

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [REDACTED] Gender: Male
First Name: [REDACTED] Father's Name: [REDACTED]
Other names used: [REDACTED] Mother's Name: [REDACTED]
Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Passport / ID number: [REDACTED]
Date of Birth/Age: [REDACTED] Nationality: [REDACTED]
Ethnicity: [REDACTED] Religion: [REDACTED]

Language(s) Spoken: French, Sango

Language(s) Written: French, Sango

Language(s) Used in Interview: French and English

Occupation: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: Remote Interview via [REDACTED] Investigators in THE HAGUE,
Interpreter in LEEDS, Witness in BANGUI

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview: [REDACTED] Investigator; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Associate Investigator; [REDACTED] French-English Interpreter;

Signature(s): [REDACTED]

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Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and told that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and told that they are an interpreter with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in the Central African Republic since August 2012. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in French, with the help of a French-English interpreter. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.

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8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. The investigators explained to me that the OTP is currently using [REDACTED] software (with the required security features) to conduct some of its interviews because of the travel and other limitations imposed by the COVID-19 situation. I agreed that the interview be conducted this way and, that at the end of the interview, the investigators will produce a written statement, which I will be asked to sign in the presence of [REDACTED] Associate Investigator, having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information. I understand that the other OTP staff and the interpreter will then sign this document electronically.
11. The OTP staff asked me to show them my identity card which is a Central African passport bearing the number [REDACTED]

Background

12. I grew up in [REDACTED]. The family house is still in [REDACTED] but I no longer live there. I have lived in [REDACTED] all my life, apart from when I moved to [REDACTED] for my studies.
13. When BOZIZE took power in 2003, I had just started at the [REDACTED] where I first studied [REDACTED] and then [REDACTED] in the private faculty of [REDACTED]. The youth at university felt they should support the new political dynamic. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I joined the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] but I was too young and I still wanted to study. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] went on to become the [REDACTED] but [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
14. I moved to [REDACTED] and obtained a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from the [REDACTED] in 2012. When I returned, I was still in the [REDACTED] but was not very active. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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15. When I returned to BANGUI in [REDACTED] I began to work at the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I was in charge of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which I do
to this day.
16. In [REDACTED] I was appointed to the position of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I reported to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. In March 2013
the Seleka arrived and a new regime in place was put in place. In September 2013,
[REDACTED] within the same [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In this role, I [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED] was related to DJOTODIA and in fact had held the same position of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] previously. DJOTODIA did not have a problem with the KNK, in fact, he
himself used to campaign for the KNK. The problem was that DJOTODIA was not
ready for power, he had brought people with him but lost control of them. I had
Muslim and Christian friends. However, there were abuses throughout the country
and the Seleka regime could not manage the situation. At the time, I just got on with
my work, although I had to avoid certain areas and certain people so I limited my
movements. I could have left the country, like many did, but it was a personal
challenge to stay and experience a new period in the history of CAR. I was persecuted
by some, but I carried on and served my country.
18. In January 2014, under the Transitional Government of SAMBA-PANZA, [REDACTED] was
replaced by [REDACTED] I worked under [REDACTED] until [REDACTED]
or [REDACTED] found that I was [REDACTED]
and I was persecuted because of this. The atmosphere was not good, and
[REDACTED] tried to 'buy me out'. In BANGUI, the power is managed by a very
small circle of people, and any appointment is decided by this small power group. I
preferred to just get on with my [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
19. Since January 2020, I have resumed my activities with the [REDACTED] I am now the
[REDACTED] in which role I
[REDACTED] I am also the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
20. I previously worked for the [REDACTED] but I
find that he is not being fair - [REDACTED]

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BANGUI in 2013

21. When DJOTODIA came to power, many people fled BANGUI. [REDACTED] left before the Seleka arrived – he was [REDACTED] for my [REDACTED] so of course we stayed in touch. He had French nationality so went to FRANCE, where he stayed during the Seleka regime. Many who fled the Seleka were [REDACTED] – we also stayed in touch. Some of my friends who I knew [REDACTED] also left BANGUI and we stayed in contact. Some blamed me for staying in BANGUI, and others understood. I stayed in touch with Central African people who had left for BRAZZAVILLE, CHAD and CAMEROON. We spoke about all manner of things – about politics, about the situation in the country etc.
22. DJOTODIA's arrival had resulted in disorder, and I wanted stability for my country. I did not mind if it was BOZIZE or someone else who brought this. You must remember that BOZIZE's mandate was ongoing, so it makes sense that he wanted to come back. However, I was not interested in the man, I was simply interested in the situation stabilising. For this to happen, DJOTODIA had to leave and the regime had to end, because he was not able to control people and it was a real mess.
23. One thing must be clear, I was not involved with the Anti-Balaka, I had no responsibility and no position within the Anti-Balaka. However, something had to be done, as the situation was unbearable. People, including those in charge of the Anti-Balaka, would contact me [REDACTED]. For instance, I was in contact with [REDACTED] who is [REDACTED] like me – our families [REDACTED]. The others who I was in contact with did not have as much influence as him. I know NGAISSONA, but I have no relationship with RHOMBOT. NGAISSONA and RHOMBOT belong to different branches of the movement.
24. They would not contact me for military advice – this was not my forte – but just for advice on how to oust DJOTODIA. I had political arguments, and could put them in touch with people [REDACTED]. We talked about [REDACTED]. Rather than speaking about the military aspect of [REDACTED].
25. When the Seleka took power, they were divided into small groups, each with a chief. However, they were not ready for power. Many of them were just looking for material goods they could take, and they committed many crimes. DJOTODIA's elements also took hostages. We asked for them to be released, and DJOTODIA had to pay the ransom to his own elements to have them released. As I have said, he was not able to

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control his own elements. We ended up in a situation where everyone simply had to defend themselves.

26. In the rest of the country, things were even worse than they were in BANGUI. I heard about crimes being committed. Everyone communicated by phone, information circulates quickly around here. I have relations and friends in many places such as BOSSANGO, MBAIKI, BOUAR and BAMBARI, and I would hear from them what was happening in their localities.
27. Under DJOTODIA, the CAR army, police and gendarmerie practically no longer existed. DJOTODIA wanted to create his own army. Some of those in the CAR army were chased out while some kept on working under the new regime, thinking that they might get promoted. Some joined the resistance.
28. The Anti-Balaka was not created to take power. It was a spontaneous self-defence movement at first, the politics came later. People were fed up of being attacked and humiliated. In every locality they organised a traditional resistance movement with fetishes and traditional weapons. There were clashes, and gradually they obtained more weapons and military professionals joined them. Everyone knew the Anti-Balaka were advancing, even the Seleka knew. At the beginning, the movement was all about defending your village. It was only later that the movement became politicised and structured at the highest level. I will discuss this later.
29. I did not leave BANGUI around this time – [REDACTED] did not allow me to. During the day, I worked until 4PM or 5PM, but in the evening and at the weekends, at home, I would try to obtain information about what was happening on the ground, from [REDACTED] (I do not know his other names), [REDACTED] and many others, as I mention throughout this statement.

Attack of 5th December

30. The 1st December is our national day in CAR, and in 2013 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We heard about possible attacks on BANGUI as early as 29th-30th November 2013, so it was decided that the celebrations would be cancelled that year. There was a sort of a pre-attack fever in the air, the Seleka were everywhere, waiting for something to happen. On the 4th December at about 7PM, I got a call from a [REDACTED] friend who was following the movements of the Anti-Balaka. He told me to be careful and that it could be bad. Indeed at about 4AM we were all woken by shots and detonations. At the time, I was living [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I lived close to the main road. My family were with me at home.

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31. Everybody began to telephone everyone else. At 5AM or 6AM, when it was light, I left my compound and could see the Anti-Balaka withdrawing towards the northern neighbourhoods. The Seleka were able to take back the town.
32. This various Anti-Balaka groups who attacked BANGUI on the 5th December were, in the end, coordinated by a few elements of the French army, to justify the arrival of the Sangaris. This was common knowledge. The attack was rushed so that the Anti-Balaka could not take power. The Anti-Balaka created bases in BANGUI and conducted attacks to chase out the Seleka, until their arrival at the town centre of our capital. DJOTODIA then had to resign. The international community arranged for DJOTODIA to leave quietly and for the Muslim population to be secure in areas such as PK5.
33. The Anti-Balaka's structure then became political. Of course, politicians have their own agenda, and the big question was, who would replace DJOTODIA as president? The politicians used the Anti-Balaka as contacts, to try to take control. This is why the 'President' – this is what we all NGAISSONA because of his role with the CAR Football Federation – became the Anti-Balaka coordinator. There was a vacancy at the presidency, but we had to use people from civil society to stop these politicians trying to grab power. This is why the Transitional Government was chosen.
34. The investigators asked me when and why it was decided that NGAISSONA would become the Anti-Balaka coordinator. I replied that this is not something that was decided as such. NGAISSONA came to BANGUI and he decided himself that he would be their coordinator. He was both economically powerful and confident, and he simply imposed himself as the coordinator. It was an honour for the Anti-Balaka that he wanted to be their coordinator. It was an opportunity for NGAISSONA – he had lost a lot in these events and he wanted to save what was left. From BANGUI, he organised the different factions of the Anti-Balaka coalition. At the beginning, that meant everyone, but later, divisions emerged.
35. Maxime MOKOM came to BANGUI before NGAISSONA to structure the Anti-Balaka. I know this because [REDACTED] Later, there was a power struggle on the ground and in the end, NGAISSONA was more powerful.
36. When SAMBA-PANZA became the President of the Transitional Government, the idea was to bring back calm and order, but this did not work. The armed groups wanted to cause trouble and a lot of people wanted to take control and gain power. There was a lot of trafficking and some made money from the disorder.
37. NGAISSONA was already fully in contact with the Anti-Balaka before and at the time of the Anti-Balaka attack on BANGUI, but I do not know who gave the order for the

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attack. I discuss his role in the coordination from CAMEROON throughout this statement. Maxime MOKOM was also in contact with the Anti-Balaka, and when NGAISSONA returned to BANGUI and became the Anti-Balaka coordinator, he became their deputy coordinator (under NGAISSONA). The Anti-Balaka Coordination was then established.

38. The RHOMBOT wing did not always respect the hierarchy of the Anti-Balaka Coordination although they should have done so. RHOMBOT's group, under his direction, was more rebellious and stubborn. They did not always follow the orders of the Anti-Balaka Coordination. The RHOMBOT wing did play a role in paralysing BANGUI around September 2014 - the order was followed by all the groups.

Facebook Messages between [REDACTED] (CAR-OTP-[REDACTED])

39. The investigators told me that they would show me some Facebook messages that I exchanged with [REDACTED] at the time of the conflict. [REDACTED] and I are old friends [REDACTED] He is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at the time of BOZIZE. We both got involved with politics [REDACTED] at the same time. When BOZIZE lost power, [REDACTED] was wanted by the Seleka. [REDACTED] I told [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We stayed in contact the whole time he was out there, through Facebook, email and telephone.

40. The investigators directed me to various messages on the document CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] [REDACTED] which contains Facebook correspondence between [REDACTED] and me.

41. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] The investigators asked me about the messages exchanged from [REDACTED] I explained that we were exchanging information at the time regarding the country and our families. At the time, there was a rumour in BANGUI that BOZIZE was going to see HOLLANDE. BOZIZE was in FRANCE after CAMEROON. MDD (Ministre délégué de la défense) refers to Francis BOZIZE. This was in connection with the idea that he was going to ISRAEL to find weapons - the term [REDACTED] but in this context it refers to weapons. In general, when I use the term [REDACTED] it is referring to weapons and/or ammunition. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] However, this information turned out not to be true. We would hear through rumours that he was in ISRAEL or FRANCE (he has French nationality), but in fact he stayed in BRAZZAVILLE and KINSHASA.

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42. GBANGOUMA is mentioned in the messages. He is a military man, he was part of the BOZIZE rebellion of 2003 and is close to BOZIZE. When BOZIZE lost power, GBANGOUMA went to the border in CAMEROON, where he led a team of Presidential Guards. He was in the field when the regime fell, so he went directly to the border with his team, but they were disarmed by the Cameroonians. He later ended up in YAOUNDE. He spent a lot of time with [REDACTED]. He is now back in BANGUI and has become the commander of the Mobile Legion in the Gendarmerie.
43. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] The investigators asked me about the message sent on [REDACTED]. The situation was very confusing when the Seleka took power. It was a disaster, and most people had gone into exile in CAMEROON. They decided to do something to change the situation. DOLOWAYE, who was a General, was appointed Chief of Staff under the Seleka. However, he was not happy to hold this position and he ended up in CAMEROON. Later, he returned to BANGUI to occupy this position.
44. The Cameroonians disarmed the military (FACA) who crossed the border and kept their weapons. I think DOLOWAYE came to CAMEROON to negotiate getting the weapons back, but I am not sure. At the time, DJOTODIA and then SAMBA-PANZA both negotiated to get the weapons back and failed. I think it is only now that the weapons are being returned.
45. The investigators asked me if I had heard about weapons being hidden or buried by FACA on their way to CAMEROON. I did not hear about this, but it is possible.
46. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] Here, [REDACTED] was informing me about people's movements and locations in June 2013. For instance, BOZIZE was supposed to still be in CAMEROON.
47. I know Eric DANBOY. He is the nephew of President BOZIZE, who sent him to military school. He joined the 'libérateur' rebellion of 2003 and later joined BOZIZE's *garde rapprochée*. He went into exile with BOZIZE and they went to FRANCE together. DANBOY stayed in FRANCE and I believe he has now been arrested there. OUAPOUNABA or WAPOUNABA is the direct *aide de camp* of BOZIZE - Touaboy LANDRY was his other *aide de camp*. When the Seleka arrived in BANGUI, OUAPOUNABA almost had to brutalise BOZIZE to force him to flee in a helicopter. Later, he ended up in FRANCE and returned to BANGUI in 2015. I do not know DOBIGUE.
48. On [REDACTED] I sent a message regarding 'NGAIKOSSE'. He was BOZIZE's close associate, his right hand man, Eugène NGAIKOSSET.

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49. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] The investigators directed me to the message sent on [REDACTED] This message gives information about people's movements, and how an operation should be undertaken from SIBUT, BOUAR and BERBERATI. This is just information that I received. I do not know much about this, I explained earlier on that the situation was very difficult for the military in BANGUI, because DJOTODIA wanted to get rid of the FACA and create his own army. This message is in relation to creating fronts in these towns and encouraging others to join them for a potential movement on BANGUI, but I do not have any more details.
50. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] Here, [REDACTED] is giving me information on what was happening in DRC and SOUTH SUDAN. People were starting to get organised to launch an attack in CAR but there was a problem in CAMEROON, because GBANGOUMA and LAMKAGUE's group had been told by SANI and DAZ YALO that they would not succeed, and that they should instead join the YALO's group. This destabilised the organisation that the military were trying to set up.
51. SANI YALO is an important person, he is involved in transportation, he is the President of the Board of Directors of BARC, a state body which monitors transportation. He has always been close to the power circle. His brother DAZ was involved in the rebellion with BOZIZE in 2003. They are both Muslims. When BOZIZE left in 2013, they stayed in CAR. There was then an issue regarding the looting of the Renault car company, and they were both arrested by the Seleka. However, they escaped to DRC and made public statements saying they would take power. They eventually came to CAMEROON where many of the military were in exile and made contact with GBANGOUMA and LAMKAGUE, who they tried to win over to their cause. However, this did not work. In addition, the Cameroonian authorities started to monitor their movements.
52. SANI and DAZ YALO hoped to recruit the FACA in CAMEROON to join them. All politicians were trying to benefit from the situation and take power. Many alliances were made and fell apart. Everyone was trying to get somewhere. However, it did not work and they eventually returned to CAR.
53. There were also FACA soldiers in DRC and SUDAN. They were probably contacted to join groups and change the situation. I do not really know much about SUDAN, but ZONGO is not very far, so I know there were police and gendarmes there who were asked to be ready. In DRC, NGAIKOSSET and Maxime MOKOM appeared to be organising things, while in CAMEROON GBANGOUMA and other FACA were organising at that level. Where the actual orders came from I am not sure. You can read in the message that I say [REDACTED]

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54. The investigators asked me to explain what I meant by the message of [REDACTED] which reads [REDACTED] had said to me that people were organising themselves to come to BANGUI, so I was trying to find out if this was actually happening. On one hand, the military who were humiliated by the Seleka and forced to flee the country were organising themselves to try to take back control. On the other, people such as those in previously existing *auto-défense* groups, who could no longer stand the atrocities committed by the Seleka were trying to defend themselves. Later, the two groups began working together. However, the organisation of the military around the time of this message was an issue and nothing was really happening yet.
55. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] When SANI and DAZ YALO made contact with GBANGOUMA and LAMKAGUE, they could not agree. SANI and DAZ made contact with an army officer named KOKATE, who was with the Seleka but betrayed them at the time of the LIBREVILLE negotiations. IFONDO is a locality in CONGO BRAZZAVILLE, close to CAR, and I had heard that there was movement of armed men there. That is why I asked [REDACTED] about it. [REDACTED] told me that it was SANI, DAZ and KOKATE who organised for these troops to cross over from BRAZZAVILLE into CAR.
56. Abdoulaye HISENE was a Seleka officer who played a double game. Each Seleka group had their own leader, and each group was only accountable to their own leader. HISENE had his own group. He understood that the Government could not succeed and he started making contact with people outside the country to see how he could position himself.
57. The investigators asked me what [REDACTED] meant when he says that the [REDACTED] have arrived in BANGUI. [REDACTED] indicates that there are armed people in place in BANGUI. He confirms that elements of HISENE and others are there already, and they are armed for an operation. Each of the leaders had their armed men, some had obtained weapons in the provinces. Do not forget that in BANGUI, the Seleka had looted the arms depot, so there were a lot of weapons around. I do not know anything else about these [REDACTED] arriving in BANGUI, or where they came from.
58. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] These messages follow on from the previous conversation; they give information about movements in BOSSANGO and BENZAMBE (BOZIZE's village). BENZAMBE is towards the Chadian border. When [REDACTED] says that the men and [REDACTED] were [REDACTED], he simply means that they were sent there. [REDACTED] refers to BOSSANGO. When [REDACTED] speaks of 'GUEMENA', this is referring to a place in DRC where elements were gathered. I think that it referred not just to FACA soldiers, but also to other men who were recruited in GUEMENA (or GENEMA), who had come to reinforce the FACA. I do not know who these other

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men were - probably mercenaries. I do not know if they were recruited in GUEMENA or if they were recruited elsewhere and then sent there.

59. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] When I refer to 'attaques mistik', I mean attacks with fetishes and *gris-gris*. [REDACTED] refers to Levi YAKETE. I was in BANGUI, YAKETE was in FRANCE, [REDACTED]
60. The investigators asked me about the 'Anti Zaraguina'. People say that 'Anti-Balaka' means anti-machete, but this is a misconstruction. Rather, it means 'Anti Balle AKA', meaning AKA-47 bullets could not go through them. The Anti Zaraguinas have existed for a long time, they fought the highway bandits or *coupeurs de route* in the provinces who would rob vehicles and loot villages. The 'Anti Zaraguinas' became the *auto-défense* groups who defended their villages, and they used *gris-gris* and fetishes to protect themselves against bullets. These Anti Zaraguinas or *auto-défense* groups became the Anti Balaka. At the time, we referred to them as the Anti Zaraguina. When the Seleka were taking over villages, for instance BOUCA and BOSSANGOA, the Anti Zaraguina reacted to this. The movement then developed, becoming known as the Anti-Balaka.
61. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] This follows on from previous messages. I am asked if things are moving in BANGUI. DOBIGUE and PRINCE LAKOUETENE are military men and were both in BANGUI at the time. FRANCO is an officer, but he is dead now. I cannot remember another name for him. The investigators pointed me to [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] asks who is [REDACTED] and I reply [REDACTED]. I replied that [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] was an officer from our neighbourhood.
62. PRINCE [REDACTED] but he came back when the Seleka came to power and he was in charge of supplying the food for the guards and the military, for instance for the Presidential Guard of DJOTODIA. DOGUELA is also an officer, and they were able to contact small groups of people to try to organise themselves, saying that the military must do something. DOGUELA is now deceased.
63. When the Seleka came to power, some military men fled, but some others actually joined the Seleka because they hoped to quickly get promotions and were given new titles and grades. PRINCE was one of these people, he came back and worked in the army under DJOTODIA. These people exploited the situation but were quickly disappointed, as the Seleka did not have the normal way of doing things. They then became disillusioned and tried to organise themselves to overthrow the new regime.
64. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] Here, I am speaking about my aunt who worked at the [REDACTED] who went into exile in DOUALA. She asked me to [REDACTED] and she made a mistake in the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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65. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED]: Around this time, SASSOU NGUESSOU and DEBY were supposed to be coming to BANGUI to talk about the crisis. People from BOY RABE were supposed to be mobilising against DEBY because he was seen as having helped the Seleka, and I was referring to the organisation of this being very bad. I am not sure who the organiser was, or what the connection was with NGAISSONA in CAMEROON or anything like that.
66. [REDACTED] refers to MISKINE, [REDACTED] It was at the center of everything in BANGUI.
67. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] Here, [REDACTED] is talking about BOZIZE who is supposed to be going back to YAOUNDE. People thought he was in SOUTH SUDAN but he was actually in FRANCE and we thought he would be coming back to CAMEROON. OUAPOUNABA had come back on the Sunday so people were wondering if BOZIZE was going to join him.
68. There is a reference to NGAISSONA and MOKOM *père* going to BERTOUA and GAROUA BOULAYE to meet the archers who were based in BOUAR. The archers are those who fought with bows and arrows to protect their cattle, they did not have modern weapons. They also used *gris-gris* and other things. NGAISSONA and MOKOM *père* wanted to approach them to see if they could also be used in the resistance. At the time, there were no Anti-Balaka in the north-west of the country and the archers were contacted to join the movement. BOUAR is about 100km from the Cameroonian border, so they needed a first group to 'clean the ground', and then allow the others to intervene. At the time, in BOUAR, the situation was very difficult and NGAISSONA and MOKOM wanted to potentially organise the movement there.
69. NGAISSONA and MOKOM *père* are both Gbaya, [REDACTED] They were in exile in CAMEROON and wanted to organise a resistance movement in CAR. They were close to BOZIZE who wanted the return to constitutional order.
70. MOKOM *père* was a *sous préfet*, I do not think he could have brought much equipment to the movement, but he might have helped with facilitating contacts and such. Perhaps he had contacts with the archers, I do not know. I know MOKOM *père*, his first name is Bernard and we also refer to him as Vieux MOKOM. He is the father of Maxime MOKOM. I did not have direct contact with MOKOM *père* while he was in [REDACTED] However, since he returned to BANGUI he became a pastor and for a [REDACTED]
71. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] Around this time, the FACA were organising themselves, there were groups everywhere- in BOSSANGOA, BOUCA, BATANGAFO- there was fighting in various zones. There were serious clashes

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between the Seleka and Anti-Balaka in a village named NDJO. This reinforced the idea and the determination to move on to BANGUI. In fact, NDJO is a little further than 10km from BOSSEMBELE.

72. There are three major axes, the MBAIKI axis which was essentially controlled by RHOMBOT, the BOALI axis towards BOSSEMBELE and CAMEROON and the DAMARA axis. FACA elements who wanted to flee to the provinces could leave through any one of these axis, where they would join whatever group they had connections with. For instance, they might join a group in BOSSANGO or BOUCA or BATANGAFO. I had no direct contact with any of these FACA elements who went to the provinces. In fact, they did not even use phones – maybe the chiefs had telephones, but the soldiers did not. I was only in contact with FACA who stayed in BANGUI, such as [REDACTED]
73. I obtained information regarding BOSSANGO and BOUCA from relatives who lived there. I have two relatives in the BOSSANGO and BOUCA region, and they provided me with information, telling me about attacks there. I remember that they told me that the Anti-Balaka would ambush the Seleka as they passed, and there would then be an exchange of fire. This is how the Anti-Balaka would obtain weapons.
74. When the Seleka heard that their comrades were caught in an ambush by the Anti-Balaka, there would be reprisal attacks on the villages, and so the cycle continued. These villages were normal villages where civilians – elderly people, women, children – all lived. The Anti-Balaka, as with the Seleka, would also attack in places where there were civilians. My relatives told me that both sides killed innocent civilians.
75. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] refers to President BOZIZE. [REDACTED] told me that he had left for FRANCE the previous day, and that he was directing the operation – the ‘operation’ refers to what was taking place in the field. In actual fact, it was not true. He went from FRANCE straight to UGANDA. Do you think that the French authorities would have permitted him to direct an operation from there? There were many rumours circulating at the time about the Anti-Balaka and armed groups, and the BOZIZE name could motivate elements, so his name would be mentioned frequently for this purpose.
76. I was in contact with [REDACTED] but not with his father. Due to [REDACTED], I obtained a lot of information and he thought I was well placed if he wanted to ask something about happenings in CAR. I obtained information from many people - I would chat with various groups of friends, military and civilian. [REDACTED] was in contact with the Seleka’s military hierarchy so he was a good

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source of information. I was also [REDACTED] and would exchange information with my colleagues and [REDACTED]

77. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] These messages indicate that Levi YAKETE was in YAOUNDE [REDACTED] and that NGAISSONA was on mission. You will recall that NGAISSONA was supposed to go to the border to make contact with the archers from BOUAR, I think this is the mission [REDACTED] was referring to.
78. KOKATE was like a liaison person, he would contact elements to mobilise them, he had a lot of connections in the military and in politics. I discuss his relationship with Vieux MOKOM and NGAISSONA later in this statement.
79. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] In the last message on this page, [REDACTED] tells me that [REDACTED] told him that 'our men' had taken MONGOUMBA, BATALIMO and MBATA. KOKATE was supposed to have brought men to the border with him. I do not think that this information was true about bringing men to the border, but this refers to these men. [REDACTED] is friends with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] he worked as [REDACTED] at the time of BOZIZE. When the regime fell, he went to the DRC, to KINSHASA with BOZIZE's children, where he stayed until the conflict was over. [REDACTED] He is now back in BANGUI.
80. In MONGOUMBA, BATALIMO and MBATA, the Seleka were chased away and withdrew to BANGUI. Only YEKATOM's men were ever seen in that area, despite what people said. The Anti-Balaka movement did not exist as such in that region, YEKATOM's men were military men and civilians, but at some point, Anti-Balaka arrived with *gris-gris* and vaccinated those in his group. Before their arrival, some of the locals already used *gris-gris* and fetishes, but they were not Anti-Balaka as such. Everyone was talking about the group in BANGUI at the time, and would just call them 'Anti-Balaka'. The group also considered themselves to be Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED] myself did not have contact with YEKATOM or his group.
81. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] I refer to SOCRATE – he is another son of BOZIZE's. I also refer to [REDACTED] receiving instructions. OUAPOUNABA was still in FRANCE at the time. These messages refer to people moving towards BERTOUA, but I do not really know anything about [REDACTED] instructions or who he received them from. I do not know what post he occupied while BOZIZE was in power.
82. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] These messages were exchanged on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told me that he had contact with BOZIZE, and that BOZIZE gave him the responsibility of the [REDACTED] and then

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communicating this to BOZIZE. I think that he was lying about this. He told me that at the same time, he worked with the Seleka guard.

83. [REDACTED] knew that things were moving, so I think he said this in the hope of obtaining more information from me. I do not think he was passing this information on to the Seleka, but during this troubled period, everyone was just trying to get themselves a particular position or advantage, and with information, they could influence people.
84. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] The first message on this page refers to the soldiers in CAMEROON going towards BERTOUA. The second message refers to the fact that at the time, BOSSANGO had been 'cleaned up', if you do not mind me using the expression, meaning the Seleka had been chased away. As they were able to chase the Seleka, they seemed to be well armed and taking BANGUI should not be too difficult. When [REDACTED] says that [REDACTED] he is referring to the Anti-Balaka and the military who had joined their ranks, who were together cleaning the inside of the country and were ready to progress towards BANGUI.
85. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] The investigators referred me to the message about [REDACTED] and CLAUDE, which refers to Claude NGAIKOSSET. [REDACTED] was just giving me information; he had a few elements who followed his orders. [REDACTED] was ordering these elements from [REDACTED] which is not far from [REDACTED] elements had joined the Anti-Balaka from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were already in [REDACTED] but I do not think it is true.
86. PRINCE would tell his elements exactly what they should do on the ground. [REDACTED] he and his group deployed to BOALI to cut off the electricity supply, for the attack the National Assembly when HOLLANDE came to BANGUI. NGREMANGO ordered PRINCE and his group to go to BOALI for this purpose. NGREMANGO coordinated all the military operations in BANGUI. I do not know how many elements PRINCE had.
87. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] These messages refer to NGAISSONA sending food and money to MOKOM and Claude NGAIKOSSET for the men in ZONGO, but nothing arrived and it sounded as if MOKOM had misappropriated or taken the goods, because people were complaining that they did not have any means out there. I know that NGAISSONA was sending food and money to these people because my friends in the military told me this. These military friends of mine were in contact with their colleagues in ZONGO. I think that this information was likely reliable.
88. I spoke to [REDACTED] about this at the time. I just said that I heard [REDACTED] the goods and money that NGAISSONA had sent, and he said that "it was not true, [REDACTED]". He said that NGAISSONA had not sent money and goods [REDACTED] for ZONGO.

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89. I do not know where NGAISSONA's money that he was supposedly was sending to ZONGO came from. Even though a lot of his warehouses were destroyed, he had many shops and such in BANGUI so he still had a lot of money. I think he used his own money. But we are not talking big amounts – he might have sent 100,000 or 200,000 FCFA. As I discuss later, I believe that NGAISSONA was also receiving money from people who wanted to support the Anti-Balaka movement.
90. I did not have direct contact with NGAISSONA at this time. When he returned to BANGUI, I had contact with him three or four times, but solely in connection with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He was in BANGUI during the conflict, and he virtually [REDACTED] when NGAISSONA was not around. NGAISSONA was President of the CAR Football Federation [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been in [REDACTED] for about two years now. We are not often in contact, as we were not on very good terms when he left. We often call him [REDACTED] – he has had this nickname since childhood, for some reason. [REDACTED] was with me in BANGUI all the time.
91. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] '[L]'assaut final' refers to the attack on BANGUI. People were preparing themselves for this and then nothing happened - as soon as politics got involved it was a totally different situation. Everyone was working towards the same aim of ousting DJOTODIA. The international community were under immense pressure to intervene because they knew that if the Anti-Balaka reached BANGUI, there would be a slaughter. They knew the Seleka would not give up the fight and there would be a terrible battle.
92. I was in BANGUI and had seen how DJOTODIA had taken power. First, there was a battle outside the entrance to BANGUI. The Seleka were initially defeated but the invisible hand of CHAD reinforced their troops. I think it was good that the international community intervened with the Anti-Balaka, because although they attacked and there was a big battle from 4AM to 6AM, it did not go exactly as planned and the international community were able to limit the fighting.
93. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED]: Again, this is in relation to the progression of the Anti-Balaka, I know a young guy who was part of the Anti-Balaka and he would telephone me from time to time to give me information. I also heard that there was fighting in GAGA. I just wanted to know this for my own information.
94. CAR-OTP [REDACTED] I read in particular the last message on the page 2101-9811 onwards. [REDACTED] is telling me that [REDACTED] said that the military men who have formed groups in BANGUI are waiting for supplies, and that

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NGAISSONA told [REDACTED] to tell him [REDACTED]. As for [REDACTED] as I have said, he often lied to obtain information and he did this by providing false information, hoping to get reliable information in return.

EMAIL - CAR-OTP [REDACTED]

95. The investigators showed me an email from [REDACTED] to NGAISSONA, sent on the [REDACTED]. The email details the [REDACTED] to NGAISSONA. The south is the zone that YEKATOM controlled. I never knew he sent this e-mail to NGAISSONA. I know he spoke to NGAISSONA. I have never seen this email before and I do not know if NGAISSONA sent these items. If NGAISSONA had sent these items, I think that [REDACTED] would have told me about it. [REDACTED] sent this document without my knowledge, but there was no reaction to it, otherwise I would know. What I mean by this is that at the time, I was [REDACTED] he would [REDACTED] and talk about events. [REDACTED] also knew PRINCE and DOGUELA.
96. As you can see, this document was sent late at night - I was not aware of it. If [REDACTED] had received 9 million FCFA around this time I would have noticed that he had come into money, but I did not notice this. This is what I mean by 'otherwise I would have known'. In normal times, [REDACTED] had a lot of money, as he is [REDACTED] and would earn a lot, but at the time of the conflict, [REDACTED]
97. When [REDACTED] says that the focal point is [REDACTED] he is saying that [REDACTED]. This is just pure fantasy. BANGUI is divided into a north zone (towards PK12) and a south zone (towards BIMBO). Perhaps [REDACTED] wanted to get some money out of NGAISSONA. [REDACTED] and I never saw him buying such supplies. Although he is close to military men, [REDACTED] is not one himself, he would have no knowledge of what to do in such a situation. I think it was just an opportunity for him try to obtain money from NGAISSONA.
98. Investigators asked me if I kept a journal or diary of the events. I used to keep notes on my computer at the time of the conflict, but this computer was stolen.
99. The investigators continued to show me Facebook messages I exchanged with [REDACTED] as follows:
100. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] As I have indicated, [REDACTED] refers to weapons and ammunition, while here [REDACTED] simply refers to everything that goes with them – such as food for the troops, credit for the troops and the kind of supplies we saw mentioned in the email we just looked at.

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101. There were several groups of military men who got together in small groups in the town of BANGUI. For instance, my friend [REDACTED] had his little group, and [REDACTED] also had a group of soldiers. Frankly speaking, they did not occupy a certain territory, they would simply call each other and organise meetings, then spread the message and the news, and get on with their activities. .
102. PRINCE and DOGUELA were soldiers and had weapons. They would just meet at various locations, if there were things to be distributed, it would have been done there on the spot.
103. The investigators asked me about the message that [REDACTED] sent in which he asks me if I had not said that the [REDACTED] had started to arrive. At the time, I was in contact with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I was curious about how things were being organised. I got information from [REDACTED] and various other people about the [REDACTED] arriving. These [REDACTED] would have been sent to the bush to Anti-Balaka chiefs there, but I do not know exactly who. People would cross over from DRC with the ammunition, but I do not know their names.
104. I know that these [REDACTED] came from DRC. When I take about [REDACTED] coming from DRC, it was essentially ammunition rather than weapons that was arriving. There was a lot of trafficking between DRC and CAR, it is still happening today.
105. The [REDACTED] could not have come from MOKOM and his group because they were in a refugee site so you could not have weapons there. MOKOM stayed in this refugee camp for a while, until he returned to BANGUI to join the groups. By 'groups' I mean the Anti-Balaka – [REDACTED]. He is not a soldier so I cannot imagine him leading the military in BANGUI. When he returned, he hid somewhere in BANGUI, perhaps even in his own house, I am not sure. He gave orders from there.
106. I recommend that the investigators speak with [REDACTED], who was a captain at the time of the conflict and is now a *commandant*. He can give you a lot of information about what happened with the military, the coordination of the soldiers and so on in BANGUI. I only have general information on this.
107. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] Koya means 'maternal uncle' and we use this as a term for the French. At the time, the situation was catastrophic, and HOLLANDE and his Foreign Minister FABIUS came to BANGUI to tell DJOTODIA that he had to go. [REDACTED] and I had an exchange on the content of HOLLANDE's message. At the same time, there was a movement in DRC to allow FACA who were over there to act as reinforcements in a potential operation. This all forms part of the work of the international community I was referring to the other day.

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108. I do not know who the leader was of the FACA in ZONGO. I know that from BANGUI, NGREMANGOU was coordinating them.

109. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] The investigators referred me to the messages sent at [REDACTED] onwards on this page. NGAISSONA and Vieux MOKOM went to the border with ammunition and medicine for the archers in BOUAR and [REDACTED] which refers to BERBERATI. This ammunition would have been mainly bullets – the Anti-Balaka did not really use heavy weapons. Often the bullets came from DRC, and the Anti-Balaka would prepare them themselves with fetishes and such. I do not know how much ammunition was taken there or how it was taken there. The medication would have been for people in the bush, because the conditions there were very difficult. I do not know who received the ammunition or medicine, my information is only general. There would have been people there who were in charge of distributing these items. There would also have been people in charge of the circulation of weapons. Weapons could leave CAMEROON for CAR quite easily as the borders are porous.

110. Investigators asked me why NGAISSONA and MOKOM went to the border themselves. NGAISSONA had contacts with the Anti-Balaka, and became their coordinator later on. As for the archers, they had more to do with Vieux MOKOM, but NGAISSONA wanted to take charge and push things forward. There were a lot of people in CAMEROON that NGAISSONA could have commissioned for this, but maybe he did not trust them and he took responsibility himself.

111. [REDACTED] knew about all this because he was amongst those civilians and military who had fled to YAOUNDE. He took part in the [REDACTED] out there and he would have known this kind of thing. He was a reliable source – I would say the information he provided was 80-90% reliable.

112. [REDACTED] in CAMEROON, they would discuss the military and Anti-Balaka movement, and also discuss diplomatic solutions to DJOTODIA's removal.

113. It is too bad that Levi YAKETE is dead, because he and [REDACTED] and they shared a lot of information. These meetings were run by Levi YAKETE, who was first in FRANCE and who eventually went to CAMEROON to organise things out there. NGAISSONA and Vieux MOKOM also attended the meetings, together with the former Director General of Radio Centrafrique, David GBANGA. GBANGA was in charge of communication, for instance writing press releases and statements. [REDACTED] did not mention the name of anyone else who attended these meetings to me, or at least I cannot think of them now. The investigators asked me if someone named GUERSON and Kevin KPEFIO attended these meetings. GUERSON possibly did from time to time, but he moved around a lot. KPEFIO was together with [REDACTED] in CAMEROON.

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114. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] The investigators asked me to read the three messages sent on [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] onwards. I asked [REDACTED] for information, and he told me about the Seleka taking two people to the Mayor MODAME's place. He was the Mayor of the 4th arrondissement. The 'boss' refers to BOZIZE.
115. I do not know where NGAISSONA might have gotten any such Thurayas from, but in CAMEROON it is easy to get them. I do not know who they might have been given to. [REDACTED] answer is very vague. NGAISSONA may have brought Thurayas to CAMEROON. I did not hear about people receiving Thurayas in the field. People would use telephones – there were various networks, Orange, Telecel, Moov and Azure, but at the time we were told to use Orange. Orange was primarily used as it was the best network in the interior of the country, and indeed outside of CAR. A message that circulated in BANGUI from the Orange company saying that their network was safer because Telecel calls could be intercepted. I think this was just marketing on the part of Orange, because I do not think that phone calls can be intercepted in CAR. In any event, Orange was the network that was mainly used. My phone number at the time was [REDACTED] I also had a Telecel number, [REDACTED]
116. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] Here, [REDACTED] refers to [REDACTED]. I know him well, he is from BANGUI. He was [REDACTED] He is from a village named [REDACTED] close to BOSSANGOA, which is also where [REDACTED] is from. His wife is a friend of my sister and I call her 'big sister'. My sister is based at [REDACTED]
117. At CAR-OTP [REDACTED] The investigators referred me to the message that I sent to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] and the messages which follow. When HOLLANDE and FABIUS came to BANGUI, we knew that things were moving fast and coming to an end, but we did not know what exactly would happen. The diplomatic route was now in full swing, while the Anti-Balaka had started liberating their villages. As I have explained, [REDACTED] so I was well placed to understand the situation. There was talk that perhaps the Sangaris force would come to BANGUI. I knew that Bernard MOKOM and NGAISSONA were starting to organise the Anti-Balaka and also the military but at that point, it was a matter of wait and see.
118. As you can read in the message, [REDACTED] told me that Vieux MOKOM had been in contact with him regarding providing supplies. I do not know what kind of supplies, but [REDACTED] is a military man, so I think it refers to ammunition. I was doubtful that this would happen, because as I have mentioned, NGAISSONA had previously promised to supply items to Maxime MOKOM, and in the end it never happened. This is what I meant when I said that I was afraid that Vieux MOKOM was behaving like his son. I also knew that Bernard MOKOM had previously managed BOZIZE's

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petrol stations very badly. I do not know what happened in the end, if Bernard MOKOM actually did misappropriate the supplies that were to go to [REDACTED] or not. I cannot confirm if [REDACTED] received anything from Bernard MOKOM. [REDACTED] did not always tell me everything. It is possible that behind my back he received things I was not aware of.

119. [REDACTED] was in contact with Maxime MOKOM before this contact with Vieux MOKOM. He once received [REDACTED] via [REDACTED] some time between [REDACTED] for the purposes of mobilising the youth and organising a demonstration or attack in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was postponed a number of times before finally taking place in [REDACTED]. This money was sent via [REDACTED] to a young man who worked at [REDACTED] – I cannot remember his name – who then brought the money to [REDACTED]. I do not think that this money came from [REDACTED] directly, rather, he would have received a commission to organise this demonstration. I suppose that [REDACTED] would have kept some of the money he received, and sent the rest to [REDACTED]. I do not know who gave the money to [REDACTED]. At the time, the idea of resistance was emerging and many people were sending money for the cause, even politicians outside the country sent money.

120. [REDACTED] It was clear that he and [REDACTED] had spoken on the phone many times, I could see that they knew each other very well. The youth [REDACTED] I do not know exactly what [REDACTED] did with this money, but I know that he was supposed to mobilise people, provide them with transport, motorbikes and water, and organise a demonstration at the airport and the assembly [REDACTED]. Many other people were involved in organising civilians for this demonstration, in every sector of BANGUI, such as [REDACTED].

121. Once these people were mobilised, the civilians were supposed to stage a sit-in. The military, who were organised by NGREMANGOU, were meant to meet at the 100 Logements at PK15, towards the northern exit of BANGUI, with their weapons. There, the plan was that they would be given ammunition by NGREMANGOU so that they could disrupt the ceremony and shoot near the National Assembly. In the end - it's a shame - but this did not take place. The plan did not work, as the Seleka got wind of the plan and organised a large-scale looting in BOY RABE at the same time.

122. After this, [REDACTED] dealt directly [REDACTED] more than with Maxime MOKOM. Joel YANGONGO was in contact with Maxime MOKOM and Claude

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NGAIKOSSET and others in DRC, maybe even with KOKATE. YANGONGO's father was a general in the army and one of the sons of [REDACTED] and he and [REDACTED] were in charge of designing leaflets distributing them in BANGUI. [REDACTED] was a businessman and he had his own money to fund this. Previously, such leaflets had been coming from DRC. The leaflets attacked DJOTODIA, saying he was a bad president, that he should leave and that the army should do everything they can to force him to leave power.

123. I think that Bernard MOKOM would have been in contact with his son Maxime MOKOM around the time [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] this money. I do not know exactly what they talked about, but Maxime MOKOM is a policeman and he is very careful about what he speaks of, for instance in relation to organising demonstrations.

124. I do not know if PRINCE received money directly from NGAISSONA. If there are Facebook messages which indicate this, I can comment on them. I know he was more in direct contact with Maxime MOKOM.

Email CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]

125. The investigators showed me an email bearing the ERN CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] They asked me if the sites mentioned on the email (KOUZOUNDORO, BOGOURA, LAMBI, LAC CAIMON, NDJO, BOSSEMPTELE, BOZOUM and BAORO) were the responsibility of [REDACTED] knew these villages well, he had previously been out there on detachment with his elements. During the crisis, he wanted to [REDACTED] – he may still have had contacts out there. In fact, he was never able to [REDACTED], I would have known if he did. You have to speak with [REDACTED] for more information on this – he was the one in contact with the military at the time.

126. I remember there were discussions about supplies needed at the time, but I never saw these emails. [REDACTED] knew that NGAISSONA was involved, so he asked [REDACTED] to write to NGAISSONA to try to get some money. [REDACTED] is a professional soldier, so he could help NGAISSONA understand how any money he sent would be used. I remember the discussions, but I have never seen any of these emails that the investigators showed me. I never saw any results of the requests in these emails, [REDACTED]

127. [REDACTED] would meet up together to talk about these requirements in [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]'s house or elsewhere, such as in a bar along the main road. We would sometimes meet with a whole group of people. [REDACTED] and I were the [REDACTED] and many people come to us for [REDACTED]

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advice. Sometimes other military friends would join us for these discussions, such as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the most senior of the military in these discussions.

128. It was [REDACTED]'s idea to ask NGAISSONA for supplies, and he convinced [REDACTED] to do the same. However, the contact with NGAISSONA went through [REDACTED] because he knew him through [REDACTED]. I knew through [REDACTED] that NGAISSONA was on the ground, in YAOUNDE, BERTOUA and GAROUA BOULAYE. It made sense that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would require supplies, because they are military men. As for [REDACTED] and me, neither of us controls a group, so I am not sure why [REDACTED]. As I have said, RHOMBOT was in charge of the south, [REDACTED] had nothing to do with that zone.
129. I can see in the email that [REDACTED] is also referred to, linked to the sites of BANGUI, BIMBO, BEGOUA and LANDJA. These sites comprise essentially the whole of BANGUI. He, like [REDACTED], was committed to the 'final assault' or the upcoming attack on BANGUI. They both had elements but they needed the means to deploy them and occupy the territory. In the end, neither of them was able to deploy their elements.
130. These requests were sent to NGAISSONA because we knew that he had the money to finance these things. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] expressed their needs to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sent those needs to NGAISSONA. [REDACTED] was making an attempt to get money from NGAISSONA. NGAISSONA already financed a lot of youth movements and political movements, such as the KNK, the National Youth Council and COSCIPAC. This was not just out of the goodness of his heart, behind it lay the desire to stay on good terms with those who held power as they would use his businesses for services and supplies. When the Seleka came to power, he lost a lot of money.
131. The investigators asked me if NGAISSONA supported COCORA or COAC. I did not see NGAISSONA with Levi YAKETE or Steve YAMBETE, so I do not have any knowledge of this.
132. I do not know if [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in phone contact with NGAISSONA right before these emails were sent. At the time, [REDACTED] was in contact with the Seleka - as I mentioned [REDACTED]. Weapons were being trafficked across the river and were relatively easy to obtain. In addition, the arms depot had been looted by the Seleka and weapons could be bought from them. I do not know if [REDACTED] bought any of these weapons, but in general, I know that he is involved in this kind of thing. He engaged in a 'virtual rebellion' at the time and would try to show his power to people on the internet, saying that such and such a town had been attacked and claiming to be behind the attack. He was not so good with computers

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so [REDACTED] a young guy to help him publish this kind of thing on the web. [REDACTED] did not use his real name, [REDACTED] he used the name [REDACTED] I think he just used [REDACTED] as his first name. At another time, when [REDACTED] became a Muslim, he called himself [REDACTED]

133. [REDACTED] is no longer in the military, he does not want to advance his military career but also does not want to leave the army, so he is on long-term leave. He created his own [REDACTED] and has a [REDACTED] He also works as a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] having obtained a diploma for this work in the [REDACTED] I know [REDACTED] very well and we talk a lot. He is not a very stable person when it comes to finances – he will do anything to try to get money.

Email CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]

134. The investigators showed me the email bearing the ERN CAR [REDACTED] which shows that NGAISSONA sent [REDACTED]'s email to [REDACTED] on 15th October 2013, and [REDACTED] replied two days later, on the 17th, saying that it would be done immediately. [REDACTED] is a young man I knew in BANGUI, he left the country when the Seleka were in power, fleeing first to FOMAC at MPOKO and then joining [REDACTED] and NGAISSONA's group in YAOUNDE. However, I do not know anything about this email. I do not know why NGAISSONA would have forwarded this email to [REDACTED] – perhaps so he could forward it to someone else who was in CAMEROON at the time, such as Levi YAKETE. While [REDACTED] was in YAOUNDE, we were in contact, we would exchange messages, but we never spoke about this.

135. Before the crisis, Boris DANBOY worked on a team with [REDACTED] Christian GUENEBEM. GUENEBEM was President of the National Council of the Youth and of KNK Youth. While GUENEBEM was in FRANCE, Steve YAMBETE attempted to oust him from the position of President of the National Council of the Youth and take this for himself. BORIS and his friends tried to resist this attempt, to help GUENEBEM, [REDACTED]

136. I am still in permanent contact with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. GUENEBEM is the deputy secretary general and spokesman of the KNK. He directs BOZIZE's national campaigns for the elections.

137. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]: This was information I had obtained and shared it with [REDACTED] There had been an attack in BOUAR, the archers and others had attacked the positions of the Seleka and the Seleka were preparing reinforcements to send there. This was public knowledge, I heard it on Radio Ndeke Luka and I called a friend in BOUAR who confirmed it. In YAOUNDE, [REDACTED] and others would have been able to get this information on the internet.

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138. When [REDACTED] says that 'nos gars' would be joining as reinforcements, he is talking about their team in CAMEROON – the military and the others who had fled to CAMEROON, such as the BOZIZE's Presidential Guards. I do not know where the military were at that time, you can see in the chronology of the messages, it is very confusing – we say they are in BERTOUA, then in YAOUNDE, then at the border and then no longer there.
139. When [REDACTED] says [REDACTED], you can see that he is annoyed. NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM were like relays in the field, they were supposed to be in charge of things in CAMEROON. Their role was to mobilise resources and send a little money to people in the field, such as to the Anti-Balaka at the border who were requesting ammunition and supplies. In the end, NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM did not properly fulfill their role.
140. When I say 'the Anti-Balaka at the border', I am referring to all of them: the archers, the Anti-Balaka, and the FACA – although within the Anti-Balaka there were these three groups, we would just referred to them all as the Anti-Balaka. When I say that NGAISSONA was close to the Anti-Balaka, I am referring to these three groups. However, I do not know whom amongst the Anti-Balaka NGAISSONA was dealing with in the field. As you can see throughout my exchanges with [REDACTED] this is not what interested me, I was just exchanging general information, not exactly who did what, where and when.
141. Everyone knew that DJOTODIA had to go, and for that resources had to be mobilised for the brave people in the field. If you want me to name those who mobilised for this purpose, I could mention the name of every citizen in the republic. NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM were in CAMEROON and there were many Central African nationals there who were mobilising. This mobilisation would have been through traders and transfers of money, for instance by Western Union. I do not think there would have been a specific account to lodge money into, that would have been too obvious in terms of intelligence. If you speak directly with [REDACTED] I think he would tell you who supported the movement. [REDACTED] many people who were contributing to it. I have not seen [REDACTED] and do not know who exactly was [REDACTED]
142. The investigators asked me about some names, and if I thought that those people would have been [REDACTED] They cited the following names:
143. **GUERSON:** GUERSON was close to the Anti-Balaka, the proof is that later he returned to BANGUI and served in the Transitional Government of SAMBA-PANZA as *chargé de mission* for the youth, as a representative of the Anti-Balaka wing.

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144. GUERSON would not have been a financier; he was more of an intermediary for various commissions. He would bring money to the Anti-Balaka in the field, where he had contacts. We are not talking about large sums – they would have been in the region of 200,000 or 500,000 FCFA, in cash in little bags. We are not talking about large transfers of money through the banking system. The Anti-Balaka in the field were also supported by villagers who would provide food, goats and allow them to take manioc from their crops. The main need of the Anti-Balaka in the field was ammunition for traditional weapons and AK-47's, and this essentially came from DRC.
145. I do not know who would give GUERSON the money to take to the field. I do not think that NGAISSONA and GUERSON had a high level of collaboration. GUERSON wanted to develop another wing of the Anti-Balaka, but this wing was taken over by MECKASSOUA.
146. I do not really know the ins and outs of how the finances worked in CAMEROON, but at the end of the day, it is quite simple. We can see that at a certain point information was circulating on the internet and in telephone calls, indicating that the Anti-Balaka were suffering in the field. People made enquiries and would hear NGAISSONA was close to them. They would then contact NGAISSONA and ask what they could do to contribute. People knew that this would lead to the overthrow of the Seleka Government and that they might then be in a good position, having contributed to this. So I can say that there were money transfers to NGAISSONA. But practically speaking, I do not know how such money transfers were effectuated.
147. **Celestin YANINDJI:** Yes and no. YANINDJI was NGAISSONA's Vice-President of the Football Federation. He stayed in BANGUI while NGAISSONA was in CAMEROON. He had a lot of money, but he lost his wealth at one point. After NGAISSONA came back to BANGUI from CAMEROON, [REDACTED] helped YANINDJI financially. However, during the conflict between the Christians and Muslims, anyone who had money wanted to help so he might have contributed.
148. While NGAISSONA was in exile in CAMEROON, he had problems managing his accounts in CAR. [REDACTED] told me that YANINDJI would send NGAISSONA small amounts of money on occasion to help him out. [REDACTED] did not say how YANINDJI sent this money.
149. At one point [REDACTED] was on charge of managing [REDACTED] and in particular [REDACTED] NGAISSONA and YANINDJI felt that [REDACTED] was not managing this properly and was [REDACTED] so they dismissed him and he left CAR. I do not think that

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NGAISSONA was using money from the football federation to finance the Anti-Balaka.

150. I would also like to point out that President TOUADERA also contributed to the Anti-Balaka. In fact, the President came into power because of the Anti-Balaka's actions, but he was frightened of Maxime MOKOM. I told [REDACTED] this and put [REDACTED] in contact. They had a meeting, followed by a big assembly, and Maxime himself indicated that TOUADERA had helped the Anti-Balaka at the time of the crisis.

151. As for the Anti-Balaka who later arrived in BANGUI, such as DOUZE PUISSANCES, KEMA and ANDJILO, I do not associate with them. I only know the military men who were in BANGUI throughout the crisis. I met Florent KEMA at the time of the elections, because he became an MP, although I had already heard his name during the crisis.

152. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] Here, I am referring again to [REDACTED]'s contact with Vieux MOKOM regarding sending supplies, which I discussed above (see at 2101-9822).

153. [REDACTED] indicates that not all those who were in CAMEROON went to the field. I asked him who gave the go ahead for the attack on BOUAR, but he did not know. Everyone was surprised - the go ahead should have come from CAMEROON, but I do not know if NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM were involved in launching the attack. When [REDACTED] says that the boss (BOZIZE) was [REDACTED] he meant that BOZIZE found out what happened in the field and heard about the behaviour of NGAISSONA and Bernard and Maxime MOKOM, which would have made him angry. NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM were supposed to be organising people in the field, but the reality was that the Anti-Balaka did not have enough ammunition and Bernard had sent money to his son although his son was known to have mismanaged things in the past. I was terribly annoyed myself because the Seleka were slaughtering people in retaliation, and big sums were needed to support the Anti-Balaka's actions.

154. KOKATE moved around to different places and then went to CAMEROON, as did Levy YAKETE and LENGBE. Somehow, KOKATE was chosen as the Chief of Operations, but as [REDACTED] points out, NGAISSONA and Vieux MOKOM did not want him, as they wanted to be in charge themselves, whence their behaviour to put him in a difficult position. In these type of situations, the person who has the most connections and means, gets the power.

155. At CAR-OTP-2 [REDACTED] Here we are talking about the planning of a simultaneous attack after the failed attack on BOUAR. Groups were starting to re-establish themselves in BANGUI. We are also referring to the groups of locals in the different

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towns (you can see that [REDACTED] lists BAORO, SOSO NAKOMBO or SOSSO NAKOMBO, BOSSANGO, BOHONG etc) who had been joined by military from BANGUI. The plan had been that people in CAMEROON and DRC would join the Anti-Balaka in the field. Although those in CAMEROON and DRC were taking money for the movement, in fact it was the Anti-Balaka from these towns that [REDACTED] lists, together with the military who had joined them from BANGUI, who were there gradually advancing towards the capital. Although they were supposed to be managing the action in the field, NGAISSONA and MOKOM were busy fighting with KOKATE and the coordination was not working.

156. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] In the message sent on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] speaks about waiting for money to arrive so that *les gars* could leave the next day. As I have previously indicated, a lot of people were spending money to mobilise people to march to BANGUI, but I cannot tell you who exactly.

157. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] Here, I am asking where we are with the deployment of men. I wanted to find out what was going on in CAMEROON, but nothing much was. KOKATE had arrived in YAOUNDE. [REDACTED] says that military groups were to infiltrate BELOKO, where they would be provided with weapons, from whom I do not know. You can see that I was a bit confused at that point, and was doubtful that we would be able to overthrow the Seleka regime. The whole plan was to end up in BANGUI but without proper coordination it would not be easy. [REDACTED] – he was also a [REDACTED] and he called himself [REDACTED] which we would shorten to [REDACTED] Where [REDACTED] says [REDACTED] he is referring to KOKATE, LENGBE and officers of rank in CAMEROON.

158. At CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] Here, I indicate that [REDACTED] had told me that [REDACTED] asked him to indicate to him how many elements he had [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who had his little group in BANGUI, wanted to contact the people making the decisions in CAMEROON and he spoke to [REDACTED] who asked him what his requirements were. I do not know exactly how many elements [REDACTED] indicated that he had, nor what he sent to [REDACTED] as a list of requirements, but they would have corresponded to the needs that [REDACTED] had sent to NGAISSONA, as we saw in the email (CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not himself deal with NGAISSONA and Vieux MOKOM because it had not worked previously. After waiting in vain for supplies, he realised that NGAISSONA and Vieux MOKOM were not reliable, so he ended up contacting [REDACTED] in CAMEROON. As we approached the 5th December, I was very busy with work, but I do know from [REDACTED] that in the end the supplies did not arrive.

159. I think [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would have been in contact by phone [REDACTED] was not very good with computers.

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160. I think that [REDACTED] likely contacted other people as well to ask them for supplies, but I cannot think of any names. Perhaps some other Facebook messages will refresh my memory.
161. I indicate in a message that [REDACTED] had Thurayas. [REDACTED] ran a [REDACTED] was in contact with the Seleka and was friends with [REDACTED] the Gendarmerie – he could have obtained them anywhere. At the time, you could also win a Thuraya if you entered a competition with Moov. There were many circulating in BANGUI.
162. When [REDACTED] tells me that [REDACTED] told him that secure lines had been distributed, he was referring to telephones with secure SIM cards. I think that the regulatory agency of communications could organise for special secure SIMs with unlimited credit. This was a government body under the Ministry of the Post Office and Communications. They were the link between the state and the telephone operators. The Seleka did not have enough manpower to control everything. [REDACTED] was an IT specialist who was experienced in such secure communications. I do not know if [REDACTED] was also referring to Thurayas.
163. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] When I say that we are tired, I am talking about myself and everyone in BANGUI, living under the Seleka regime was impossible, there were many atrocities and we were fed up with it.
164. [REDACTED] indicates to me that NGAISSONA and MOKOM got GBANGOUMA, LAMKAGUE and NGBOYA in difficulty, and that these three military men had been arrested. I think that one of the reasons for this is that MOKOM and NGAISSONA wanted to keep the power in their hands, rather than the military being in charge. I think that there would have been less violence if KOKATE and the military were in charge, because they were professionals who had been trained in the proper techniques of combat. They know how to structure and plan, without resorting to *gris-gris* and such. This was not the first time the FACA had intervened, they are infantrymen and in the early days they would have helped villagers in the fight against highway bandits.
165. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]: GBADOLITE is a Congolese town on the CAR border, not far from ZONGO. [REDACTED] refers to [REDACTED] When the Seleka arrived in BANGUI, the South Africans fought on BOZIZE's behalf in BANGUI. The battle of 22nd March 2013 was won by the BOZIZE camp, but then the Chadian army came to reinforce the Seleka. Angolan troops were due to arrive in BANGUI to reinforce BOZIZE's troops, but as they were on their way, the French army took control of the airport and prevented them from entering. They were instead diverted to GBADOLITE. In the interim, DJOTODIA took power.

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166. The Angolan troops had come with weapons and equipment. The Angolans left, but their weapons and equipment all stayed in DRC, in GUEMENA or GBADOLITE. A team from DRC (primarily mercenaries) that had been mobilising in GUEMENA (or GEMENA) went to GBADOLITE, and the plan was that they would come and join the attack on BANGUI. Those who had fled BANGUI had not joined this team from DRC. The plan was that team from DRC would take the Angolans' weapons and equipment, but this did not happen. The DRC authorities seized the weapons and to this day, CAR has not been able to get them back. [REDACTED] was in KINSHASA so he was best placed to provide this information. You will have heard that Eugène NGAIKOSSET was arrested in KINSHASA – this was in relation to this. I do not know who was coordinating the whole thing in GBADOLITE. Eugène NGAIKOSSET was close to BOZIZE.

167. The troops were not able to cross over to BANGUI in the end, as the weapons were blocked in DRC. The objective was for the troops to go to ZONGO and cross to DAMARA, but it did not happen. In CAMEROON, GBANGOUMA was arrested – the military were prevented from attacking and instead the international community eventually let the Anti-Balaka, who were not professionals, reach BANGUI.

168. The investigators asked me if I know a person named KOLIOS. I do know him, he has a lot of connections. He used to be the Director of Cabinet at the Ministry of Finance under BOZIZE. He was seconded to the Ministry of Housing. I would not be surprised if he played a role in this, but I cannot say for sure. We used to exchange messages on the internet at the time. I cannot remember him going to GUEMENA – I know he often came and went to FRANCE and CAMEROON. KOLIOS stayed in BANGUI when BOZIZE lost power, in fact, on the day BOZIZE fled [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] He stayed in BANGUI for quite a while – I cannot be sure if he went to DRC or not.

169. At CAR-OTP, [REDACTED] These messages were sent in the run-up to December 2013 and the Anti-Balaka had progressed – on 27th November they took BOSSEMBELE and [REDACTED] was supposed to be joining them there. [REDACTED] it was not clear if he was committed to this or not. [REDACTED] refers to [REDACTED] he was another one of my military friends who was in [REDACTED] group. He and [REDACTED] wanted to join the group in BOSSEMBELE. They were all in BANGUI at the time. [REDACTED] has connections in BOSSEMBELE – I do not know who was leading the group there. [REDACTED] disappeared during the time of the fighting – from about [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. When he came back, he did not give me an indication of where he had been. The information I got from [REDACTED] tended to be contradictory.

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170. DOGUELA was trained at the military academy in BANGUI under BOZIZE. When the situation was bad in BANGUI, he continued to have relations with trained Seleka officers, and also with DEMAFOUTH who controlled an Anti-Balaka group. DOGUELA was a heavy arms specialist, but these weapons were not used on the side of the Anti-Balaka.

171. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]: The investigators referred me to the message that [REDACTED] sent on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. At the time, the Seleka were losing ground in BANGUI. This [REDACTED] refers to Francis BOZIZE, not to the other [REDACTED] I mentioned. [REDACTED] told me that Francis BOZIZE had gone to SOUTH AFRICA to obtain weapons. Again, this is not true – no weapons were brought from there, as the authorities stopped them coming across to CAR. The weapons in question were real weapons of war, which would have been more efficient than those the Anti-Balaka fought with.

172. PINDAO is an area in the PK12 district. [REDACTED] says that [REDACTED] who is a soldier, had gone to PINDAO. Some individual FACA soldiers came back from CAMEROON and DRC one by one, both before and after the big attack on BANGUI. [REDACTED] was one such soldier – he came back from CAMEROON. [REDACTED] full name is [REDACTED] and he is [REDACTED] s nephew. BOZIZE owned houses in PINDAO, which at this time had been looted and were occupied by the Seleka. For this reason, I do not think that [REDACTED] actually went to PINDAO.

173. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] When I say that I put [REDACTED] this is just an expression which means he was in the doghouse with me. [REDACTED] had Seleka friends in high places and played a double game, as I have indicated. Prior to the Seleka's arrival, a national day was supposed to be celebrated on 18th January. 43 million FCFA were given to Christian Olivier GUENEBEM DEDEZOOM by BOZIZE for the organization of this day, which was to be combined with the Youth Day. This did not go ahead, because of the situation. Christian GUENEBEM went to FRANCE and people wondered how he used the money. [REDACTED] I made some enquiries and learned that [REDACTED] who told them this. It was very dangerous if the Seleka heard that you had money and were connected with BOZIZE. When I refer to [REDACTED] on Facebook, I am referring to [REDACTED]

174. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] was another Facebook identity used by [REDACTED]

175. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] At this time, the Anti-Balaka were in BANGUI, and were chasing the Seleka and the Muslims, who had fled to PK5 or town centre. IOM were repatriating Muslims to BANGUI from places like MBAIKI and BOSSANGOA so as to relocate them to places such as BAMBARI, NDELE and BRIA. Convoys were taking them to the provinces, but on the way, in certain areas of BANGUI such as FOUH, the convoys would be attacked by the Anti-Balaka. These Muslims were civilians, but

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there were also combatants amongst them. Sometimes the Anti-Balaka would get weapons from the vehicles. Sometimes the Anti-Balaka would set fire to the vehicles.

176. On [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] when I say [REDACTED] I am referring to the Anti-Balaka in general. I was wondering where BOZIZE was, because at that time, there were different Anti-Balaka wings, such as NGAISSONA's wing with MOKOM and ANDJILO, and RHOMBOT's wing. DOUZE PUISSANCES was in NGAISSONA's wing, but he was also working with DEMAFOUTH. I was concerned about who would lead if DJOTODIA left power, and wondered if it would be BOZIZE. BOZIZE did not come back to power, because he had not organised the overthrow of the Seleka regime. In addition, FRANCE did not want him in power. He had no influence on the ground, as he had only been dealing with the trained professional soldiers. In 2003, the organisation involved trained soldiers with a chain of command – of course a few civilians joined, but in general it was professional soldiers. In 2013, the Anti-Balaka were all mixed-up and not very well structured, and everyone was trying to take advantage of the situation. Although there were some military men amongst them, they were not officers. The officers were busy organising themselves in a different way. The Anti-Balaka civilians used mystical power, but in a way they were more powerful than the military and in fact would often lead, instead of being led by the military men amongst them.

177. As I have indicated, I could foresee that the conflict would be bloody and violent, the Anti-Balaka were already going too far prior to December 5th. Despite this, I think that NGAISSONA wanted to support the Anti-Balaka to take advantage of the opportunity to resume his business activities. The Seleka were on the ground, committing atrocities, and it was not possible to stop them politically. The Anti-Balaka were a necessary evil.

178. Prior to December, I am not sure what the connection was between NGAISSONA's wing and RHOMBOT's wing. I know they were in contact but I do not know what their relationship was. I knew this through [REDACTED] in fact RHOMBOT occupied the axis where KOKATE was meant to be intervening. KOKATE and NGAISSONA were both in CAMEROON, so they were in contact there. This is my own logic and perception of the situation. NGAISSONA is a civilian while RHOMBOT is a military man, but the latter was not very well known. I myself only heard about RHOMBOT on the 5th December 2013, because he controlled the south. RHOMBOT just acted to be noticed at the time of the events. I suppose, because they were fighting for the same cause, he and NGAISSONA had contact. All of this, including the attack on BANGUI, is not a coincidence, there was some kind of coordination taking place. However, do not forget that in addition to the connection between the groups, the French army was also there organising and coordinating things. I did not try to find out exactly how the French were coordinating – everyone knew that the Anti-Balaka would attack and thought that they would take power.

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179. I was not in contact with YEKATOM and his group in the lead-up and aftermath of the attack of 5th December.

Facebook Conversation with Lévi YAKETE, CAR-OTP- [REDACTED]

180. The investigators showed me Facebook messages that Lévi YAKETE and I exchanged. YAKETE is like a big brother to me [REDACTED]. In 2004/2005, when [REDACTED], he was already there. [REDACTED] and he was President BOZIZE's Advisor for Youth. He organised the resistance of the youth, the COCORA, in BANGUI during the 2013 crisis. He then went abroad and we stayed in contact.

181. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] PRINCE had many contacts in ABIDJAN. When things were being organised, YAKETE was in contact with BOZIZE in relation to the return to constitutional order. PRINCE has wealthy friends, and they were willing to launder money. If BOZIZE was to commit to rebellion, this money could be used to purchase weapons and everyone would get their share. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who had previously helped YAKETE obtain finance for the youth who had set up various checkpoints in BANGUI. PRINCE worked with BND, BOZIZE's intelligence department, and had influence with various Lebanese businessmen through this. During the Seleka period, PRINCE approached the Lebanese for money for the war effort, which he would then give to YAKETE so that he could provide the COCORA youth who set up checkpoints in BANGUI with supplies such as food and coffee.

182. At CAR-OTP- [REDACTED] At this time, people were organizing themselves in BANGUI, civilians were mobilising to stop the advance of the Seleka. For instance, civilians blocked the runway several times, and there was a need to organise these people. You will recall the problem with MOKOM and his father providing supplies that never arrived. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] YAKETE said that the problem with [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED] could not be sent, but [REDACTED] YAKETE said he would speak with [REDACTED] about it. I think that he did speak with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and I always spoke on the phone, not by email. After this, I no longer dealt with this question of [REDACTED]. I was just trying to find small solutions for the people fighting on the ground, but those guys, YAKETE and [REDACTED] had other priorities. YAKETE is a bit of a bandit when it comes to money, just like Vieux MOKOM. To be honest, I was not expecting much from him. In the end, I think that this idea of mine did not work.

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183. Those who had fled had connections outside the country – I have already told you about the ECOBANK youth who brought money to [REDACTED] Those in CAMEROON had connections, they knew traders and could have sent money or items to BANGUI within 48 hours. I am not sure if this actually happened or not.

184. The investigators asked me what I knew about FROCCA. YAKETE first created COCORA in BANGUI, and then later FROCCA in FRANCE with Lin BANOUKEPA. BANOUKEPA has a representative in BANGUI named Cyriaque AZOUASSA. David GBANGA was also a member of FROCCA. FROCCA began to claim responsibility for a lot of Anti-Balaka events, as YAKETE wanted to be seen as the inspiration for what was happening in the field. When the Seleka were defeated in BOSSANGO, YAKETE claimed responsibility for this, saying that the attack was inspired by FROCCA. I do not think in reality that he helped the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO. He might have mobilised resources, but might not have sent them to the field. YAKETE is brave and has a lot of ideas, he wanted to support the Anti-Balaka on the ground, but he is also a real opportunist. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

185. YAKETE was in contact with Bernard MOKOM and NGAISSONA, so they would have known what FROCCA was about.

186. All youth groups joined either the Anti-Balaka or the Seleka. Before NGAISSONA became the President of the CAR Football Federation, he was in charge of a football team named SCAF, and there were a lot of military men on the team.

187. The investigators asked me about the following persons:

188. Junior NGAISSONA or Junior MOKPEM: I have never heard these names.

189. Nicolas NAMYOUISSE: I know a Nicolas who is close to the Anti-Balaka but I do not know his surname.

Further Thoughts on the Conflict

190. In the end, in terms of coordination, some French officers joined the movement in order to coordinate it for the attack on BANGUI of 5th December. The plan to get rid of DJOTODIA was not secret. The whole problem was coordination, to avoid even more disaster and violence in the end.

191. When the Seleka arrived in BANGUI, lootings were frequent. DJOTODIA had no money for his elements and the Seleka had no food - I would even give them 500 or 1000 FCFA from time to time, so they could eat.

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192. Many people fled, but they kept contacts in BANGUI. During this time, the Anti-Balaka – both the civilians and the military - found it was quite easy to organise themselves, a little at a time, both in the provinces and in BANGUI. This was done with phone communication and messages.
193. The civilian Anti-Balaka's aim at the beginning was to defend themselves against crimes and atrocities of the Seleka, while the military were fleeing from persecution. However, as they had the same objective and a common enemy they joined together to drive out this common enemy. Civilians who were neither Anti-Balaka nor FACA to begin with also joined the Anti-Balaka during their progression to BANGUI. These civilians were put through mystical treatments or 'vaccinated' in order to join the movement. Together, they were all collectively called the Anti-Balaka.
194. The investigators asked me what I know about GOBERE. I told them that I did not know where it was on the map. I later told them that I had asked someone about it, and I heard that it is a place near BOSSANGOA where many went to be vaccinated and obtain fetishes to protect themselves. Those who could write would list the ingredients of the vaccinations, and would sometimes sell them. GOBERE was connected with ANDJILO. I first heard about GOBERE when the Anti-Balaka entered BANGUI.
195. I do not think that the FACA needed the others to drive out the common enemy. If they had coordinated themselves properly they could have succeeded, but the military were surprised at how fast the Anti-Balaka were progressing, so in the end they decided to join together.
196. I received information that the Anti-Balaka were told to follow instructions and progressively advance towards BANGUI and surround the town. The proof of all of this is the attack of the 5th December 2013.
197. I do not know who gave the Anti-Balaka these instructions – I was not in the field, I was just sharing information. Everyone knows who the Anti-Balaka leaders were, such as Maxime MOKOM, DOUZE PUISSANCES and ANDJILO, but I cannot say exactly who was giving the orders. In the run-up to the final attack on BANGUI, information was not circulating as much so as not to be picked up by the enemy.
198. You can see in my conversations with [REDACTED] in October that we thought that the attack on BANGUI would be imminent, but in actual fact, it took place two months later.
199. Commander NGREMANGOU played a very big role in the idea of the FACA joining the civilian Anti-Balaka. It was simple – the Anti-Balaka were in the provinces, and politicians who wanted to be in power just had to contact them. The FACA had their

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own chiefs, and the Anti-Balaka looked to mystical people for leadership. The FACA chiefs and the Anti-Balaka chiefs had telephone contact to organise the resistance. However I do not know, practically speaking, how they organised everything. I do not know the names of all the Anti-Balaka chiefs, but in each zone there was a commander, such as KEMA, ANDJILO and DOUZE PUISSANCES. From BANGUI, NGREMANGOU would have been in contact with the Anti-Balaka chiefs. I do not know what other FACA chiefs were in contact with the Anti-Balaka chiefs.

200. The FACA were motivated to join the Anti-Balaka due to the mistreatment of Christians by Muslims during the reign of the Seleka. This retaliation against the Seleka was not at all surprising. The Seleka was majority Muslim. I have very good relations with Muslim friends. Sometimes they even gave me information. I am an [REDACTED] and I can say that the Seleka were manipulated. The Muslims in this country are not educated, they are traders. Their national days were not acknowledged and their community was marginalised in society. It was easy to manipulate them, and they then sprang into action. They did not kill as such during their progression to BANGUI, but they systematically destroyed state buildings as they moved through the provinces, despite the poverty of the country. [REDACTED] who I was friends with spoke about all this, and he told me that it was Nourredine ADAM and not DJOTODIA who was supposed to become president. He told me that [REDACTED]

201. I do not think that the Anti-Balaka were manipulated as such to start with, the movement started off as a natural instinct, based on *auto-défense* groups forming against the Seleka. Of course, once politics became involved, the manipulation started in the background. They became very motivated and then their progression to BANGUI started to happen quite quickly.

202. The Anti-Balaka's ammunition was insufficient to take BANGUI, but they were given targets (heading towards the palace) and told that once they reached them they would be given further supplies and ammunition, and told that they would be given sophisticated weapons. Although they reached these targets, this did not happen. I heard that these sophisticated weapons were going to come from the French army. In the end, I myself saw people fighting with sticks in the street.

203. Perhaps the Anti-Balaka thought that they were supernatural beings who could resist anything, but in reality, fetishes do not protect against weapons. In any event, they were only supposed to protect against AK-47 bullets, and in BANGUI the Seleka were using heavy weapons against them.

204. Of course there were serious atrocities committed by the Seleka but I think in retaliation, the Anti-Balaka went too far. None of this came as a surprise because most

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of these Anti-Balaka were not educated, and the violence came from the idea that the Muslims were responsible. The Seleka was a rebel group, but many of those the Anti-Balaka targeted were civilians. I understand the Anti-Balaka state of mind, and I know that once they got vaccinated, they would become enraged and want to fight, and if they did not see blood, they would not be satisfied. If they could not direct that rage towards a military man, they would attack civilians. They confused the Seleka and Muslim civilians in their minds, and the enemy became all Muslims.

205. I was asked by investigators if any of the leaders tried to prevent the violence against Muslim civilians or change the mindset. 60% to 70% of people in CAR cannot read or write so it was difficult to change people's mentality. While DJOTODIA was in power, I worked with [REDACTED] to raise awareness, and a multi-denominational religious platform did similar work. [REDACTED]

206. I was not at all surprised by the Anti-Balaka's violence because I understood their mentality. [REDACTED] I was privy to a lot of information and I could predict that things would be violent. When the Anti-Zaraguinas were fighting against the bandits, it was a pretty serious business, [REDACTED] was near the community hospital and we could see the bodies of these Zaraguinas brought in. Sometimes we ourselves would go into the morgue and we could see that these people had been seriously tortured by the Anti-Zaraguinas.

207. When civilians get hurt, this is not right - the military should protect civilians. The Seleka were not a regular army so they did not follow rules of war, although they did have some genuine military people amongst their ranks. Similarly, the Anti-Balaka had some professional soldiers - they needed the military amongst them to train them and impose some form of discipline. These soldiers would have been trained to respect human rights, but unfortunately, on both sides, it did not work like this and civilians were targeted.

208. The investigators asked me if, while I was in BANGUI in September 2013, I heard about attacks in the villages around BOSSANGO, BOGANGOLO and in BOUCA. I told them that of course I had heard about these attacks and about that on BENZAMBE as well. These attacks saw serious atrocities committed by both the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka. Obviously those in ZONGO and CAMEROON would have known about these attacks and atrocities as they were in contact with the Anti-Balaka, but I do not know who gave the orders.

Motivation

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209. I think that many things were said about the crisis, and I wanted to give my own reading of what took place and bring some clarifications from a political and sociological angle.

Closing Procedure

210. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

211. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.

212. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.

213. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

214. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

215. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the French language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Due to the fact that the statement was taken remotely through [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I signed the statement in the presence of Associate Investigator [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who also signed the statement.

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Signed:

Dated:




INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by [REDACTED] that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of [REDACTED] who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. [REDACTED] has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: _____

Dated: _____



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