

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: YAGAO

Gender: Male

First Name: Roger de Martial

Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: Sia

Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Ethnicity: BANDA

Religion: Catholic Christian

Language(s) Spoken: Sango and French

Language(s) Written: French

Language(s) Used in Interview: French & English

Occupation: Company Commander at the Territorial Gendarmerie Company,
BERBERATI

Place of Interview: BANGUI, CAR

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview:

22/10/2018; 10:45-12:00; 13:20-15:00

23/10/2018; 10:30-12:00; 13:30-15:00

24/10/2018; 13:20-15:20

25/10/2018; 10:30-12:00; 13:20-16:30

28/10/2018; 9:15- 13:30

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CAR-OTP-2093-0267



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

Names of all persons present during interview:

Associate Investigator [REDACTED] Associate Investigator [REDACTED]
Interpreter [REDACTED] and witness Roger de Martial YAGAO

Signature(s): Roger de Martial YAGAO [REDACTED]

WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I was told that they are Investigators with the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and I was told that she is an interpreter for the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from 1st August 2012 until present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and interpreted into French. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Personal Information, Educational and Professional Background

11. My name is Roger de Martial YAGAO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

16. From 1994-2000 I was posted in the Mining Brigade of BERBERATI as an element. From 2000-2001 I was posted in the Mining Brigade of NOLA as Deputy Brigade Commander. From 2001-2002 I was posted in the Mining Brigade of BRIA as Deputy Brigade Commander. I do not remember the exact dates only the years when I was posted to these different areas.

ICC RESTRICTED

Page 3 of 29

CAR-OTP-2093-0269



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

17. In 2002 there was an attempted coup d'état and I had to go to BANGUI for a short period.
18. I was then posted in the Territorial Brigade of BAKOUMA as the Brigade Commander in 2002. I stayed less than a year in that position and then I went back to BANGUI.
19. I think that I went to BANGUI towards the end of 2002. PATASSE was still President of CAR at the time. I was posted as an investigator at the Judicial Brigade of the SRI (*Section des Recherches et d'Investigations*). I asked to be posted there since my previous posts were mostly focused on issues related to mining and I wanted to work more on issues related to the Penal Code.
20. In 2003 I became Deputy Brigade Commander at the Judicial Brigade of SRI. PATASSE was still President when I got this post. I remained in this post until 2005.
21. From 2005-2006 I was Deputy Brigade Commander of the Financial Brigade of SRI. From 2006-2007 I was Brigade Commander of the Territorial Brigade in BIMBO, PK9. From 2007-2008 I was Brigade Commander of the Territorial Brigade in YALOKÉ. From 2008-2009 I was the Chief Secretary of the Company of the Gendarmerie in BOUAR. From 2009-2011 I was the Brigade Commander of the Territorial Brigade in BAORO. From 2011-2012 I was the Brigade Commander of the Territorial Brigade in BERBERATI.
22. Around 2012-2013 I came back to BANGUI where I stayed for about 4-5 months. I did not have a specific post at that period but I was still working in the gendarmerie while waiting for my new posting.
23. While I was in BANGUI the Seleka took power. A lot of the gendarmes and the police officers had abandoned their posts in the provinces and the Seleka committed a lot of atrocities. The population was asking for the return of the police and the gendarmes in the provinces.
24. I was then posted in BOSSANGOA as the Deputy Company Commander. I think that I was posted there at the end of September or early October 2013 and I remained until the end of June 2014.
25. On 3 July 2014 I was posted in BERBERATI as a Company Commander at the Territorial Gendarmerie Company and I remain at this post until today.

The period of the formation of the Seleka



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

26. As mentioned above, in 2012 I was posted in BERBERATI. While there I heard about the creation of the Seleka coalition.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

ICC RESTRICTED

Page 5 of 29

CAR-OTP-2093-0271



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

36. Since the rebels were committing crimes against civilians, members of the international community, including CEMAC, AU as well as local politicians had many meetings in BRAZZAVILLE, LIBREVILLE, NDJAMENA and other places in order to find a solution.
37. After these negotiations the Government of CAR and the rebels agreed on a power – sharing government of National Union. TIANGAYE was the Prime Minister in this government and DJOTODIA became Minister of Defence.
38. Despite the creation of this government, the rebel coalition was still present and active in the provinces.
39. [REDACTED]
40. [REDACTED]
41. There was essentially no resistance against the Seleka. The international community had set a 'red line' (*ligne rouge*) at DAMARA and there were some South African and Angolan troops there. There were also some MICOPAX troops. The area between BANGUI and DAMARA was controlled by these troops while part of the country was already under the control of the Seleka.

The Seleka in power

42. The Seleka advanced to BANGUI from SIBUT, NDELE, BIRAO, BRIA, BAMBARI, BOSSANGO, KAGABANDORO and other places. The Seleka took BANGUI without much resistance and DJOTODIA became President.
43. I got this information from the international and national media, from my sources of information and also from other friends who were members of the security forces, such as police officers and FACA.
44. As the Seleka were advancing towards BANGUI, they were cutting off the radio communications from the different posts of the gendarmerie and we could not receive news and information in this way anymore.
45. BOZIZE fled and DJOTODIA put a new government in place. The Seleka took control of the provinces and they committed a lot of crimes. I was in BANGUI when

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

the Seleka took power and I heard about crimes committed both in BANGUI and in the provinces by the Seleka.

46. The crimes committed by the Seleka were becoming worse and worse and there was a reaction from the international community. DJOTODIA had difficulty to contain the rebel coalition since each rebel leader was in control of his own elements.

Deployment in BOSSANGO

47. [REDACTED]

48. This is why I decided to deploy in BOSSANGO. I do not remember the exact time that I went to BOSSANGO but I think it was at the end of September or early October 2013. I went there with 5 elements. Their names are [REDACTED]

49. A number of gendarmes who had also been asked to deploy in BOSSANGO with us refused to join us. The request for this deployment came from [REDACTED] He is currently [REDACTED] The reason that some gendarmes refused to join this mission is that they knew we would not be provided with vehicles, or weapons while operating in a very volatile area.

50. There were 2 Police Officers who also deployed with us in BOSSANGO at the same period. I can only remember Police Commissioner [REDACTED] who is now retired. I do not have his contact details.

51. We travelled to BOSSANGO in a MISCA vehicle and we initially stayed in the MISCA base in BOSSANGO. The next day MISCA soldiers took us to the church of BOSSANGO where the displaced Christians were staying and also at the *Ecole de la Liberté* where the displaced Muslims were staying. Both communities were protected by MISCA.

52. About a month later, 12 more gendarmes joined us but I cannot remember their names. They brought few weapons with them.

The Seleka in BOSSANGO

53. When we arrived in BOSSANGO, the MISCA took us to the Seleka base to meet their leader. Their leader was a self-professed General who did not speak French or Sango. I think he only spoke Arabic. I do not remember his name but he died later on during the conflict.
54. The Seleka occupied the Police Commissariat and they acted as the Police since they had control of the city.
55. I tried to explain to the Seleka chief that we were gendarmes and our role was to protect the population and their properties. He did not seem to understand what I was telling him or what we were. He initially thought that we were some form of commandos. He later went and talked to some people in the Muslim community who explained to him who we were.
56. The Seleka chief then asked his elements to leave the Police Commissariat and to return to the Seleka base. The police officers then established themselves in the Police Commissariat and we established ourselves at the post of the Gendarmerie.
57. The Seleka had a base opposite the office of UNICEF. It was a house which was in the administrative neighbourhood of BOSSANGO. All the people around the Seleka base had left because they were afraid of the Seleka and they went to stay at the church.
58. The Seleka had also set up checkpoints at the entrance of the town, at the town hall, at FENEC and at the building of the SEDIC cotton company, previously called SOCADA. The elements under the Seleka General occupied some administrative buildings in the centre of the town and also some abandoned private houses. The General occupied the base opposite UNICEF. He later left for BANGUI with his elements and I heard that he and his men were killed during the 5th December attack. I learned this from some Seleka who had remained in BOSSANGO but I cannot remember any of their names.
59. The base at SEDIC was under the control of [REDACTED] He is a Peuhl, light in complexion and spoke Sango and French.
60. I do not know how many Seleka were in BOSSANGO. It was difficult to know since they were a lot of Seleka coming and going and their number was not stable. Some wore military uniform others wore civilian clothes.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

61. The General was the Commander in-charge and under him there were a number of colonels including [REDACTED] Most of them were Arabs and did not speak Sango or French.
62. Before I deployed in BOSSANGO A I had heard that the Seleka had committed crimes. I heard that people and houses were burned and that bodies were thrown in wells and in the OUHAM River.
63. When we arrived in BOSSANGO A, we learned from the local population that the Seleka detained and tortured people in small houses around their bases and in containers near the town hall. They would kill some of the detainees and dump the bodies in the river or in the neighbourhoods. I did not personally witness any crimes by the Seleka.
64. We did not conduct investigations on the crimes committed by the Seleka and we did not record statements from the locals who informed us about the crimes. We did not write reports regarding the crimes committed by the Seleka in BOSSANGO A since the situation was chaotic during that time of crisis.
65. [REDACTED] BOSSANGO A was there during the conflict and he may have information regarding these crimes. His name is [REDACTED] His assistant [REDACTED] and was also present in BOSSANGO A during the conflict.
66. [REDACTED] This happened when DJOTODIA was still President. I heard that [REDACTED] was responsible [REDACTED] The Sangaris intervened for his release and he was evacuated to BANGUI. He later returned to BOSSANGO A.
67. The police and the gendarmerie in BOSSANGO A resumed some activities after our arrival there. We started having meetings with the displaced people, with the population and the community leaders from both sides in order to manage the crisis.
68. We were acting in coordination with the other security forces that were present in BOSSANGO A at the time, including the MISCA, the Sangaris, the Police and the Seleka. Sometimes the gendarmes and the police would act as interpreters during meetings, since the MISCA, the Sangaris and the Seleka did not speak much Sango and the population did not speak much French. We would have weekly meetings during which we discussed about the committed crimes and how to stop them. The meetings were organised by MISCA and attended by the following representatives: [REDACTED] from the Sangaris, [REDACTED] from the Christian community, [REDACTED] a former civil servant who represented the Chef de quartiers, [REDACTED] as representative of the Seleka, a



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

representative from the Police, the Imam, from the Muslim community and representatives from International NGOs. I cannot remember the name of the Imam. I attended the meetings as representative from the gendarmerie.

69. Few weeks after our arrival in BOSSANGOA we started hearing rumours that there was an Anti-Balaka rebellion that was being formed in the bush and that they wanted to take revenge against the Seleka because of the crimes they had committed and because they had overthrown President BOZIZE. I do not remember the exact time that I heard of the Anti-Balaka for the first time.
70. We had security meetings with the MISCA, Police, the Seleka, the community leaders and the religious authorities and we were often discussing about the Anti-Balaka. We were getting information that the Anti-Balaka in the bush were manufacturing their own weapons and going to marabouts to get fetishes. I do not remember the specific source of this information but it must have been one or more of the participants in these security meetings. The Seleka also informed us that every time they went out of BOSSANGOA on patrol they were shot at and they thought that they were shot by the Anti-Balaka.
71. We heard a lot of rumours about the Anti-Balaka but it was difficult for me and the rest of the gendarmes to verify these rumours as we did not have vehicles and we could not go to the bush to see what was happening.
72. We learned that the objective of the Anti-Balaka was to chase away the Seleka and DJOTODIA since it was the Muslims who overthrew BOZIZE. I say 'Muslims' because the Seleka were mostly Muslims.
73. The Anti-Balaka rebellion emerged very fast because most of the Anti-Balaka were ex-liberators who had helped BOZIZE take power. I do not remember the names of any of these ex-liberators.
74. 
75. Every time that the Seleka would go to patrol in BENZAMBE, OUHAM-BAC, BOUCA, KOROMPOKO or in other areas, they were attacked by the auto-defence groups. All the population had become Anti-Balaka. Some people were actively participating in the Anti-Balaka while the others were supporting them.



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

76. The Seleka were shot at by 'invisible' attackers who were hiding behind houses and would then run into the bush.
77. In retaliation to such attacks the Seleka would attack innocent people, throw them in wells or burn them alive. I did not personally see this happening but I heard about it from our MISCA colleagues and I also saw videos that the some MISCA elements and the Christian population had in their phones from such incidents.
78. In BOSSANGO A there was an invisible 'red line' in the city centre that divided the two communities, the Christian and the Muslim, and they could not move from one side to the other. This red line was already established before my arrival in BOSSANGO A. I think that at the time that this 'red line' was established the Muslim and Christian population were still living in their houses and they had not yet been displaced.

The Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO A

79. The Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO A were living in the CAMP CHIC neighbourhood behind the municipal stadium, not far from the church where the displaced Christians were staying. They occupied houses of civilians who had fled to the church. They had a spokesperson nicknamed [REDACTED] in Sango or [REDACTED] in Gbaya, which means grandfather.
80. I got to know that [REDACTED] was the spokesperson of the Anti-Balaka because he introduced himself as such during the meetings. He is from BOSSANGO A but I am not sure about his occupation before the crisis. He was a spokesperson for the male Anti-Balaka while his wife, [REDACTED] was spokesperson for the female Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED] means grandmother in Sango.
81. The investigators showed me a photo with remigration number CAR-OTP-2088-2206. This photo was taken [REDACTED] The person on the far left of the photo with the red beret is a Seleka. I do not know his name. The white man on his right is a Sangaris soldier. I do not know his name. The man in the light blue shirt on his right is the [REDACTED]. The man in the military uniform behind [REDACTED] is a Congolese MISCA named [REDACTED] and he was in charge of the Administration. The man in the white traditional Muslim clothing on his right is the Imam. I do not remember his name. The man dressed in green, standing between the two women is [REDACTED] The woman in the black trousers on his right is the Prefect of BOSSANGO A [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is currently in BANGUI. On the right of the Prefect, dressed in a military uniform and red beret is the Seleka [REDACTED] The man on the right of [REDACTED] in the multi-coloured African print



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

shirt is the Bishop of BOSSANGO. The man on the right of the Bishop dressed in black, holding a white hat is [REDACTED] the representative of the Chefs de quartiers. He is wearing a pin on his jacket indicating that he is a Chef de quartier. I do not recognize the other persons in the photo.

82. [REDACTED] was not only the spokesperson but also the Anti-Balaka commander in BOSSANGO. There was another Anti-Balaka leader in BENZAMBE by the name of KEMA. He is a former Presidential Guard. I did not know KEMA personally. I heard about him from the MISCA and Sangaris in BOSSANGO, who were often the sources of my information. He is currently a Member of Parliament. He did not take part in the meetings we had in BOSSANGO. Another group of Anti-Balaka was based in NANA BAKASSA, but I do not know who led this group. I came to know about these groups because the Anti-Balaka groups from BENZAMBE and NANA BAKASSA would sometimes come to BOSSANGO centre to loot and steal. [REDACTED] would then tell us that his group was not responsible for these incidents but that the Anti-Balaka groups from NANA BAKASSA or BENZAMBE were responsible for that. I cannot say with certainty if the Anti-Balaka groups from NANA BAKASSA and BENZAMBE were two different groups since I did not have the possibility to verify the received information myself. I know though that only [REDACTED] participated as an Anti-Balaka representative in the meetings we had at MISCA. I never saw [REDACTED] carrying a weapon in the meetings. Maybe he carried weapons when he was outside.
83. There were some soldiers and members of the Presidential Guard among the Anti-Balaka. I had heard some of their names when I was in BOSSANGO but I do not remember them anymore. The situation in BOSSANGO was very tense and we, in the gendarmerie were very constrained. We had to use a lot of diplomacy as we were dealing with rebel groups who were armed while we were not. BOSSANGO was a 2nd military region in CAR after BANGUI and the last regional commander there was Olivier KOUDEMON (also known as GBANGOUMA). KOUDEMON went in exile to CAMEROON when the Seleka took over. He was an ex-liberator but I do not know whether he was an Anti-Balaka or not.
84. After the 5th December attack I also heard rumours that Teddy BOZIZE was in the area of BOSSANGO and that he was preparing the return of the former President BOZIZE. Teddy was brought up by former President BOZIZE and he was part of BOZIZE's close protection. I am not sure if he was a military. I do not know if he is a relative of the former president.
85. I believe that there were weapons hidden in former President BOZIZE's house in YOUROUBA village in the BENZAMBE commune. I think that some of the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO had access to these weapons and that is why they were able to resist the Seleka for a long time during fights. As a gendarme I could tell from the



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

sounds of the weapons fired if they were handmade or automatic weapons of a particular type. During the Anti-Balaka and Seleka attacks in BOSSANGO, I could hear sounds of the following weapons being fired from the Anti-Balaka positions: mortars, rockets, A52, small calibre weapons, AK47 and RPG7. I could tell the difference from the sound that each weapon was producing since I am a trained gendarme. In CAR due to the prolonged crisis, even civilians can distinguish the sound of different weapons.

86. I do not know with certainty if there were weapons hidden at BOZIZE's house in YOUROUBA but I assume that this was the case. In BOSSEMBELE there was a large ammunition depot and BOSSEMBELE is more than 100km from BOSSANGO. I believe that many of the weapons from BOSSEMBELE had been taken to YOUROUBA where BOZIZE had a house and where he planned to retire. I think they had kept these weapons there for his protection. This explains why we could hear rockets and mortars coming from the Anti-Balaka positions in BOSSANGO.
87. I heard of NGAISSONA after the 5th December attack for the first time. I never heard [REDACTED] speaking about NGAISSONA and I do not know if they were in contact. [REDACTED] and the Anti-Balaka were however mistrustful of the authorities and they would probably not share such information.
88. I assume that there was a connection between the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO because both NGAISSONA and MOKOM are from the area of OUHAM. Additionally NGAISSONA became the National Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka and he must have been representing the Anti-Balaka of BOSSANGO as well. The fact that there was an Anti-Balaka attack both in BANGUI and in BOSSANGO on 5th December makes me also think that there was some sort of connection between the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and BOSSANGO.
89. The investigators asked me if I know a person called DEDANE. I do not remember this name.
90. The investigators asked me if I knew of a place called GOBERE. GOBERE is 70km from BOSSANGO on the road to BOUCA. I heard that there was an Anti-Balaka base there and this is where the Anti-Balaka were getting their fetishes to be protected. I do not know who the Anti-Balaka chief was there. I never went to GOBERE since we did not have a vehicle in the gendarmerie when I was in BOSSANGO.

Attacks between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO

91. I think that the first fight between Anti-Balaka and Seleka in BOSSANGO took place on 5 October 2013. I heard detonations and fire exchange. We did not get



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

involved since we had no weapons. People from both sides died, others were wounded, including civilians. The MISCA or the Sangaris intervened and took the wounded to the hospital. The gendarmerie protected the hospital so that armed people would not enter. Some of the Anti-Balaka who were wounded and admitted at the hospital told us that they fought the Seleka as revenge because the Seleka had killed their families. They said they did not want the Seleka in town.

92. When the Seleka took power some Muslims became their accomplices. Because of that, many innocent Muslims paid the price. Some of the Anti-Balaka we spoke to at the hospital of BOSSANGO called all the Muslims, even civilians, Seleka. They were completely confused. For them it was enough to be a Muslim in order to be equated to a Seleka. I do not remember the names of any of the Anti-Balaka at the hospital who said that.
93. I think that on 07 and 10 October 2013 there were two more fights between Anti-Balaka and Seleka in BOSSANGO. There were casualties on both sides. The Anti-Balaka were in the bush. They came out of the bush, attacked and then returned to the bush.
94. Since the attacks were becoming recurrent, the Sangaris came to support MISCA. Due to the Sangaris presence the Anti-Balaka and Seleka activities decreased.

5th December 2013 attack

95. I heard that some of the Anti-Balaka from BOSSANGO decided to take their weapons and gris- gris and to go to BANGUI walking through the bush to participate in the attack of the 5th December 2013. I only heard about the Anti-Balaka 5th December attack in BANGUI but I do not have much information about it. I do not remember when I heard the rumours that the Anti-Balaka left from BOSSANGO to BANGUI.
96. On the same day the Anti-Balaka attacked BOSSANGO simultaneously. It seems as if there was coordination between the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO and this is why they attacked on the same day. I do not have any specific information on that but this is my personal deduction.
97. Meanwhile in BOSSANGO, after most of the Anti-Balaka had left for BANGUI, there was less tension. The Anti-Balaka and some Christian civilians however pillaged and destroyed Muslim houses and administrative buildings.
98. Due to the severity of the attacks on Muslim community by the Anti-Balaka, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) evacuated Muslims to CHAD, GORÉ and PAOUA. There were many Chadian Muslims in BOSSANGO due to



the influx, into Central African Republic, of supporters of former Chadian President Hissene HABRE.

99. They had lived in BOSSANGOA for more than 23 years and had integrated into the community since there were intermarriages between different communities. However, when the Seleka arrived with the Muslim connotation associated with them, the Anti-Balaka and the Christian community turned against the Chadian Muslims by attacking them, pillaging and destroying their houses. This is why most of the Muslims could not stay and had to be evacuated to CHAD and to PAOUA in the prefecture of OUHAM-PENDE. In the end the entire Muslim community was evacuated from BOSSANGOA by the IOM. The Muslims wanted to be evacuated at that time because of the severity of the violence and the attacks.
100. Some of the Muslims were evacuated to PAOUA because this is the area where ex-President PATASSE came from. BOZIZE had overthrown PATASSE in 2003 and the people of PAOUA were still angry with BOZIZE. This is why they accepted the displaced Muslims in their area. This is also the reason why there were no Anti-Balaka in the area of PAOUA at the beginning.
101. The armed Seleka also left town at night. I do not remember the exact date but I was still there at the time. The town remained under the control of Congolese contingent of MISCA, the Sangaris, police and the gendarmerie. Later on MISCA changed to MINUSCA and the Congolese were replaced by Chadian MINUSCA contingent. I cannot recall when this happened.
102. When the Chadian MINUSCA contingent started operating they were not compliant with MINUSCA regulations, they made many mistakes and committed a lot of crimes. For instance, as part of the DDR process, there were rules that people should not enter the town with weapons. The people were searched at checkpoints for weapons. Sometimes the locals could not understand instructions from the MINUSCA soldiers. For example they would be told to raise their hands at the checkpoint but they would not because they did not understand. The Chadian MINUSCA soldiers would take it that they were being defiant and they shot them.
103. When the Sangaris got to know about this problem they asked the gendarmerie to take over and sensitize the Chadian contingent on how to conduct security checks and the population on how to conduct themselves at checkpoints since the security checks was a specific police task rather than a military one.
104. There was a joint operation among the Sangaris, MINUSCA, the police and the gendarmerie to rid the community of weapons. Due to this process the Anti-Balaka became non offensive. Some international Organisations also arrived to sensitize people on peace and reconciliation.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

105. I remained in BOSSANGO A until June 2014 when I was posted to BERBERATI.

106. The Investigators asked me if I know the following individuals;

107. [REDACTED] I think that I know who [REDACTED] is. If I am not mistaken on the person, [REDACTED] is a native of BOSSANGO A and he was the deputy spokesperson for the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO A. He would represent the Anti-Balaka during meetings in the absence of [REDACTED] I do not know if he was military. He had a base in front of the Catholic Church. At some point he started extorting money from drivers who were passing from BOSSANGO A. For instance he used to demand money from WFP trucks which brought food rations to BOSSANGO A. If he wouldn't receive the money, he and his elements would take the food off the trucks by force. I do not know where [REDACTED] is now. He could be in BOSSANGO A. I think that [REDACTED] was under the command of [REDACTED] I think that [REDACTED] my Chief Secretary at the gendarmerie when I was in BOSSANGO A, can tell you more about this.

108. [REDACTED] I think he was an Anti-Balaka based in BENZAMBE but I think he is dead now. I do not know if he was military. He would come to BOSSANGO A centre and would extort the population. He took meat from butchers and money from traders and other civilians. I used to see him in town driving a motorbike which made a loud sound. People feared him in BOSSANGO A because he was robbing them. I have never met him personally.

109. [REDACTED] I know about someone by the name [REDACTED] who was chosen to be a representative of the youth of the displaced Christians in the church of BOSSANGO A. I do not remember his last name. He had already been the representative of the youth when I arrived in BOSSANGO A. I think that the other youth in the church had selected him for this position.

110. [REDACTED] He was a trader in BOSSANGO A. People listened to him in BOSSANGO A. He attended the meetings but I am not sure if he was representing the Christian community or the IDPs.

111. The investigators asked me if I know the following individuals; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I have heard the names of these persons in the past but I do not remember anything about them as some time has passed since I was in BOSSANGO A.

112. The investigators asked me if I knew of the killing of 18 Muslim civilians during the 5th December attack in BOSSANGO A. It is possible that this is true. On 5 December,

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

we were initially in our office at the gendarmerie but when we realized that the attack was enduring, we sought shelter at the MISCA base. As mentioned above, we did not have any weapons, the gendarmerie office had been looted and we did not even have a pen to write. Our role is usually to protect the population but in that period in BOSSANGO we were playing mostly the role of facilitators between different organizations. We had no power to do anything else at that time. We could not conduct investigations and there was not even a functioning tribunal. I was informed by MISCA soldiers that some Muslims were killed. Probably around 18 but I am not sure of the number. I do not know if these were Muslim civilians or Seleka.

113. The investigators asked me what I knew of the displacement of Muslims in the *Ecole de la Liberté* in BOSSANGO. The *Ecole de la Liberté* is located in the city centre of BOSSANGO, opposite the town hall and not far from FENEC and the Prefectural school. The Imam of BOSSANGO was managing the organization of the IPD camp at the school. He does not speak Sango well. Some displaced people with their families were staying in some classrooms and single men and women were also staying in separate classrooms. There were also some people who were staying outside in tents. Many of the Muslims had fled to this school with their merchandise and they had set up a sort of small market within the area of the school. There was MINUSCA protection outside of the school to protect the Muslims from Anti-Balaka attacks.
114. The central mosque of BOSSANGO had already been destroyed before my arrival in the town. I saw the mosque after I arrived in BOSSANGO and it was completely destroyed. I do not know who destroyed it. The central mosque was at quartier BORO which was the Muslim quartier of BOSSANGO. Before the conflict Muslims lived in all quartiers of BOSSANGO but the main Muslim quartier was BORO.
115. When I arrived in BOSSANGO some of the houses and shops of Muslims had already been looted and damaged and even the Administrative buildings were destroyed. The Seleka were in control at this period and they were targeting whoever had any money, Muslims and Christians alike.

BERBERATI

116. When I arrived in BERBERATI I saw that there had already been extensive looting and destruction of property mostly in POTO-POTO, the Muslim quartier of BERBERATI. The mosques, houses, shops, diamond and gold collector offices of Muslims had been looted and destroyed.

117. Most of the Muslims from BERBERATI had fled to CAMEROON and the remaining ones sought shelter in the St. Anne Church of BERBERATI. The Bishop of BERBERATI stays in this church. When the Anti-Balaka attacked BERBERATI, the Muslims initially ran to the churches closest to them to seek shelter. The priests from each church were then transferring them to St Anne. This church is at the outskirts of BERBERATI and next to the road that goes to CAMEROON. I do not remember the exact date that the Anti-Balaka first attacked BERBERATI but it was before my arrival in July 2014. I heard that the Anti-Balaka took control of BERBERATI 2-3 days after the departure of the Seleka from the town.
118. The Anti-Balaka were in command of BERBERATI. They were looting and destroying the properties of Muslims. They were stealing goats and chickens. Those who resisted were attacked.
119. In the gendarmerie of BERBERATI there were already about 20 gendarmes and I went there with other 27 elements. I had a weapon but not all the gendarmes had weapons. We created groups of 3-5 persons and each group had one weapon.
120. After my arrival in BERBERATI, I tried to establish a security mechanism and we set up gendarmerie checkpoints in various neighbourhoods (quartiers) and Arrondissements in the town. Those who committed offences were arrested and taken to the gendarmerie.
121. The Anti-Balaka Coordinator in BERBERATI at the time of my arrival was 'Chiki-Chiki'. I initially did not remember his real name. The investigators later during my interview asked me if I knew a man called Chrysostome YAPELET and I remembered that this was the real name of 'Chiki- Chiki'.
122. 'Chiki-Chiki' had a car and he knocked down a Chef de quartier with his car. He did not stop to see what had happened but he drove off. We started an investigation against him in the gendarmerie and we also looked into all the other crimes that he had reportedly committed in the past during the conflict.
123. 'Chiki- Chiki' was reportedly involved in the theft of motorbikes, attacking and torturing people, armed robberies, appropriation of stolen goods, possession of weapons and also abduction of women. I have not heard any accusations of rape against him. When he was arrested he had a very young girlfriend. I do not know if she was 18 years old and I do not remember her name. It seems that she was the girlfriend of somebody else but he took her from him. I think that her parents did not like that their daughter was with 'Chiki-Chiki'.
124. We opened an investigation on crimes committed by 'Chiki- Chiki' in BERBERATI and there must be a copy of the Proces Verbal against him in the archives of the



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

gendarmerie. I do not remember what exactly was included in his Proces Verbal. [REDACTED] was the Brigade Commander who investigated this case and he might remember more. He is currently serving in in the PK12 Brigade, in BANGUI.

125. Since there were no magistrates in BERBERATI when we arrested 'Chiki-Chiki', we sent him to BANGUI. I do not know what happened to him after that. I am not sure if he is in prison or if he is dead or alive.
126. 'Chiki- Chiki' called me few times when he was imprisoned in BANGUI. I do not remember the exact date that he called me but it must have been a couple of months after he was transferred to BANGUI. He called me twice on one day and once on the day after. I did not answer his calls but I could see that it was him calling. I used to have his phone number on my phone but when later on my phone was stolen, I lost my entire phone directory.
127. I did not pick up the phone when he called me but then I heard rumours that he was threatening to take revenge against me and I called him back on the next day. I told him about the rumours I heard, that I am a trained gendarme and if he wanted to come and take revenge on me I will be waiting for him. 'Chiki-Chiki' said that the rumours were not true and that people were trying to create conflict between us.
128. It is important to note that victims were still afraid to come forward and denounce the crimes that were committed against them. They were afraid of what might happen to them if they did so. It was often the case that a third person who knew about a crime would come to the gendarmerie and inform us about it but the victims themselves were afraid to do so.
129. When there was a meeting in KENYA with DJOTODIA and BOZIZE and many Seleka and Anti-Balaka comzones. 'Chiki-Chiki' also went and stayed for about 2-3 months. While 'Chiki- Chiki' was in KENYA, the Anti-Balaka Coordinator in BERBERATI was [REDACTED]
130. When [REDACTED] was the Anti-Balaka Coordinator some of his elements physically aggressed and disarmed one of my gendarmes, [REDACTED] at a checkpoint at about 25km from BERBERATI. The reason of this attack was probably to steal his weapon, which they did.
131. When we got this information, we went to find our injured colleague and we brought him to the hospital. We then arrested the three Anti-Balaka who were involved in this incident and we imprisoned them in BERBERATI. One of them was called [REDACTED] but I do not remember the names of the other two. [REDACTED] was married to [REDACTED] I do not know her name.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

132. We also searched at [REDACTED] house and we found weapons, ammunition and grenades there [REDACTED] escaped from BERBERATI. I do not know where he went and what happened to him. [REDACTED] is now in BANGUI and he could provide more information on this incident. We drafted a report about the incident and sent it to the gendarmerie Headquarters in BANGUI. The incident took place when 'Chiki-Chiki' was in KENYA.
133. 'Chiki- Chiki' was from the North of CAR and [REDACTED] was from OUHAM. [REDACTED] did not last long as the Anti-Balaka Coordinator of BERBERATI. The next Anti-Balaka Coordinator of BERBERATI was [REDACTED] and he was from BERBERATI. I think that people believed that he was going to behave better since he was from BERBERATI but he also committed a lot of crimes.
134. [REDACTED] gave orders to his elements to commit many armed robberies. He was behind the robbery of [REDACTED] a collector of diamonds. I do not remember the last name of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] quartier. I do not know [REDACTED] phone number. He is still in BERBERATI as he comes from there. A catholic priest named Abbot [REDACTED] was also a victim of [REDACTED] elements who went to his house and stole his money, passport and computer. [REDACTED] and his elements also aggressed some Muslims who were coming out of the Catholic Church where they were living at the time. The Muslims were coming out of the church sometimes to get food or to visit relatives.
135. You can find further information on the crimes that [REDACTED] committed from the President of the Islamic Community, [REDACTED] and from local NGOs working on human rights in BERBERATI.
136. [REDACTED] committed a lot of crimes and this is why we, the gendarmes from BERBERATI, arrested and questioned him and then we transferred him to BANGUI. I do not know what happened to him after that. Since we had a very heavy workload we could not follow up on these cases.
137. I do not remember the exact dates that 'Chiki- Chiki' and [REDACTED] were arrested and transferred to BANGUI but this information can be found at the gendarmerie registry of BERBERATI or at the MINUSCA archives.
138. I think that 'Chiki-Chiki' came back from KENYA soon after [REDACTED] was arrested and transferred in BANGUI. He had some money and he was drinking. It was at that time that he knocked down the Chef de quartier and he was arrested.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

139. [REDACTED] took over as Anti-Balaka Coordinator in BERBERATI after [REDACTED] and after 'Chiki- Chiki's arrest. [REDACTED] he was raised there. His family comes from [REDACTED]
140. [REDACTED] is shrewd and he knows how to escape justice. Even though we have heard rumours that he has been using his elements to steal money and animals from people we cannot confirm the allegations since the victims do not come forward to report him.
141. When I first arrived in BERBERATI, I called a meeting with the Anti-Balaka of the town. I told them that their chiefs had already signed an agreement in BRAZZAVILLE and that they should stop the hostilities as it was time for peace. The meeting took place in my office at the gendarmerie. They were not informed about the agreement to stop the hostilities and what I told them was news to them. During this meeting they did not express approval or disapproval of what I told them. They just listened to me. Some of them came to bring their weapons in the coming days and others did not.
142. I remember that the following Anti-Balaka were present during this meeting: 'Chiki- Chiki' [REDACTED] There were other Anti-Balaka who were present at the meeting but I do not remember their names. I used to have all their phone numbers but then my phone was stolen and I had lost my entire phone directory. 'Chiki-Chiki' was the Anti-Balaka leader at that time in BERBERATI.
143. [REDACTED] was the Anti-Balaka chief in the POTO- POTO quartier. There was an open space under a mango tree - 'sous manguier'- and this is where they had their base. He was already the chief of the Anti-Balaka in POTO-POTO 'sous manguier' before my arrival and he continued to be after my arrival. Many of his men were killed during MINUSCA operations to secure the city. He fled from BERBERATI soon after 'Chiki- Chiki's arrest because he was afraid he might also be arrested. I heard that he went either to BODA or BOSSANGO.
144. [REDACTED] was the Anti-Balaka chief in the BABA SALAO quartier. I do not know if they had a base in an open space or in an abandoned building because they ran away when the police or gendarmerie arrived. He was already the chief of the Anti-Balaka in BABA SALAO before my arrival and he continued to be after my arrival.
145. I do not know if 'Chiki- Chiki' had a base but he was the Coordinator of all the Anti-Balaka and their bases in BERBERATI until the time of his arrest. I know that he had two houses both on the way to the BABA SALAO quartier.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

146. I had arranged some more meetings with the Anti-Balaka in BERBERATI when I first arrived but then I realized that they were saying different things in the meetings and they were doing different things in their quarters, I decided to stop these meetings. During the meetings the Anti-Balaka said that there should be no more violence in the town and agreed to comply with the instructions I gave them, such as not to walk around in the streets with weapons but to surrender them to the police and gendarmerie. But then they returned to their quarters and there was still disorder. I then changed my strategy and I started arresting them. They asked for my mercy but I refused and brought them to justice.

147. In the gendarmerie of BERBERATI we still have people like [REDACTED] under observation. These people have no jobs but they have money and motorbikes, they go to bars and drink and they seem to be living a good life. We hear rumours that they are using people around them to steal but none of the victims has come forward to report them.

148. [REDACTED] was military during BOZIZE's time and he is related to Maxime MOKOM. He refused to go back to the army during the Transition Period when SAMBA PANZA called all the FACA to return to the army. He is still in BERBERATI.

149. [REDACTED] was also an ex-military who did not reintegrate into the army during the Transition Period. [REDACTED] was a very dangerous person. He died about 2 years ago from natural causes.

150. [REDACTED] lives in AMADAGAZA and he is the Anti-Balaka com-zone there. He is very dangerous and we have heard rumours that he had killed a lot of Muslims and seized their properties. He manages to do things in a smart way and he escapes an arrest.

151. As a Company Commander and gendarme I get information from many sources. I got information that [REDACTED] elements have killed some youth at NAO. NAO is a village between AMADAGAZA and BERBERATI. The youth of NAO did not want [REDACTED] and his elements to erect barricades in their village, they resisted and they were killed by [REDACTED] elements. The relatives of the killed youth provided me with this information. I do not remember the names of anybody specifically. This incident must have taken place towards the end of 2014 or beginning of 2015.

152. [REDACTED] was a street seller and he is from OUHAM. He went to AMADAGAZA, got married and stayed there. He became a com-zone as soon as the Anti-Balaka movement emerged. I do not remember the exact date but it was before I arrived in BERBERATI. With the money he got from stealing animals and looting houses, he became a buyer of diamonds and gold. He now controls the diamond trade in the

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

area and he also helps to shelter other Anti-Balaka from many areas such as BOUAR, BELOKO, BAORO, CARNOT, BERBERATI, who have escaped from MINUSCA. [REDACTED] has a lot of money and maintains relationships with administrative and judicial authorities in BERBERATI and BANGUI and this is how he escapes his arrest.

153. I had also heard about Rodrigue MOKOM, who was also known as 'RO' or 'ROCCA'. He was already dead by the time I went to BERBERATI. He was killed together with the journalist Camille LEPAGE at AMADAGAZA. Rodrigue MOKOM was brother of Maxime MOKOM and they are also relatives of [REDACTED]. The father of MOKOM was for a long time the sub- Prefect of GAMBOULA and he was sometimes the interim sub-Prefect of AMADAGAZA. I think the father of MOKOM is an older brother of BOZIZE. The Anti-Balaka came to BERBERATI through AMADAGAZA under the leadership of Rodrigue MOKOM. As mentioned above the Anti-Balaka came in BERBERATI two-three days after the departure of the Seleka from the town.
154. There is a local NGO in BERBERATI that is focusing on Human Rights issues. When I first arrived in BERBERATI I had meetings with representatives of this NGO so as to get information on what has happening in the town. I think that they have a database with information in BERBERATI and the surrounding villages where they recorded the committed crimes, dates, perpetrators and victims.
155. The name of the President of this NGO is [REDACTED]. He is a CAR citizen but he is not from BERBERATI.
156. During all the period of the conflict the Bishop of the Catholic Church, [REDACTED] was present in BERBERATI and had helped to manage the crisis. Other priests were also present in BERBERATI and tried to help during the crisis.
157. [REDACTED] was the Catholic priest in the parish St. Basil of POTO-POTO, the Muslim quartier in BERBERATI. [REDACTED] was transferring Muslims in his car from his parish, Sacre Coeur, located in the city centre of BERBERATI, where they had initially fled, to St. Anne Church where all the displaced Muslims were gathered. I heard that he almost got killed by the Anti-Balaka because of that. One time [REDACTED] was transferring some Muslims to St. Anne and the Anti-Balaka surrounded his car. The Abbot got out of the car and one Anti-Balaka wanted to shoot him. The Anti-Balaka decided to let him go since he is a religious man. This happened before my arrival in BERBERATI. I think that he is currently in [REDACTED] for training.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

158. [REDACTED] might also have a lot of information on the crimes committed against the Muslims. I think that he might have a list of all the Muslims killed in BERBERATI and in the prefecture [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is still in BERBERATI and he is back in his quartier.
159. All the Muslims who were displaced in the Catholic Church returned to their quarters about 2-3 years ago. Some of the Muslims who had fled to KENZO have also returned but not all of them.
160. When I arrived to BERBERATI with my elements we were determined to bring peace back to the town. A number of NGO's also came and they were raising awareness on peace and talked about the end of hostilities.
161. [REDACTED]
162. All the Seleka had already left BERBERATI long before my arrival but I do not remember the date. The Seleka left without any bloodshed or fighting. Seleka from the surrounding areas gathered in BERBERATI and they departed from there.
163. About 2-3 days after the departure of the Seleka, the Anti-Balaka came to BERBERATI under the command of Rodrigue MOKOM.
164. Rodrigue MOKOM called a meeting with the Muslim representatives and financial operators and told them that they should not worry, that the Anti-Balaka were not going to harm them and that they were going to protect them. Rodrigue MOKOM said that in compensation the Muslims should feed them and they should give him something to take care of his elements who were going to protect them.
165. The Muslims gathered some money and they gave it to the Anti-Balaka. I do not know how much money they had gathered. The Anti-Balaka thought that the money was not enough and they said that since they did not want to contribute enough money, they (the Anti-Balaka) were going to go door-to-door and take the money themselves.
166. This is when the Anti-Balaka started the killing of Muslims and the looting and destruction of their houses and many Muslims fled to the Catholic Church. I know all this, even though I was not in BERBERATI at the time, because [REDACTED] told me about it.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

167. During that time of crisis it was not possible to keep a record of those who were killed and of all the destructions but I think that the Human Rights' NGO that I mentioned above must have information on killings and destruction of properties.

168. When I arrived in BERBERATI all the mosques were already destroyed. I heard that the mosques were destroyed by the Anti-Balaka and by some ill-intentioned Christians. There were mosques in all the quartiers of the town since Muslims lived in all the different quartiers. POTO-POTO was the Muslim quartier of BERBERATI where the central mosque was located. The central mosque had also been destroyed but it is now been rebuilt.

169. I believe that the Anti-Balaka from BERBERATI were in contact with the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI and that they were reporting to them what was happening in BERBERATI. I say that because during the first meeting I had with the Anti-Balaka when I arrived in BERBERATI they told me that they had already informed their chiefs in BANGUI that they were going to participate in this meeting. They also said that they were going to inform their leadership in BANGUI about what was discussed during the meeting.

170. I know that NGAISSONA was the National Coordinator in BANGUI. I do not remember who told me that they had informed the Anti-Balaka in BANGUI about our meeting. I think it was [REDACTED] since he was acting as their spokesperson and Chargé de Mission. I do not remember ever talking to NGAISSONA on the phone. The investigators asked me if I recognize phone number [REDACTED] I do not recognize this phone number and it is not in my phone directory.

171. Maxime MOKOM had called me once. I think it was toward the end of 2014 or beginning of 2015. I had never met him before and we did not know each other.

172. He told me that I was slowing down the activities of the Anti-Balaka and that the actions of the Anti-Balaka were in the interest of the population. [REDACTED]

173

174

175. I do not know from which phone number Maxime MOKOM called me. I have been using my two phone numbers [REDACTED] for many years, even

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

before the crisis. My phones had been stolen from me two or three times when I was in BERBERATI but I maintained the same phone numbers.

176. Some other people had called me and they said that they were Anti-Balaka from BANGUI but I do not remember their names or any further information about these phone calls. I am not even sure if these people were actually Anti-Balaka since I did not know them and have never heard of them.

177. When I arrived in BERBERATI there were already displaced Muslims in the church of St. Anne. I visited the displaced Muslims in the St. Anne Church a number of times. The first time I wanted to introduce myself as the Company Commander of the gendarmerie and to see what the situation was. There were more than 1,000 Muslims there. Some were with their families while others were alone. Some were sleeping in rooms and others in tents provided by UNHCR. I think that [REDACTED] must have a list of the Muslims who were in the Catholic Church. [REDACTED] and Imam [REDACTED] were members of the Muslim Community and they were in charge of the organization of the Muslims who were displaced at St. Anne and they could provide further information. All three of them are still in BERBERATI.

178. NGOs were providing water, food and toilets. There was MISCA presence right outside the church, providing security and protection.

179. The Bishop created a Committee for the peace and social cohesion that brought together representatives both of the Muslim and of the Christian population.

180. During the conflict the Muslims were attacked and targeted. Those Muslims in BERBERATI who did not leave but remained in the Catholic Church did not want to go to exile since they were the ones who were born and raised in CAR. They did not have a family to go to in other countries. Most of them are our cousins since they have mothers from CAR and their families have been in the country since the beginning of the independence of CAR.

181. The population in CAR was angry mostly against the Chadians and the Sudanese, since they were considered to be the ones who had caused the political and military conflict. Since the Chadians and Sudanese are Muslims, all Muslims were persecuted after the Seleka lost power. Even during the BANGUI Forum the representatives of the Christian population said that they did not want the return of the Sudanese and Chadians to CAR. They did not oppose the return of Muslims. I did not participate in the BANGUI Forum but I heard the news.



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

182. The investigators showed me a document with registration number CAR-OTP-2003-1736. I remember the meeting that is referred to in this document. The meeting was organized by the Bishop of BERBERATI and I was present as well.
183. While the Muslims had fled to the Catholic Church in BERBERATI, some Christians occupied their houses and took over their shops and they were getting the benefits of the commercial activities that used to belong to Muslims. Some of these persons did not want the return of the Muslims to the town because they would lose these benefits.
184. There was also a lot of manipulation and there were rumours amongst the population that the Bishop wanted the return not only of the Muslims but also of the Seleka. I do not know who was circulating these rumours.
185. This first meeting that is described in the document that the investigators showed me was a failure but we called many similar meetings inviting the population and the local authorities. We insisted until we managed to make the population understand that the Muslims had to return to their houses.

Closing Procedure

186. I was informed that individuals, who according to the judges, qualify as victims will be entitled to participate in future Court proceedings and potentially to receive reparations. I was informed of the existence of the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section and its function, as well as of the procedure for applications. I do not consent to my personal data being shared with the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section.
187. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
188. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.
189. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
190. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

191. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

192. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in French with interpretation in English and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed

Date

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the English language into the French language and from the French language into the English language.
3. I have been informed by Roger de Martial YAGAO that he speaks and understands the French language.

ICC RESTRICTED

Page 28 of 29

CAR-OTP-2093-0294



Statement of Roger de Martial YAGAO

4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of Roger de Martial YAGAO who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. Roger de Martial YAGAO has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: _____

Dated: _____

ICC RESTRICTED

Page 29 of 29

CAR-OTP-2093-0295

