

ANNEX F

Confidential

P-2602

ANNEX B

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OTP INTERVIEW SUMMARY [REDACTED] P-2602)

ICC Statement - A/V Recording

26 October 2019 - CAR-OTP-2120-0257 - Day 1/4

27 October 2019 - CAR-OTP-2120-0258 - Day 2/4

28 October 2019 - CAR-OTP-2120-0259 - Day 3/4

29 October 2019 - CAR-OTP-2120-0260 - Day 4/4

Saturday, 26 October 2019

CAR-OTP-2118-9500 - Track 1, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 1/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9525 - Track 2, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 1/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9545 - Track 3, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 1/4

Sunday, 27 October 2019

CAR-OTP-2118-9560 - Track 1, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 2/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9579 - Track 2, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 2/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9598 - Track 3, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 2/4

Monday, 28 October 2019

CAR-OTP-2118-9617 - Track 1, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 3/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9641 - Track 2, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 3/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9664 - Track 3, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 3/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9683 - Track 4, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 3/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9705 - Track 5, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 3/4

Tuesday, 29 October 2019

CAR-OTP-2118-9714 - Track 1, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 4/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9737 - Track 2, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 4/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9764 - Track 3, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 4/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9785 - Track 4, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 4/4

CAR-OTP-2118-9807 - Track 5, Working copy of audio recorded interview Day 4/4

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I. BACKGROUND

1. The Witness P-2602 is former FACA [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED] Central African Republic (CAR), on [REDACTED]. He is of [REDACTED] and follows the [REDACTED]. He speaks Sango, French and Arabic.³
2. P-2602 attended school until he was [REDACTED] years old, stopping his studies to look after his father's cattle.⁴ P-2602 lived in [REDACTED] until joining the *Forces Armées Centrafricains* (FACA) when he was approximately [REDACTED] years old.⁵ He is the [REDACTED] brothers and sisters, and his father had [REDACTED] wives.⁶ In 2019, P-2602 was part of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

II. JOINING THE REBELLION [REDACTED]

3. P-2602 explains that around [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] P-2602

¹ CAR-OTP-2120-0267, at 0267.

² CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9561-9562, l. 28-37.

³ CAR-OTP-2120-0267, at 0267.

⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9513-9514, l. 456-464.

⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9514, l. 482-489.

⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9514, l. 471-481.

⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9563, 89-97.

⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9514, l. 488-489.

⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9515, l. 509-511.

¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9515, l. 514-520.

¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9515, l. 523.

¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9516, l. 528-529.

¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9516-9517, l. 553-565.

¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9516, 530-533.

¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9516, l. 545-549.

¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9515, l. 495-496, 509-511.

¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9519, l. 495-496.

[REDACTED]⁸ P-2602 was a FACA

[REDACTED]

III. MILITARY TRAINING AND CAREER

5. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was a member of the FACA

[REDACTED] -2602 joined

[REDACTED] GOBERE Anti-Balaka group.

¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9517, l. 575-578.

¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9570, l. 318-330.

²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 386-389.

²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9571, l. 352-359.

²² CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9571, l. 358-359.

²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9570-9571, l. 335-372.

²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9569-9570, l. 282-304; CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9811, l. 116-118.

²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9564, l. 106.

²⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9517, l. 570; CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9564, l. 110-117.

²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9564, l. 120-122.

²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9565, l. 136-147.

²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9565-9566, l. 156-176.

³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9567, l. 214-261; CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9568, l. 271-273.

³¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9567, l. 214-261; CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9568, l. 271-273.

IV. SELEKA ATTACK [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. When the crisis in CAR commenced, P-2602 and his FACA counterparts organized themselves to avoid being attacked by the Seleka, who started killing soldiers.³² P-2602's was stationed in [REDACTED] at the time. P-2602 left BANGUI [REDACTED] to fight the mercenaries going towards BANGUI,³³ as soon as militaries fighting in [REDACTED] demanded reinforcements in the area.³⁴ P-2602 explains that soldiers usually communicated the need for reinforcements via radio.³⁵ P-2602 [REDACTED]

10. P-2602 [REDACTED] when he heard that the Seleka captured and murdered a soldier in BANGUI.³⁷ After accounts of killings of soldiers by the Seleka in BANGUI,³⁸ P-2602 went back [REDACTED] from BANGUI to OUHAM through the bushes. [REDACTED] P-2602 arrived at [REDACTED] together with people that joined him along the way.³⁹ Their goal was to settle [REDACTED] to avoid the entrance of more Seleka elements [REDACTED] P-2602 also explains that the intent was to push the Seleka to BOSSANGO.⁴¹

Killing of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

11. P-2602's [REDACTED] was killed by the Seleka in [REDACTED].⁴² P-2602 explains that he was informed about his [REDACTED] killing in [REDACTED] and that it probably happened when he was deployed from BANGUI [REDACTED] P-2602 wrote to [REDACTED] chief of the Seleka in [REDACTED] telling him that he would like to visit [REDACTED] grave, but P-2602 request was denied.⁴⁵ P-2602 states that he is not aware of other killings in [REDACTED] besides his [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

³² CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9517, l. 583-586.

³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9518, l. 600-603; CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 392-398. The witness refers to the Seleka often in his interview as "mercenaries".

³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 403-406.

³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 403-406.

³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9518, l. 606-625.

³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9519, l. 649-650.

³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9519, l. 655-656.

³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9520, l. 674-687.

⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9520, l. 676-695; CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9527, l. 61-62.

⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9520-9521, l. 682-705.

⁴² CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9529-9530, l. 128-157, and at 9531, l. 181-202.

⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9531, l. 189-192.

⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9531, l. 189-192.

⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9529, l. 136-140.

⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9530, l. 173.

V. JOINING THE SELEKA TO STEAL WEAPONS

12. P-2602 joined the Seleka before going into the bush with [REDACTED] who were in the [REDACTED].⁴⁷ P-2602 was with the Seleka for [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] who became a Seleka Chief.⁴⁸ [REDACTED] was among [REDACTED].⁴⁹ P-2602 joined the Seleka as means to obtain the weapons placed in a vehicle.⁵⁰ P-2602 was able to steal the vehicle, and hid in the bushes with it.⁵¹

13. P-2602 joined the Seleka in [REDACTED] by request of [REDACTED].⁵² and on his way back from [REDACTED] the Witness stole the vehicle and hid in the bushes. P-2602 then recalls switching off his phone and meeting the other soldiers who were waiting for him.⁵³ P-2602 did not go to the base to leave the weapons, but to the [REDACTED] in BANGUI.⁵⁴ P-2602 managed to take [REDACTED] AK-47s from the car, later [REDACTED] to disguise the fact that he had stolen the weapons.⁵⁵ The vehicle that carried the AK-47s left before the witness, who took another route.⁵⁶ According to P-2602, each person in the group took its own weapon with the intent to chase away the mercenaries.⁵⁷

14. P-2602 states that [REDACTED] did not know about the plan,⁵⁸ whilst other FACAs such as [REDACTED] were involved, [REDACTED] knew about their plan.⁵⁹ [REDACTED] was arrested and detained [REDACTED] until managing to escape and re-joining the group.⁶⁰ [REDACTED] area after the crisis.⁶¹ [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also joined the Seleka, but [REDACTED] was killed when trying to escape.⁶²

15. After stealing the weapons from the Seleka, P-2602 and his FACA colleagues considered to attack the Seleka in BANGUI but decided to withdraw to OUHAM and plan an organized attack, as the Seleka were well-equipped.⁶³

⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2119-9560, at 9574, l. 483.

⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9575, l. 508-520.

⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9575, l. 485-487.

⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9575, l. 503-506.

⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9575, l. 485-487.

⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9575, l. 494-495.

⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at. 9575, l. 498-502.

⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at. 9575, l. 498-502.

⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9576, l. 530-541.

⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9576, l. 543-544.

⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9577-9578, l. 573-592.

⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9576, l. 522-527.

⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9583, l. 119-120.

⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9577, l. 563-566.

⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9582, l. 89-90.

⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9582-9583, l. 102-117.

⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9578, l. 614-616.

VI. FORMATION OF GOBERE ANTI-BALAKA GROUP (OUHAM PREFECTURE)

16. According to P-2602, the Anti-Balaka emerged after the Seleka took power in CAR, and chased BOZIZÉ away in 2013.⁶⁴ P-2602 states that everything crumbled when BOZIZÉ left. There were no remaining military chiefs-Chief of Staff or Ministry of Defence, so the CAR population as well as the military were left stranded.⁶⁵

17. P-2602 then called [REDACTED] sought to avoid the killing of military personnel by the Seleka.⁶⁶ P-2602 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁶⁸ which had P-2602, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as members.⁶⁹ According to the Witness, the plan of the group was to chase away the mercenaries.⁷⁰ This group of OUHAM went into the bush in GOBERE, approximately 43 km from BOSSANGOA,⁷¹ establishing the GOBERE Anti-Balaka. DEDANE was the one that chose GOBERE as their base, as he was born in BOWAYE and knew the area and the forest very well.⁷²

Initial gatherings in BANGUI

18. [REDACTED] like P-2602, [REDACTED] and others, would meet [REDACTED]

19. Before going to GOBERE, [REDACTED] agreed to meet in BOSSANGOA.⁷³ [REDACTED] went by vehicles because they did not have the strength to walk to GOBERE.⁷⁵ Through the way to GOBERE, they communicated by phone.⁷⁶

Trip from BANGUI to GOBERE and recruitment of auto-defence groups

20. P-2602 went from BANGUI to [REDACTED] with th [REDACTED] FACA members that were part of the [REDACTED] and approximately [REDACTED] other civilians that joined them along the way.⁷⁷ According to the Witness, people adhered to their movement voluntarily.⁷⁸ P-2602

⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 403-415.

⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9572, l. 413.

⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9573, l. 436-437.

⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9578, l. 598-601.

⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9573, l. 424-425.

⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9574, l. 458-481.

⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9560, at 9578, l. 607-609; CAR-OTP-2118-9550, at 9578, l. 607-609.

⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9522-9523, l. 739-773.

⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9591, l. 394-397.

⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9582, l. 72-82, and at 9583, l. 119-137.

⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9584, l. 159

⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9581, l. 37-66.

⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9581, l. 49.

⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9584, l. 165-172, and at 9585, l. 182-183.

⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 418.

approached former auto-defence groups in their villages, as well as other people such as hunters in the bush, to tell them to join the group in GOBERE.⁷⁹ P-2602 also asked civilians to spread the message that [REDACTED] intended to defend the country, and their base would be in GOBERE.⁸⁰ According to the witness, the civilians who joined them were carrying weapons.⁸¹ P-2602 and his group spent approximately [REDACTED] in GOBERE.⁸² P-2602 spent [REDACTED] teaching civilians how to use automatic weapons.⁸³

21. On the way from BANGUI to GOBERE, P-2602 got lost [REDACTED] days, and stayed at [REDACTED].⁸⁴ From [REDACTED] P-2602 went to [REDACTED] in that order.⁸⁵ After [REDACTED] in GOBERE, P-2602 and the group ended up going to [REDACTED] but DEDANE – who was in charge – decided it was best to return and base in GOBERE as [REDACTED] was [REDACTED].⁸⁶ P-2602 drew the route with a red pen on a map of CAR, which can be found in **Annex A** to this statement.⁸⁷

22. P-2602 kept in contact with [REDACTED] via telephone. P-2602 inquired whether they encountered barricades or mercenaries along the way, whether they had any intercurrent while traveling, and also coordinated their meeting in GOBERE.⁸⁸ The other FACA informed P-2602 of the presence of barricades and mercenaries along the way.⁸⁹ On barricades, they had to show IDs or pay a fee to pass through, and as for the Seleka, they did not have the fire power to attack them, so no incidents occurred while on their way to GOBERE.⁹⁰

Arrival in GOBERE

23. P-2602 found GOBERE on his way to [REDACTED] being [REDACTED] arrive with about [REDACTED] civilians who joined him along the way.⁹¹ They settled their base 43 km from BOSSANGO in the bush in GOBERE, per DEDANE's decision, as DEDANE was familiar with the area as he was born in BOWAYE.⁹²

24. Other group members like [REDACTED] arrived in GOBERE [REDACTED] to analyse where mercenaries

⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 415-426.

⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 424-432.

⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9581, l. 38-39.

⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9606-9607, l. 278-288.

⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9607, l. 287-291.

⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9585, l. 195.

⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9585-9586, l. 197-231.

⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9586, l. 234-235; CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9599, l. 21-36, and at 9600, l. 40-43.

⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9586 l. 236-238; CAR-OTP-2120-0261.

⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 427-438.

⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 436-438.

⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9592, l. 427-449.

⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9594, l. 499-500, 513-514.

⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9522, l. 739-743; CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9594-9595, l. 513-524.

were positioned.⁹³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁹⁴ P-2602 and the other FACA would show their military IDs around to request food, so they got their food supplies from small surrounding villages.⁹⁵

Recruitment

25. When they reached GOBERE, the group recruited people through messages – usually transmitted through letters –,⁹⁶ sent to small village chiefs around the area to inform on the will of the group to defend the country from mercenaries.⁹⁷ In the messages, they also tried to recruit “strong children” who could join the fight and serve defending the country.⁹⁸ People were sent to recruitment trips to small villages, to reportedly inform the youth on their intent to defend the country.⁹⁹ Each district had a person assigned with recruitment, and also an auto-defence group.¹⁰⁰

Organization and structure

26. The initial group in GOBERE was roughly composed by [REDACTED] nilitaries (FACA), and the [REDACTED] civilians who joined them along the way.¹⁰¹ The civilians who joined the GOBERE group were mostly local villagers, who desired to chase away the Seleka as they disrupted the lives of people in the villages.¹⁰²
27. P-2602 [REDACTED] Danboy DEDANE.¹⁰³ Danboy DEDANE was the commander in chief of the GOBERE group, and the ultimate person to ask for permission within the group’s structure.¹⁰⁴ It is unknown whether DEDANE reported to a bigger hierarchy, but P-2602 states that DEDANE was in constant communication with people over the phone.¹⁰⁵
28. [REDACTED]¹⁰⁶ He recalls having registered names, amounting to around [REDACTED] names after a month in GOBERE.¹⁰⁷ The document with the names was reportedly damaged by climatic conditions – such as rain -

⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9593-9594, l. 480-490.

⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9595-9596, l. 527-568.

⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9607, l. 312.

⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9593, l. 473-479.

⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9593, l. 468-470.

⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9593, l. 468-472.

⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9610, l. 391-400.

¹⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9610, l. 399-410.

¹⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9522, l. 745-754.

¹⁰² CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9522, l. 757-761.

¹⁰³ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9522-9523, l. 765-773.

¹⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 504-510.

¹⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 514-517.

¹⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9523, l. 774-781.

¹⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9523, l. 778-803.

in the bushes of GOBERE.¹⁰⁸ P-2602 explains that the group grew exponentially due to the messages sent to village chiefs asking for *brave men* to join.¹⁰⁹ The messages reached people from surrounding villages, such as BOZOUM, PAOUA, and others.¹¹⁰

29. The GOBERE group was then organized in, and divided into [REDACTED] camps or *companies*, per the military definition.¹¹¹ The [REDACTED] camp/company leaders were all FACA, including [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹¹² According to P-2602's recollection, amongst the names of other militaries were KEMA, BAMA, HOURONTI, KPA, DANWE, Brice WALLOT, and Alexis MANDAGO.¹¹³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁴

30. Each company had a chief, and was divided into sections, which also had their respective chiefs – usually civilians with command capacity.¹¹⁵ If the company was a military company, it would have around 120 people in it.¹¹⁶ If it was composed by civilians, the numbers could go up to 200 or more, depending on whether it was wartime or not.¹¹⁷ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁸

31. Each company also had a secretary, whose main duty was to register all newcomers and to make a list of all men who joined the group. The intent of this control was to know where the men came from, when did they join the group, and to explain them the rules.¹¹⁹ Registering people was also important to perform the traditional rituals of the Anti-Balaka on newcomers, and to provide them the *gris-gris*.¹²⁰ P-2602 states that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]²¹ Once registered, P-2602 explains that the person was not allowed to go back to their respective village.¹²²

32. The organisation and structure of the group was based on DEDANE's decision to mimic a military structure.¹²³ The decision was to organise the group to avoid being scattered while

¹⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9523, 787-795.

¹⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9609, at 9609, l. 356-359.

¹¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9607, l. 316-319, at 9608, l. 329-331.

¹¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9610, l. 417-423; CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9618, l. 29-34.

¹¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9611, l. 443-448; CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9618, l. 26.

¹¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9611-9612, l. 447-484.

¹¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 493-494.

¹¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9619, l. 38-40.

¹¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9619, l. 44-46.

¹¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9619, l. 44-46.

¹¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9619, l. 49-52, 64-65.

¹¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9620, l. 72-82.

¹²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9620, l. 93-99.

¹²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9620, l. 87.

¹²² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 107-116.

¹²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9621, l. 131-132.

fighting,¹²⁴ to avoid insubordination, and to make the imposition of disciplinary measures viable – avoiding misbehaviour.¹²⁵

Weapons and training

33. P-2602 states that elements were trained on how to use weapons,¹²⁶ being taught on how to fire, dismantle, and assemble them.¹²⁷ People who were newly recruited would arrive and be distributed along the companies,¹²⁸ and each FACA leader was in charge of training the men assigned to his camp/company.¹²⁹

34. According to P-2605, the whole group shared 5 automatic weapons.¹³⁰ A civilian in the group also had an automatic weapon.¹³¹ Other civilians had hunting weapons,¹³² and P-2602 [REDACTED]¹³³

Planning and strategy

35. When in GOBERE, the plan was to defend their prefecture's district and to attack the Seleka positioned there.¹³⁴ The military leaders used intelligence as tactics to analyse Seleka positions and to plan attacks, they would deploy more than 2 people to look where the Seleka were positioned and to report back.¹³⁵ Based on the varying reports, the leaders decided on how to attack.¹³⁶ P-2602 provides an example, stating that a woman could be deployed to sell something to the Seleka, as to analyse their position and report back.¹³⁷

36. An example of this tactic is the 5 December attack in BOSSANGO. P-2602 states that they deployed a woman to sell yams before planning the attack, and then sent another to sell cassava. Both reported back, giving the necessary information for them to plan and carry out the attack.¹³⁹

37. The group was also adept to Anti-Balaka traditional rituals, such as the use of *gris-gris*, and their traditional medicine, and used those methods before carrying out attacks.¹⁴⁰

¹²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9621, l. 139-141.

¹²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9621, l. 117-132.

¹²⁶ CAR-OTP-2188-9598, at 9607, l. 287-291, 304-308.

¹²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9607, l. 307-307.

¹²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9610, l. 417-419.

¹²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9610, l. 417-419, and at 9611, l. 428-430.

¹³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9607, l. 292-300.

¹³¹ CAR-OTP-2188-9598, at 9607, l. 302-303.

¹³² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 522-523.

¹³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9614, l. 529-534.

¹³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9614, l. 540-543.

¹³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615, l. 577-591.

¹³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615, l. 587-588.

¹³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615, l. 582-583.

¹³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615, l. 595-597.


¹³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615-9619, l. 595-602.

¹⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9614, l. 552-556.

FACA leaders in GOBERE and other FACA members in the group

38. Besides the [REDACTED] FACA leaders in GOBERE, P-2602 explains that other FACA joined the GOBERE Anti-Balaka group, as the group attacked the Seleka in the 5 districts of ZERE, BOWAYE, OUHAM BAC, BOUCA, and BENZAMBE (aka Bir Zambe).¹⁴¹

39. P-2602 was provided with a list obtained by the prosecution¹⁴² with names of FACA leaders and other FACA who joined the GOBERE group, further providing information about the place that said elements joined the Anti-Balaka and their roles.¹⁴³



¹⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 142-146, and at 9635, l. 578-595.

¹⁴² CAR-OTP-2068-0118.

¹⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9623, l. 192-200;

¹⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 159-172.

¹⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 152-154, 164-168.

¹⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 152, l. 157, 160-168.

¹⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9623, l. 183-186, and at 9624, l. 214-223.

¹⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9814, l. 221.

¹⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9814, l. 224.

¹⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9623, l. 188-191, and at 9623-9624, l. 208-212.

¹⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9624, l. 224-237.

¹⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9624-9625, l. 241-246.


¹⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9625, l. 265-272.

¹⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9626, l. 278-286.

¹⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9626, l. 291.

¹⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9626, l. 291-295.

¹⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9626, l. 303.



¹⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9627, l. 314 - 321.

¹⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9628-9629, l. 375-388.

¹⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9628, l. 349-354.

¹⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9628, l. 356-367.

¹⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9628-9629, l. 375-388.

¹⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9630, l. 410.

¹⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9629, l. 403, CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at. 9630, l. 413-431.

¹⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9630, l. 441.

¹⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9631, l. 444.

¹⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9631, l. 447.

¹⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9631, l. 470.

¹⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9631, l. 472.

¹⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9632, l. 478-482.

¹⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9632, l. 484-491.

¹⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9632, l. 492-505.

¹⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9633, l. 519-526.

¹⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9633, l. 529-532.

¹⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9642, l. 20-29.

¹⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9633, l. 535.

Identification of civilians who joined the GOBERE Anti-Balaka group

40. P-2602 also provides information on civilians who joined the GOBERE Anti-Balaka group.

¹⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9633, l. 537-538, and at

¹⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9634, l. 546-556.

¹⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9636, l. 624-629.

¹⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9637, l. 652-654.

¹⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 493-494.

¹⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9639, l. 710-714.

¹⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 504-510.

¹⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9644, l. 100-102.

¹⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9639, l. 716-722.

¹⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9638, l. 694-700.

¹⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9638, l. 694-704.

¹⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9639, l. 724-734.

¹⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9639, l. 736-740.

¹⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9639-9640, l. 741-743.

¹⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9640, l. 754-765.

¹⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9642-9643, l. 30-59.

Leadership

41. Despite not being the most senior military, Danboy DEDANE was the leader of the GOBERE group.²⁰² DEDANE was chosen to lead the group, because he was the one to ultimately gather the group to fight the mercenaries.²⁰³ DEDANE had a small group of men guarding him, whom the witness refers to as DEDANE's staff.²⁰⁴ LEBENE was part of his guard,²⁰⁵ as well as GUEDERAN, the only FACA amongst civilians in DEDANE's guard.²⁰⁶

GOBERE Anti-Balaka's objectives

42. The objective of the GOBERE Anti-Balaka was to chase away the Seleka ("mercenaries").²⁰⁷ CAR's population, in particular villagers, were attacked by the Seleka, so many people joined the Anti-Balaka based on this declared objective.²⁰⁸ P-2602 states that the massive adherence to the Anti-Balaka started before the 5 December attack, and the Seleka attack on villages is why their group went from [REDACTED] to more than 3000 people in a month.²⁰⁹

¹⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9645, l. 117-127.

¹⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9645, l. 123.

¹⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9647, l. 201.

¹⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9647, l. 190-197.

¹⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9648, l. 214-220.

¹⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9648, l. 223-224.

¹⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9650, l. 292-296.

²⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9650, l. 280.

²⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9650-9651, l. 301-312.

²⁰² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9613, l. 504-510.

²⁰³ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9625, l. 258-261.

²⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9644, l. 90-93.

²⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9644, l. 97-98.

²⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9644, l. 104-106.

²⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9651, l. 336-339; at 9652, l. 358.

²⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9652, l. 347-354; at 9654, l. 420-424.

²⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9654, l. 420-424.

43. P-2602 also explains that the Anti-Balaka recognized the Seleka by their traditional rites, and could differentiate between a traditional military and a Seleka.²¹⁰ There were Chadians, Sudanese, and Malians,²¹¹ among the Seleka, but P-2602 states that Anti-Balaka elements were able to differentiate between the nationals of those countries who lived in CAR before, and the Seleka.²¹² P-2602's group would not harm the Sudanese, Chadians and Malians who had been living in CAR before, as his group knew them, and they were based in RDOT military camp.²¹³ The focus was to attack the Seleka,²¹⁴ and they were recognizable by their beards, the way they wore *gris-gris*, and carried weapons.²¹⁵

VII. OPERATION IN [REDACTED] O PUSH SELEKA TO BOSSANGO

44. [REDACTED] was considered a strategic location, taking into account the group's plan to avoid [REDACTED]¹⁶ and to push the Seleka to BOSSANGO. ²¹⁷ After [REDACTED] in GOBERE, P-2602 and the group proceeded to [REDACTED] to settle, but later DEDANE – who was in charge - decided it was best to return and establish GOBERE as base.²¹⁸

45. In [REDACTED] P-2602 and his group engaged in a military tactic to push the Seleka to BOSSANGO. P-2602 says the group went towards [REDACTED]¹⁹ The aim of their tactic was to base themselves there so as to prevent the Seleka from receiving reinforcements [REDACTED] which would force them to go to BOSSANGO.²²⁰

46. Anti-Balaka groups pushed the Seleka to BOUCA, BATANGAFO and ZERE.²²¹ P-2602 and his group pushed mercenaries to BOSSANGO because the *Force Multinationale en République Centrafricaine* (FOMAC) were there and FOMAC would intervene to separate mercenaries from civilians.²²² P-2602 avoided pushing the mercenaries to small villages, as the population had no backup against the Seleka.²²³

²¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9653, l. 392-397.

²¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9652, l. 360.

²¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9653, l. 402-403.

²¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9652-9653, l. 367-373, 402-403.

²¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9651, l. 336-339.

²¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9653, l. 392-408.

²¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9520, l. 676-695; CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9527, l. 61-62.

²¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9500, at 9520-9521, l. 682-705.

²¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9579, at 9586, l. 234-235; CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9599, l. 21-36, and at 9600, l. 40-43.

²¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9526, l. 18-19.

²²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9527, l. 61-67.

²²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9528, l. 74-75.

²²² CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9528, l. 84-86.

²²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9528, l. 84-89.

47. DEDANE coordinated the different Anti-Balaka groups pushing the mercenaries to KAMBAKOTA, ZERE, BENZAME and BOWAYE.²²⁴ DEDANE was always in communication with the different groups, being informed whether they succeeded or if they needed reinforcement.²²⁵ [REDACTED]¹⁶

[REDACTED] receded by the local code, which is different from the one that he had at the moment of the interview.²²⁷

48. P-2602 explains that the Seleka moved around with vehicles and motorcycles, and had 12-7, RPG and DKM weapons, while the Anti-Balaka would move around on foot, and would mostly carry handmade weapons.²²⁸ If an Anti-Balaka carried an automatic weapon, that would mean he is a military or professional, as civilians usually used DOUBLE ZEROS, a type of weapon used for hunting and killing animals.²²⁹

VIII. TRIP TO BANGUI TO GET AMMUNITION

49. The first time P-2602's group went to [REDACTED] there were no fights with the Seleka.²³⁰ The second time, the group launched an attack in [REDACTED] to push the Seleka south, but the Seleka repelled them, so they withdrew from the mission and went towards BANGUI to look for ammunitions.²³¹ P-2602 got the ammunition in BANGUI from the population.²³² During the crisis, the local population broke into weapon stores and military bases, and kept the ammunition in safe places such as in PK12, and RDOT base.²³³

IX. ANTI-BALAKA ATTACK ON 5 DISTRICTS IN OUHAM PREFECTURE BEFORE 5 DECEMBER 2013

50. The attack on the 5 districts of ZERE, BOWAYE, OUHAM BAC, BOUCA, and BENZAMBE (aka Bir Zambe)²³⁴ happened in early October, by different companies from GOBERE. P-2602 was in GOBERE for about [REDACTED] months before the attack.²³⁵ After the attack on the five districts [REDACTED] proceeded to BOSSANGO.²³⁶ The five districts were chosen based on Seleka positions.²³⁷ The companies or groups were dispatched to a certain location based on their knowledge of the area.²³⁸ The plan was to attack the villages at the same time.²³⁹

²²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9602, l. 110-123.

²²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9602, l. 118-123.

²²⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9602, l. 136-138.

²²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9602-9603, l. 141-154.

²²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9601, l. 75-93.

²²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9601, l. 91-104.

²³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9603, l. 162-163.

²³¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9603, l. 166-175, and at 9604, l. 180-181.

²³² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9604, 196-204.

²³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9603, l. 198-204, and at 9604, l. 215-221.

²³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9622, l. 142-146, and at 9635, l. 578-595.

²³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9634, l. 557-567.

²³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9635, l. 581.

²³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9654, l. 433-443.

²³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9654, l. 446-449.

²³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9534, l. 291-293.

51. [REDACTED] was the leader of the ZERE attack together with [REDACTED]²⁴⁰ ZERE is 27 km east of BOSSANGO on the axis to BOUCA. The company that attacked ZERE was split into two, one directed to BOSSANGO,²⁴¹ and other to KORO-MPOKO.²⁴² [REDACTED] was in the group that went to KORO-MPOKO.²⁴³
52. [REDACTED] led the attack in OUHAM BAC,²⁴⁴ later proceeding with the group to BOSSANGO.²⁴⁵ [REDACTED] and his group went from OUHAM BAC towards the main road, which runs through BOSSANGO, to block the road on the level of the bridge over the OUHAM river to stop the Seleka from fleeing towards BANGUI.²⁴⁶
53. The attack on BOUCA was led by [REDACTED]²⁴⁷ who later led the group to BOGANGOLO.²⁴⁸ [REDACTED] led the BOWAYE attack,²⁴⁹ and the BOWAYE group went to BOSSANGO.²⁵⁰
54. [REDACTED] led the group that attacked BENZAMBE with other civilian who later died.²⁵¹ BENZAMBE is about 11 km from BOSSANGO.²⁵² [REDACTED]²⁵³ After the attack, the BENZAMBE group went straight to BOSSANGO.²⁵⁴
55. P-2602 states that [REDACTED] succeeded in taking back the towns from the Seleka on the day of the attacks, except for BOUCA, which [REDACTED] succeeded in the following day.²⁵⁵ All the groups had the same tactics to take over the 5 districts, as the FACA leaders of the different groups had the same military training.²⁵⁶ The plan was the same, to chase the Seleka to BOSSANGO.²⁵⁷

²⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9635, l. 602-607.

²⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9536, l. 370-371; CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9706, l. 18-20.

²⁴² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9635, l. 586-588.

²⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9706, l. 18-20.

²⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9638, l. 698-700.

²⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9638, l. 702-704.

²⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9701-9702, l. 612-654.

²⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9636, l. 617-619.

²⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9636, l. 617-633.

²⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9637, l. 651-661.

²⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9638, l. 686-691.

²⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9636, l. 636-641.

²⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9657, l. 531-532.

²⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9535, l. 313-315.

²⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9635, l. 592.

²⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9656, l. 510-511.

²⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9534, l. 305-310.

²⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9535, l. 330-339.

Planning for Attacks on the 5 Districts and BOSSANGO

56. All the militaries in GOBERE assisted in the coordination of the 5 districts attack, it was a shared effort and each leader gave their own input in the formulation of the plan.²⁵⁸ They were aware of the presence of Seleka in BATANGAFO and KATAK, and concluded that they could call for reinforcements there,²⁵⁹ so to prevent this from happening, the companies attacked the 5 districts.²⁶⁰

57. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] were leading the discussions because they were the elders.²⁶¹ DEDANE called for the meeting,²⁶² for the purpose of deciding how to attack and the planning of the attack.²⁶³ [REDACTED] on the day they were going to attack and on same time - 5am – on the five districts.²⁶⁴ [REDACTED] discussed the attack on BOSSANGO, [REDACTED] proceed with the attack in BOSSANGO after the attack on the 5 districts.²⁶⁵

58. P-2602 states that the plan worked for all districts.²⁶⁶ When the Anti-Balaka attacked, [REDACTED] the Seleka fleeing in direction to BOSSANGO, on foot, by vehicle or by motorcycle.²⁶⁷

59. [REDACTED]

²⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9654, l. 427-432.

²⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9564, l. 437-438.

²⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9564, l. 440-441.

²⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9655, l. 454-464.

²⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9655, l. 470.

²⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9655, l. 476-480.

²⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9656, l. 486-487.

²⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9656, l. 493-494.

²⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9656, l. 508-516.

²⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9656-9657, l. 517-521.

²⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9752, l. 489-491.

²⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9754, l. 553-557.

²⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9753, l. 521-524.

²⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9752, l. 497-502.

²⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9753, l. 532-542.

Weapons and ammunition [REDACTED]

60. Prior to the 5 December attack,²⁷³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] saved the rest for the 5 December attack in BOSSANGO. ²⁷⁸

61. The population from [REDACTED] took guns and ammunitions left of a gun store that was ransacked by the Seleka, and kept it by demand of a FACA called [REDACTED] who – together with about [REDACTED] ther elements - [REDACTED] collect the AK-47 ammunitions.²⁷⁹ Different sections also went to different locations to get ammunitions, like [REDACTED] who went to BOZOUM to get double zero ammunition to attack BOSSANGO on 5 December.²⁸⁰

X. 5 DECEMBER ATTACKS ON BANGUI, BOSSANGO, AND BOUAR

Planning and coordination of 5 December attacks

62. Approximately 4 days before the 5 December attack [REDACTED] FACA leaders from GOBERE's Anti-Balaka gathered at a cemetery, around 5 km from BOSSANGO, and discussed the date of the attack.²⁸¹

63. The 5 December attack was planned to happen in BOUAR, BOSSANGO and BANGUI.²⁸² The zone/area leaders of the Anti-Balaka kept in contact with each other, information was passed on from group to group.²⁸³ The attack on BOSSANGO was supposed to happen at 2PM, based on a traditional ritual, and BANGUI at 5AM.²⁸⁴ [REDACTED] time for BOUAR, as the groups were not able to communicate.²⁸⁵

²⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9752, l. 510, and at 9753, 525-531.

²⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9753, l. 529-531.

²⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9657, l. 522-524.

²⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9657, l. 526-540.

²⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9657, l. 543-548.

²⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9657-9658, l. 552-570.

²⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9658-9659, l. 571-616.

²⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9660, l. 633-645.

²⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9661, l. 669-686.

²⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9665, l. 17; CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9662, l. 699-706.

²⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9661, l. 690-693.

²⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9662, l. 703-706, 725.

²⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9663, l. 732-738.

64. According to P-2602, DEDANE was the one in charge of coordinating operations, and was giving orders for both teams in OUHAM and BANGUI.²⁸⁶ DEDANE did not fight in BOSSANGO, ²⁸⁷ but was killed in BANGUI. P-2602 states that there were some disorder in BANGUI, as some “bad people” joined the group and started shooting people, looting, etc.²⁸⁸ DEDANE’s plan was to disarm those elements, but DEDANE was shot and killed shortly after he reached BANGUI.²⁸⁹ Richard BEJAOUANE replaced DEDANE, but BEJAOUANE was later killed in BOZOU. ²⁹⁰ In BOUAR, [REDACTED] led the attack.²⁹¹

65. Before the attack in BOSSANGO, P-2602 and his group heard about the attack and Anti-Balaka casualties in BANGUI,²⁹² as [REDACTED] was in contact with P-2602 and would call him from time to time to report about the attack.²⁹³ [REDACTED] was in the 4th arrondissement of BANGUI, based in [REDACTED] ²⁹⁴ [REDACTED] was with his [REDACTED] who already died,²⁹⁵ and informed P-2602 that they were unsuccessful in the fight in BANGUI, as not many professionals were there to fight.²⁹⁶

66. [REDACTED] participated of the attack in BANGUI with their own groups, and the rest of the militaries who were at [REDACTED] also participated.²⁹⁷ [REDACTED] was the one to inform P-2602 about the BANGUI attack, but he states that the other chiefs also knew about the attack, and were communicating with BANGUI.²⁹⁸

67. After the attack on BANGUI, which started at 5AM on 5 December, P-2602 received calls from BANGUI, [REDACTED] the attack in BOSSANGO yet.²⁹⁹ [REDACTED] 2PM to be in accordance with tradition.³⁰⁰ P-2602 received calls from colleagues including [REDACTED] ³⁰¹

²⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9665, l. 21.

²⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9643, l. 62-68.

²⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9665, l. 22-32.

²⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9665, l. 25-27, at 9666, l. 39.

²⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9666, l. 47-50.

²⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9666, l. 51-56.

²⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9666, l. 63-67.

²⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9666-9667, l. 68-71, and at 9668, l. 131-136.

²⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9667, l. 74-76.

²⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9667, l. 80.

²⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9667, l. 94-104.

²⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9668, l. 105-121.

²⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9668, l. 135-136; CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9723-9724, l. 301-330.

²⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9669-9670, l. 171-187.

³⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9670, l. 190-198.

³⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9670, l. 180-182.

BOSSANGO A attack

68. [REDACTED]³⁰² The elements who were on the ground [REDACTED]³⁰³ P-2602 knew BOSSANGO A well, and states that [REDACTED]³⁰⁴ [REDACTED] about a week prior to the attack,³⁰⁵ [REDACTED]³⁰⁶ DEDANE was among [REDACTED] assisted in the plan,³⁰⁷ as he was the overall chief of the movement on the OUHAM area, before dying in BANGUI.³⁰⁸ P-2602 explains that they surrounded the town of BOSSANGO A,³⁰⁹ and is able to demonstrate the setup of the attack based on an aerial image of BOSSANGO A (Annex B).³¹⁰

Overview of the 5 December attack

69. To prepare for the attack, the group first employed their intelligence tactics and sent ladies who sold yams and cassava to analyze Seleka positions.³¹¹ When the women returned with information, they sent some of their men in the night to verify this information and launch the attack.³¹² The men stayed in the town at night.³¹³ The next day at 2PM, [REDACTED] the Seleka in the first or second position, [REDACTED] stayed the night in BOSSANGO A were hiding, and then managed to block Seleka reinforcements to enter BOSSANGO A.³¹⁴ [REDACTED] succeeded to control the situation in BOSSANGO A, some elements stayed in town to maintain control over the area, and other elements headed towards BANGUI.³¹⁵

7 [REDACTED]

³⁰² CAR-OTP-2118-9617, at 9637, l. 642-645.

³⁰³ CAR-OTP-2118-9637, at 9637, l. 642-648.

³⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9547, l. 61-69.

³⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9548, l. 78-81.

³⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9547, l. 64-69.

³⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9548, l. 82-83.

³⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9548, l. 86-126.

³⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9671, l. 232-237.

³¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9671-9676, l. 242-401.

³¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9615-9616, l. 592-602.

³¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9616, l. 599-602.

³¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9616, l. 604-605.

³¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9598, at 9616, l. 619-623; CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9546-9547, l. 33-56.

³¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9548, l. 89-100.

³¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9669, l. 141-167.

³¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9700, l. 579-581, and at 9701, l. 588-590.

³¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9669, l. 143-155.

³¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9669, l. 157.

71 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] they managed to repel the Seleka from BOSSANGO on the same day – 5 December.³²² The Seleka that remained were protected by MISCA, at *Liberté* School.³²³

72. P-2602 was aware of other Anti-Balaka groups in DEKOA, SIBUT, GRIMARI, and NDJOUKOU.³²⁴ The groups would call each other in case reinforcement was needed.³²⁵ As an example, P-2602 even went to [REDACTED] to support the Anti-Balaka there.³²⁶

ANTI-BALAKA movements into BOSSANGO on 5 December 2013

73. P-2602 describes where the different Anti-Balaka groups were located in order to attack BOSSANGO.³²⁷ [REDACTED] through the main road, and crossed the bridge towards the city.³²⁸

74 [REDACTED] and his elements came from OUHAM BAC towards the main road that runs through BOSSANGO, closer to the Southern part of the town, to block the road.³²⁹ The intent was to block the road at the level of the bridge to BOSSANGO.³³⁰ P-2602 is able to point out in a map where the bridge is located.³³¹ [REDACTED] and his group progressed to block the bridge, but they did not succeed.³³² [REDACTED] was hit by a bullet close to BOSSANGO's town hall, and then was carried back to the bush.³³³ P-2602 received the news that [REDACTED] was injured, and was being taken to BENZAMBE.³³⁴ After around 5 days in BENZAMBE, [REDACTED] was taken to BOSSANGO by a RED CROSS vehicle to be treated.³³⁵

75. The elements coming from ZERE divided themselves, with some going towards KORO-MPOKO, and others joining the blockage in the main road, to prevent the Seleka from

³²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9546, l. 12-26.

³²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9546, l. 12-26.

³²² CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9546, l. 27-30.

³²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9546, l. 29-30.

³²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9549, l. 111-121.

³²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9549, l. 128-129.

³²⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9549, l. 134-139, and at l. 149-156.

³²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9675, l. 351-353.

³²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9675, l. 372-375.

³²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9701, l. 604-605, 612-615.

³³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9702, l. 623-626.

³³¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9702, l. 633-634.

³³² CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9703-9704, l. 682-686.

³³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9704, l. 692-694.

³³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9704, l. 701-705.

³³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9704, l. 706-712.

fleeing.³³⁶ [REDACTED] went to KORO-MPOKO, while [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] went to block the bridge.³³⁷

76. The elements coming from BOWAYE with [REDACTED] came from BENZAMBE's direction.³³⁹ [REDACTED] passed along the OUHAM river, crossed ZOUDAME, and went to SEMBE neighbourhood.³⁴⁰ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁴¹ P-2602 does not know how many elements were in [REDACTED] group, but states that more people joined it after the attack in BOWAYE.³⁴³ [REDACTED] was with two other FACA chiefs, named [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. P-2602 explains that the FACA members in [REDACTED] group had AK-47, and civilians hunting weapons.³⁴⁵ P-2602 cannot elaborate on what happened to [REDACTED] group after the FOMAC stopped the attack, he only heard about the casualties afterwards.³⁴⁶

Operations in BOSSANGO on 5 December 2013

77. [REDACTED] BOSSANGO on 5 December. He estimates that there were around [REDACTED].³⁴⁷ The witness explains that [REDACTED] BOSSANGO.³⁴⁸ [REDACTED] progressed to BANGUI, and participated in the 5 December attack to the airport there.³⁴⁹

78. P-2602 describes the 5 December attack in BOSSANGO, and explains [REDACTED] clashed with the Seleka in their secondary position,³⁵⁰ near the [REDACTED] as marked by P-2602 with a red pen on the map (Annex B).³⁵¹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁵²

³³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9701, l. 607-609.

³³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9706, l. 15-20.

³³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9698, l. 506-511.

³³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9675, l. 365-370; CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9698, l. 508-511.

³⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9698-9699, l. 508-517.

³⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9699, l. 523-529.

³⁴² CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9699, l. 528-529.

³⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9699, l. 530-537.

³⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9699-9700, l. 538-555, 565-572.

³⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9700, l. 556-562.

³⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9700, l. 574-584.

³⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9679-9680, l. 517-521.

³⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9671, l. 212-213.

³⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9671, l. 224-231.

³⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9676, l. 403-412.

³⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9677, l. 418-436.

³⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9679, l. 486-490.

79 [REDACTED] as a signal to attack the Seleka's secondary position.³⁵⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that a woman among the Seleka was killed in the attack.³⁵⁶

80 [REDACTED] Seleka reinforcements coming from *École Liberté*, where the Seleka's were based, and [REDACTED]

81. When the Seleka crossed the river, they started retreating to their base at *École Liberté*.³⁶⁰ Then the Congolese FOMAC forces entered the picture to stop the shooting between the groups.³⁶¹ [REDACTED]

82 [REDACTED] he fight was over.³⁶⁶

FOMAC Intervention at *École Liberté* and Anti-Balaka's retreat

83. The Congolese FOMAC intervened the attack, preventing the Anti-Balaka to get to *École Liberté* and proceed with the attack against the Seleka.³⁶⁷ [REDACTED] casualties on their side during the shooting.³⁶⁸

³⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9676, l. 406-407.

³⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 452-454.

³⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9679, l. 495-502.

³⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9756, l. 629-636.

³⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9676, l. 406-412.

³⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 455-477.

³⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 466-484.

³⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 460-462.

³⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 460-462.

³⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9678, l. 460-462.

³⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9680, l. 539-543.

³⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9680, l. 546-547.

³⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9681, l. 559-560.

³⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9681, l. 561-566.

³⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9681, l. 561-579, l. 587-588.

³⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9681, l. 576-588.

[REDACTED] the FOMAC forces shot and killed some Anti-Balaka elements while retreating.³⁷⁰ Hence, the FOMAC also became a target of the group.³⁷¹

84

85

[REDACTED] he Seleka and their equipments, vehicles, and weapons, in the grounds of *École Liberté* on 5 December.³⁷² [REDACTED] children and women, who – according to the witness – were probably taken by force by Seleka elements.³⁸⁰

86

Weapons Used

87. The civilians had hunting weapons, mostly fabricated locally, and the ammunition they got from BOSSEMBELE was given to the FACA militaries who carried automatic weapons.³⁸² [REDACTED] had automatics FM-DKM [REDACTED] [REDACTED] RPGs, and mortars taken from the SELEKA when they

³⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9681-9682, l. 589-617

³⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9682, l. 616-617.

³⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9664, at 9682, l. 619-620.

³⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9685, l. 58-59.

³⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9685-9686, l. 61-73.

³⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9686, l. 98-103.

³⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9687, l. 107-113.

³⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9687, l. 120.

³⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9687, l. 122-125.

³⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9687, l. 129-130

³⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9684, l. 15.

³⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9684, l. 16.

³⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9684, l. 35-36, and at 9685, l. 39.

³⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9692, l. 304-308, and at 9693, 310-314.

³⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at. 9693, l. 315-326.

attacked [REDACTED]³⁸⁴ On the 5 December attack in BOSSANGOA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RPGs and mortars, using them in the attack.³⁸⁵

88. The RPG was used on a vehicle taken from the Seleka,³⁸⁶ next to BORO SCHOOL [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³⁸⁷ The RPG [REDACTED]³⁸⁸ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from the SELEKA,³⁸⁹ which was used by an element trained on how
to use it.³⁹⁰ [REDACTED] fired at the Seleka in BOSSANGOA, attacking them from
KAFA to BORO, BORO to SEMBE, and SEMBE to *École Liberté*.³⁹¹

ANTI-BALAKA Crimes on 5 December 2013

89. [REDACTED] did not capture any Seleka while advancing through BOSSANGOA,
as they did not have a place to keep them.³⁹² The plan was to shoot the Seleka and advance
to their meeting point.³⁹³

90. P-2602 states that he did not see civilians on the way,³⁹⁴ only aiming at those who were
armed and wearing uniforms.³⁹⁵ P-2602 explains that he did not see the population as they
advanced, as the population of BOSSANGOA was at the Bishop's house, and there was
nobody moving around.³⁹⁶ P-2602 describes the location of the Bishop's house, noting that
it is in the southern part, marking it in **Annex B**.³⁹⁷ P-2602 also describes the location of *École
Liberté*, which is at 1.5 km from the ZOUDAME river.³⁹⁸ He explains that to those coming
from BENZAMBE, the school is on the left.³⁹⁹

91. P-2602 states that most of the Muslim population fled to *École Liberté* with the Seleka,
leaving their cars in the town.⁴⁰⁰ The witness also states that they were armed, and had
guns as well.⁴⁰¹ P-2602 witnessed the Muslim population fleeing to the school, with the
same weapons that the Seleka were using, such as a 12-7 gun that goes on top of a vehicle.⁴⁰²

³⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at. 9693, l. 327-333.

³⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9693, l. 335-341.

³⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9694, l. 348-355.

³⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9694, l. 366-367.

³⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9694-9695, l. 369-379.

³⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9695, l. 386-395.

³⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9695, l. 393-395.

³⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9695, l. 399-409.

³⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9696, l. 424-429.

³⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9696, l. 427-429.

³⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at. 9696, l. 436-442.

³⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9696, l. 445.

³⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9696-9697, l. 446-450.

³⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9697, l. 451-465.

³⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9697-9698, l. 479-482.

³⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9683, at 9698, l. 484.

⁴⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9707, l. 39-46.

⁴⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9707, l. 49, 61.

⁴⁰² CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9707, l. 55-66.

According to P-2602, the Muslim population and the Anti-Balaka also clashed on 5 December, in the BOSSANGO centre, through the neighbourhoods to *Liberté*.⁴⁰³

92. P-2602 explains that Muslims could not have stayed in their neighbourhoods as they could be killed.⁴⁰⁴ So Muslims, including women and children, were in *Écolé Liberté*, as well as the Seleka. They were guarded by the FOMAC forces who intercepted [REDACTED] in the day of the attack.⁴⁰⁵ After a while, the Chadian FOMAC evacuated the Muslims to Chad.⁴⁰⁶ P-2602 states that in the day of the attack, he only saw Seleka and a Muslim man running towards the school, and the man was holding a weapon.⁴⁰⁷ After a while,

93. P-2602 also explains that [REDACTED] entered houses, and looked on trees, mostly in BORO neighbourhood, to see whether there was someone armed, and meaning to open fire.⁴⁰⁸ As to businesses and shops, the witness states that in preparation for the war, the shelves were probably previously emptied, and the merchandises were taken to *Écolé Liberté*.⁴⁰⁹

94. There was a clash between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka near the mosque in BOSSANGO. P-2602 attributes guilt to the Seleka for blocking the access to the mosque, culminating to this clash.⁴¹⁰ P-2602 denies having knowledge of the destruction of buildings by the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO, stating that they did not have time to destroy those buildings.⁴¹¹ P-2602 affirms that the population in BOSSANGO destroyed buildings as a reprisal for Seleka's actions, and the buildings were destroyed after the Anti-Balaka and Seleka left the scene.⁴¹²

95. When confronted with the existence of video footage, newspaper articles, and media reports, attributing the destruction of religious buildings – mosques-, and the burning of Muslims houses and shops to the Anti-Balaka, P-2602 states that the Anti-Balaka took the blame for those actions, but were there to fight the Seleka and to advance in that goal.⁴¹³ P-2602 affirms that only *fake* Anti-Balaka's would go to villages and take things, as traditional Anti-Balaka elements are taught not to steal, take someone's property, or fire on someone who is not armed.⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰³ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9708, l. 70-86.

⁴⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9805, l. 664-678.

⁴⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9804, l. 644-645, 647-648.

⁴⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9536, l. 347-348.

⁴⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9806, l. 706-707.

⁴⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9708, l. 81-102.

⁴⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9708-9709, l. 103-106.

⁴¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9709, l. 107-121.

⁴¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9802, l. 560-574.

⁴¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9802, l. 582-583, and at 9803, l. 592-608; CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9711, l. 184-194, and at 9712, l. 218-226.

⁴¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9710, l. 145-169.

⁴¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9710-9711, l. 172-183, and at 9712, l. 234-235.

96. P-2602 denies the association of the Anti-Balaka with the Sango expression “*lawa lawa*”, which he explains that means that sooner or later the person will pay.⁴¹⁵

97. P-2602 acknowledges that he was in contact with [REDACTED] during the 5 December attack in BOSSANGO. ⁴¹⁶ P-2602 affirms that he was not in contact with any of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, P-2602 was in contact with [REDACTED]

98. P-2602 affirms that he was not aware that [REDACTED] nor that he was a military, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] P-2602 affirms that he referred to [REDACTED] as elder brother (*KOTAZO*) out of respect, as he did not know if [REDACTED] was older or younger than him.⁴²⁰

99. P-2602 states he did not know where [REDACTED] was calling from.⁴²¹ P-2602 thought [REDACTED] was in CAR, not abroad.⁴²² P-2602 explains that [REDACTED] mostly called the witness to ask about his grandparents in [REDACTED].²³ P-2602 went to [REDACTED] when he fought in [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] is approximately [REDACTED].²⁴ P-2602 would call [REDACTED] and pass his phone to [REDACTED] relatives.⁴²⁵ P-2602 could not understand what they were saying, as they spoke Gbaya among each other.⁴²⁶

100. P-2602 affirms he did not know [REDACTED] grandparents before the conflict. He explains that [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] surroundings [REDACTED] then giving the witness phone number to [REDACTED].²⁷ [REDACTED] then started to call the witness, later explaining how to locate his grandparents in the village.⁴²⁸ When [REDACTED] gave his phone number to [REDACTED] P-2602 was informed, but he did not know that it was [REDACTED] calling.⁴²⁹

⁴¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9705, at 9711, l. 195-209.

⁴¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9723, l. 281-308.

⁴¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9724, l. 333-347.

⁴¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9725, l. 358-379.

⁴¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9725, l. 364-368.

⁴²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9744, l. 217-219.

⁴²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9725, l. 378-379.

⁴²² CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9730, l. 581-583.

⁴²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9726, l. 385-395.

⁴²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9726, l. 396-399.

⁴²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9726, l. 402-403.

⁴²⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9726, l. 402-406.

⁴²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9726, l. 410-415, and at 9728-9729, l. 482-491, and at 9729, l. 501-506.

⁴²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9729, l. 509-514.

⁴²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9729, l. 490-491.

101. P-2602 reinstates that his phone was used by [REDACTED] after his injury in the 5 December BOSSANGO attack. Prior to his injury, around 11:30AM, P-2602 states that [REDACTED] also used his phone to call relatives in BANGUI.⁴³⁰

102. P-2602 acknowledges that [REDACTED] called his phone number on 5 December, around 11:28AM, to ask about the safety of his relatives. Besides receiving a call from [REDACTED] CDR shows that the witness called him back right after.⁴³¹ According to P-2602, he called back because [REDACTED] was speaking in Gbaya when he called, so as the witness could not understand, he called back with [REDACTED] by his side, who translated to the witness that [REDACTED] wanted to know about his relatives.⁴³² P-2602 affirms to not know why [REDACTED] called him on that particular day.⁴³³

103. P-2602 and [REDACTED] exchanged phone calls from late 2013 to early 2014, approximately until April.⁴³⁴ The witness states that [REDACTED] called him to be informed about the situation in the country, asking P-2602 about his relatives, his properties that were looted, his vehicles, his house, etc.⁴³⁵ The witness affirms that he never saw [REDACTED] despite talking to him.⁴³⁶

104. On these phone calls, [REDACTED] would also ask P-2602 about Seleka operations and Seleka attacks on people. They talked about incidents in places such as [REDACTED]³⁷ P-2602 later states that [REDACTED] was only interested and asked about locations where he had relatives, then stating that [REDACTED] did not call to ask about [REDACTED]³⁸ P-2602 further states that [REDACTED] wanted to know what happened in [REDACTED] as the Seleka were fleeing or killing people, but the witness did not know what was happening there as he was in BOSSANGO.⁴³⁹

105. P-2602 explains that he would know about incidents in other villages, as the different Anti-Balaka groups were informed on what happened in other locations. [REDACTED]⁴⁰ Besides, as an example, to know what

⁴³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9727, l. 420-445.

⁴³¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9727-9728, l. 450-478.

⁴³² CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9728, l. 474-479.

⁴³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9728, l. 480-482.

⁴³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9729, l. 516-520.

⁴³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9729-9730, l. 516-539.

⁴³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9730, l. 541-547.

⁴³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9732-9733, l. 596-642.

⁴³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9742, l. 141-172, at 9743, l. 180-187, and at 9744, l. 221-227.

⁴³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9744, l. 228-238.

⁴⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9733, l. 652-668.

happened in BOSSEMPTELE, as people would flee from one place to the other, it was possible to call YALoke, which facilitated the process of gathering information.⁴⁴¹ P-2602 informs that [REDACTED] in YALoke was named RICHARD.⁴⁴²

106. Despite talking about incidents, P-2602 states he did not inform [REDACTED] on specifics, such as concerning reinforcements. As an example, RICHARD needed reinforcements, and the chief from KORO-MPOKO went to assist YALoke.⁴⁴³ P-2602 affirms that he would only say there was an incident in YALoke, but not report details to [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] was not his chief.⁴⁴⁴ Other small villages also needed reinforcements sometimes, P-2602 knew about the ones in the OUHAM area and OMBELLA MPOKO.⁴⁴⁵ In OMBELLA MPOKO, [REDACTED] and then went back to OUHAM before going back to directly to BANGUI.⁴⁴⁶

107. The inflow of information between P-2602 and [REDACTED] was based on Seleka killings in specific locations.⁴⁴⁷ P-2602 does not know if [REDACTED] was passing on the information to other people.⁴⁴⁸ As to information given by [REDACTED] P-2602 states that a while before the 5 December attack, [REDACTED] warned him that the Seleka were headed towards [REDACTED].⁴⁴⁹ The witness was in [REDACTED] getting ammunition at the time.⁴⁵⁰ [REDACTED] did not inform on other SELEKA attacks.⁴⁵¹

Killing of people in high ranking positions

108. P-2602 states that a colonel from the Chadian army was killed during [REDACTED] while DEDANE was still alive [REDACTED].⁴⁵² [REDACTED] after DEDANE's death.⁴⁵³ Other Chadian majors, captain, or even colonels were captured, but in BANGUI, specifically GOBONGO, so P-2602 does not know much about it.⁴⁵⁴ As for Seleka's, P-2602 remembers an incident where a Seleka colonel was killed in a vehicle in YANGALA.⁴⁵⁵ He explains that the Seleka used to steal goats from the village, and on one occasion, the Anti-Balaka was there and killed the colonel.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9733, l. 643-650.

⁴⁴² CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9734, l. 670-676.

⁴⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9738, l. 5-12.

⁴⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9738, l. 14-26.

⁴⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9740, l. 86-88.

⁴⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9741, l. 116-122.

⁴⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9738, l. 24-31.

⁴⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9738, l. 33-34.

⁴⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9746-9747, l. 294-329, and at 9748, l. 351-360.

⁴⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9747, l. 346-348.

⁴⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9748, l. 361-364.

⁴⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9754, l. 573-585.

⁴⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9755, l. 588-589.

⁴⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9755, l. 594-597.

⁴⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9755, l. 610-615.

⁴⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9755, l. 612-615.

XI. [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

continued to BANGUI.⁴⁵⁷ [REDACTED] instructions on discipline, on following their leaders orders, on tactics to avoid the Seleka in the capital, and how to operate in BANGUI.⁴⁵⁸ [REDACTED] instructions not to steal, as thieves among them would be killed,⁴⁵⁹ not to take people's things by force, and to only fight with people that were armed.⁴⁶⁰ The BOUCA group was also not to attack DAMARA, they should stop there to rest, and have energy to attack the capital.⁴⁶¹ P-2602 explains that the SIBUT was supposed to attack DAMARA, and that among their members, there were children of the area, militaries, and others.⁴⁶²

110. P-2602 went [REDACTED] to get weapons more than once.⁴⁶³ [REDACTED] there were weapons stored there.⁴⁶⁴ As previously mentioned, the Seleka broke the local weapons storage after BOZIZE left, and the local population took the remaining weapons.⁴⁶⁵ [REDACTED] took the remaining weapons originally from the Presidential Guard, so the Anti-Balaka could use them in combat.⁴⁶⁶ There were about 30 AK47s to be used in the field.⁴⁶⁷ [REDACTED] it was difficult to get weapons by other means.⁴⁶⁸ Other weapons, like the DKM RPG, and mortars, [REDACTED] in the field, after chasing the Seleka away in an attack.⁴⁶⁹

111 [REDACTED] clashed with the Seleka on his way.⁴⁷⁰ P-2602 then proceeded to BOSSANGO, and from BOSSANGO went directly to BANGUI.⁴⁷¹ P-2602 states that this happened after the 5 December attack.⁴⁷²

⁴⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9537, l. 403-407.

⁴⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9541, l. 537-550.

⁴⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9537, l. 398.

⁴⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9537, l. 395-396.

⁴⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9537, l. 410-415, and at 9538, l. 431-433.

⁴⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9538, l. 419-425.

⁴⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9714, at 9714, l. 163-168.

⁴⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9538, l. 437-441.

⁴⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9538, l. 437-449.

⁴⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9540, l. 492-500.

⁴⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9540, l. 492-495.

⁴⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9540, l. 509-511.

⁴⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9541, l. 526-529.

⁴⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9542-9543, l. 562-617.

⁴⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9543, l. 619-621.

⁴⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9525, at 9543, l. 625-626.

XII. TRIP TO BANGUI IN LATE DECEMBER 2013

112. There were no clashes with the Seleka on the way from BOSSANGO to BANGUI.⁴⁷³

P-2602 proceeded to BANGUI around [REDACTED] after the 5 December BOSSANGO attack, he walked for around [REDACTED] to arrive in BANGUI.⁴⁷⁴ In BANGUI, [REDACTED] settled at [REDACTED]⁴⁷⁵ where [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁴⁷⁶ [REDACTED] others who joined along the way.⁴⁷⁷ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁴⁷⁸ No militaries joined them along the way, only civilians.⁴⁷⁹

113. [REDACTED] with the exception of those who had family in BANGUI and left to join their families.⁴⁸⁰ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from small villages like [REDACTED] [REDACTED]⁴⁸¹ When activities resumed, gradually men started to leave and search for jobs.⁴⁸²

114. [REDACTED] French troops disarmed them⁴⁸³ taking [REDACTED] AK-47s.⁴⁸⁴ P-2602 states that the French troops were flying over PK13 with a helicopter, firing at the group, while the group did not offer resistance as the French troops were not perceived as enemies.⁴⁸⁵

115. P-2602 stayed [REDACTED] before going back to BOSSANGO.⁴⁸⁶ P-2602 states that at some point in BANGUI, he received a call from [REDACTED] who called the military to come back and establish control. P-2602 accepted this request, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

⁴⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9553, l. 252-254.

⁴⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9553, l. 258-266.

⁴⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9553-9554, l. 280-285.

⁴⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9554, l. 307-315.

⁴⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9749, l. 397-413.

⁴⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9749, l. 414-416.

⁴⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9750, l. 417-429.

⁴⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9762-9763, l. 845-872.

⁴⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9763, l. 875-879.

⁴⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9763, l. 880-881.

⁴⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9777, l. 421-432.

⁴⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9554, l. 288-296.

⁴⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9554, l. 304-306.

⁴⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9557, l. 400-405.

⁴⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9557, l. 407-410.

⁴⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9558, l. 428-433.

GOBERE's Anti-Balaka leadership after 5 December

116. P-2602 explains the whereabouts of some of the leaders in GOBERE after the 5 December BOSSANGOYA attack. While he was still in BOSSANGOYA, hence before his arrival in BANGUI, KEMA and MANDAGO were recovering from their bullet wounds in BOSSANGOYA, and did not have the strength to move with the group.⁴⁹² KEMA was in the [REDACTED] neighbourhood, and MANDAGO was in [REDACTED].⁴⁹³ Both KEMA and MANDAGO went to MSF, the central hospital of BOSSANGOYA, for medical care.⁴⁹⁴ [REDACTED] KEMA became the chief in BOSSANGOYA.⁴⁹⁵ DEDANE died [REDACTED] in BANGUI.⁴⁹⁶ P-2602 was informed that DEDANE was shot while trying to disarm other troops⁴⁹⁷ by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] P-2602 explains that DEDANE was replaced by the leader of the Anti-Balaka, the Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka.⁴⁹⁹ P-2602 states he did not have time to or chance to meet DEDANE's replacement aka the coordinator.⁵⁰⁰

117. P-2602 had information on BANGUI before his departure, he kept contact with the GOBERE Anti-Balaka members who proceeded to BANGUI in the 5 December attack.⁵⁰¹ The groups communicated along the way, while moving, progressing, and when they arrived in BANGUI.⁵⁰² P-2602 states that they communicated every time it was possible, namely, when there was network coverage.⁵⁰³ P-2602 was mostly in contact with the FACA members, who were constantly updating him on their whereabouts.⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9558, l. 434-443.

⁴⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9557, l. 409-460.

⁴⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9558-9559, l. 451-454.

⁴⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9756, l. 650-657.

⁴⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9757, l. 658-663.

⁴⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9757, l. 664-673.

⁴⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9757, l. 674-677.

⁴⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9555, l. 335-345.

⁴⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9555, l. 344-345, and at 9556, l. 353-355.

⁴⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9556, l. 356-358.

⁴⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9556, l. 366-375, and at 9557, l. 389.

⁵⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9557, l. 390-396.

⁵⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9554-9555, l. 316-319.

⁵⁰² CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9555, l. 322-324.

⁵⁰³ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9555, l. 322-324.

⁵⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9555, l. 330-333.

ComZone

118. P-2602 explains that he does not know many of the names on *Liste des Com Zones Anti-Balaka*, ERN CAR-OTP-2030-0232, and the names he recognises, are of chiefs of the Anti-Balaka of various villages and districts, as well as neighbourhoods in BANGUI.⁵⁰⁵ P-2602 affirms he was not the ComZone of [REDACTED] and also affirms he was not a ComZone.⁵⁰⁶ P-2602 explains he was living in [REDACTED] but was not a ComZone there.⁵⁰⁷

119. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] people removing the roof from schools, or people who were potentially [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PK12 was controlled by HOUKONTI.⁵¹¹ [REDACTED] of a day to day task, only happening when there was an incident i.e., when they heard gunshots and followed the sound to disarm the person.⁵¹² [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

120. [REDACTED] the barricades their men were erecting in the neighbourhood, so as for them to lift it.⁵¹⁵ The barricades were erected as a way for men to subsist, as they were not receiving any revenue.⁵¹⁶ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the barricades to be lifted as to encourage the search for jobs, and because activities were resuming, and he wanted people to move freely.⁵¹⁷ P-2602 states that every village and district had barricades,⁵¹⁸ and claims he does not know what was the situation in PK5.⁵¹⁹

⁵⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9760, l. 773-788.

⁵⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9760-9761, l. 792-805.

⁵⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9737, at 9761, l. 797-805.

⁵⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9765, l. 16-21.

⁵⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9765, l. 24-31.

⁵¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9765-9766, l. 34-39.

⁵¹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9766, l. 41-51.

⁵¹² CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9769-9767, l. 66-73.

⁵¹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9766, l. 62-65.

⁵¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9767, l. 74-78.

⁵¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9767-9768, l. 104-109.

⁵¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9768, l. 111-114.

⁵¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9768, l. 119-128.

⁵¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9768, l. 136.

⁵¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9769, l. 141-143.

XIII. THE ROLE OF NGAÏSSONA

121. P-2602 states that he was unaware of the fact that NGAÏSSONA returned to BANGUI in 14 January 2014, as he was still in BOSSANGO. ⁵²⁰ P-2602 also states that he did not know anything about NGAÏSSONA as a coordinator or as a leader of the Anti-Balaka, ⁵²¹ as he is only acquainted with the structure and coordination of the Anti-Balaka from GOBERE, and the ones who were in the bush or in contact with him. ⁵²²

122. P-2602 explains that he heard about NGAÏSSONA on the radio, and saw him on TV as the President of the Federation, but not as Anti-Balaka's coordinator. ⁵²³ P-2602 explains that because of his military role, he did not attend Anti-Balaka's political meetings, in which the coordination of the movement was setup. ⁵²⁴ Nor has he attended a meeting in which NGAÏSSONA was proclaimed coordinator. ⁵²⁵

123. When P-2602 came back to BANGUI, he and his fellow elements who were fighting in the bushes realised the Anti-Balaka had turned political, and they did not wanted to be involved in politics. ⁵²⁶ P-2602 expresses his frustration with the new disposition of the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI, and states that he and many other elements shared this discontentment, revoking their military duties. ⁵²⁷

Documents, decisions, appointments, mission orders, and other Anti-Balaka figures

124. P-2602 states that he does not know NAMSIO Emotion personally. ⁵²⁸ P-2602 claims to have heard NAMSIO speak on the radio, but not as a spokesperson for the Anti-Balaka. ⁵²⁹ P-2602 does not know the ones involved in the political side of the Anti-Balaka, nor has any document, as mission orders, appointments, *communiqués*, from the Anti-Balaka coordination. ⁵³⁰

125. P-2602 did not have any document or mission order [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ⁵³¹ P-2602 states that an Anti-Balaka [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁵²⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9768-9769, l. 139-143.

⁵²¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9770, l. 179-197.

⁵²² CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9771, l. 212-230, and at 9773, l. 284-285.

⁵²³ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9771-9772, l. 242-245.

⁵²⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9772, l. 265-277.

⁵²⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9772, l. 246-257.

⁵²⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9773, l. 287-301.

⁵²⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9773-9774, l. 302-318.

⁵²⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9786, l. 18-26.

⁵²⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9786, l. 33-34.

⁵³⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9787, l. 37-46.

⁵³¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9787, l. 58-61.

⁵³² CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9787-9788, l. 62-73.

126. P-2602 does not know anything about the 23 January 2014 *communiqué* from NGAÏSSONA, declaring him as leader of the Anti-Balaka.⁵³⁵ When P-2602 arrived in BANGUI, he was disarmed by the French troops, and as a military, he did not want to be involved in the political part of the movement, so he abandoned the group.⁵³⁶ In the *communiqué*, P-2602 recognises the name KONATE as he was previously a FACA, but does not know about his leadership role.⁵³⁷

127. P-2602 does not know anything about the PCUD, he does not know anything about the party, or who is the president of the party.⁵³⁸

128. [REDACTED]

129. P-2602 recognizes KEMA on a list of 23 people that represented the Anti-Balaka, ERN CAR-OTP-2001-6924, and affirms that when KEMA was in the BRAZAVILLE talks, P-2602 was in BOSSANGO.⁵⁴⁰ KEMA, HOURONTI and LEBENE Thierry [REDACTED] in BOSSANGO, and were in GOBERE [REDACTED]

130. P-2602 affirms he does not know anything about the document named [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁴ P-2602 reinforces that he was not involved with the political side of the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁴⁵

⁵³³ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9788, l. 73-78.

⁵³⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9788, l. 79-83.

⁵³⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9788, l. 87-98.

⁵³⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9788-9789, l. 99-108.

⁵³⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9789, l. 109-113.

⁵³⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9792, l. 221-229.

⁵³⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9792, l. 213-243.

⁵⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9794-9795, l. 292-319.

⁵⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9795, l. 331-340.

⁵⁴² CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9789, l. 114-134.

⁵⁴³ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9789, l. 134.

⁵⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9789-9790, l. 141-143.

⁵⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9790, l. 145-162.

XIV. ANTI-BALAKA [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]

they did not wanted

to be involved in politics.⁵⁴⁸

13 [REDACTED]

Anti-Balaka Badges

133. P-2602 still has his Anti-Balaka ID card,⁵⁵¹ which was issued [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁵⁵² P-2602 explains that they issued the badges as identification, especially after unruly (“bad”) elements started joining, and doing things in the name of the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁵³ Each person was to pay 1,500 for the badge, their ID card to be issued.⁵⁵⁴ [REDACTED] as a way to avoid others to infiltrate.⁵⁵⁵ [REDACTED] half in BANGUI and half in BOSSANGO, but as many others joined along the way, not all of them owned badges.⁵⁵⁶

XV. YEKATOM

134. P-2602 affirms that he does not know anything about YEKATOM, besides the fact that they were both militaries, and YEKATOM was Chief Corporal at the chief of staff office in 2007.⁵⁵⁷ P-2602 also affirms that he and YEKATOM did not have direct interactions, were not in communication during the crisis, nor heard anything about him while he was

⁵⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9796, l. 376-379.

⁵⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9797, l. 395-402.

⁵⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9797-9798, l. 403-416.

⁵⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9799, l. 457-464.

⁵⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9799, l. 465-474.

⁵⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793, l. 250-256.

⁵⁵² CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793, l. 258-264.

⁵⁵³ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793, l. 267-269.

⁵⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793, l. 271.

⁵⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793, l. 272-275.

⁵⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9793-9794, l. 277-287.

⁵⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9780, l. 540-551.

in GOBERE.⁵⁵⁸ P-2602 was aware that military members were forming Anti-Balaka groups in other parts of the country, but did not know that YEKATOM personally was forming a group in his location.⁵⁵⁹ P-2602 explains that it was common knowledge that FACAs, especially if the Seleka killed their relatives, would gather and form their own groups seeking for revenge.⁵⁶⁰ Besides GOBERE, P-2602 states that this happened in BOUAR, where they gathered and called for colleagues to come and support them.⁵⁶¹ P-2602 heard about incidents in the LOBAYE prefecture through the radio, but was not directly informed by chiefs about YEKATOM or where his group was located.⁵⁶²

XVI. BOZIZÉ

135. P-2602 knows that BOZIZÉ and his family are from BONGOZUI, a village in OUHAM, though he does not know how close BONGOUZI is from BENZAMBE and BOSSANGO.⁵⁶³ P-2602 states that he does not personally know BOZIZÉ's family.⁵⁶⁴

XVII. FINAL DOCUMENTS

██████████ to support the ANTI-BALAKA i ██████████ 2014

136. P-2602 went to ██████████ before being disarmed by the French.⁵⁶⁵ P-2602 was in BANGUI when the Anti-Balaka ██████████ called for reinforcements. They had been attacked by the Seleka and were losing their posts.⁵⁶⁶ ██████████

██████████ to assist the Anti-Balaka there.⁵⁶⁷

137. ██████████

██████████ went to ██████████ in motorcycles, met with other Anti-Balaka elements and handed the ammunitions.⁵⁶⁹ P-2602 did not fight with the Seleka there, the clashes between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka had already happened.⁵⁷⁰ The group arrived at night, and left in the next morning around 10, going back through ██████████ to BANGUI.⁵⁷¹

⁵⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9781, l. 554-561.

⁵⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9781, l. 562-571.

⁵⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9781, l. 572-577.

⁵⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9781, l. 578-583.

⁵⁶² CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9781-9782, l. 585-597.

⁵⁶³ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9811, l. 120-131.

⁵⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9812, l. 138.

⁵⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9777, l. 421-425, 426-432.

⁵⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9550, l. 153-156.

⁵⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9550, l. 158-170.

⁵⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9550-9551, l. 171-189.

⁵⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9778, l. 459-460.


⁵⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9551, l. 204-206.

⁵⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9545, at 9551, l. 204-206, and at 9552, l. 231-249.

138. P-2602 affirms that he did not know what was happening in [REDACTED] at the time.⁵⁷² P-2602 affirms he knew [REDACTED] but did not know about his role within the Anti-Balaka,⁵⁷³ nor knew about other chiefs from [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁴ P-2602 also denies knowing a ComZone by the name of [REDACTED].

CDR for February [REDACTED] 2014 in [REDACTED]
 139. P-2602 went to [REDACTED] in around [REDACTED] February 2014 after the attack in BOSSANGOA [REDACTED] who died in BANGUI.⁵⁷⁶

Persons of interest



Videos

140. P-2602 was shown a couple of videos for comments, including ERN CAR-OTP-2088-2240, of destroyed houses after the BOSSANGOA attack on 5 December. P-2602 states he

⁵⁷² CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9778, l. 478.

⁵⁷³ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9779, l. 494-504.

⁵⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9779, l. 506-512.

⁵⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9764, at 9779-9780, l. 515-522.

⁵⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9814-9815, l. 232-241.

⁵⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9646, l. 146-166.

⁵⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9646-9647, l. 170-177.

⁵⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9651, l. 317-322.

⁵⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9641, at 9651, l. 325-327.

⁵⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9812, l. 145-168.

⁵⁸² CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9813-9814, l. 169-177.

⁵⁸³ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9813, l. 178-183.

⁵⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9813, l. 188-195.

does not recognise the location,⁵⁸⁵ and reinstates that the buildings were destroyed by the population, out of anger of the Seleka, after the Anti-Balaka left the town.⁵⁸⁶

141. P-2602 is shown CAR-OTP-208 [REDACTED] which is a video where Anti-Balaka elements state that the Muslim population should be considered responsible for the crimes of the Seleka.⁵⁸⁷ P-2602 states that professionals knew how to differentiate the Seleka from the Muslim unarmed population,⁵⁸⁸ and further states that [REDACTED] BANGUI were trained to fight and defend the population, hence, did not share this view portrayed in the video.⁵⁸⁹ P-2602 recognises [REDACTED] in the video, seated in a [REDACTED] chair.⁵⁹⁰ And [REDACTED] a man from [REDACTED] seated in the back in a [REDACTED] chair with [REDACTED].⁵⁹¹

Photos

142. P-2602 is shown CAR-OTP-2061 [REDACTED] CAR-OTP-2061 [REDACTED] CAR-OTP-2061 [REDACTED] and identifies other Anti-Balaka figures from [REDACTED]⁵⁹² based on the way they dress.⁵⁹³ P-2082-0796, P-2602 recognises [REDACTED] from a small village in [REDACTED] who died in PK12.⁵⁹⁴ In CAR-OTP-2061-4195, P-2602 does not recognise anyone.⁵⁹⁵

Attribution of Telephone Numbers

143. P-2602 is shown a couple telephone numbers to see whether he can determine who they belong to.

- [REDACTED] He does not know the owner of this number.⁵⁹⁶
- [REDACTED] He does do not know this number.⁵⁹⁷
- [REDACTED] He does do not know this number.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9800, l. 482-502.

⁵⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9785, at 9802-9803, l. 582-600.

⁵⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9819, l. 390-397.

⁵⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9819, l. 401-403.

⁵⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9819-9820, l. 405-411.

⁵⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9820, l. 434-444.

⁵⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9820, l. 426-432.

⁵⁹² CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9821, l. 464-475.

⁵⁹³ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9821-9822, l. 477, 479.

⁵⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9822-9823, l. 502-506, 513.

⁵⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9822, l. 484-488.

⁵⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9816, l. 279.

⁵⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9816, l. 289-295.

⁵⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2118-9807, at 9816, l. 305.