7940-7941, l. 742-767.

⁸⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7941, l. 769-782.

⁸⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793-7794, l. 429-430, 468-469.

⁸⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793, l. 427-433.

⁸⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793, l. 434-452, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8108, l. 1937-1039.

⁸⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7793, l. 439-444, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8108-8109, l. 1042-1045.

⁸⁶⁹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8039, l. 103-104.

⁸⁷⁰ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8039-8040, l. 104-115.

⁸⁷¹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8042, l. 198-199.

⁸⁷² CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8042, l. 208-209.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

discipline.⁸⁷³ YEKATOM was having problems with the Congolese authorities⁸⁷⁴ and they advised him to stop with the atrocities, but he continued.⁸⁷⁵ YEKATOM was put under police custody and later released.⁸⁷⁶

Charles NGREMENGOU

206 [REDACTED]

Sébastien WENEZOU

207. P-0889 knows WENEZOU, who was from BOEING and whom MOKOM also wanted to see on the day of their arrival,⁸⁸¹ but he was not there.⁸⁸² When he became a minister P-0889 tried to reach him, but he would not pick up the phone.⁸⁸³

Lin BANOUKEPA and the FROCCA

208. P-0889 heard of FROCCA for the first time [REDACTED] when talking about BANOUKEPA.⁸⁸⁴ [REDACTED] the FROCCA coordinator (BANOUKEPA) and preferred him to be the Anti-Balaka coordinator.⁸⁸⁵ [REDACTED], BANOUKEPA was BOZIZE's lawyer, so he had mastered the situation.⁸⁸⁶ [REDACTED]⁸⁸⁷

209. MOKOM wanted BANOUKEPA to lead and represent the Anti-Balaka in the transition government and before the international community.⁸⁸⁸ Had MOKOM been in BANGUI at the time, he would have done this.⁸⁸⁹ But, since he was still in ZONGO, MOKOM thought BANOUKEPA was the man for the job.⁸⁹⁰

Dieudonné NDOMATE

210. Dieudonné NDOMATE ("NDOMATE") used to be a ComZone in BOY-RABE, from BATANGAFO. He is now a minister and is apparently currently coordinating the Anti-

⁸⁷³ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8043, l. 222-224.

⁸⁷⁴ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8040, l. 118.

⁸⁷⁵ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8040, l. 139-140.

⁸⁷⁶ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8040-8041, l. 128-159.

⁸⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7772, l. 1107-1109, 1119-1124.

⁸⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7772, l. 1113-1114, 1125-1129.

⁸⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7772-7773, l. 1119-1122, 1130, 1139-1144.

⁸⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7772-7773, l. 1132-1152.

⁸⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7773, l. 1160-1168, CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8087, l. 249.

⁸⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7773, l. 1163-1164.

⁸⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8087, l. 253-255.

⁸⁸⁴ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8063-8064, l. 951-959.

⁸⁸⁵ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8064, l. 963-974, CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7679, l. 1002-1007, CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7827-7828, l. 72-78.

⁸⁸⁶ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8064, l. 976-977, 988-989.

⁸⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7679, l. 987-1002, 1007-1011.

⁸⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7679, l. 1015-1018.

⁸⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7679, l. 1019-1020.

⁸⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7679-7680, l. 1020-1028.

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Balaka.⁸⁹¹ NDOMATE was close to NGAISSONA and supported his political ideas.⁸⁹² NDOMATE reported to NGAISSONA.⁸⁹³ He represented the Anti-Balaka alongside him, until this day.⁸⁹⁴ He did not support MOKOM.⁸⁹⁵ NDOMATE was Minister of Art and Culture, and was under the Anti-Balaka wing of NGAISSONA.⁸⁹⁶ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].⁸⁹⁷

MAZIMBELET in BOY-RABE

211. MAZIMBELET was the reason why BOY-RABE had such a bad reputation. He terrorised everyone in BOY-RABE; Muslims and Christians alike.⁸⁹⁸ As noted, MAZIMBELET was a military man from BOY-RABE (but a native of BATANGAFO).⁸⁹⁹ He surrounded himself with military men and young civilians in BANGUI.⁹⁰⁰ They were thieves, and would steal vehicles, even those of the government. He and his men would take motorcycles and sell them off. They would assault anyone who resisted, and even sometimes extort money from victims to get their vehicles back.⁹⁰¹ MAZIMBELET and his men would hit everyone, and [REDACTED].⁹⁰² Because of MAZIMBELET, MINUSCA and the SANGARIS could not enter BOY-RABE at one point.⁹⁰³ He would shoot at any white MINUSCA vehicles trying to enter.⁹⁰⁴

212. [REDACTED] MAZIMBELET was in contact with MOKOM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁹⁰⁵ as was Dieudonné NGAIBONA, ANDJILO's brother.⁹⁰⁶

DEDANE DANBOY

213. P-0889 confirms that DEDANE died in combat in BOY-RABE after the 5 December, but when [REDACTED]⁹⁰⁷ [REDACTED]
ANDJILO's little brother, Dieudonné NGAIBONA had killed him.⁹⁰⁸

Sylvestre YAGOUZOU

214. YAGOUZOU was based around the 8th arrondissement.⁹⁰⁹ YAGOUZOU worked mostly with MOKOM in the beginning.⁹¹⁰

⁸⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7934, l. 529-546.

⁸⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7935, l. 547-562, 569-572.

⁸⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7936-7937, l. 605-626.

⁸⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7935, l. 562-568.

⁸⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7935, l. 565.

⁸⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8096, 8098, l. 589-596, 651-656.

⁸⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8096, l. 584-589.

⁸⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7755, l. 492-510.

⁸⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7755-7756, l. 509-531.

⁹⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7756, l. 531-532.

⁹⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7756, l. 532-555.

⁹⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7756, l. 555-558.

⁹⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7757, l. 581-588.

⁹⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7757, l. 584-591; CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7757, l. 593-602.

⁹⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7758, l. 603-610.

⁹⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7758, l. 611-624.

⁹⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7758-7759, l. 625-638.

⁹⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7758-7759, l. 630-640.

⁹⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8085, l. 181-185.

⁹¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8085, 188.

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Alexandre DEDE

215. P-0889 explained that magistrate DEDE's name appears in the organigram "situation".⁹¹¹

Guy Blaise BONGARKA

216. Guy Blaise BONGARKA was one of the Anti-Balaka leaders in CARNOT, or GADZI-CARNOT.⁹¹⁴ There were others in CARNOT who were MOKOM's right men, but P-0889 does not know their names.⁹¹⁵ BONGARKA was also MOKOM's right hand man and they have remained close.⁹¹⁶ P-0889 recalls and recounts an incident involving AZOUNOU and BONGARKA long after the 5 December's attack and possibly in 2015.⁹¹⁷ They imitated NGAISSONA's signature, pretending that he agreed to sell cattle in BANGUI (to raise money to rebuild a school and a hospital in the area, which had been destroyed by the Seleka). When the cattle arrived, AZOUNOU and BONGARKA sold the animals and kept the money for themselves and bought new motorcycles. The population went to see NGAISSONA and showed him the signed document. He said that he had never signed this and never agreed to selling cattle. They told him that AZOUNOU was the one who transported the animals, and so NGAISSONA called AZOUNOU to come and explain himself. But AZOUNOU did not show up. P-0889 does not know the rest of what happened.⁹¹⁸ P-0889 does not know anything regarding any involvement in the badges.⁹¹⁹ P-0889 believes that BONGARKA avoided telling MOKOM about the cattle as he arranged everything with AZOUNOU because they speak the same languages.⁹²⁰

217. P-0889 states that [REDACTED]. It was in BANGUI that P-0889 heard his name, but only in relation to CARNOT-GADZI.⁹²¹ MOKOM had his men all the way from GADZI-CARNOT to BERBERATI, because MOKOM's father was the Prefect near BERBERATI, so they had all of those men at their disposal.⁹²² CARNOT is near BERBERATI.⁹²³

⁹¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7762, l. 779-781.

⁹¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7762-7763, l. 782-790, 802, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7792, l. 389-391.

⁹¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7763, l. 797-799.

⁹¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7831-7832, l. 191-194, 246-252.

⁹¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7832, 7834, l. 255-257, 297-298.

⁹¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7831-7833, l. 196, 261-267.

⁹¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7831-7832, l. 196-232, 237-244.

⁹¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7831-7832, l. 196-232.

⁹¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7832, l. 231-235.

⁹²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7833, l. 268-282.

⁹²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7833, l. 284-293.

⁹²² CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7834, l. 298-307.

⁹²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7834, l. 310-313.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

ANTI-BALAKA ORGANISATION

Anti-Balaka Involvement in International Peace Talks

BRAZZAVILLE talks

218. [REDACTED]⁹²⁴ It was an attempt to cease hostilities under the aegis of Denis SASSOU NGUESSO (“SASSOU NGUESSO”), mediator in the CAR crisis at the time.⁹²⁵ The attendees included NGAISSONA, WENEZOU, YEKATOM, Maxime MOKOM, ZILABO, Vivien BEINA, Mamadou GBIEBGA, 12 PUISSANCES, NDOMATE, P-0889, KONATE, and HOURONTI.⁹²⁶

219. In respect of CAR-OTP-2030-0267 (Annex 18) titled “*Anti-Balaka, liste des participants au forum de BRAZZAVILLE du 21 au 23...*”.⁹²⁷ P-0889 confirmed the presence of all of the persons mentioned.⁹²⁸

220. After the signing of the BRAZZAVILLE Agreement, the organisers and SASSOU NGUESSO gave the sum of 23 million CFA to MOKOM, who did not disclose how much he had received to the others.⁹²⁹ NGAISSONA returned to the CAR with SAMBA-PANZA on the same flight, because she had things to discuss with him.⁹³⁰ In the meantime, MOKOM distributed 50,000 CFA to each of the 22 members of the delegation.⁹³¹ Once they had arrived back in BANGUI, MOKOM told everyone that he had received something like 8 or 10 million CFA.⁹³² NGAISSONA asked that the money be shared between the ComZones, who could then buy medicine for their elements – so that they would stop coming to him for money.⁹³³ Everyone later realised that MOKOM had received a lot more than just 8 or 10 million, but no one reacted because MOKOM was a big boss.⁹³⁴

ANGOLA talks

221. There were talks in ANGOLA, with DOS SANTOS who was helping to bring the crisis in the CAR to an end by providing examples of what had happened in ANGOLA, and who was providing financial support to SAMBA-PANZA.⁹³⁵

22 [REDACTED] The aim was to bring together the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka to explain how peace was achieved

⁹²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7923, l. 118-119.

⁹²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7923, l. 120-122.

⁹²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7923-7924, l. 133-154.

⁹²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7924, l. 157-164.

⁹²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7924, l. 165-181.

⁹²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7944, l. 854-887.

⁹³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7944, l. 871-874.

⁹³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7944, l. 875-886.

⁹³² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7944-7945, l. 886-888.

⁹³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7945, l. 888-894.

⁹³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7945, l. 894-898.

⁹³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7923, l. 122-134.

⁹³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7928-7929, l. 316-337.

⁹³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7925, l. 192-203.

⁹³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7925, l. 201-214.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

in ANGOLA, to bring awareness to their own fighters.⁹³⁹ It was the President of ANGOLA's idea.⁹⁴⁰

223. The Anti-Balaka were again not happy that [REDACTED] because they thought that he was receiving money for these trips.⁹⁴¹ They thought that everyone received large sums of money at these talks, and NGAISSONA explained to them that it was not the case; as only their travel, meals, and accommodation were paid for.⁹⁴²

224. After BRAZZAVILLE and ANGOLA, there were peace talks in SANT'EGIDIO, ROME in 2017.⁹⁴³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁹⁴⁴ There again objective was to bring all of the groups together to sign a peace agreement.⁹⁴⁵ At that time, attacks were still ongoing in the provinces between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka. The idea was to put an end to this, but also to make a case for the Anti-Balaka to be given a position of responsibility within the government.⁹⁴⁶ Representatives of the government, civil society, and religious communities, were present and signed an agreement.⁹⁴⁷

225

226

⁹³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7925-7926, l. 215-224.

⁹⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7926, l. 226-227.

⁹⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7945, l. 900-920.

⁹⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7945, 7947, l. 911-931, 989-991, 993-1000, 1005.

⁹⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7926, l. 228-235.

⁹⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7926, 7927, l. 246-253, 263-265.

⁹⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7927, l. 265-270.

⁹⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7927, l. 269-275.

⁹⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7927, l. 275-276.

⁹⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7945-7948, l. 924-959, 1006-1020.

⁹⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7946, l. 959-973.

⁹⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7946-7947, l. 973-988.

⁹⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948, l. 1020-1021.

⁹⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948, l. 1021-1024.

⁹⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948, l. 1031-1033.

⁹⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948, l. 1035-1039, 1044-1045.

⁹⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948-7949, l. 1039-1042, 1061-1064.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

NGAISSONA.⁹⁵⁶ P-0889 was waiting for and expecting NGAISSONA to react – but he did not.⁹⁵⁷

NAIROBI talks

227. P-0889 explained that NGAISSONA was preparing to sign an agreement in NAIROBI, with both BOZIZE and DJOTODIA, thinking that the agreement would be under the auspices of the international community.⁹⁵⁸ But NGAISSONA was told that the international community was not aware of any of this.⁹⁵⁹ The French Ambassador advised NGAISSONA not to go.⁹⁶⁰ In turn, NGAISSONA advised MOKOM not to go, but MOKOM did not listen.⁹⁶¹ At that point, NGAISSONA realised what MOKOM was up to behind his back, and he therefore started to distance himself from MOKOM.⁹⁶² MOKOM drafted a list of Anti-Balaka elements who were to accompany him, including KOKATE, BEOROFEI, and AZOUNOU, and they went to NAIROBI to see BOZIZE and DJOTODIA and signed the agreement.⁹⁶³ To this day, no one in BANGUI actually knows what was in this agreement.⁹⁶⁴ P-0889 explained that this caused rumours in BANGUI, at one point, that MOKOM's Anti-Balaka and the Seleka were coming together to share the power.⁹⁶⁵ P-0889 explains that upon their return to BANGUI, MOKOM got in contact with Abdoulaye HISSENE from the Seleka, and they started working together.⁹⁶⁶

Implementation of the Peace Talks:

228. According to P-0889 the decisions taken at these talks were implemented. Whenever there were talks with the international community, a meeting was then convened to explain what decisions had been made and what had to be done.⁹⁶⁷ The standards and principles had to be respected, but P-0889 does not think that this was the case for all of the Anti-Balaka leaders, because there was no follow-up or monitoring.⁹⁶⁸ Some of the things that were still going on in certain areas would not have been happening if the agreements had been respected.⁹⁶⁹ Although the leaders came to the meetings, they did not disseminate the information within their own groups.⁹⁷⁰

Limited Sanctions within the Anti-Balaka

229. P-0889 was surprised to see that one of the *communiqués* that he was shown during the interview mentioned sanctions and an internal regulation, as he never saw any sanctions.⁹⁷¹

⁹⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948, l. 1047-1048.

⁹⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7948-7949, 7956-7957, l. 1049-1051, 1053-1056, 1318-1334.

⁹⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7760, l. 690-708.

⁹⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7760, l. 700-707.

⁹⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7760, l. 702-703.

⁹⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7760-7761, l. 707-709.

⁹⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761, l. 711-718.

⁹⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761, l. 709-721.

⁹⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761, l. 721-722.

⁹⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761, l. 722-726.

⁹⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7740, at 7761, l. 726-728.

⁹⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7927-7928, l. 290-298.

⁹⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7928, l. 298-299.

⁹⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7928, l. 299-301.

⁹⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7928, l. 303-315.

⁹⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7902-7903, l. 1071-1080, 1088-1090.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

P-0889 confirms that he witnessed 12 PUISSANCES hitting one of his elements who had stolen something. But this was not something that all of them did.⁹⁷²

230. There was no response or sanction if the orders or decisions that were made during the Anti-Balaka meetings were not respected on the ground.⁹⁷³ They were strong, and had the means to defend themselves.⁹⁷⁴ He recalls that on one occasion they reacted and took a stand, and ended up firing shots in NGAISSONA's father's house.⁹⁷⁵ P-0889 explains that there was also an element of fear in all of this, because if you impose authority and people do not like it, they are going to rise against you.⁹⁷⁶

Leaders's lack of knowledge of their elements crimes/ ability to punish

231. P-0889 provided an example of some of 12 PUISSANCES' elements having stolen [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]⁹⁷⁸ A group of four of his elements went to this young man's house during the night, beat him, and took him away. They also took all of his money, his TV, a ventilator, and a few other things.⁹⁷⁹ Although the elements had said that 12 PUISSANCES sent them, they had acted without him knowing.⁹⁸⁰ The victim identified the elements present,⁹⁸¹ and 12 PUISSANCES then ordered they returned the victim's belongings and money (minus the 60,000 CFA that they had already spent, that they were to reimburse).⁹⁸² 12 PUISSANCES started to hit the responsible element in punishment.⁹⁸³

ANTI-BALAKA VIEWS OF SAMBA-PANZA'S TRANSITION GOVERNMENT

Barricades Erected in Bangui in Opposition to SAMBA-PANZA

232. According to P-0889, the coordination did not meet to discuss SAMBA-PANZA's leadership.⁹⁸⁴ In 2015, SAMBA-PANZA reportedly had received a large sum of money from the Angolans, who also gave her directives on what to do with the money.⁹⁸⁵ When she returned to BANGUI, the *Conseil National de Transition* ("CNT") started asking questions about the money.⁹⁸⁶ SAMBA-PANZA tried to explain what she had done with the money, and claimed that she had given some of it to the Anti-Balaka.⁹⁸⁷ This was relayed on the radio, so when the Anti-Balaka heard that SAMBA-PANZA had allegedly given money to the movement, they went to see NGAISSONA – arms in hand – to ask what he had done with it and why he was keeping it all for himself.⁹⁸⁸ NGAISSONA explained that he did not receive anything from SAMBA-PANZA, and published a press

⁹⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7903, l. 1091-1113.

⁹⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7902, 7904, l. 1064-1067, 1125-1133.

⁹⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1135-1139.

⁹⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1139-1144.

⁹⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7904, l. 1143-1146.

⁹⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7694-7696, 7699, l. 380-465, 559-578.

⁹⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7694-7695, l. 390-394.

⁹⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7695, l. 394-403.

⁹⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7695, l. 414-421.

⁹⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7695, l. 427-431.

⁹⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7695-7696, l. 431-464.

⁹⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7684, at 7696, l. 450-455.

⁹⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7906-7907, l. 1215-

⁹⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7929, 7931-7933, l. 354-366, 421-479.

⁹⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7929-7930, l. 366-369.

⁹⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7930, l. 371-375.


⁹⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7930, l. 375-389, CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005-8006, l. 114-125.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

release stating this.⁹⁸⁹ The Anti-Balaka ended up believing him – and realising that SAMBA-PANZA had lied – and decided to completely barricade the streets for an entire day in opposition to SAMBA-PANZA.⁹⁹⁰ They then decided themselves to free the streets and take down the barricades.⁹⁹¹ No one would have dared say anything – they easily could have been killed.⁹⁹²

233. P-0889 says that there are rumours that SAMBA-PANZA and DJOTODIA will be testifying against NGAISSONA.⁹⁹³ DJOTODIA was pushed out, and he saw that NGAISSONA became coordinator – so he thought that NGAISSONA was the one who had pushed him out.⁹⁹⁴ But in reality, it was MOKOM.⁹⁹⁵

234. According to P-0889, NGAISSONA was not aware of all of this reality because he had too much trust in himself and thought too much of himself.⁹⁹⁶ MOKOM, however, controlled and managed the situation – P-0889 refers back to the ammunition that he had sent as an example.⁹⁹⁷ [REDACTED]



Anti-Balaka's reaction to NGAISSONA'S Arrest

235. [REDACTED] P-0889 heard that NGAISSONA had been arrested with a few Anti-Balaka elements who were beside him at the French military camp M'POKO.¹⁰⁰⁷ He thought they were let go two days later.¹⁰⁰⁸

⁹⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7930, l. 389-396.

⁹⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7930-7931, l. 397-419.

⁹⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7933, l. 480-498.

⁹⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7933-7934, l. 499-527.

⁹⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 105-108.

⁹⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 108-113.

⁹⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 113-114.

⁹⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 141-144.

⁹⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 144-145.

⁹⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 145-147.

⁹⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 147-149.

¹⁰⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 150-152.

¹⁰⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 152-153.

¹⁰⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 153-157.

¹⁰⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 157-160.

¹⁰⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 160.

¹⁰⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 160-164.

¹⁰⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8006, l. 164.

¹⁰⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 933-942.

¹⁰⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 942-943.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

236. Later, when P-0889 was in BANGUI, there was rumour that NGAISSONA had been arrested. Apparently he had gone to see SAMBA-PANZA or the French Ambassador.¹⁰⁰⁹ P-0889 does not really know what happened, but NGAISSONA went home at around midnight.¹⁰¹⁰ P-0889 explains that people, especially in the neighbourhood of BOY-RABE were scared, because they thought that the Anti-Balaka were going to react and take up arms.¹⁰¹¹ They were mostly afraid of MAZIMBELET because when something happened, he would take advantage of the situation to really do some harm.¹⁰¹² So people were getting ready to flee.¹⁰¹³ The population was so frightened of MAZIMBELET who had stolen motorbikes and vehicles on that day, but P-0889 did not see anything else happen.¹⁰¹⁴ P-0889 learned about NGAISSONA's release the day after when people were saying that he was back home.¹⁰¹⁵ P-0889 did not ask NGAISSONA personally.¹⁰¹⁶

237. When NGAISSONA returned home, things became calm again.¹⁰¹⁷ P-0889 does not remember if there was a meeting after his release, but he did not take part in one.¹⁰¹⁸ The coordination continued to function. NGAISSONA and the Anti-Balaka were there, and NGAISSONA continued to push for the disarmament and total peace and the free movement.¹⁰¹⁹

Anti-Balaka's Press Releases

238. [REDACTED] ¹⁰²⁰

[REDACTED]

¹⁰²⁵

239. [REDACTED]

¹⁰⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 945-947.

¹⁰¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 947-950.

¹⁰¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988-7989, l. 951-953, 958-975.

¹⁰¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 953-957.

¹⁰¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7988, l. 957-958.

¹⁰¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7989, l. 975-982.

¹⁰¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7989, l. 984-992.

¹⁰¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7989, l. 994-995.

¹⁰¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7989-7990, l. 996-1024.

¹⁰¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7990-7991, l. 1026-1050.

¹⁰¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7991, l. 1051-1061.

¹⁰²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7821, l. 1430-1438.

¹⁰²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7796, l. 537-559.

¹⁰²² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7794, 7823, l. 470-484, 1514-1520.

¹⁰²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7795, 7821, l. 500-522, 1438-1440, CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7826, l. 16-30.

¹⁰²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7821, l. 1440-1441.

¹⁰²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7796, l. 560-565.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

240. [REDACTED] he would go home and do whatever he had to do. [REDACTED]

Anti-Balaka BADGES

241. P-0889 heard that MOKOM wanted to create badges for the Anti-Balaka, as a way of identifying the real Anti-Balaka and distinguishing them from the fake Anti-Balaka who were bandits¹⁰²⁹ Each *real* Anti-Balaka element would have a badge so that they could be easily recognised.¹⁰³⁰ MOKOM told all the leaders to mobilise their elements so that this could be put in place.¹⁰³¹ Because he thought that [REDACTED]

242. P-0889 also clarifies that when during his first interview he said [REDACTED]

¹⁰²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7796-7800, l. 567-703.

¹⁰²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7828-7829, l. 84-114.

¹⁰²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7829, l. 114-124.

¹⁰²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7675-7676, l. 849-860, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7794, l. 484-489.

¹⁰³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7676, l. 859-860.

¹⁰³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7675-7676, l. 854-857.

¹⁰³² CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7676, l. 860-862, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7801, l. 719-723.

¹⁰³³ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7676, l. 863-864, 878-886.

¹⁰³⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7653, at 7676, l. 865-875, 890-895, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7794-7795, 7801-7802, l. 489-499, 725-735, 744-755.

¹⁰³⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7820-7821, l. 1421-1429.

¹⁰³⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7802, l. 757-759.

¹⁰³⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7802, l. 759-760.

¹⁰³⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7802, l. 762-765.

¹⁰³⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7802, l. 765-769.

¹⁰⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7802-7803, l. 770-794.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

243. P-0889 further explains that AZOUNOU and a man named BAUDOUIN (likely 'BEJOUANE') were already making badges for money [REDACTED].¹⁰⁴³ Everyone had these badges, even people who were not Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁴⁴ This is what gave MOKOM the idea to make badges,¹⁰⁴⁵ AZOUNOU himself signed them.¹⁰⁴⁶

P-0889'S COMMENTS ON DOCUMENTS [REDACTED]

244. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁰⁴⁷

ANNEX 1 – BADGE – CAR-OTP-2124-1209 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0231)

245. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0231 (the back of the badge), (Annex 1),¹⁰⁴⁸ P-0889 confirmed that it is [REDACTED].¹⁰⁴⁹ He confirmed that this was the type of badge distributed by the Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁵⁰

ANNEX 2 – BADGE – CAR-OTP-2124-1210 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0230)

246. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0230 (the front of the badge) (Annex 2),¹⁰⁵¹ P-0889 confirmed that [REDACTED].¹⁰⁵² He explained that the black part on the badge is the code system inserted to prevent people from copying it and making fake badges. It was inserted at the bottom – if it was not there, it meant that it was a fake.¹⁰⁵³ P-0889 confirms that this sort of badge was distributed to the Anti-Balaka, but explains that not all real Anti-Balaka elements had it.¹⁰⁵⁴ However, if one had one of these badges, then he was a real Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁵⁵

247. P-0889 described the badge information as follows: first there is the surname; then the first name; the function; nationality; city or village; (military) company, then comes the ID number.¹⁰⁵⁶ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁰⁵⁷

¹⁰⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7803, l. 796-807.

¹⁰⁴² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7803, l. 807-809.

¹⁰⁴³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7830-7831, l. 172-177, 180-184.

¹⁰⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7830, l. 177-179.

¹⁰⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7830-7831, l. 179-183.

¹⁰⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7831, l. 188-189.

¹⁰⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7812, l. 1128-1143.

¹⁰⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7803-8705, l. 815-816, 828-863.

¹⁰⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7803, l. 818-819.

¹⁰⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7803-7804, l. 820-827.

¹⁰⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7805, l. 864-868.

¹⁰⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7805, l. 870.

¹⁰⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7805, l. 873-883.

¹⁰⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7805-7806, l. 884-393.

¹⁰⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7806, l. 900-907.

¹⁰⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7814-7815, l. 1206-1217, 1222-1232.

¹⁰⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7815, l. 1233-1234, 1247.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

[REDACTED] went to AZOUNOU to get a badge.¹⁰⁵⁸ AZOUNOU used his camera to take a picture [REDACTED]. He took note of his surname, first name, zone from which he is from, his role as an Anti-Balaka (is he a leader or not). If he is just an element, it would be noted beside his name.¹⁰⁵⁹ AZOUNOU took note of all of this [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁰⁶²

248. P-0889 confirmed that the badges had serial numbers that were identity numbers.¹⁰⁶³ He says that [REDACTED].¹⁰⁶⁴ P-0889 does not know what the “NG” or “UK” following the numbers on the bottom of the badges mean.¹⁰⁶⁵ [REDACTED]

249. P-0889 claimed that he did not know even approximately how many badges had been distributed to the Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁶⁸ MOKOM’s idea was that the badges had to be distributed through the leaders. Every Anti-Balaka leader had to group all of his elements and MOKOM would send his team, namely AZOUNOU and WILFRID.¹⁰⁶⁹ WILFRID would take photos of the elements and walk around in the base.¹⁰⁷⁰ Those who had money could get it done, others had to wait until they found the money.¹⁰⁷¹ Once WILFRID was done with inserting the names and the photos of those who had already paid, he would print them and hand them back to MOKOM, who noted the numbers so he could know exactly how many real Anti-Balaka there were.¹⁰⁷² The badges would then be distributed to the elements who had paid.¹⁰⁷³ Those who had not paid were not allowed to receive theirs.¹⁰⁷⁴ The leaders did not pay for their elements; each element had to figure out how to get the money to buy their badge for themselves.¹⁰⁷⁵

250. According to P-0889, a lot of the elements were in the Anti-Balaka because they eventually wanted to join the army.¹⁰⁷⁶ They were told that if they did not get a badge, they would not be allowed to take part in the disarmament. They would be considered as fake

¹⁰⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7816, l. 1259-1263.

¹⁰⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7816, l. 1265-1270.

¹⁰⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7816, l. 1268-1277.

¹⁰⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7816-7817, l. 1283-1290.

¹⁰⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7817, l. 1288-1301.

¹⁰⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7817, l. 1304-1309.

¹⁰⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7817, l. 1315-1316.

¹⁰⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7817-7818, l. 1317-1319, 1322-1328, 1348-1351.

¹⁰⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7818-7819, l. 1352-1360.

¹⁰⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7819, l. 1362-1375.

¹⁰⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7807, l. 951-969.

¹⁰⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7808, l. 971-999.

¹⁰⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7808-7809, l. 994-1005, 1015-1027.

¹⁰⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7809, l. 1010-1013.

¹⁰⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7809, l. 1029-1036.

¹⁰⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7809-7810, l. 1038-1039, 1042-1047.

¹⁰⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7809, l. 1039.

¹⁰⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7810, l. 1048-1052.

¹⁰⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7810, l. 1052-1054, 1056-1057.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁷⁷ Everyone wanted to pay and get their badge. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁰⁷⁸

251. NGAISSONA was the one who signed the badges as the Anti-Balaka General Coordinator, around January, February, March and April, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁰⁸⁰

252. P-0889 says that the badges did not even get to the provinces, as not everyone in BANGUI had even received one.¹⁰⁸¹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] P-0889 stated that the leaders who had come from the provinces had had a look at the badges samples and reached out to AZOUNOU.¹⁰⁸³

[REDACTED] Anti-Balaka leaders from the provinces had come to see him and wanted him to make badges.¹⁰⁸⁴ AZOUNOU took their photos [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AZOUNOU was going to print them and give them to the leaders who were going to go back home. P-0889 says that there were leaders from BAMBARI or GRIMARI. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁰⁸⁵

253. P-0889 further explains that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁰⁸⁶
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁰⁹⁰

ANNEX 3 – CAR-OTP-2124-1211 (copy of CAR-OTP-2001-3372)

254. In reference to CAR-OTP-2001-3372, titled “*Communiqué Conjoint*”,¹⁰⁹¹ P-0889 confirmed that NGAISSONA signed this document.¹⁰⁹² He recounts that Leopold BARA (“BARA”) and others, including KAMEZOLAI had already put in place a coordination

¹⁰⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7810, l. 1054-1056.

¹⁰⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7810, l. 1056-1062.

¹⁰⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7810-7811, l. 1071-1084

¹⁰⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7811, l. 1086-1092.

¹⁰⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7811, l. 1093-1099.

¹⁰⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7811, l. 1100-1109.

¹⁰⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7811, l. 1110-1112.

¹⁰⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7811, l. 1115-1117.

¹⁰⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7812, l. 1115-1127.

¹⁰⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7806-7807, l. 928-939.

¹⁰⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7807, l. 934.

¹⁰⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7807, l. 939-944, 946-950.

¹⁰⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7814, l. 1189-1205.

¹⁰⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7807, l. 944-945.

¹⁰⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7834, l. 314-328.

¹⁰⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7834, l. 330.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

before MOKOM's return, and they were also very unhappy that MOKOM was coming back and that the Anti-Balaka listened to him.¹⁰⁹³

255. P-0889 explained that MOKOM was revolted by the content of this press release, because he realised that there was no place (for him), and this pushed him to want to return to BANGUI – to try to take charge of the situation.¹⁰⁹⁴ MOKOM was surprised to see KAMEZOLAI, NGAISSONA, and BARA, and wondered where they had come from; while he was still leading from where he was.¹⁰⁹⁵ He decided to return to BANGUI to clear things up.¹⁰⁹⁶ KAMEZOLAI was a captain in the army, alongside YEKATOM.¹⁰⁹⁷ But it did not work out with YEKATOM either, so MOKOM pushed him out and changed the organigram.¹⁰⁹⁸ KOKATE was also pushed out, and then they started hearing that he had his own Anti-Balaka.¹⁰⁹⁹ No one really knew what KOKATE's and BARA's positions were.¹¹⁰⁰ P-0889 did not know who Caroline DEBOULET was.¹¹⁰¹

256. P-0889 does not know whether 12 PUISSANCES and ANDJILO who were in contact with MOKOM commented on this press release.¹¹⁰²

ANNEX 4 – CAR-OTP-2124-1212 (copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0250)

257. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0250, P-0889 confirmed that the document - about the Geneva Convention of 1977 - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹¹⁰⁴ Although NGAISSONA's name appears as General Coordinator, P-0889 insists NGAISSONA did not write these declarations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹¹⁰⁶

ANNEX 5 – CAR-OTP-2124-1213 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2006-1215)

258. In reference to CAR-OTP-2006-1215, an Anti-Balaka press release dated 4 Avril 2014,¹¹⁰⁷ P-0889 recognised the document and confirmed that NGAISSONA had signed it.¹¹⁰⁸ [REDACTED]¹¹⁰⁹

ANNEX 6 – CAR-OTP-2124-1214 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2059-0024)

259. In reference to CAR-OTP-2059-0024, titled "*Anti-Balaka, Organigramme du bureau de la coordination*"¹¹¹⁰ P-0889 remembers the document, [REDACTED]

¹⁰⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7835, l. 355-366.

¹⁰⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7836-7837, l. 390-391, 401-409.

¹⁰⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 416-419.

¹⁰⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 413, 421, 434-438.

¹⁰⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 421-422.

¹⁰⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 422-425.

¹⁰⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 425-427.

¹¹⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 427-429.

¹¹⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 429-430.

¹¹⁰² CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7837, l. 431-434.

¹¹⁰³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7838, l. 440-448.

¹¹⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7838-7839, l. 445-453, 482-506.

¹¹⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7838-7839, l. 454-459, 496-497.

¹¹⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7838, l. 459-461, 464-473.

¹¹⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7842, l. 597-609.

¹¹⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7842-7843, l. 611-619.

¹¹⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7843, l. 623-628.

¹¹¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7843, l. 630-634.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

██████████¹¹¹¹ MOKOM wrote the document, because he presented it in front of NGAISSONA who asked him to show it to the other leaders.¹¹¹² The first organigram he presented ██████████.¹¹¹³ Then, when the others arrived, NGAISSONA said that he was going to change it to make space for YEKATOM's team.¹¹¹⁴ That's when ██████████¹¹¹⁵ P-0889 does not remember when exactly this was made, but it was not straight after their arrival, it was later on.¹¹¹⁶

260. MOKOM is named National Operations Coordinator in the document.¹¹¹⁷ He could already be considered as such because he had managed the operations from the provinces to BANGUI.¹¹¹⁸ MOKOM already had the role, and if NGAISSONA had not returned to lead the ANTI-BALKA, BANOUKEPA would have been Coordinator.¹¹¹⁹ Once NGAISSONA was Coordinator, MOKOM remained Operations Coordinator – he wrote it himself.¹¹²⁰

ANNEX 7 – CAR-OTP-2124-1216 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0280)

261. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0280 (Annex 7) another organigram in which Lin BANOUKEPA is “*Coordonateur Politique*”, NGAISSONA is the “*Coordonateur général politique adjoint*”, and Maxime MOKOM is the “*Coordonateur général des Anti-Balaka*,”¹¹²¹ P-0889 stated he did not know the document, but he is sure that MOKOM wrote it because Lin BANOUKEPA is mentioned.¹¹²² P-0889 believed that AZOUNOU typed the document with MOKOM.¹¹²³ P-0889 explained that, even if it was worthless, MOKOM made the organigram because he wanted to show NGAISSONA that he had an important role in the operations.¹¹²⁴ This is because the other organigram - *Communiqué Conjoint* - that P-0889 was shown from before MOKOM returned to BANGUI did not mention MOKOM.¹¹²⁵

262. P-0889 believed that Annex 7 is the organigram ██████████ titled “*Organigramme du mouvement Anti-Balaka*”, that MOKOM presented to Anti-Balaka leaders in January 2014, but was rejected in favour of designating NGAISSONA.¹¹²⁶ P-0889 first said that he thought it could not be from 2014 and must have been from before the 5 December 2013 attack, but he does not remember and cannot give a date.¹¹²⁷

¹¹¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7843, l. 642-650.

¹¹¹² CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7843-7844, l. 640, 651-655.

¹¹¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7844, l. 659-664.

¹¹¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7844, l. 664-667.

¹¹¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7844, l. 667-668, CAR-OTP-2122-7781, at 7794, l. 459-466.

¹¹¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7844, l. 671-684.

¹¹¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7844-7845, l. 685-688.

¹¹¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7845, l. 689-694, 700-702.

¹¹¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7845, l. 697-700.

¹¹²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7845, l. 703-708.

¹¹²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7851, l. 942-948.

¹¹²² CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7852, 7855, l. 955-965, 1062-1064.

¹¹²³ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7852, l. 967-974.

¹¹²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7852-7853, l. 976-1011.

¹¹²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7853, l. 1011-1015.

¹¹²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7855-7856, l. 1066-1087.

¹¹²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7825, at 7854, 7856-7857, 7860, l. 1021-1030, 1105-1125, 1220-1233.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

the objective of this press release, created after the BRAZZAVILLE talks, was to clarify the situation as they did not know who exactly was real and who was fake Anti-Balaka.¹¹⁴⁷

ANNEX 11 – CAR-OTP-2124-1223 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2062-0077)

268. In reference to CAR-OTP-2062-0077 (Annex 11), titled “*Communiqué de la coordination nationale des opérations*”,¹¹⁴⁸ P-0889 stated that this is one of MOKOM’s documents, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹¹⁵⁰ MOKOM signed the document on 29 December 2014.¹¹⁵¹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹¹⁵²

ANNEX 12 – CAR-OTP-2124-1224 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2025-0407)

269. In reference to CAR-OTP-2025-0407 (Annex 12), titled “*Anti-Balaka Communiqué de presse numéro 9*”,¹¹⁵³ P-0889 stated that this is NGAISSONA’s document, but that he did not sign it.¹¹⁵⁴ [REDACTED]¹¹⁵⁵ which was intended to call upon the Anti-Balaka to cease hostilities, and respect the agreements signed in the peacebuilding process.¹¹⁵⁶ But, in the field, this sort of press release was not followed.¹¹⁵⁷ Some Anti-Balaka continued to steal and commit acts of violence on people – against Muslims, and even against Christians.¹¹⁵⁸

ANNEX 13 - CAR-OTP-2124-1225 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2002-0716)

270. In reference to CAR-OTP-2002-0716 (Annex 13), titled “*Communiqué de presse des Anti-Balaka*” published on 28 June 2014,¹¹⁵⁹ P-0889 confirmed that it is about WENEZOUÏ.¹¹⁶⁰ He remembers that WENEZOUÏ wanted to become an Anti-Balaka representative and to be named minister, so he created his own groups who became a source of threats.¹¹⁶¹

ANNEX 14 – CAR-OTP-2124-1228 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0247)

271. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0247 (Annex 14), titled “*Communiqué de presse numéro 25*”,¹¹⁶² P-0889 stated that it was to raise awareness among the Anti-Balaka, because a system to steal NGO and government vehicles had been put in place. MAZIMBELET is an example of this. But, civilians were also doing this. This press release

¹¹⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7874, l. 40-59.

¹¹⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7874, l. 60-62.

¹¹⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7874-7875, l. 63-76.

¹¹⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7875, l. 78-79.

¹¹⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7875, l. 83-88.

¹¹⁵² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7875, l. 90-93.

¹¹⁵³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7875, l. 106-110.

¹¹⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7876, l. 112.

¹¹⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7876, l. 113-121.

¹¹⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7876, l. 122-134.

¹¹⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7876, l. 136-140.

¹¹⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7877, l. 145-150.

¹¹⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7877, l. 163-172.

¹¹⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7879, l. 230.

¹¹⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7878-7879, l. 217-227.

¹¹⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7879-7880, l. 238-251, 287.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

addresses this issue, and tells them not to touch or take NGO personnel vehicles.¹¹⁶³ P-0889 does not know who typed up this document.¹¹⁶⁴

ANNEX 15 – CAR-OTP-2124-1229 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0246)

272. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0246 (Annex 15), titled “*Communiqué de presse numéro 26*”,¹¹⁶⁵ P-0889 did not know who typed this document, but noted that it called upon the Anti-Balaka to respect the BRAZZAVILLE Agreement and to not resort to violence.¹¹⁶⁶

ANNEX 16 – CAR-OTP-2124-1230 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2030-0245)

273. In reference to CAR-OTP-2030-0245 (Annex 16), titled “*Communiqué de presse numéro 27*”,¹¹⁶⁷ P-0889 stated that he did not know if internal regulations existed within the movement. It is still aimed at those who were stealing cars and preventing free movement, but he did not know anything about internal regulations or sanctions.¹¹⁶⁸ However, he confirmed that this could have been circulated among the Anti-Balaka.¹¹⁶⁹

AUDIO RECORDING provided by P-0889

274. In reference to CAR-OTP-2127-0708, file number *PTT-20190824-WA0006-OPUS*, an audio recording of a communication, and message reference 31918, CAR-OTP-2127-1332, of 5 minutes 17 seconds, P-0889 recalled them.¹¹⁷⁰ According to P-0889, NGAISSONA is being blamed for something that someone else had done, something he was not aware of.¹¹⁷¹ He arrived and was the Anti-Balaka Coordinator, but forgot that MOKOM had led the Anti-Balaka from the beginning from ZONGO until their arrival in BANGUI.¹¹⁷² Although it is unclear how he knows, P-0889 maintains that NGAISSONA did not know that MOKOM bought ammunition and [REDACTED] to bring to the Anti-Balaka; he fell into it.¹¹⁷³ NGAISSONA was also not aware that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹¹⁷⁴

EMAILS CONTACTS OF THE ANTI-BALAKA COORDINATION

275. P-0889 claimed that he never heard anything about an Anti-Balaka coordination e-mail address or Facebook account.¹¹⁷⁵

276. In respect of his own email addresses, P-0889 confirmed as his: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]¹¹⁷⁶

¹¹⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7880, l. 287-294.

¹¹⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7880-7881, l. 295-305.

¹¹⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7881, l. 318-320.

¹¹⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7881, l. 321-328.

¹¹⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7882, l. 339-340.

¹¹⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7882, l. 342-353.

¹¹⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7872, at 7882, l. 361-365.

¹¹⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7999-8000, l. 262-287, CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8003, l. 20-27.

¹¹⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005-8006, l. 78-164.

¹¹⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 88-97.

¹¹⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 97-101.

¹¹⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8002, at 8005, l. 101-104.

¹¹⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7949, l. 1067-1077.

¹¹⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7950, l. 1090-1102.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

277. In respect of the e-mail address at the bottom of annexes 6 and 9 (cantibalaka@yahoo.fr), P-0889 assumed that it was NGAYA's.¹¹⁷⁷

278. [REDACTED] 1186

279. [REDACTED] 1188

280. P-0889 did not have the time to talk to NGAISSONA about his problems with the Anti-Balaka because NGAISSONA was always surrounded by other people.¹¹⁸⁹ P-0889 maintains that in three years he did not have time and he lost the opportunity to do so because NGAISSONA was arrested.¹¹⁹⁰

281. [REDACTED] 1191
[REDACTED] why NGAISSONA did not protect him, he said that he was nobody – SAMBA-PANZA or TOUADERA were not going to send soldiers to protect him, like SAMBA-PANZA had done for NGAISSONA when the Anti-Balaka had come arms in hand to his house.¹¹⁹² P-0889 did not call or send an e-mail to NGAISSONA after this because he was shocked and felt abandoned.¹¹⁹³

¹¹⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7951-7952, l. 1132-1159.

¹¹⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7964, l. 52-66.

¹¹⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7964, l. 66-68-

¹¹⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7964, l. 68-75.

¹¹⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7964, l. 77-80.

¹¹⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7964-7965, l. 80-88.

¹¹⁸³ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7965, l. 89-90.

¹¹⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7965, l. 92-95.

¹¹⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7965, l. 96-99.

¹¹⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7962, at 7965, l. 100-109.

¹¹⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7952-7953, l. 1166-1175, 1105-1291.

¹¹⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7952-7953, 7957, l. 1175-1194, 1336-1366.

¹¹⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7953-7954, l. 1205-1242, 1247-1257.

¹¹⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7954-7958, l. 1258-1306, 1402.

¹¹⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7958-7959, l. 1405-1418.

¹¹⁹² CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7958-7959, l. 1417-1432.

¹¹⁹³ CAR-OTP-2122-7919, at 7959-7960, l. 1433-1453.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

P-0889's Contact details

282. P-0889 confirmed two phone numbers as his: [REDACTED]¹¹⁹⁴ He has these two numbers from Orange and Telecel to facilitate communication costs.¹¹⁹⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], but at some point in at some point while in BANGUI, he did not because his internet fee was expensive.¹¹⁹⁷

283. [REDACTED]¹¹⁹⁸
[REDACTED]¹¹⁹⁹

PEOPLE P-0889 KNOWS

284. P-0889 stated that he knows the following individuals:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] but P-0889 did not know if he is in the Anti-Balaka and or his whereabouts since the crisis.¹²⁰¹
- [REDACTED]¹²⁰²
- [REDACTED]¹²⁰³ He is a military at the Presidential Guard and was a ComZone towards NDRESS.¹²⁰⁴ He often participated in Anti-Balaka Coordination meetings at NGAÏSSONA's house and the AZIMUT Hotel.¹²⁰⁵
- [REDACTED] is a military in BOY-RABE.¹²⁰⁶ They were in contact for the reduction project in 2014.¹²⁰⁷
- [REDACTED] is a military [REDACTED]¹²⁰⁸ He lives in BOY-RABE and participated in NGAÏSSONA's coordination meetings.¹²⁰⁹
- [REDACTED] is a military and MOKOM's little brother who lived in ZONGO.¹²¹⁰
- [REDACTED] is NGAÏSSONA's father. He worked with NGAÏSSONA every day and was often with him.¹²¹¹ When NGAÏSSONA went out he would always go

¹¹⁹⁴ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8065, l. 1017-1019.

¹¹⁹⁵ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8066, l. 1032-1035.

¹¹⁹⁶ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8066-8067, l. 1054-1067.

¹¹⁹⁷ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8067, l. 1092-1096.

¹¹⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8093-8094, l. 495-497, 504-505.

¹¹⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8094, l. 509-513.

¹²⁰⁰ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8068-8069, l. 1107-1110, 1119-1120, 1130-1136.

¹²⁰¹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8069, l. 1140-1141, 1147-1154.

¹²⁰² CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8070, l. 1169-1177, 1183-1186, 1191.

¹²⁰³ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8070-8072, l. 1194-1199, 1207, 1235.

¹²⁰⁴ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8071-8072, l. 1212-1217, 1226-1228.

¹²⁰⁵ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8072, l. 1236-1240.

¹²⁰⁶ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8073, l. 1265, 1269, 1284.

¹²⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8088, l. 294-298.

¹²⁰⁸ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8073, l. 1287-1294.

¹²⁰⁹ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8074, l. 1296-1297.

¹²¹⁰ CAR-OTP -2122-8036, at 8074, l. 1301-1309, 1313.

¹²¹¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8080, 8092, l. 44-46, 453.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

- with him.¹²¹² [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]¹²¹⁴
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]¹²¹⁸ They were also [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]¹²¹⁹ FEISSONA was
 Deputy of Yvon KONATE.¹²²⁰
 - Alfred Legrand NGAYA lived in BOY-RABE.¹²²¹ [REDACTED] e.¹²²²
 [REDACTED]¹²²³
 - P-0889 has never had contact with Hippolyte DONOSSIO, but he knows he is a
 reporter and the representative of RFI, who often published funny things on
 Facebook.¹²²⁴
 - Lieutenant [REDACTED] was a military who was already an Anti-Balaka
 [REDACTED]¹²²⁵ He was based in CITÉ JEAN 23. P-0889 does
 not where he was positioned during the 5 December 2013 attack.¹²²⁶
 - Olivier KOUDEMON is a military who fled to CAMEROON when the Seleka took
 power.¹²²⁷ He was in the military service at BOSSANGO.¹²²⁸
 - Igor LAMAKA used to work for BOZIZE in the KNK party and was brought to the
 Anti-Balaka coordination by MOKOM.¹²²⁹ However, LAMAKA became closer to
 NGAÏSSONA.¹²³⁰
 - [REDACTED] worked in NGAÏSSONA's political party and often
 came to NGAÏSSONA to talk about political issues and the Anti-Balaka.¹²³¹
 - [REDACTED] P-0889 knows a [REDACTED] but does not know if he is
 referring to the same one.¹²³² [REDACTED]

¹²¹² CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8080, l. 55.¹²¹³¹²¹³ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8092, l. 453-454.¹²¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8080, l. 67.¹²¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8082, l. 87.¹²¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8082, l. 88.¹²¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8082-8083, l. 94-97, 113.¹²¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8083, l. 133-134.¹²¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8084, l. 142-14.¹²²⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8084, l. 155-156.¹²²¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8084, l. 165.¹²²² CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8084, l. 170.¹²²³ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8085, l. 173-174.¹²²⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8094-8095, l. 528-533.¹²²⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8085, l. 191-197.¹²²⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8085-8086, l. 198-207.¹²²⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8088-8089, l. 309-314.¹²²⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8089, l. 322.¹²²⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8092, l. 424, 428-438.¹²³⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8092, l. 439-442.¹²³¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8096-8097, l. 599-606, 631.¹²³² CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8099, l. 694.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

- Hervé YOMBO is a military based in the 7th *arrondissement* with 12 PUISSANCES.¹²⁵⁹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹²⁶⁰
- Hissène ZOKOUE MAHAMAT aka MACHIN MACHIN was an Anti-Balaka.¹²⁶¹ He did not have a base and P-0889 never saw him with other elements.¹²⁶²
- Thierry LEBENE aka 12 PUISSANCES was an Anti-Balaka.¹²⁶³ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹²⁶⁶
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹²⁶⁷

285. P-0889 does know Nicaise NGUEFIO,¹²⁶⁸ Ludovic Nathan SABE,¹²⁶⁹ Blaise MAIXENT,¹²⁷⁰ Junior NGAISSONA,¹²⁷¹ Bienvenue NAMKOISSE,¹²⁷² Florent DOMATE WANDABONA.¹²⁷³

ANNEX 20 – CAR-OTP-2124-1237 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2082-0074)

286. In reference to CAR-OTP-2062-0074, titled “*Titre de reconnaissance*” (there are three pages with sequential ERNs), dated 21 August 2014, and signed by NGAISSONA,¹²⁷⁴ P-0889 stated that he had no recollection of it¹²⁷⁵ and did not know the names mentioned in the document;¹²⁷⁶ Hubert Juvénal KOMBO, Kevin KPEFIO, Christian FEINDIRA.¹²⁷⁷ He confirmed having heard about Adamou NDALE from BOUAR.¹²⁷⁸

ANNEX 21 – CAR-OTP-2124-1240 (Copy of CAR-OTP-2029-0175)

287. In reference to CAR-OTP-2029-0175, P-0889 did not know who typed it up¹²⁷⁹ and he never saw this kind of document in the Coordination.¹²⁸⁰ According to P-0889, it recognises that NAMSIO worked towards the restoration of peace.¹²⁸¹ P-0889 believed he often took

¹²⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8109, l. 1049, 1054-1059.

¹²⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8109, l. 1051-1052.

¹²⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8110, l. 1080-1083, 1088.

¹²⁶² CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8110, l. 1088-1089, 1094-1098.

¹²⁶³ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8106, l. 944-945.

¹²⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8106, l. 945-946.

¹²⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8106, l. 948-952.

¹²⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8106, l. 958-974.

¹²⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8095, l. 543-546.

¹²⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8110, l. 1104-1105.

¹²⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8108, l. 1030-1031.

¹²⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8087, l. 245.

¹²⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8082, l. 70-73; CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8094, l. 446.

¹²⁷² CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8107, l. 1004-1007.

¹²⁷³ CAR-OTP-2122-8079, at 8099, l. 687-688.

¹²⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7996-7997, l. 151-164.

¹²⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7997, l. 167-177.

¹²⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7997, l. 178-179.

¹²⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7997, l. 180-186.

¹²⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7997, l. 190-192.

¹²⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7999, l. 254-257.

¹²⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7999, l. 241-243.

¹²⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7999, l. 232-240.

Summary of P-0889 Interview Transcripts

part in the types of actions mentioned, and that he worked a lot to restore peace in the CAR – in every *arrondissement*.¹²⁸²

¹²⁸² CAR-OTP-2122-7992, at 7999, l. 244-252.