

**INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR**

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: LLORCA

Gender: Male

First Name: Aurélien

Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: N/A

Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: France

Passport / ID number: N/A

Date of Birth/Age: 09/10/1979

Nationality(s): French

Ethnicity: White

Religion: N/A

Language(s) Spoken: French, English, Spanish, Portuguese

Language(s) Written: French, English, Spanish, Portuguese

Language(s) Used in Interview: English

Occupation: Expert on Mission

Place of Interview: The Hague

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

CAR-OTP-2115-0239



Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview: 24/09/2018 (12:00-12:45 and 14:00-17:40) ;
25/09/2018 (10:00-12:15 and 14:00 – 17:30); 26/09/2018 (10:00-12:00 and 14:00-
18:00); 27/09/2018 (09:00-12:00 and 14:30-15:45); 28/09/2018 (09:00-14:30)

Names of all persons present during interview: [REDACTED] (Associate
Investigator), Olivia STRUYVEN (Trial Lawyer), Matthew GILLETT (Trial
Lawyer -only present on 27/09/2018 from 14:30 to 15:45), [REDACTED] (Legal
Officer), Aurélien LLORCA (Witness).

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WITNESS STATEMENT

PROCEDURE

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] Olivia STRUYVEN, and Matthew GILLETT and was told that they are an investigator and trial lawyers, respectively, with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I already know [REDACTED], a Legal Officer with the United Nations.
2. The investigator and trial lawyer(s) explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigator and trial lawyer(s) explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic since August 2012. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.



4. I agreed that this interview would be conducted in English. I fully understand and speak English.
5. The investigator and trial lawyer(s) explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. They explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
7. The investigator and trial lawyer(s) have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.
9. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
10. The investigator and trial lawyer(s) explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
11. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

BACKGROUND

12. Between 1997 and 2001, I studied and obtained a degree in political sciences at the Institut d'études politiques of Grenoble (France). After I graduated, in



2002, I joined the French police service as a 'Lieutenant de Police'. During my work as a 'Lieutenant de Police', between 2003 and 2005, I completed a Master's degree in Political Science at the university of Paris-Est (France). I continued working with the French police until July 2009.

13. After having worked for one year as a high school teacher from September 2009, I was appointed as a member of the Monitoring Group of the Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea, a role I stayed in until 2013. In 2013, I briefly went back to the French police service from September 2013 to February 2014 and was promoted as a 'Capitaine de Police'.
14. I was appointed as an Expert on Armed Groups and the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic ('CAR') in February 2014, a role I held until February 2016. From February 2016 to the end of 2016, I worked as a Field Security Adviser with UNHCR, based in Geneva, travelling to Mali, Uganda, Calais, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ('DRC'). In 2017, I continued my career as a Security Affairs Manager in the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. Finally, in February 2018, I was appointed as an Expert on mission on the Panel of Experts for Mali, a position I still hold today.

PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE CAR

15. The creation of the Panel of Experts on the CAR was decided upon on 5 December 2013 to assist the Security Council Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR. The mandate of the Panel is set out at the beginning of each of the reports.
16. On 13 February 2014, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed the five Panel members, including myself as an Expert on Armed Groups and as the Coordinator of the Panel (S/2014/98). On 17 February 2015, the Secretary-General appointed the five Experts, including myself, again as an Expert on Armed Groups and as the Coordinator of the Panel (S/2015/119).
17. The Panel produced three public reports in the period 2014-2015 (the 'Reports'):
 - The Interim report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 59(c) of resolution 2127 (2013) on 26 June 2014 (S/2014/452)(the '2014 Interim Report');



- The Final report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 59(c) of resolution 2127 (2013) on 29 October 2014 (S/2014/762)(the '2014 Final Report'); and
- The Final report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 17(c) of resolution 2196 (2015) on 21 December 2015 (S/2015/936)(the '2015 Final Report').

FUNCTIONING OF THE PANEL AND ROLE AS THE COORDINATOR OF THE PANEL

18. After my appointment as an Expert, on 1st March 2014 I travelled to NEW YORK for induction training. All five Panel Experts were present for the training, and we discussed an initial investigation plan. The Panel collectively decided on this plan, which provided a road map for the future investigation.
19. Subsequently, the Panel members started gathering, examining and analysing information. Each Panel Member acts independently in accordance with the Panels' mandate. However, the information is shared and discussed and the investigation plan is updated accordingly.
20. As the coordinator of the Panel, I give direction to the other Panel members. I compile the information of the other Panel members and discuss and update these directions on the basis of this information. I also drafted the general parts of the Reports. The annexes are drafted by the Panel members who investigated the particular issue.
21. All five Panel members travelled to BANGUI for an initial joint mission from 15-25 March 2014. Shortly after this, the Panel tried to maintain a 'permanent presence' in the field by pairing up at least two Panel members in CAR throughout its mandate, except when we were drafting reports or had to leave due to increased violence.

METHODOLOGY OF THE REPORTS

22. The methodology of the three reports that the Panel produced and that I mentioned earlier (the 2014 Interim Report, the 2014 Final Report, and the 2015 Final Report) follow the methodology set out in the section 'Methodology' of the respective reports (paras. 5-9 of the 2014 Interim



Report, paras. 5-9 of the 2014 Final Report, and paras. 4-8 of the 2015 Final Report) which in turn refers to the application of the methodological standards set out in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). The Panel has set out further details of their methodology with regard to security/criminal incidents at Annex 28 to the 2014 Interim Report (CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0977-0978) and Annex 64 (CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5570-5571) to the 2014 Final Report.

23. I can confirm that all three Reports including all the annexes strictly follow this methodology, to the best of my knowledge. I also confirm that the Reports have not been censured by anyone or any organisation.

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE PANEL

24. The main source of the information reflected in the report is testimonial evidence, followed by documentary evidence and physical evidence (photographs etc.). The Panel does not have the capacity to examine forensic evidence.
25. In respect of the selection of individuals interviewed, the Panel does not use intermediaries: our leads often come from individuals who we meet, and who in turn refer us to other individuals.
26. We do not use interpreters. The Panel members all speak French, and in the event other languages are involved, in most cases the interviewed person provides for an interpreter. Our driver also assisted us on occasion with interpretation from Sango to French, and a Panel member who spoke Arabic would interpret for the other members where necessary.
27. Most often, missions and interviews are conducted by two or more Panel members. The Panel members evaluate the credibility of the evidence collected independently and in accordance with the methodology referred to above.
28. When we interview individuals, we introduce ourselves as members of the UN Panel of Experts. We have never provided any incentive to witnesses we spoke to, money or otherwise. Usually, notes are taken during the interview on paper, which we type up later that day. Sometimes, we prefer not to take



notes during an interview, in which case we write up the content of the conversation after the interview, but always on the same day.

MISSIONS TO CAR

29. In 2014, I was in the CAR from 15 to the 25 March, from 22 April to 6 May, from 13 to 27 May, and from 8 July to 29 July. I had planned to return shortly afterwards, but was unable to do so due to a peak of violence in the country in autumn 2014. I was again present in the CAR in 2015 from 13 to 27 January, 14 to 29 April, 19 May to 2 June, 23 June to 1 July, 25 August to 1 September and 22 September to 6 October. In 2015, the Panel had a 'permanent presence' in CAR from March 2015 to 7 July and from 4 August to 22 October. In 2016, I did one final mission from 8 to 19 January.
30. During my time in CAR, I travelled to the following locations: BANGUI, BOSSANGO, BRIA (for the 2014 Interim Report report); DAMARA, SIBUT (for the 2014 Final Report); BAYANGA, NOLA, SAM-OUANDJA, MBAIKI, KOUANGO, BRIA, OBO, AM-DAFOK and BIRAO (for the 2015 Final Report).

First mission to BANGUI

31. My first introductory mission (with the entire Panel) to Bangui took place from 15 to 25 March 2014. Upon our arrival in Bangui, the situation was tense - we heard a lot of gunfire. During the first mission, the Panel members introduced themselves to the Government and staff of the United Nations. It wasn't really an investigative mission, although we did begin meetings with senior Anti-Balaka commanders (and others), as I will discuss further in my statement.
32. On the Sunday after my arrival in BANGUI on 15 March 2014, I was told by MISCA commanders that there had been fighting between MISCA and Anti-Balaka members in the BOY-RABE neighbourhood that day. MISCA had been searching for weapons in BOY-RABE and they had been shot at by Anti-Balaka elements.
33. As we were returning to the airport on 25 March 2014, we witnessed members of the Anti-Balaka attacking Sangaris in the COMBATTANT neighbourhood of Bangui. I estimate their number at less than a dozen.



Despite the fact that the Anti-Balaka had no distinctive signs, other than *gris-gris*, I knew that they were Anti-Balaka because COMBATTANT was controlled by Anti-Balaka. During the course of our mandate, we established who was in charge of which areas (amongst the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka), and our research confirmed that COMBATTANT was an Anti-Balaka stronghold, as was later confirmed to me by NGAISSONA.

34. As the Anti-Balaka attacked the Sangaris, I was able to take a video. The pictures in Annex 5.6 to the 2014 Interim Report (CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0890-0891) are screenshots of this scene.
35. I do not remember if all the Anti-Balaka involved in the attack were wearing *gris-gris*. They were all armed - the ones you see in the pictures had machetes. I did not see them holding a grenade, but I know that at that time, there were a lot of grenades available in BANGUI, from government stockpiles. Automatic rifles were rare at that time. These pictures at Annex 5.6 accurately reflect what I saw on that day. When we saw the Anti-Balaka attacking the Sangaris, we made a U-turn before they could set their sights on attacking us.
36. During this initial March 2014 mission, I also heard gunshots coming from PK0. I was at the Bangui Tribunal which is approximately 500 metres away from PK0 when I heard these shots. I heard later that armed elements wearing uniforms were robbing Muslims from PK5 after they came out of ECOBANK. I am not aware of any link between this incident and the Anti-Balaka.

ANTI-BALAKA

Leadership

37. The Panel's conclusions on the structure of the Anti-Balaka are as explained in the Reports. In the Panel's opinion, NGAISSONA was indeed coordinating the Anti-Balaka groups from a political point of view. Maxime MOKOM was in charge of military operations. In BANGUI all the neighbourhoods under Anti-Balaka control, such as BOY-RABE, COMBATTANT, BOEING and CASTOR were under the control of various Com-zones, who - in turn - would be under the coordination of area



coordinators, the military coordinator, and subsequently the coordination NGAISSONA.

38. A confidential source told me that Bernard MOKOM took part in the initial planning meetings in YAOUNDE in 2013. The same source said that NGAISSONA was also in Cameroun and supposed to take command and control of the movement. In my analysis, NGAISSONA – as a founding member of COCORA and the minister of youth under BOZIZE, could have been instrumental in mobilizing the Anti-Balaka later on. I do not however have information that NGAISSONA was involved in the 5 December 2013 attack. Some indicated to us that NGAISSONA had arrived 'late', i.e., in January 2014.
39. The same confidential source also indicated that in March 2014, NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM were living together. During our investigation, I came to know that the MOKOM family had several houses in BANGUI, in particular in the BOY-RABE neighbourhood that were being used by Anti-Balaka leadership. We also knew that NGAISSONA had houses in this neighbourhood. As an expert I have seen rebellion leaderships supporting the rebellion not necessarily by money but also by other means such as housing. In respect of the anti-Balaka, many times the Anti-Balaka told us that they were hunted by Sangaris. In my own analysis, the fact that they could change residency regularly and easily helped them in the sense that it was a way to protect them from Sangaris.
40. The confidential source further indicated that Thierry LEBENE (aka DOUZE PUISSANCES – hereinafter referred to as LEBENE) attacked PK5 in March 2014 under the instructions of NGAISSONA. This confidential source participated in the 5 December 2013 attack and was an experienced mid-level commander in the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] I. He told me that these meetings took place in YAOUNDE in a private house and that Bernard MOKOM attended at least one meeting. I do not know who else attended this meeting.
41. The same confidential source told me that the attack of the 5 December 2013 in BANGUI was planned at these meetings. He also told me that the attacks on BOAUR and BELOKO-CANTONNIER were planned at other meetings which took place in CAMEROON. The attack on BELOKO CANTONNIER



also included an attack on the ECOBANK after which Steve YAMBETE was arrested with a bag of money.

Violence in BANGUI - armed Anti-Balaka

42. While we were in BANGUI, there would be a peak of violence followed by a period of calm, and so periods of tension would ebb and flow. During attacks, we would not linger to see what happened, therefore we would not see the Anti-Balaka attacking. During the calmer periods, we wouldn't see armed Anti-Balaka roaming the streets. I did, however, see armed Anti-Balaka in compounds I visited for meetings or interviews, as I will explain later.

Com-zones versus foot-soldiers

43. Usually I would be able to distinguish between a Com-zone and a 'foot-soldier' of the Anti-Balaka. Being a Com-zone is like a social status, they are usually more educated, better dressed and better spoken than the 'foot-soldiers'. Com-zones usually speak French, often quite sophisticated French. There are of course exceptions such as ANDJILO.
44. Other Anti-Balaka commanders explained to me that ANDJILO is more of a 'bush'-commander: and that there were only a few of those. There were a lot of members of the CAR Armed/Security Forces personnel (FACA, Police, Gendarmerie, etc.) amongst the Anti-Balaka commanders who were educated and well-spoken.

Number of Elements of the Anti-Balaka

45. I noticed a tendency amongst Anti-Balaka commanders to overstate the number of elements under their control. For instance, as I will explain below, I believe that LEBENE and NGAISSONA both overstated the number of Anti-Balaka as well as the geographical area they controlled. However, I note that as a Panel, we distinguished between the full-time Anti-Balaka involved in the day-to-day activities of the militia (for example those who were manning checkpoints) and those who would simply participate in particular events, such as a group of youth mobilised to participate in demonstrations, in erecting barricades (blocking the road), etc. In respect of the first, I did not hear of any salaries being paid to full-time Anti-Balaka, but I know that they



had the capacity to make money from the local population, for instance at checkpoints.

46. In respect of the latter, I would not consider them to be 'Anti-Balaka' as such despite their participation in such events. I also did not hear of payments made to the youth for their mobilisation. Nevertheless, I came to understand that when the youth would to set up barricades, this would clearly prevent all activity in BANGUI: the barricades would prevent all movement of vehicles and trucks etc. The Anti-Balaka themselves did not have vehicles but the barricades would block the movement of all the vehicles and trucks of the UN, the international forces, the government, but also business trucks. At the time (especially early 2014), there were still factories/plants active in BANGUI, and there were commercial activities going on resulting in imports and export for example from and to Cameroun.
47. When those road barricades would be erected, life in BANGUI would stop: the barricades would prevent and stop all commercial activity; they would prevent and stop security operations; the government would not be able to function; Air France would cancel flights to or from BANGUI; etc. So in that sense, the barricades provided leverage politically. Once those barricades would be brought down again, everyone would be able to go about their usual business again.
48. I do not know who exactly would order the setup of the barricades, and whether it was a result of orders being given and the higher level and brought down the lower echelons. I know however that the barricades were set up by youth from BOY-RABE and by youth from COMBATTANT and that they would block the two main strategic access roads on: the one hand access to the airport, on the other hand access to PK12 and CAMEROON. For example, the barricades would be erected on the main road, on Avenue de l'Indépendance and on the Avenue des Martyrs, in the area after the parliament (the avenue continues to PK12) and between PK6 (in the BOY-RABE neighbourhood). As mentioned, the youth of BOY-RABE would set those up on avenue de l'Indépendance and erect barricades and prevent all traffic to CAMEROON. Likewise, in COMBATTANT, the youth of COMBATTANT would set up barricades on the main road to the airport.

Anti-Balaka capacity



49. In my opinion, and as explained in the Reports, the capacity of the Anti-Balaka has increased throughout my time in CAR (i.e. between my first visit in March 2014 until my last visit in January 2016). I saw an increasing number of locations where Anti-Balaka were present. In terms of military capacity, the local hunting groups, or youth, or self-defence groups had no military capacity on their own until they joined the Anti-Balaka (which amongst its ranks had FACA elements). We also noticed an increased number of incidents using assault rifles (instead of artisanal rifles), and even RPGs. We also identified an increased number of cases where Anti-Balaka commanders and elements coming from BANGUI were involved in incidents in the provinces.
50. The fact that the Anti-Balaka were involved in taxation and racketeering and that they were also involved in the mining business also meant that they had more resources as time went on.

Anti-Balaka recruitment

51. In the Panel's analysis, the *modus operandi* of the Anti-Balaka throughout its existence remained the same in that Anti-Balaka military commanders, most of whom are former FACA, were sent to the area to mobilize Christian youth or to assume command over existing local self-defence groups. They would be sent by NGAISSONA or MOKOM who signed mission letters to that effect.

INTERVIEW WITH NGAISSONA: 3 May 2014

52. I had one face to face meeting with NGAISSONA, which took place on 3 May 2014 in the 4th arrondissement. I wanted to meet him as he was one of the main political / military actors at the time in the CAR, and I had seen his signature on press communications and mission letters.
53. The meeting I had with NGAISSONA was at a compound that I believe belonged to Bernard MOKOM's wife. The compound had a gate, manned by unarmed men. I saw between 10-12 people at the compound, two were outside manning the gate, the others were in the compound itself. The individuals I saw were middle-aged men. I did not see any children, woman or elderly persons. None of the individuals I saw at the compound were carrying guns openly. They were not in military attire, nor did they have any



distinctive signs, such as *gris-gris*, visible. To me, it looked like NGAISSONA was using the compound only as an office, i.e. that he was not living there as there were no typical day-to-day activities such as cooking etc. going on. We were told by the confidential source mentioned above that in this time-period NGAISSONA was living in the same compound as Bernard MOKOM.

54. In the compound's yard we also saw some broken down trucks and busses. I was told that NGAISSONA – upon his return to BANGUI (i.e. 2014) had been involved in import and export through a company called 'DIVINE GROUP' (as also indicated by insignia on some of the trucks in the yard). I was informed however by a confidential source that NGAISSONA's company would smuggle some of the items he was trading in (for example stationary) from CAMEROON in different trucks (not those having the official DIVINE GROUP insignia) so that he would avoid paying taxes on those goods. He would sell them to the CAR government adding the taxes to the selling price.
55. There were several individuals waiting to meet NGAISSONA. We were told by NGAISSONA that some of the individuals waiting to meet him were commanders coming from the provinces (outside of BANGUI) and some were commanders from BANGUI. NGAISSONA told me that they had come for a coordination meeting.
56. NGAISSONA presented himself to me as the coordinator of the 'liberators' who liberated the country from the Seleka; he explained that he is representing them politically to defend their rights as 'freedom fighters'. He explained it is a representation role. NGAISSONA referred to a letter which I saw later on, and which NGAISSONA had sent on behalf of the Anti-Balaka on 21 January 2014 to congratulate SAMBA-PANZA on her position. NGAISSONA signed that letter as the Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka. I believe he said his role as the coordinator was going to be confirmed at a General Assembly of Anti-Balaka that was going to take place in the near future.
57. He indicated that the Anti-Balaka was not represented sufficiently in the transitional government. When asked about Anti-Balaka violence and exactions committed by Anti-Balaka elements (generally speaking), he would respond that this violence is committed by uncontrolled elements or 'fake' Anti-Balaka. I did not ask him about specific incidents. I asked him about measures he would have taken and he explained me that had asked the



international forces in a press communication to arrest the fake Anti-Balaka. He himself had not taken any specific measures.

58. In response to my question as to who was in charge of the military operations, NGAISSONA referred to Maxime MOKOM. He explained that he himself and the Anti-Balaka have no link with BOZIZE in the sense that BOZIZE was not – at that point in time – backing his group.
59. In respect of his role, NGAISSONA explained that as a coordinator he would '*sensibiliser*' the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and in the provinces to reconcile and end the violence. NGAISSONA did not provide more information on what he meant by this. I came to understand that it did not necessarily mean preaching reconciliation and the end of violence: it was a way to maintain and keep some form of unity of the movement and the link between the elements in the provinces and the leadership in BANGUI. It involved maintaining a grip on the Anti-Balaka in the provinces: one of the ways was by handing money over to them, buying their allegiance and loyalty. From their side, they had an interest in having someone to represent them in BANGUI.
60. My conclusion based upon repeated confirmation to that effect was that NGAISSONA and MOKOM would regularly send Anti-Balaka elements into the provinces. I heard that NGAISSONA sent money to give to local commanders of groups such as *autodéfense* groups, who would then be added to a list of 'Anti-Balaka commanders' in that region together with 'Anti-Balaka elements' under their control. Thus a group that already existed became an 'Anti-Balaka group'.
61. In my analysis, someone like NGAISSONA was trying to have more personal political leverage by buying allegiance from these local groups - the more elements you have, the stronger your voice is with the Government, with the UN etc. In other words, the more elements he could claim fell 'under his umbrella', the more relevant he would become. For the same reason they issued badges: those would 'prove' that they were under his organisation. The higher the number of Anti-Balaka under his coordination, the more power he would receive from that. That is why he needed to maintain contact with the provinces. As explained before in respect of the barricades, these would also provide political leverage (a voice at the table) or a voice amongst the business community.



62. I heard from a confidential source based in NOLA, for example, explained that an individual named [REDACTED] was sent by NGAISSONA to SANGHA-MBAERE with a mandate signed by NGAISSONA and by MOKOM and a mission order signed by MOKOM. He provided money, hunting ammunition and telephone credit there to local commander.
63. NGAISSONA had called the [REDACTED] of NOLA threatening to kill him. He threatened him because the Anti-Balaka had attempted to come to NOLA to establish a base, but had been repelled by the MINUSCA, and NGAISSONA suspected the [REDACTED] of being behind the MINUSCA operation. Directly after this call, December 2014, [REDACTED] showed up in NOLA bearing a 'mandate' signed by NGAISSONA and MOKOM and a mission letter signed by MOKOM. I heard from this source that they also had a mission letter signed by NGAISSONA, but they could not find it. Shortly afterwards, Anti-Balaka elements from places such as BERBERATI, BOSSANGO and MBAIKI arrived in NOLA on 16/17 December 2014.
64. My colleagues on the Panel also told me that while on mission in BERBERATI on 10/11 July 2014, they met with Jean Louis NGAIZOUNOU, a representative of NGAISSONA on mission, as detailed in the 2014 Final Report at CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5405, para. 69. As detailed in the Report, the Panel later witnessed a meeting between NGAIZOUNOU, the Com-zone of BERBERATI and the Com-zone of GAMBOULA.
65. I heard from another Panel member that in May 2014, Anti-Balaka from BANGUI under the control of Brice EMOTION were involved in an supply of grenades to Anti-Balaka elements operating in an area South of BAMBARI: the grenades were brought by boat to KOUANGO and then by road from KOUANGO to the area south of BAMBARI. I do not know who financed these grenades.
66. In my experienced opinion, in armed groups such as the Anti-Balaka is, every level has to add value to the other levels (from local to regional to national). Every level needs to be relevant to the other level or else they would not be part of the organisation. In the case of the Anti-Balaka, the lower levels needed individuals at the next level to represent them, for example individuals who could speak French or who were literate. The next level would need, for example, money or ammunition and therefore turn to the level above them. In turn, the highest levels would offer international representation of the needs and demands of the Anti-Balaka; they would




promise participation in DDR programs, which in the CAR – from past experience - meant receiving some money. They would also promise positions in the army and in return they would increase their own political leverage. In these types of organisations, these coordination meetings are key to the existence of the organisation.

67. As the Panel also confirmed later on, the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and in the provinces would refer to NGAISSONA as their coordinator. When we discussed this (even after the disagreements and splits within the movement in 2014) they would still refer to NGAISSONA as their coordinator. They would not explain to us what they meant by that. The only exception was the Anti-Balaka my colleagues met from ROMBHOT's group who would refer to ROMBHOT as their chief and leader.
68. The Anti-Balaka from the provinces would meet NGAISSONA in BANGUI during coordination meetings – often staying (openly) at the Hotel AZIMUT. During my time in BANGUI, I learned that the owner of the Hotel AZIMUT is connected to the Anti-Balaka, but I cannot recall his name. I am not aware of coordination meetings with the Anti-Balaka from the provinces before May 2014, which is when we received the list of the commanders of the provinces (see CAR-OTP-2001-5464 and 5465). I do not know if the Anti-Balaka commanders from the provinces were staying at the hotel for free or whether someone was paying for them but they weren't paying themselves. I do not remember how I came to know this information.
69. I was referred to page CAR-OTP-2001-0849 of the 2014 Interim Report. I had indeed asked NGAISSONA if he was in control of Anti-Balaka groups operating in BANGUI, for example, BOY-RABE, COMBATTANT, BOEING, CASTOR and other neighbourhoods, and he responded yes.
70. In my opinion, and based on the Panel's analysis, in 2014 the Anti-Balaka were indeed in control of specific and defined neighbourhoods in BANGUI, including BOY-RABE, COMBATTANT, BOEING and CASTOR.

INTERVIEW WITH KOKATE: 20 MARCH 2014

71. I decided to meet Joachim KOKATE because he was seen as a senior Anti-Balaka (he was the prime minister's advisor). We met in a restaurant in BANGUI in March 2014. He explained he was representing ROMBHOT (i.e.,



Alfred YEKATOM's faction politically. He explained that NGAISSONA was against the transition and that they had split up (but he did not tell me when). He said that NGAISSONA was channelling money from BOZIZE to the Anti-Balaka to reinstate BOZIZE into power. He explained that NGAISSONA had strongholds in BOY-RABE and COMBATTANT.

72. He explained that NGAISSONA's return from CAMEROON on 15 January 2014 coincided with a peak of violence, but did not offer more details about this. He explained that NGAISSONA's arrest would have a clear impact on the security situation in the country but that the government does not have the capacity to arrest NGAISSONA. KOKATE explained that the Government did not have enough gendarmerie or armed police to arrest him. My understanding was that KOKATE meant that, to arrest someone like NGAISSONA you would need to conduct a proper police operation: the police would need to be stronger than the person they wished to arrest, or otherwise they wouldn't be able to arrest him. NGAISSONA already at that time had enough power and/or importance to outweigh the Government's capacity.

73. KOKATE told me BOZIZE mainly trusts his extended family and people from his own clan, i.e. the Gbaya ethnic group such as Yvon KONATE. BOZIZE sent seven names to the transitional president Catherine SAMBAPANZA to be appointed in the transitional government - all seven were 'related' to BOZIZE (i.e. his extended family).

74.

[REDACTED]

75. KOKATE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but also operated at a higher level than ROMBHOT or



KAMEZOLAI. KOKATE had been a minister in the BOZIZE CAR Government and was a person of some standing in CAR.

76. KOKATE did not mention anything about funding or access to weapons nor his ability to give orders. He did mention a reconciliation meeting which he went to in BODA as the Prime Minister's advisor. He explained he could not do much in BODA because the Anti-Balaka were being manipulated at the local level by the Christian business community who supported the Christian Deputy Mayor of BODA. The Deputy Mayor's aim was to rid BODA of Muslim businesses and its Muslim Mayor. He said that the situation was similar in BOSSANGO, except that the Mayor was not Muslim, [REDACTED]

INTERVIEW WITH LEBENE: 22 MARCH 2014

77. During my first mission, I interviewed LEBENE, not far from where I interviewed NGAISSONA later in BOY-RABE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

as a businessman. There were people manning the gate and some people around but not as many as in the compound where I interviewed NGAISSONA. They were not armed or wearing military attire. I never saw Anti-Balaka leaders with weapons except for MAZIMBELET who was holding a grenade during our interview with him. LEBENE was wearing discrete *gris-gris*.

78. LEBENE told me that he reported to NGAISSONA. He did not explain how.
79. He explained that the aim of the Anti-Balaka was to defend the population against Seleka actions and that they were also protecting the population from the MISCA Chadians.
80. During the interview, he explained to me the command structure of the Anti-Balaka. He explained that NGAISSONA is the political coordinator, that BOZIZE is not involved, that he (LEBENE) commands 2000 Anti-Balaka elements – which I believe to be an overestimation. He said that the government is not offering anything to the Anti-Balaka despite the fact that they liberated the country from the Seleka. At that time, LEBENE did not



mention Maxime MOKOM. He spoke as if he himself was directly under NGAISSONA. For me, it was very clear that [REDACTED] it was Maxime MOKOM who was in charge of military operations in the Anti-Balaka. Later on this was confirmed throughout the information we collected.

81. He told me that those in government, such as KOKATE and BARA, do not represent the Anti-Balaka, but are rather self-interested. He also said that people within the government are encouraging the commission of crimes to discredit the Anti-Balaka – for example LARMASSOU who is manipulated by the government. LEBENE arrested LARMASSOU (who had been a military commander under DEMAFOUTH) and when LEBENE brought him to the gendarmerie, LARMASSOU was liberated by DEMAFOUTH. LARMASSOU controlled the 8th arrondissement with 300 elements (which we also believed was an overestimation). LEBENE explained that they, the Anti-Balaka, control BOY-RABE, OUANGO, PK12, BOEING, DAMARA, BOUCANGOLO, BOALI, BOSSEMBELE, BOUAR, BOSSANGO AND YALAKO.
82. LEBENE explained that ROMBHOT controlled the road from BIMBO to PK9 and that ROMBHOT's group receives financial support from the government which was channelled through KOKATE and KOLINGBA. He described KOKATE, BARA, ROMBHOT, KAMEZOLAI and KOLINGA as part of a dissident branch of the Anti-Balaka. LEBENE explained that because of the government funding, around 25,000,000 CFA, ROMBHOT had a lot of weapons whereas they only had 3 AK-47's and machetes.
83. LEBENE explained that the Anti-Balaka Etat-Major was composed of area coordinators, companies, and sections (each company having three sections). He explained that he marched from DAMARA to BANGUI and participated in the 5 December 2013 attack. He explained to me that while he was marching to Bangui, BARA called him to try to get his support. BARA at the time was creating his own Anti-Balaka. BARA met him again after the 5 December 2013 attack to ask again for his support – but LEBENE refused because BARA was – [REDACTED] He explained that BARA was supported by FRANCE and the government.

84. [REDACTED]



- 
85. LEBENE told us that all real Anti-Balaka bear badges. He explained that the badges would allow them to distinguish the real from the fake Anti-Balaka. I recall seeing KOMBO's badge that day, which was later photographed by another Panel member (see CAR-OTP-2001-0882 – badge of KOMBO). To my recollection, LEBENE also had a badge. He also explained that ANDJILO was a company commander in BOUCA but when asked to meet him LEBENE explained that ANDJILO had left on a '*sensibilisation*' mission two weeks earlier. I could see from this that LEBENE had information regarding the actions of other Anti-Balaka commanders.

INTERVIEW WITH BOZIZE: 6 JUNE 2014

86. I interviewed BOZIZE alone in Entebbe on 6 June 2014 at a guest-house called 'ARCH Apartments'. I think he was residing there.
87. BOZIZE denied commanding the Anti-Balaka in the CAR. He denied any involvement on what was happening in CAR. He did not understand why people would say that he is responsible. He felt betrayed by the international community, Idriss DEBY, Denis SASSOU-NGUESSO, FRANCE.
88. I asked him about the accusation that he had distributed machetes to the CAR population and he responded that these accusations were ridiculous because the entire CAR population already had machetes.
89. He explained that Anti-Balaka took control over BOSSANGO in September 2013 when he was in PARIS, and explained that he could not have been involved since he was in PARIS. He referred to the Bishop of BOSSANGO's statement that the Anti-Balaka of BOSSANGO were self-organised. He said that since July 2013, he had been in PARIS asking to meet with the French advisor on Africa, so he could not have been behind the organisation of the offensive in CAR. He explained that the fact that a lot of people involved in that insurgency are close to the President (i.e. him) was a coincidence and had nothing to do with him. He continued by saying that since he left FRANCE, he did not travel to CAMEROON or DRC, but only to KENYA and ETHIOPIA before the 5 December attack. He explained that he had been

asked by the French authorities to leave PARIS but I do not know what date he actually left.

90. BOZIZE told me that on the 5 December 2013 his sons Jean-Francis and Franklin were in PARIS; Josef, Teddy, and Aimé-Vincent were in KINSHASA; Bakounaba (his *aide-de-camp*) and Rodrigue were in CAMEROON, and Socrate was travelling back and forth in between SENEGAL and FRANCE. In general, he added that [REDACTED]

91. BOZIZE said that he received some help from the Cameroonian President BIYA - [REDACTED]

92. We discussed the telephone call that was tapped between him and Yvon KONATE and that was leaked in February 2014. He said that he called KONATE at the request of the US State Department. He was contacted by them to get in touch with the people on the ground in order to prevent further violence, which he did. He said that the fact that the conversation was leaked coincided with internal struggles within the Anti-Balaka movement for leadership. He did not elaborate on that but I supposed he was referring to the power battles between BARA, KOKATE, NGAISSONA, WENEZOUÏ and others.

93. He told me that he never played any coordination role for the Anti-Balaka and had never called any Anti-Balaka commander before that particular call. He said the Anti-Balaka are the grassroots reaction to the crimes committed by the Seleka, and that he welcomed the election of SAMBA-PANZA as head of the transition.

94. He explained that his political movement, the FROCCA or KNK had no relation with the Anti-Balaka but that he would be happy to be part of an inclusive reconciliation process. He said he knows Seleka individuals very well because he had used them for his own coup in 2003 and had paid them between 1,000,000 – 20,000,000 CFA each, depending on their rank. He said

that all the payment at that time were made [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

95. [REDACTED]

96. Regarding NGAISSONA, BOZIZE explained that NGAISSONA was doing his own thing and did not elaborate on that further.

INTERVIEW WITH MAZIMBELET: between April and August 2014

97. I interviewed Guy MAZIMBELET next to a house that he was occupying in BOY-RABE. The house was on the flank of a hill, overlooking the neighbourhood. I was told the house belonged to someone else, not to MAZIMBELET, but I cannot tell you who it belonged to. There was no gate, and we interviewed him outside the house.

98. MAZIMBELET was dressed normally, not in military attire, and during our interview, he was holding a grenade in his hands.

99. At the house, there were a lot of Anti-Balaka elements, two or three with assault rifles. They were not wearing uniforms, nor did I see *gris-gris* (as far as I can remember). It was clear to me that these were his elements by the way they interacted with each other.

100. I interviewed him one-on-one with another Panel member, there were no other Anti-Balaka around. During the interview, he indicated (like the others) that the Anti-Balaka had 'liberated' the country.

INTERVIEW WITH MAXIME MOKOM: 27 June 2015

101. I met MOKOM on 27 June 2015 in GOBONGO, in a house in a compound. I did not know who the house belonged to – it may have belonged to him or to his family. I am also not sure whether he lived there but I do not think that he did. There were no women, children or elderly persons in the house. There were no typical day-to-day activities, such as cooking, going on.

102. There were a lot of people at the house, including Jocelyn MONGOUNDOU, and other Com-zones, including one from KAGA-BANDORO. I do not know who the other Com-zones were or where they came from, but as I previously explained I could usually tell who was a Com-zone by their manner of dress, behaviour and speech. I do not think seeing anyone armed at the compound. During the interview MOKOM indicated he had malaria and was hooked up to a drip.
103. I spoke to MOKOM after the NAIROBI talks. The discussions were focused on that, and the Anti-Balaka internal struggles.
104. MOKOM said that he split from NGAISSONA on the 23 of October 2014 after NGAISSONA announced the creation of the PCUD. MOKOM said he split because he does not want to be involved in politics. He does not have political ambitions, nor does he have an agenda. He is just an Anti-Balaka leader, who wanted to defend the population from the Seleka.
105. He said that NGAISSONA was playing the Government's role. He said he saw a document signed by NGAISSONA pledging allegiance to the political transition and the President of the transition on behalf of the Anti-Balaka. The document was signed on 17 April 2014, and MOKOM and others were never informed of the signing - NGAISSONA never told him that he would sign on behalf of the Anti-Balaka.
106. He explained that the Seleka was targeting the GBAYA people, and that his uncle, cousin, younger brother (i.e., Rochael aka Rocco) were killed by Seleka. He said that within the Seleka, the only person that matters is Nourredine ADAM, the others are not relevant.
107. MOKOM said that he had an issue with the fact that they could not continue their '*sensibilisation*': he wanted to continue doing outreach in the provinces about the DDR-process. He also wanted to have discussions with MINUSCA about the DDR-process. He said they would like to be cantoned like the Seleka both in BANGUI and in the provinces. He explained that the more the international community prevented him and NGAISSONA from doing the *sensibilisation*, the more complicated it would become to have an effective DDR process because they both (MOKOM and NGAISSONA) would lose contacts with the local commanders in the provinces. He told me that this was also having an impact on the structuring of the Anti-Balaka movement.

108. In respect of the '*sensibilisation*', the Panel came to learn that the '*ordre de missions*' were used by the Anti-Balaka to travel around freely in the country (passing check-points of International forces etc.). Despite the text of the '*ordre de missions*' their purpose was not necessarily the '*sensibilisation*' but also the integration of existing commanders as Anti-Balaka or the continued recognition of local commanders as part of the Anti-Balaka in the provinces.

109. MOKOM said that when he travelled back from NAIROBI (via BRAZZAVILLE), the gendarmerie was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that NGAISSONA still had a lot of money from his companies and business to buy allegiances, and that in addition he received more money from President SAMBA-PANZA including money that she had received from ANGOLA for reconciliation purposes.

110. MOKOM said that KONATE, GREMANGOU are under him (MOKOM) in terms of hierarchy. He also indicated that MAZIMBELET was also under him but that he also acted independently. He did not explain that further.

111. MOKOM said that he would like be recognised as the real leader of the Anti-Balaka, as the only and overall representative of the Anti-Balaka, both politically and militarily. He said he did not want to be seen solely as a Gbaya from BOZIZE's clan. I asked him whether he and his family were specifically targeted because of his link with BOZIZE. He did not like the question and did not answer it.

112. MOKOM said that he would like the Sangaris to stop 'hunting' him. He said that he was in contact with government envoys but that he would like to speak with the president directly as opposed to the envoys. He said that on the Seleka side he is regularly in contact with AL KHATIM, ARDA HAKOUMA and General KADHER.

113. We did not discuss the violence in 2013 or anything related to the creation of the Anti-Balaka. We did not discuss financing, weapons or ammunition.

114. In my opinion, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Call to Army Personnel from KAMEZOLAI

115. I was referred to page CAR-OTP-2001-5408, para. 81 of the 2014 Interim Report, which indicates that on 30 July 2014, KAMEZOLAI called upon all army personnel to return to their barracks and leave the Anti-Balaka movement, which certain Anti-Balaka commanders allegedly followed. I would like to add that a [REDACTED] told a member of the Panel that KAMEZOLAI had not been given authority from NGAISSONA or the general coordination of the Anti-Balaka to make such a call.

MISSION TO BOSSANGO: 30 April 2014 and 1 May 2014

116. I went on a two day mission to BOSSANGO between 30 April and 1 May 2014. The case study in Annex 5.5 of the 2014 Interim Report (CAR-OTP-2001-0885 to 0889) is based on my mission and meetings in BOSSANGO.

117. In BOSSANGO I met a local Anti-Balaka, Pastor BERTIN, a local businessman named Rocky and other 'actors' (i.e., people of relevance to my investigation). Rocky was known [REDACTED] Compared to the rest of BOSSANGO, he was a wealthy man. We did not obtain information that he was financing the Anti-Balaka.

118. Before my mission to BOSSANGO, I consulted a UNOSAT satellite image (CAR-OTP-2001-0888) which indicated to me that the BORO neighbourhood of BOSSANGO had been destroyed. Using the map as a guide, I went to BORO where I confirmed that all the buildings in the BORO neighbourhood had recently been destroyed. I could see they were destroyed recently because there was no vegetation growing back yet, and the neighbourhood had not yet been occupied by other people. When I say 'destroyed', I mean that the windows, doors and roofs of the houses had been taken away and the contents of the houses looted. As I indicate in the report, I learned that

local groups associated with the Anti-Balaka were responsible for the destruction and looting.

119. I took the four photographs of the BORO neighbourhood available at CAR-OTP-2001-0886, 0887 and 0889. These pictures accurately reflect what I saw on that day. The photographs are an example of what I saw during my visit.

120. At the time of my visit on 30 April 2014, the BORO neighbourhood, which was generally known as being the Muslim neighbourhood in BOSSANGO, was completely empty of people.

121. The Panel conducted a weapons inspection in BOSSANGO in April/ June 2015, but I did not go back to the BORO neighbourhood.

122. I also visited the EVECHE neighbourhood which was predominantly Christian. This neighbourhood was crowded, people were going about their usual business; there were no signs of destruction of houses or buildings. I did not notice any other destruction at that time in the other neighbourhoods I visited in BOSSANGO.

123. Sources who I met in BOSSANGO (but who were not part of the Anti-Balaka) informed me that Florent KEMA had just arrived from BEN ZAMBE. This did not necessarily mean that his troops had not already arrived before him. The same sources also indicated that he had just been appointed as leader by the Anti-Balaka leadership in BANGUI. I do not know why he was appointed to be the Anti-Balaka leader in BOSSANGO.

124. BERTIN told me that he represented the youth of BOSSANGO as a community focal point but my local sources said he was a local Chief of the Anti-Balaka.

125. BERTIN told me that he had proposed that his group takes part in the DDR. He told me there was no other leadership over the youth in BOSSANGO, other than him. This was confirmed by my other sources. I concluded that indeed that he was the only local Anti-Balaka in charge of the youth, but that there was another group of Anti-Balaka under the control of KEMA, with DORASSIO and DANGBA as deputies and ANDRE (a local from EVECHE) as their spokesperson.

126. BERTIN informed me that there was no hierarchy in the self-defence group in BOSSANGO, but that they were being manipulated by people coming from BANGUI. He told me that on at least one occasion, a local Anti-Balaka disarmed an Anti-Balaka 'coming from BANGUI'.
127. My findings were that the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO were divided between a more moderate faction headed by [REDACTED] and a more extremist faction coming from BEN ZAMBE under the leadership of KEMA.

INTERVIEW WITH FLORENT KEMA: 18 April 2015

128. I met [REDACTED] in BANGUI, where they had come for an Anti-Balaka General Assembly/coordination meeting. They were expecting MOKOM and KOKATE to brief them on what happened at the NAIROBI talks. NGAISSONA was expected to join them for the Anti-Balaka General Assembly.
129. KEMA said that MOKOM used to be the military coordinator of the Anti-Balaka but that now he is involved in politics.
130. KEMA told me that he and FINDIRI fall under the authority of NGAISSONA - although NGAISSONA is only a coordinator and the decisions are taken by the general assembly of the Anti-Balaka: NGAISSONA cannot take decisions on his own.
131. KEMA told me that he is the regional coordinator of OUHAM province (which includes the town of BOSSANGO). He said that the main objective of his group - the Anti-Balaka in OUHAM province - is 'still' to chase all the Muslims out of OUHAM and also to chase out all the Seleka. He spoke about this as an ongoing objective but did not mention from when this had been their main aim. KEMA told me that his Anti-Balaka had made peace with the Peuhl during a meeting from 1-3 April 2015. He showed me pictures of this meeting. Due to this, he did not include the Peuhl when he indicated that his objective was to drive all Muslims from OUHAM.
132. It was my understanding that the objective of the Anti-Balaka generally was to chase out the Seleka, but because they make an association between Seleka, Sudanese, Chadians and 'foreigners' they would group them all

together as their enemy. However, lower down in the chain of Anti-Balaka command, this led to a simplified idea of who was the enemy. In the lower ranks, the perceived enemy simply became 'Muslims in general'. I heard this throughout my time in CAR, from different Anti-Balaka members, in different places, in different positions, and also from the general population. It was as though there was a simplified message circulating that all the Muslims needed to be chased out. In my opinion, the message was so widespread that the Anti-Balaka leadership were aware of the fact that this was the general understanding of the Anti-Balaka troops. There was one instances were a Panel members looked at the killing of the Deputy Mayor in the MBAIKI area and an Anti-Balaka explained that it was because of this simplification that those crimes were being committed.

133.KEMA explained to me that his group does not cooperate with Revolution and Justice ('RJ') because protects the Muslims. He had an issue with that, as he did not want them to be protected.

134. [REDACTED] told me that his group were in contact with Seleka in [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED]

135.KEMA explained that when ANDJILO was in the BOUCA area, they used to coordinate with all the Com-zones in the BOUCA and BATANGAFO area – but now ANDJILO's brother is in charge and there is no more cooperation because the brother is hiding himself.

136.This interview took place in Hotel AZIMUT – were the commanders were openly meeting for an Anti-Balaka coordination meeting. At the hotel I saw KEMA, FINDIRI, Grace a Dieu ENDJIZAPOU (alias EMPIZADO), Gaetan BOUADE, Dieudonné HOURONTI, Nicodeme DOUMIA (Comzone of BOCARONGA) – who told me he was under NGAISSONA, Barthelémy NAMSENO (artisan miner – charge des operation Anti-Balaka a CARNOT) who equally told me he was under NGAISSONA, Aubin MBOYA (Com-zone NOLA) and Alexis MANDAGO. I met them all face-to-face and they all introduced themselves to us. We asked them identifying information (date of birth etc.).

137.FINDIRI is the coordinator of BEN ZAMBE (which is relatively small) – whereas KEMA is the regional coordinator of OUHAM. FINDIRI did not speak to me; he let KEMA speak as he was his superior.

138. As I had received information that Teddy BOZIZE had been present in the area of BEN ZAMBE, I asked KEMA about Teddy's role. KEMA explained that Teddy BOZIZE does not play any role in BOSSANGO or in BEN ZAMBE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only one in contact with Teddy BOZIZE from BOSSANGO is Rocky.

SELEKA

139. During my time in CAR, I spoke to several persons associated with the Seleka. As the Panel's mandate was to examine events which took place from 5 December 2013, I did not ask Seleka commanders questions regarding human right abuses and crimes committed by the Seleka in 2013.

140. In 2014, I wished to speak with ex-president Michel DJOTODIA in BENIN, where he was at the time. I travelled to BENIN on 1 October 2014 for the purposes of the meeting. I called DJOTODIA on arrival and he agreed to meet, but when I called again shortly afterwards he did not answer his phone. When I went to his house, together with one of my colleagues on the Panel, I learned that he had just left the country. At his house, I spoke with his aide de camp, whose first name was HASSAN. HASSAN is young, skinny and of medium height. As I could not meet with DJOTODIA, I left the next day, on 2 October 2014.

141. The Panel met with Issa ISSAKA three times in April/May 2014, at RDOT CAMP and 36 VILLAS. I personally met with ISSAKA in BANGUI at RDOT CAMP. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ISSAKA was the Chief of the Seleka at the RDOT, which is why I wanted to speak to him. We had a conversation about Anti-Balaka attacks and the cantonment of the Seleka.

142. I had a face to face meeting with General ALKHATIM in 2015. The Panel spoke with him on the phone on 20 May 2014 and 25 August 2014, but I did not call him myself as he speaks Arabic and I do not. I stood next to the Panel member who made the call. I was there for one of the two meetings with

him. A photograph of the meeting is included in the 2015 Final Report (see Annex 4.5 at CAR-OTP-2023-0239). We did not discuss crimes or human rights abuses at the meeting.

143.

144.

145. I think that I spoke with Nouredine ADAM on the telephone in order to try to set up a meeting, but the meeting did not take place. I met with Ousmane Mahamat OUSMAN, Bachar FADOUL and Ibrahim SARFADINE, but we focused on the situation at that time and did not speak about events which took place in 2013. I also met with Eric MESSI, Mohamed DHAFAN, Abdoulaye ISSENE, and Abdelkarim MOUSSA. I did not meet with Abdul Kader KHALIL. I do not think that I met with Arda HAKOUMA.

ANNEXES

146. In respect of the annexes, as mentioned each Panel member provided their own annexes. I can comment on the ones I worked on.

147. In respect of the numbers and/or statistics mentioned in the Annexes (e.g. regarding victims, incidents, crimes, killings and other numbers and/or statistics), I can confirm that the Panel followed the methodology as set out in Annex 28 of the 2014 Interim Report (CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0977-0978) and Annex 64 of the 2014 Final Report (CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5570-5571). The Panel receives numbers and/or statistics from other organisations, including UN organisations, both public and non-public statistics.

148. In respect of the numbers and/or statistics related to victims, the Panel decided to keep an internal database in order to calculate and provided these

numbers, because no other organisation was keeping track of the exact numbers involved at that time.

Annexes to the 2014 Interim Report of the Panel of Experts

ERN	TITLE	COMMENTARY
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0875	Annex 5: Anti-Balaka – Structure and dynamics	I drafted this annex and confirm this analysis continued to be valid throughout our mandate in CAR.
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0881	Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry LEBENE alias Colonel 12 Puissances	I believe this document is authentic because I never came across a fake 'ordre de mission'. I never received information that fake documents of this kind were in circulation.
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0882	Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the 'Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain'	I have seen many Anti-Balaka members carrying badges throughout my missions to CAR
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0885-0889	Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham Province)	See above regarding my mission to BOSSANGO
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0890-0891	Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and United Nations convoy by Anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)	As I described above, I took this video footage myself on 25 th March 2014 in BANGUI.
CAR-OTP-2001-0835 at 0893	Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the "Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain" (CLPC) (copy archived at the UN)	I believe this document is authentic because we received all the Anti-Balaka press communications directly from members of the Anti-Balaka. I believe that NGAISSONA, as the Anti-Balaka Coordinator, could demand the end of hostilities on the entire territory. MOKOM explained me that NGAISSONA would not consult others before issuing press communications. In respect of this particular one, I do not believe the



		violence actually ended but he referred to this order to 'end the hostilities' on a regular basis, in later press communiqués and statements.
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Annexes to 2014 Final report of the Panel of Experts

ERN	TITLE	COMMENTARY
CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5464-5465	Annex 10: Names, positions and signatures of the political and military leadership of the CLPC in a document dated 18 May 2014 (archived at the United Nations)	I collected this document. I believe it is authentic because it was provided to me by an Anti-Balaka commander. It was an internal document with text and a list of the attendants of a coordination meeting of the Anti-Balaka. I confirm that for the annex, I only included a collation of the attendees. The original is at the UN. I confirm it is dated 18 May 2014.
CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5466-5468	Annex 11: Appointment letters signed by Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona of Soussou Abib (a.k.a. Soussou Habib) as acting regional coordinator and Rodrigue Karamokonzi as acting zone commander in Boda on 28 June 2014 (Lobaye province), and confirmation letter of their appointment on 8 July 2014 (archived at the United Nations)	I did not collect this document. I was asked about the fact that the document was not dated. I can confirm that these types of documents, as well as 'ordres de missions' were often not dated so that they could be used throughout a certain period without having to establish new documents.
CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5469	Annex 12: CLPC decision number 1 expelling Léopold Narcisse Bara signed by NGAÏSSONA (archived at the United Nations)	I collected this document. I believe it is authentic because it was provided to me by an Anti-Balaka commander.
CAR-OTP-2001-5386 at 5470	Press communiqué announcing the appointment of Sébastien Wénézoui as	I collected this document. Same remark as regarding the press communications. After this issuance of



	deputy general coordinator of the CLPC signed by NGAISSONA (archived at the United Nations)	this press communication on 24 June 2014, WENEZOU I indeed took on that role.
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Annexes to 2015 Final report of the Panel of Experts

ERN	TITLE	COMMENTARY
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0096	Annex 1.2	I took this picture of NGAISSONA at the airport lounge in BANGUI. I greeted him, he was on his way to KINSHASA for a meeting regarding a football match between the DRC and the CAR.
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0171-0172	Annex 2.4: List of Anti-Balaka commanders under Maxime MOKOM, including the zones of Bambari and Grimari, on 16 June 2015, stamped by coordinator of Anti-Balaka	I collected this document. I believe it is authentic because I discussed this document with Maxime MOKOM during my interview with him on 27 June 2015. During the interview, MOKOM had the list with him, but – did not want to provide the document because MOKOM did not have an additional copy. I received a copy later from someone in the Anti-Balaka organisation.
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0184-0186	Annex 2.13: Anti-balaka structure in the Ouham province	At 0186, para. 7: the second line refers to NGAIKOSSET but I can confirm that the correct reference is to KEMA: this is a typo.
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0303	Annex 5.3: Hunting ammunition	I took the picture of the hunting ammunition in NOLA. The shop-tender explained me that in the shops the ammunition boxes are often empty to avoid that people steal the ammunition (the shop owners keep the ammunition elsewhere). We were told that the smuggling was organised by [REDACTED] that he has an ammunition depot in NOLA; and that he organises



		the smuggling from Cameroun. He had to empty the depot on 20 December 2014 after the Anti-Balaka attack on NOLA to prevent the Anti-Balaka looting his depot. He was fighting the Anti-Balaka. His deputy was a [REDACTED] from the Seleka. [REDACTED] was the main target of the Anti-Balaka attack on NOLA because he had a militia, and because he was a Muslim: he had converted to Islam. There were other business men in NOLA who wanted him killed, in particular [REDACTED] [REDACTED] filed a complaint with the gendarmerie in NOLA regarding this attack.
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0329	Annex 5.19: List of arms and ammunition handed in by Alfred YEKATOM alias RHOMBOT	I did not take this picture. ROMBHOT was better equipped than the other Anti-Balaka. His forces were also wearing military uniforms.
CAR-OTP-2023-0032 at 0354-373	Annex 9	Annex 9 are in fact the footnotes to areas of the 2015 Final Report that we had to remove because we had reached the word limit. Para. 11 on pages 0355-0356: I met BOZIZE's lawyer three times: once with BOZIZE, and twice alone, namely on 30 June 2014 and on 4 September 2015. Our discussions involved mainly the sanctions already imposed on BOZIZE.

Closing Procedure

149. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as



an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

150.I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.

151.I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

152.There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

153.I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

154.I have read over this statement and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

