

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [REDACTED] Gender: Male
First Name: [REDACTED] Father's Name: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Other names used: Mother's Name [REDACTED]
Place of Birth: BANGUI Passport / ID number:
Date of Birth/Age: [REDACTED] Nationality(s): Central African Republican
Ethnicity: [REDACTED] Religion: [REDACTED]

Language(s) Spoken: [REDACTED]

Language(s) Written: French, Sango

Language(s) Used in Interview: English and French

Occupation: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: [REDACTED]

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview:

[REDACTED] from 13h50 -15h00;
from 10h50-12h10; 12h20-12h50; 13h15-15h00;
from 10h00-11h10; 11h15-12h35; 13h45-14h55; 15h00-16h45;
from 09h50-11h00; 11h10-12h20; 13h00-15h00;
from 09h50-13h30; 13h50-16h15.



Names of all persons present during interview: [REDACTED] Investigator [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Associate Investigator; [REDACTED] Interpreter; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Witness.

Signature(s):

[REDACTED]

WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and told that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and told that he is a French-English interpreter with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in the Central African Republic (CAR) since August 2012. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and French, with the services of a French-English interpreter. I understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges,

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Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.

7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

11. I was born in BANGUI [REDACTED] My grandmother, who lives in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told me that I was born on [REDACTED] and I may previously have given this as my date of birth, but I checked recently and it seems that my correct date of birth is [REDACTED] On the card [REDACTED] [REDACTED] my date of birth is marked as the [REDACTED] but this is also an error. I showed the card to the investigators, but I prefer that they do not take a photo of that card.

12. At the age of about seven, I went to live with my father and my big brother in a small village named [REDACTED] My father was a teacher at the [REDACTED] so that is why we lived there. When he moved to [REDACTED] we stayed in [REDACTED] I went to primary school at the [REDACTED]

13. I returned to [REDACTED] at 14 years of age to attend secondary school at Lycée [REDACTED] I went as far as [REDACTED] I then returned to [REDACTED] and started farming and hunting for wild animals. I also sold items in places such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I would travel in commercial trucks to reach these places. There, I sold items such as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Later while I was in [REDACTED] I met a girl and we married.

Arrival of the Seleka to CAR

14. When the Seleka arrived in CAR, I was [REDACTED] for business, from where I returned to [REDACTED] I stayed in [REDACTED] until the Seleka entered BANGUI on the 24 March. After this, the Seleka came to [REDACTED] where they began to pillage motorbikes, machines, goats and hens. I was there when they attacked the village, and I fled to the bush. I cannot remember the exact date of this attack. Everyone else in the village also fled – it was not safe to stay.
15. I stayed in the bush for three days. We then came back to the village, but one day later, another group of Seleka attacked. I think they attacked again because they heard that people had returned to the village. They Seleka continued their pillaging and began to shoot people. Those who had goats, motorbikes or items of value were caught and killed by the Seleka. They killed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Meeting with [REDACTED] in the bush

16. We again fled into the bush. I remember that the date was around [REDACTED] In the bush, we could see our mothers and other women crying, asking us to flee further into the bush. We did so and became separated from our mothers, who stayed behind with the young children. We found a place in the bush about [REDACTED] away from [REDACTED] where we hid ourselves.
17. The investigators showed me a map of part of CAR, which is Annex A to my statement. I have put a blue 'X' on this map to indicate where we stayed in the bush. That place did not have a name – it was just the bush.
18. We were about 100 people gathered in this place in the bush. There, I met [REDACTED] I consulted a list of Anti-Balaka that the investigators showed me, with the reference number CAR-OTP-2039-0031. At 0034, I found [REDACTED] surname: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] lived between [REDACTED]
19. While we were in the bush with [REDACTED] some Muslims gave us food and told us that they would warn us if the Seleka were coming. However, it was mainly [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] that we ate – he would go far into the bush to hunt animals for us to eat.
20. [REDACTED] held a talk with the group of us in the bush He told us that he wanted to go to [REDACTED] centre to see if the town was still safe or if houses had been



burned. He also wanted to get some supplies, such as sugar, salt and coffee to bring back to the bush. [REDACTED] said that he would go by himself, but we told him that he should not go alone. We were all crying, but he was very brave and went anyway. However, when he tried to return, the Seleka cut off the road. They were looking for [REDACTED]

21. [REDACTED] managed to flee back to where we were. He gathered us together and talked to us, telling us what had happened. He told us that the Seleka were really wicked. We all decided that we too wanted to leave the bush – and if the Seleka decided to kill us, they would kill all of us.
22. Around [REDACTED] we left the bush and approached [REDACTED] but the Seleka shot at us and killed one of our number. They burned houses and we again retreated into the bush. That night at about 20h00 we heard someone talking in the bush. We thought that it was the Seleka, so we fled further into the bush, where we hid behind trees. However, the people were speaking Sango, and [REDACTED] understood that those people were our brothers. While we hid, he went slowly towards those people, and began to speak to them. They discussed matters and joined together. This is how our group became larger.
23. [REDACTED] left the bush and went to [REDACTED] to get *gris-gris* from a famous witchdoctor named [REDACTED]. These *gris-gris* were then sold to us, for our protection.
24. When the Seleka heard that we had gone to get the *gris-gris* to protect our villages, they followed us into the bush. In both the bush and in [REDACTED] the Seleka asked people to say Muslim prayers to prove that they were of that faith. Christians were then killed, while Muslims were spared.
25. I heard that in [REDACTED] the Seleka bought a lot of traditional Muslim outfits, such as *boubous*. They wanted to distribute these clothes to everyone, so that Christians could convert to Islam. I heard that the Seleka did this everywhere, even in BANGUI. I also heard that Seleka burned Christian churches. Some Central African Christians joined the Seleka to save themselves.
26. I never heard of any mosques being burned by Christians until I arrived in [REDACTED]. I did not see a mosque being burned, so I do not know if it was Christian civilians or Anti-Balaka who burned the mosques. I think it might have been Christian civilians who burned the mosques, because they were very angry.
27. The Seleka did not have problems with Muslims, they worked together. However, not all Muslims joined the Seleka, as certain Muslims did not like what the Seleka were doing. They said that they had lived peacefully with Christians before, and they did not want to be in conflict. The Seleka also targeted these Muslims.



28. The conflict became a conflict between Christians and Muslims. Some Muslims hated Christians and then some Christians began to hate Muslims.
29. We wanted to save ourselves, so we fled that area of the bush. We thought that [REDACTED] were still free, so we planned to seek refuge in one of those towns. At this time, we thought that this terrible situation was limited to [REDACTED]. There was no telephone network in [REDACTED] so we had not heard news from elsewhere.
30. While travelling in the bush, I was separated from [REDACTED] as we had to split up to find food. I travelled north and at a place called NGOBERE we ran into other people who had fled their respective towns and villages. Those we met at NGOBERE were from BOUCA, BOSSEMBELE, BOSSANGO and BOGANGOLO. They told us that the Seleka were also doing terrible things in their towns, and in other places such as DAMARA and NDJO.
31. On Annex A, I have placed an 'X' and written 'NGOBERE' on the place where we grouped together with others who had fled. I am not certain how to spell it – KOBERE, GOBERE or NGOBERE. I decided in the end to spell it 'NGOBERE'.
32. At NGOBERE, I found [REDACTED] again. It became like a large village for those of us who had fled. Life was very difficult in NGOBERE. When we went to fetch water or food, we were afraid that we would be attacked by the Seleka. We preferred to stay together, in a group, from fear. It was tough to get even a small piece of maize or cassava.
33. I think we stayed in NGOBERE for about two months – in any event, for many days. I do not know when exactly we arrived or left. It was difficult for us to get food. We fed ourselves with wild potatoes which in Sango we call *gwi* [phon]. We also ate maize, but it was difficult to find. Sometimes we went without eating for two days.
34. We organised ourselves in NGOBERE. Elements from each town would sleep together in their own zone: those with BOGANGOLO with those from BOGANGOLO, those from BOUCA with others from BOUCA, those BOSSEMPTELE with BOSSEMPTELE and those from BOSSANGO with people from BOSSANGO. The leaders stayed in the centre of these different zones. There, they exchanged ideas and strategies. As I was not a leader, I do not know what they discussed as strategies.
35. There were many chiefs in the centre of NGOBERE. [REDACTED] represented those from BOGANGOLO and BOSSEMBELE. [REDACTED] represented BOGANGOLO, and



██████████ represented elements from BOUCA and BOSSANGO. ██████████ helped the chiefs to coordinate affairs. They received instructions from the other chiefs and passed them on to us, the elements. I think that ██████████ came from NDJO and ██████████ from BOGANGOLO, but I cannot remember where ██████████ was from. They would tell us when the chiefs wanted us to contribute money (about 50-100 FCFA each) to buy coffee and sugar. They selected people to go to buy these items from BOUCA, BOSSANGO and neighbouring villages. They usually sent women to buy such provisions, instructing them to buy small amounts of items in each place, in order to not arouse suspicion, as they had to buy these items from the Seleka.

36. In NGOBERE, ██████████ could give orders to all the other chiefs. One day, we were all called for a talk and I saw the chiefs talking. Although I could not hear what they were saying, it was clear that ██████████ was giving them orders. ██████████ were also chiefs at NGOBERE but I do not know where they came from, or who they led.
37. Amongst the chiefs were some FACA members - ██████████ and a man named ██████████ who represented people from BOSSANGO. There might have been more FACA at NGOBERE, but as I was just an element, I can't tell you who amongst those who joined us there belonged to FACA. Another chief named ██████████ who was FACA joined us later, but he was not there in NGOBERE when I arrived.
38. Amongst those who fled to NGOBERE, there were groups of people who had been in groups to guard their villages against road bandits or '*coupeurs de route*'. These groups of 'Anti-Balaka guards' existed since the time of KOLINGBA, PATASSE and BOZIZE. The Anti-Balaka were not created in NGOBERE, they existed already to protect their villages.
39. In NGOBERE, I began to call myself an Anti-Balaka as well. As our group grew, everyone started referred to themselves as Anti-Balaka. I did not know about any other groups of Anti-Balaka who were forming in CAR, outside what I saw myself at NGOBERE.
40. I do not know if the chiefs in NGOBERE were communicating with others, outside of NGOBERE. There was no phone network in NGOBERE - I never saw anyone speaking on their phone while we were there. In order to communicate with people in other places, you had to ask those who went in search of provisions to ask elderly people who had stayed behind in the villages for information. In this way, people could sometimes get news from their relatives.



41. We did nothing while we were in NGOBERE. We just wanted to move somewhere else to seek refuge. [REDACTED] was angry with the situation. We did not receive any training. He said 'We are men and Central Africans. These people are killing and pillaging and they have made us flee into the bush.'
42. We thought of going to CHAD, but realised that it was the Chadians that had attacked BANGUI and our country, so for obvious reasons we decided not to go with that idea. We thought of CAMEROON or SUDAN, but we knew they were a long way away. As we realised those options were not possible, the chiefs decided that the only option was to fight the Seleka, and to drive them away from our villages.
43. The chiefs – I cannot remember exactly who - said that we were now the guardians of BOSSANGO, BOUCA and BOGANGOLO. Usually [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conveyed such messages to us. They told us that we needed to drive the Seleka away from these villages so that we could live in peace. They told us that we would first attack BOSSANGO. Our Anti-Balaka chiefs told us that after attacking BOSSANGO, we should then attack BOUCA and then BOGANGOLO.

Attack on BOSSANGO

44. We were a large group in NGOBERE, and we organised a big celebration the night before we left for BOSSANGO. I think that we all left NGOBERE together, but I do not know if we all went to BOSSANGO. The leader of my group is [REDACTED] He [REDACTED] and he went in front while we followed him. I was not with [REDACTED]
45. We were told by the Anti-Balaka chiefs that when we attacked BOSSANGO, we should shout at the Seleka and bang pots to make an awful noise while our chiefs shot their hunting guns in the air. The idea was to scare the Seleka, so they would leave the town. We wanted to catch them by surprise and take any weapons that they left behind. The only weapons that people had at NGOBERE were hunting rifles and machetes. I did not see anyone amongst us who had a machine gun or a heavy weapon.
46. At NGOBERE, we talked about targeting the Seleka, not the Muslims. The Anti-Balaka chiefs at NGOBERE told us that we should distinguish between members of the Seleka and Muslim civilians. They told us that we should not harm Muslims who did not associate themselves with the Seleka. The investigators asked me how I could differentiate between a Muslim who was associated with the Seleka and one who was not. I myself knew that a Muslim who associated with the Seleka would be armed or be near the Seleka base.

47. Perhaps three, four or five Muslims in each town might not have associated with the Seleka. They did not go to the Seleka bases, which is how I knew that they were not Seleka. The Seleka were identifiable because they wrapped cloth around their heads and they carried heavy weapons.
48. The investigators asked me how I dressed myself before going to BOSSANGO. I told them that I wore *gris-gris* to protect myself. Some put coverings on their hair. We wore dirty, torn or worn-out clothes, or indeed went bare-chested. Everyone made their own decision as to how they should dress to best scare the Seleka. It was an intimidation strategy. Some courageous elements sharpened their machetes and got ready to go to the front line.
49. We attacked BOSSANGO in the daytime. We chose a place where we could line up behind houses, and we began to make noise from there. We were a big group and we made a lot of noise. We shouted 'Leave! Leave! We have come!' and hit our cooking pots together as loudly as we could. Our chiefs shot their hunting rifles in the air.
50. When we first attacked, the Seleka who were guarding the village were caught by surprise. They fled back to their base and left their weapons behind, and our chiefs grabbed the weapons they had left.
51. Then our chiefs and others who were armed entered the town centre of BOSSANGO. All of the chiefs who I listed above as having been at NGOBERE were part of this attack. They tried to attack the Seleka base, but the Seleka shot at them and our chiefs retreated after about twenty minutes. I was far behind these chiefs and I did not go near the centre of BOSSANGO. I was scared, and I did not want to be shot at and killed. I protected myself by hiding behind the group and behind houses and big trees. I had a knife to protect myself. I also wore *gris-gris* which I had paid for, to protect myself.
52. After retreating from BOSSANGO, everyone who had gone to attack BOSSANGO went to attack BOUCA. It took us about six days or a week to walk through the bush to BOUCA. It was tiring, but we slept along the way when it became too much. The chiefs told us that we should do the same thing in BOUCA as we had done in BOSSANGO, instructing us to shout loudly to drive the Seleka out.

Attack on BOUCA

53. When we attacked BOUCA, we made a lot of noise as we had done in BOSSANGO. There, the Seleka also shot at us and we retreated again into the bush. We were joined in the bush by many others who had heard that we had come



to attack BOUCA. They told us that they would join us for a second attack on BOUCA.

54. We all thought about how to attack effectively, and one day later we attacked BOUCA for a second time. Again, the chiefs went first while I and others followed behind. This time, the attack was a success, and we all went into the town centre of BOUCA. I did not see any Seleka even though we were searching for them. We had not discussed in advance what we should do if we captured a Seleka element, and I never heard of anyone being captured by a person in my group.
55. Some Anti-Balaka died during this attack, but I do not know if any Seleka lost their lives. I thought to myself: 'Will I die? Will I be caught?' I was afraid of death, and I stayed behind and avoided looking for dead bodies. I did not see many dead bodies until I got to BOY-RABE in BANGUI, later on.
56. I saw no Muslims in BOUCA. I do not know where they were. Previously, when I visited BOUCA for work, I would see Muslims in the town. The people of BOUCA came out to celebrate that they were free. They brought us food and water, and we sheltered under big trees. There was no telephone network in BOUCA at that time, as Seleka had cut it off.
57. In BOUCA, my chief was a man named [REDACTED] I do not know his surname. He had also been part of the attack on BOSSANGO. [REDACTED]
58. After taking BOUCA, my group, led by [REDACTED] crossed the river to a place outside the town. We stayed there for about two or three days, as we were tired and needed time to recuperate. Other groups, who had also been part of the attack on BOUCA, left ahead of us. Those from BOSSANGO went back to attack BOSSANGO again, helped by natives of BOUCA. This time they were successful. I do not remember what chiefs returned to attack BOSSANGO. One group went to attack NDJO and BOSSEMBELE. They then went in the direction of BOALI, but they skirted around BOALI. Later, I heard that a group came from further north and continued on to BIMBO. I am not sure if this was the same group who skirted around BOALI.
59. I heard that [REDACTED] stayed between BOSSANGO and BOSSEMBELE. On the first day I met the investigators, I told them that he led a group to BOALI and on to BIMBO. When the investigators asked me a few days later if I knew where [REDACTED] went, I told them that I do not know. This must have been a misunderstanding. I now confirm that he led people from BOUCA to BOSSEMBELE. As I knew he was in BOSSEMBELE, I said earlier that he led people to BOALI, but in fact, I am not sure if he went to BOALI. I am also not sure if he went to BIMBO.



60. I do not know where [REDACTED] went. [REDACTED] group went to [REDACTED]
61. [REDACTED] did not want to descend to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] I descended with a group led by [REDACTED] – I do not remember his real name. It took about four days to walk from BOUCA to BOGANGOLO, through MARALI and on to BOBATOUA.

Attack on BOGANGOLO

62. I met [REDACTED] in the bush outside of BOGANGOLO. From there, we prepared for the attack on the town of BOGANGOLO.
63. [REDACTED] was the chief of [REDACTED] but he in turn had his own chiefs above him. [REDACTED] chiefs. They gave orders to [REDACTED] implemented these orders. In BOGANGOLO, I heard [REDACTED] telling [REDACTED] that now we have taken back our native village, he should tell his elements to work for peace, and send a message to people hiding in the bush to return. I have explained above why I think [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] chief. I do not know if [REDACTED] had another chief above them.
64. When we attacked BOGANGOLO, we again made a lot of noise to try to chase the Seleka away from BOGANGOLO. They shot at us and we retreated into the bush. I remember that it was raining and we tried to shelter under big trees. The next morning, we again attacked BOGANGOLO at about 05h00, and the Seleka fled to NDJO and BOSSEMBELE. I left [REDACTED] in BOGANGOLO and went [REDACTED] that same day. The Seleka had already left [REDACTED] there were no clashes there. We found old people there, but all the young people had fled.
65. In [REDACTED] another chief named [REDACTED]. I cannot remember his other name – acted as [REDACTED] deputy. [REDACTED] had also been with us in NGOBERE, but he only became a chief in BOUCA. Later, [REDACTED] was hit by a bullet in PK10 and died.
66. In [REDACTED] we managed to live peacefully for a while. We were based in the village, but we had one group of Anti-Balaka guarding the exit of the village towards BANGUI, and the other group the exit towards BOGANGOLO. We were more worried about the exit in the direction of BANGUI, because we already knew that those on the BOGANGOLO side were our friends.
67. Some Muslims stayed in BOGANGOLO [REDACTED] as they did not accept he bad things that the Seleka were doing. While we were in BOGANGOLO [REDACTED] said that the Muslims are decent people who did not associate themselves with the



Seleka. He said that at that time, the Seleka were even targeting decent Muslims. We wanted to protect the Muslims because they had protected us previously by bringing us food in the bush. In [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] put himself forward for election, he took on a Muslim deputy. I know a Muslim called [REDACTED] who is still living in [REDACTED]

68. Not everyone thought like [REDACTED] ANDJILO wanted to kill the Muslims in BOGANGOLO. While I was in [REDACTED] I heard that ANDJILO challenged [REDACTED] and asked why Muslims were still living in BOGANGOLO, when it was because of them that we had to flee and suffer the conditions in the bush. However, by that time [REDACTED] had already taken the Muslims into hiding and assigned some elements to guard them. Due to this, ANDJILO could not get to them to kill them.
69. I heard that ANDJILO did kill Muslims during the conflict, but I do not know if he did so in BOSSANGOLO or BOUCA. I did not hear about other Anti-Balak chiefs killing Muslims during the conflict.
70. The investigators told me that they have information that many Muslim civilians were killed in places such as BOSSANGOLO, BOUCA and BOGANGOLO. I replied that Muslims who associated with the Seleka were killed. The investigators told me that they have information that Muslim women and children were killed in these places, and that Muslim women were raped. I told them that I was not at the frontline during the attacks on these villages. I simply followed at the back of the group. I did not see any dead bodies until I got to BANGUI.
71. At this point, we thought that we were finished attacking and driving away the Seleka. However, we met people – both young civilians and FACA soldiers - who had come from BANGUI [REDACTED] They told us that the situation in BANGUI was very bad. Many soldiers had left BANGUI to come to the villages, and they told us that the Seleka were targeting FACA and killing them.
72. We told these soldiers from BANGUI that we had managed to defend our own villages. They told us that if we did not go to BANGUI to defend the people there, things would only get worse. At first, [REDACTED] did not want to leave [REDACTED] but when people told him that many people were being attacked in BANGUI, he agreed to help to drive the Seleka out.
73. ANDJILO came to BOGANGOLO when he heard about this. He also wanted to descend to BANGUI and fight there. I was in [REDACTED] when he arrived. I heard about the plan to descend to BANGUI from people who came to buy salt, sugar and coffee. As there was no telephone network, people had to bring news from other places in order for us to hear about it.



74. ANDJILO began to make his way to BANGUI. I saw him when he passed through [REDACTED]. He did not talk to me directly, as I was just an element, but he spoke to our chiefs [REDACTED]. They told him that it was calm in [REDACTED] and there were no Seleka there. I do not know if ANDJILO gave my chiefs any instructions. ANDJILO continued towards DAMARA with people who had fled BANGUI and were now returning to BANGUI for the attack. For a while, we stayed in [REDACTED] and we were then told by [REDACTED] that we had to go to BANGUI to help our brothers.

75. My group walked down to [REDACTED] and on to BENIMA (both of which I have marked on Annex A.)

76. When I arrived in BENIMA, I saw that ANDJILO [REDACTED] were already there. [REDACTED] was also at BENIMA [REDACTED] was not there, but I do not know where he was – some groups stayed in BOSSEMBELE and those areas [REDACTED] was the last person to join us at BENIMA.

77. One group continued to MBOURBA. [REDACTED] was amongst this group, and he was the chief in MBOURBA. MBOURBA is located after BENIMA on the road to BANGUI.

BENIMA

78. I stayed in BENIMA for a period of about two weeks. The Seleka from DAMARA came to attack us in BENIMA, and we fled into the bush. Some Anti-Balaka elements were killed. We did not want to attack DAMARA, because there was a heavy Seleka presence there. Therefore, when we continued on our way to BANGUI, we skirted around DAMARA. While in BENIMA, I was in a group led by [REDACTED] but before we left for BANGUI [REDACTED] called me to join his group, who were mainly from [REDACTED] I do not know if [REDACTED] has another name.

79. Groups and sub-groups left BENIMA at different times to go to BANGUI. The first and biggest group was led by ANDJILO. Another group was led by [REDACTED] ANDJILO, and I had seen him at NGOBERE. I heard that [REDACTED] had been in NGOBERE, but personally, I had not seen him there. My group was led by [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] as his deputy. [REDACTED] led another group, as did [REDACTED]

80. All of these people reported to ANDJILO. I did not see him giving them orders, but the respect the other chiefs showed him made me think that he was their chief.

81. My group went through the bush around DAMARA and came out at [REDACTED] which I have marked on Annex A by writing [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] – I am not sure how to spell it. We passed through [REDACTED] and crossed over to KPATA. We established a big base at KPATA near NGUITO. I have written 'KPATA' on Annex A to indicate where this base was located.

82. We reassembled at KPATA with the other chiefs. Some people had arrived before us, such as ANDJILO [REDACTED] KEMS would shortly afterwards be shot at PK12 during the attack on BANGUI. [REDACTED] was not at KPATA. I think that he was lost in the bush with no means of communication. [REDACTED] thinking that he was still in BENIMA, but he could not get through. [REDACTED] had already left, and that he was lost somewhere with no network coverage [REDACTED] had a large group of elements with him, but I do not know how many they were in total.
83. At KPATA, we met many young people who had come from BANGUI. They had come from BOY-RABE, COMBATTANT, GOBONGO and other neighbourhoods to gather with us there. Nobody had heavy weapons, such as rockets, 12-7's or 14-5's. 12-7's and 14-5's are weapons which are mounted on vehicles. Some people had Kalashnikovs. People might have had grenades, but they are small and easy to hide – I did not see any. There were also other young people from elsewhere in CAR at KPATA.
84. We did not know where the Seleka were based or living in BANGUI, but those who came from BANGUI were able to tell us. These people were young people who were fleeing BANGUI. They did not have a leader. They joined individually or in groups of four or five, asking to join the Anti-Balaka. I cannot tell you how many they were in total. They had no weapons, just little bags and perhaps a small bit of food.
85. They told us that the Seleka were harassing the population in BOY-RABE, KASSAI and PK12. Those who had fled BANGUI to BOGANGOLO had already told us the same thing. We decided that we should attack these areas of BANGUI.
86. FACA joined us here and there along the way to KPATA. For instance, [REDACTED] joined us in BOGANGOLO. However, many more joined us at KPATA – I can recall some names including [REDACTED] I was civilian, so I could not mix much with the FACA who joined us at KPATA.
87. From KPATA, we continued until we came to a big hill behind BOY-RABE, called NGUITO. It took about an hour for everyone to leave KPATA to go to NGUITO, as we were so many of us. When I left KPATA, I was in a sub-group under [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] was also in my group. We had still had not made contact with [REDACTED] at this point.

88. We slept behind the hill at NGUITO. There was an Anti-Balaka element posted on top of the hill to watch what was happening around. There, we waited for [REDACTED] and tried to come up with a strategy to attack BANGUI. Our chiefs climbed to the top of the hill to get reception (I am not sure what network) to try to telephone [REDACTED]. Our chiefs all had telephones. We did not have any news of the group who went to BIMBO.

89. We prepared and launched our attack from NGUITO. I do not know what the chiefs discussed amongst themselves, but our chief [REDACTED] came to us and told us which path we would take during the attack. He told us that when the attack started, we should be ready to bang pots and shout 'Seleka get out, Seleka get out!' We were told to fire in the air with our hunting rifles. We dressed as we had when we attacked BOSSANGO and BOUCA.

Attack of 5 December

90. On the night of 4 December 2013, there was a night vigil in the bush behind the hill. We lit a big light, danced and sang songs of praise and about how we would defend our country. Our chiefs were with us, dancing and singing of victory, shouting 'We will push the Seleka out and the Christian God will help us'. People did not drink alcohol or take drugs – we just prayed to God to protect us. At about 02h00 on 5 December, we stopped dancing and we started praying, and then we departed.

91. [REDACTED] With [REDACTED] we took the road behind [REDACTED] took his group to attack [REDACTED]. Our group, led by [REDACTED] passed through [REDACTED]. We then went behind the [REDACTED] to attack. The other group, who went to [REDACTED] went with [REDACTED].

92. I do not know what happened to the group from BIMBO, I heard that they did not launch their attack.

93. The investigators gave me a map labelled Annex B, which is attached to my statement. I marked in green on this map the route that my group took from [REDACTED] for the attack of the 5 December. I have marked in pink on the map the route that [REDACTED] group took through BANGUI. He took the main road through the [REDACTED]. He carried out the attack at [REDACTED].



94. I have marked in blue the route that the group who went to [REDACTED] took. They took a route over the hill. The group who attacked [REDACTED] left from KPATA, as there is a road which leads from KPATA directly [REDACTED] I have marked the route they took in red. I do not know the details of this attack.
95. The FACA who participated in the attack used the weapons that we had taken from the Seleka in BOSSANGO and BOUCA. The Seleka answered by firing with us with heavy weapons and rockets. We were scared. We had one FACA in our group [REDACTED] He had joined just a week before the attack. He was a well-built man with a Kalashnikov and he was in front while we attacked. He was killed by the Seleka during the attack. He shouted that we should retreat, and we ran. It is thanks to this shout that we escaped.
96. Some FACA went with [REDACTED] others went to PK12 and others to Camp KASSAI. The FACA divided themselves into different groups.
97. Most of us in my group had hunting rifles or machetes. I myself held a hunting rifle. [REDACTED] were with us for the attack, as we made our way to the [REDACTED] They also held Kalashnikovs.
98. My group was involved in heavy clashes. Our goal was to drive out the Seleka from [REDACTED] A lot of people from my group were killed or injured that day – I do not know how many. It was very difficult. We went through [REDACTED] That is when the Seleka attacked us seriously. We then went [REDACTED] I do not know how I managed to escape [REDACTED] it was so difficult. I did not know what was happening with any of the other groups who had taken different routes that night; I was not in communication with them. I did not have a phone.
99. The Seleka had blocked the main road which leads to [REDACTED] so when we got to [REDACTED] we fled through the neighbourhood to [REDACTED] I continued [REDACTED] somebody led me to the hill and I climbed the hill behind [REDACTED] before returning to my starting position of the [REDACTED] The hill is called [REDACTED] I was very scared, and I know that it is only by God's grace that I managed to survive the attack. The Seleka were very well armed with heavy weapons and we, the Anti-Balaka, had no such thing.
100. We then returned to [REDACTED] The group who had gone to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We all discussed how difficult the attack was. Those who had been at [REDACTED] told me that the Seleka were strong and that they had attacked them. [REDACTED] group retreated to [REDACTED]



101. When I got back [REDACTED] I refused to attack the Seleka again. I was very scared. It is difficult to fight someone who holds a gun with a simple machete. We wanted to intimidate the Seleka, shouting that we were strong, but it was not the case in reality. I set off with a group towards the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] where we wanted to hide. [REDACTED] was still in [REDACTED] with his group. On the way, it started raining and we sheltered under a big tree near [REDACTED] It was now 6 December.

102. I showed the investigators two photos which were taken after we retreated from the attack of 5 December. Although each photo shows a man in uniform, the men are not from the FACA, they are civilians. There are also other people, in civilian clothing, in the pictures. The people in the photos are holding hunting rifles, also known as *gana-pointes*. There is a woman named [REDACTED] in one of the photos. I saw her name on the list numbered CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] died from an illness.

103. On 6 December, I did not sleep because the Seleka followed us up the hill near where we were. We slept in big trees in groups of two or three in [REDACTED] scattered around the bush. It rained from 05h00 to 10h00. We were wet and miserable, and we did not know if the Seleka would attack, despite the rain. We went to check if they had retreated due to the rain, but when they saw us coming, they began to shoot at us once more. We ran to [REDACTED] where we hid ourselves.

104. On the same day, the Seleka counter-attacked by targeting people in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] They killed people, beat people and burned houses. After they attacked, the Seleka retreated to Camp BEAL, MISKINE and MALIMATA. I stayed in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at my family's house. From then on, we started checking if the Seleka were still around in places such as BOY-RABE, FOU and GOBONGO, but we did not encounter them.

105. From the 6 December, I stayed in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but the house still belonged to my family.

106. There were still many Seleka in BANGUI, and many Anti-Balaka as well. Every day, each group tried to attack the others, but I was not involved in this so I cannot tell you exactly what was happening. Some other Anti-Balaka visited us at the

house and told me that each group was attacking the other. They then returned to their base. I was not in contact with any chief while I was at [REDACTED] I still did not have any telephone with me.

107. I did not go out during this time, because [REDACTED]

108. I was afraid that these chiefs might think that I was joining the Seleka or creating my own group to go and pillage. [REDACTED]

109. One day, a person who I was staying with at [REDACTED] I heard that on his arrival, about two weeks after the attack of 5 December, [REDACTED] to his family. There, he stayed with his elements, while I stayed hidden in [REDACTED] I did not join [REDACTED]

110. I wanted to join [REDACTED] because I knew that with [REDACTED] I would be safe. I did not think that it would be safe with ANDJILO, because he was a thief and robber and created a lot of disorder – I did not want to be involved in such things, because it would only cause trouble for myself [REDACTED] was against stealing, and he had protected Muslims [REDACTED] He always advised the Anti-Balaka not to steal, and not to provoke women and children. [REDACTED] was strong and powerful enough as a leader to keep things calm. [REDACTED] elements were scared of him.

111. NGAISSONA did not come back to BANGUI until after DJOTODIA had left for CHAD on 24 December. When NGAISSONA came back, he convened a meeting with all the Anti-Balaka at his father's place, to hear about and assess their problems. He knew that the Anti-Balaka had nothing, and he told them that he would support them [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was not at this meeting but I



heard about it later from [REDACTED]

112. I heard that NGAISSONA had returned to BANGUI, but I did not know him personally – I had never met him. [REDACTED]

113. [REDACTED] were close by in NGAISSONA's warehouse near Lycée ST CHARLES. There was a house in between NGAISSONA's house and the warehouse, they were not directly side-by-side. [REDACTED]

114. I could see that everything in NGAISSONA's house and warehouse had been pillaged by the Seleka. They were completely empty, even the windows and doors had been taken [REDACTED]

115. A week or two after my arrival at the base at BOY-RABE, [REDACTED]

116. In my role as [REDACTED] I helped him to identify who exactly our elements were, and to make sure they ate and slept. I would fetch medicine if someone was sick. There was a medical centre at the monastery in the 4th *arrondissement* where people received free treatment. People who fled Seleka crimes came to stay at the monastery; it was what we called a '*ledger*'. I think that '*ledger*' is a French word, which means 'refuge'.

117. When he was in exile, NGAISSONA knew that the Anti-Balaka had no means, and there was nobody to supply us with food. He decided to give money to each group for food, so that they would not go out and pillage.



118. From January or February 2014, NGAISSONA gave money - perhaps 10,000 or 20,000 FCFA - to us.

NGAISSONA would give money to

and
told me that NGAISSONA was giving money to to give to
us. I do not know if was getting money from NGAISSONA every day or
not,

119.

120. I heard from that NGAISSONA was also
giving money to other Anti-Balaka bases.

121. There were various women at the base to whom I could give money for food. I
remember, for instance, They were Anti-Balaka
members. I do not know where they were from. They slept at the base with us, but
they did not go out with any of the men. The Anti-Balaka were not looking for
women, because it was contrary to the requirements of our *gris-gris*. The women did
the cooking.

122. The investigators told me that they have information that the Anti-Balaka raped
women in BANGUI. I replied that perhaps these Anti-Balaka were fake ones who
caused trouble in various neighbourhoods.

123.

This was the only time I saw NGAISSONA
the marabout who was based in BOSSEMBELE, came to visit

once

also visited the base.

visit their bases.

124. The investigators asked me if I could identify who was calling

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[REDACTED]

125. As I did a good job [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I cannot tell you exactly when this happened, but at that time we were still at the base in BOY-RABE. I remained [REDACTED] until we left the base at [REDACTED] in BOY-RABE. When I became [REDACTED] who came up with the idea of ID cards.

126. Elements were issued with ID cards so that they would understand that they belonging to the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED] gave them these ID cards or badges so that if they went out, they could be identified. People were using the name of the Anti-Balaka to commit robbery, so with the badge [REDACTED] what base they were at. I think their base was marked on the card. The investigators told me they had seen Anti-Balaka badges and that on those badges, only the province of origin of the element was noted. I replied that this was how we knew where they were based. For instance, if an element was marked as being from [REDACTED] we would know that he was under the leadership of [REDACTED] because he was from [REDACTED] himself. [REDACTED] was marked on the card, [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was their chief.

127. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Everyone had to pay 1,000 FCFA, and they were then issued with a badge. Anti-Balaka at other bases saw that this was a good idea, and they decided to do the same for those at their bases.

128. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There was a big problem with young people stealing and looting in BANGUI. The aim of the disarmament unit was to try to catch those who were committing robberies. [REDACTED]



129. The Anti-Balaka were scared to steal from Muslims, because they would poison their goods. I do not know of someone who stole from Muslims being caught by this unit.
130. [REDACTED] sought out the authorities – police and *gendarmes* – and asked them to take Anti-Balaka who were caught stealing to prison and to discipline them.
131. The investigators asked me if the police and prison system was functioning well at the time. I replied that in February and March 2014, the police was not functioning as such, but we could for instance take people to the station in the 1st *arrondissement*.
132. The investigators told me that they had not heard of many people who were detained for long at police stations. They told me that they had heard that often family members would pay and the person would be quickly released. I was asked if I thought it was effective as a means of disciplining. I replied that that people were afraid of being sent to the police station because their family members had to then raise money to have them released. It was inconvenient for them.
133. The Investigators asked me if those who were captured were ever brought to the base. They were before the police would take them. The investigators showed me a DW article written by a journalist with the reference number CAR-OTP-2001-4441. The interpreter has translated into French for me a portion of the article which indicates that DOUZE PUISSANCE held a prisoner and tortured him at NGAISSONA's house. The portion which he read to me is at CAR-OTP-[REDACTED] and begins with 'The political leader is Patrice NGAISSONA' and ends with "'He wants to blame us for the crimes he has committed so that we are called to account under the law,'" the Colonel said.'
134. I know what this article is referring to. The person's name was LARMA, but he [REDACTED] LARMA had a lot of elements who stole and pillaged. LARMA stayed in an underground cave, from where from where he sent his elements out to steal. He claimed to be an Anti-Balaka, but he was not. He simply used that label to go into the neighbourhood and steal. DOUZE PUISSANCE heard that LARMA was racketeering, so he asked the disarmament unit to go and catch him in his cave. [REDACTED]

135 [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I had previously heard about the racketeering he was involved in,
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]

139. The investigators asked me if I knew an Anti-Balaka element named [REDACTED] I replied that I do know him, but I do not know much about him.

140. The investigators asked me if I knew an Anti-Balaka element named [REDACTED] I do not know this person.

141. We did not often leave our base at BOY-RABE. We did not do much while we were there.

142. The investigators asked me why we stayed in BANGUI if we were not doing much at the base. I replied that we stayed in BANGUI because we were waiting for the DDR process to begin and compensate us. I am not certain what 'DDR' stands for, but it might be Demobilisation, Disarmament and perhaps 'Repatriation'.

143. The investigators asked me why I stayed in the base for January, February and March 2014, before the DDR process even began. I replied that during those months, we stayed because there were still Seleka around who could try to kill us if we went out. We could not go to PK5, MISKINE, parts of PETEVO, or even to the city centre of BANGUI as there were Seleka about. If I wanted to return to [REDACTED] I would have had to catch a vehicle from [REDACTED] and there were many Seleka there. This is why we stayed at the base in BOY-RABE. It was later, [REDACTED] that we decided to wait for the DDR process to begin.

144. At BOY-RABE, we decided it was too difficult to try to drive the Seleka out of PK5, SASSARA and Camp BEAL. [REDACTED] was scared of the Seleka in their

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strongholds, they were many and they had big weapons, some even mounted on their vehicles.

145. There was a security checkpoint at the entrance to our base at BOY-RABE, to make sure that those who came were not coming to do us harm, for instance by bringing grenades. [REDACTED] were supervised by [REDACTED] who made sure that the Anti-Balaka manning the checkpoints did not provoke the population. Anti-Balaka from other bases had to get permission from their chiefs to visit our base or other Anti-Balaka bases. Their chief would write them a document granting the permission. The documents were headed 'Anti-Balaka', and would read something along the lines of: 'This is to say that X can visit Y base to see his friends'. There were checkpoints all over the city.

Problems in the Anti-Balaka

146. When Coordinator NGAISSONA began to give aid, some people did not understand why the Anti-Balaka had been created. They thought that we were a rebel group who wanted to oust DJOTODIA, take power and install a new president. This was not the case. There is no political party or politician behind the Anti-Balaka. I can tell you that I know that you are here to investigate what happened in CAR and to find out if we were pushed to do this by a politician or political party. We were not.
147. When we came to BANGUI, people started to say that the Anti-Balaka is the armed branch of such-and-such, but this not true. The Anti-Balaka came to restore peace to the Central African population. We wanted to defend our villages. When we attacked BANGUI, some young people joined the Anti-Balaka, because they felt that through the Anti-Balaka, they could make easy money through racketeering. However, this was not the purpose of the Anti-Balaka. These young people changed the philosophy of the group. They knew BANGUI well and they began targeting areas where they knew they could easily steal motorbikes or such things for their own benefit. We, the original Anti-Balaka, did not do such things. We stayed behind our leaders. The Anti-Balaka was not created to steal and rob, and no leader was paying the elements a salary.
148. The Anti-Balaka began to rob people because they did not have enough food. Sometimes they went without food for two or three days at a time. If someone has not eaten for two or three days, he loses part of his senses. Such a person knows that if he steals, he will have money for food, and he will live. Most of the Anti-Balaka who had come from the provinces had no family in BANGUI. Certain Anti-Balaka from BANGUI asked them to join them in theft and violence, telling them that they



should take something for themselves. Those from the provinces were hungry and decided to get involved.

149. The Anti-Balaka also learned at one point that the Central African State was giving food and money to the Seleka in their camps, but not to the Anti-Balaka. Certain Anti-Balaka were angry and decided they would instead get these things through violence.

150. NGAISSONA was the only one who gave the Anti-Balaka a bit of assistance. When he noticed all the robberies and violence, he told the chiefs that he would not assist them if their elements were doing such things. There were problems and clashes between the groups of Anti-Balaka who stole and those who did not.

151. There was a huge problem with gang robbery. [REDACTED] grouped with people from BANGUI to find easy targets for robbery. He and [REDACTED] wanted to become rich quickly.

Move to [REDACTED] and Theft within the Anti-Balaka

152. While we were still at the base in BOY-RABE, [REDACTED] was called to [REDACTED] to calm things down as people were committing robbery there. When he came back, he decided that we should all move to [REDACTED]

153. [REDACTED] told our group that we could not stay in the 4th *arrondissement*, as we should not be mixed up with people there who were looting and thieving. We moved to the [REDACTED] where we established our base [REDACTED]. I remember that we had already moved to [REDACTED]. I think that this was in [REDACTED]

154. A few weeks after our arrival at [REDACTED]

155. When we moved [REDACTED] some FACA left the base of [REDACTED] because he was involved in racketeering, and they joined [REDACTED]

156. At [REDACTED] told us not to go out and cause disorder. If an element was caught robbing, [REDACTED] would catch the element who had done so and chastise them in front of everyone before sending him to the police station or to prison. We would all be called together and told that the person was a thief and robber and would not be returning to our base. This happened several times.



157. [REDACTED]
There were other security checkpoints around BANGUI, to see who was moving from place to place.
158. [REDACTED] We had particular problems with the Anti-Balaka from [REDACTED] who were involved in a lot of robbing and thieving.
[REDACTED]
159. The disarmament unit was not a set group, each day different elements would be selected to carry out this work. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who had done this work at BOY-RABE, from time to time.
160. We did not have a patrol as such from [REDACTED] because there were no Seleka in the area. We only had this disarmament group, to try to prevent theft. The disarmament unit did not have a name – I just called it simply a disarmament unit or group.
161. I heard there were similar disarmament groups operating from other Anti-Balaka bases in BANGUI.
162. I do not know if there were many Muslims in the [REDACTED] I remember there was one Imam who lived there, named [REDACTED]
163. If we caught a thief, we took them to the nearest police station. If we brought the thief to the base, we would just ask them questions, and then transfer them to the police station. We did not beat them. If the police knew that you had beaten a person, even a thief, they would prosecute you as well.
164. I myself saved a *gendarme* around [REDACTED] He was attacked by young Anti-Balaka. When I heard this, I went there and caught the person who had attacked him. I put him in prison, but his family paid money for his release. This discouraged me. If this was what would happen, I thought, what was the use of doing this work?
165. I do not know if [REDACTED] had a secretary. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] If elements wanted to leave [REDACTED] they had to obtain a document granting them permission, signed by [REDACTED] was the big chief, so [REDACTED] or I wanted to leave the base, we had to have a paper signed [REDACTED] For the other elements, he delegated this responsibility to [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] However, if an element wanted to leave BANGUI, for instance to visit family, it was [REDACTED] who had to sign such a document.

166. My official title at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

167. Usually I had about [REDACTED] elements with me in the same compound. Every month,
[REDACTED]

168. From [REDACTED] we secured the zone from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] we heard that gang robbery was happening every day.

169. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

170. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

171. [REDACTED] left the meeting at [REDACTED]
went to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

172. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

173. NGAISSONA called [REDACTED] to his house and told him that he should not racketeer. I heard about this later from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I think that all of this took place in 2014, but I cannot tell you the exact date.

174. [REDACTED] were all thieves. They were arrested because of stealing. People knew that they stole and created disorder, and they cannot now move freely. [REDACTED] is not an original Anti-Balaka, this is why he behaved like this. However, there are also good Anti-Balaka, people who suffered, like me. I am still [REDACTED] and nobody is causing me problems because I did not create disorder during the time of the Anti-Balaka. I heeded the advice of my chief, my mother and my grandmother. I think if I had been a thief, by now, I would be dead.

Anti-Balaka Bases

175. I remained based in the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

176. [REDACTED]

177. Sometimes, I would get a call regarding an issue from other bases [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

178. I consulted the list of Anti-Balaka elements that the investigators brought with them [REDACTED]. I can see that [REDACTED] is marked on this list- this was my base. I can see my name on this list. I read through the list and I recognise many other names. I know most of these people, they were Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Thirty or forty people who are on this list are now dead.

179. On the left hand side column are the names of the ComZones. I know all of these people. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are the sons of the NGAISSONA [REDACTED] I can see that the first element listed in each base is often the ComZone's deputy, but not as a rule.

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180. Basil MBOMON is ROMBHOT's younger brother (related by blood). Herve YOMBO at Camp KASSAI is a FACA soldier. [REDACTED]

181. [REDACTED]

182. Sometimes, Anti-Balaka leaders had both bases and sub-bases for which they were responsible. For instance, I can see 'GOBONGO 2' on the list that the investigators showed me. This base was a sub-base [REDACTED] whose main base was at [REDACTED]. In the left hand side column is the name of [REDACTED] which suggests that he was the ComZone of that base. In fact he was [REDACTED]. I think that is an error, as his name appears again first on the list of elements at GOBONGO 2.

183. [REDACTED]

184. Judicael MOGANAZOUM's bases in BOEING and PONGOULOU in BOY-RABE are not on the list which the investigators showed me [REDACTED]. MOGANAZOUM is gone to FRANCE, he misappropriated funds that a Minister gave to the Anti-Balaka and he fled.

185. The investigators asked me if I knew of a base near the river near PETEVO and KOLONGO. I do know this base. The investigators asked me if I knew who the chief of that base was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I then checked to see who their ComZone was, and I can see that it is Alfred YEKATOM 'ROMBHOT'. KOLONGO was a sub-base of ROMBHOT, and there was a leader (ROMBHOT's deputy) attached to that base, whose name was Habib MAWAN. However, MAWAN's name does not appear on this list. ROMBHOT had many deputies. I do not know where MAWAN was from – I do not know much about him to be honest, except that he was a deputy of ROMBHOT. He died in a motorbike accident – I do not know when.

186. [REDACTED] Their chief Habib MAWAN [REDACTED] His [REDACTED]

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hair was short at the sides and longer at the top. He had a little beard. He had a motorbike. [REDACTED]

187. The list that I consulted was drawn up for the [REDACTED] and is dated November 2016. I do not know what [REDACTED] stands for, but it was part [REDACTED]. The investigators have taken a copy of this list, and scanned it onto an SD card. It is attached to my statement at Annex C. The list contains the first name and surname of Anti-Balaka elements who were involved in [REDACTED]. I do not know if there are other [REDACTED]. On the right hand side is written the name of the ComZone to which they were attached.

188. [REDACTED] called me and told me how our elements would be trained and where they would be posted. Elements had to sign up to be enrolled in the [REDACTED]. This list shows the elements of [REDACTED] who signed up to the process.

189. I showed the investigators a document which I was given when I enrolled in the [REDACTED]. In the document, I am referred to as an Anti-Balaka [REDACTED]. There are no grades in the Anti-Balaka, but the people from the [REDACTED] referred to me as a [REDACTED] because I was [REDACTED]. I prefer that the investigators do not take a copy of this document.

Anti-Balaka in the Provinces

190. [REDACTED] would often travel to many other bases in BANGUI, such as the base at [REDACTED]. He would also travel to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] contacted Anti-Balaka chiefs in [REDACTED] to give them information and to check that all was well. They also called him – they were in contact with each other. I do not know how he had their numbers or what they spoke about. I do know that when we were preparing the talks at BRAZZAVILLE and the National Assembly, [REDACTED] ComZones from [REDACTED] to come for the discussions. For this reason, I think that [REDACTED] coordinated all the places which I have just listed.

191. The investigators asked me [REDACTED] travelled to [REDACTED] and I replied that he did not.

192. [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] to talk to [REDACTED] the famous marabout. At [REDACTED] he visited another marabout named [REDACTED]. He would bring back *gris-gris* from these visits, which he would sell to us.



[REDACTED]

194. I do not know if the other chiefs in BANGUI were in contact with the ComZones in the provinces, but as the Anti-Balaka was a movement, I think they were. For instance, the idea of issuing ID cards was also implemented in the provinces, so there must have been some kind of contact. I do not know who the Anti-Balaka chiefs in the provinces were, and I did not see a ComZone from the provinces visiting one of our bases. Later, when I became [REDACTED] I received a call once from the Anti-Balaka chief in [REDACTED] I do not know where he got my number. I do not remember his name, but he told me that he was a chief [REDACTED] He then asked me what he should do in order [REDACTED]

195. The investigators showed me a document with the reference CAR-OTP-2001-6300. It is a mission order signed by [REDACTED] On this document, I can see the name [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He is now deceased. [REDACTED]

196. This mission referred to in this mission order took place while we were still in BOY-RABE. It took place because there were fake Anti-Balaka robbing with violence in the areas of OMBELLO MPOKO and SIBUT. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

197. I recognise other names on the mission order. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] When the fake Anti-Balaka realised that [REDACTED] had sent elements, they fled. People were afraid of [REDACTED] because he was brave, made decisions and spoke the truth all the time. He told it like it was – I think he would even send his own family to the police station if they thieved or committed wrongs.

198. I told the investigators that [REDACTED] would ask people to type up documents, and then he would sign them. [REDACTED] We did not have a typewriter or computer at our bases. He might have had them typed up at an internet kiosk.

The Coordination and Meetings with ComZones

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199. I did not attend any meetings of ComZones. All the big meetings took place in BANGUI, apart from one meeting at BRAZZAVILLE where people met to try to work together for peace.

200. After the meeting in BRAZZAVILLE, over 20 chiefs came for a forum or dialogue at the National Assembly. These chiefs were from BRIA, MBAIKI, NOLA BANDORO, DEKOUA, SIBUT, GRIMARI, BOUCA, DAMARA and BOALI. I think that they stayed at the Ledger Hotel for this meeting.

201. Before the talks at BRAZZAVILLE and the National Assembly, preparatory meetings were held for the talks, during which people were instructed how to speak calmly during the discussions, even if they disagreed with what others were saying. I did not go to these meetings, but [REDACTED] told us about them [REDACTED]

202. I know that there were a group of people who managed the Anti-Balaka, called the Coordination. I never met with the Coordination as such. When the Coordination was functioning, certain members visited my base at BOY-RABE, so I happened to know who some of them are. [REDACTED]

the Coordination, and I am not sure what the others' roles were. They advised us Anti-Balaka that we should stay calm, and they told us that the DDR [REDACTED] would come to help us.

203. [REDACTED] also visited the base at [REDACTED] also visited - I think he was part of the Coordination as well, but I am not sure. They brought us the same message as they had at the base at BOY-RABE.

204. I had to contact [REDACTED] before I signed up for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told me that I had to get in contact with him to establish if I could sign up to the [REDACTED]. He acted as a liaison between the elements and [REDACTED]. I also could call [REDACTED] if I wanted to. As they were in the Coordination, they knew [REDACTED]

205. The investigators asked me if I had contact with Maxime MOKOM. I replied that I have heard that he was a member of the Coordination. He was a big chief; I could not just call or visit him. I was scared of him as he was so important. [REDACTED] knew that I was one of [REDACTED] elements, because all the chiefs were required to draw up lists of their elements and [REDACTED] discussed them with him.



206. [REDACTED] would meet to speak about the [REDACTED]. They also had Coordination meetings together with NGAISSONA. At one point, there was a split in the Anti-Balaka when MOKOM claimed that NGAISSONA was using the Anti-Balaka to racketeer. MOKOM accused him of using the money of the movement for himself. MOKOM then took some elements and set up his own coordination, no longer working with NGAISSONA. [REDACTED] From then on, [REDACTED] and MOKOM no longer called each other.
207. [REDACTED] had meetings with NGAISSONA or other members of the Coordination, [REDACTED] I think that they had meetings every week or every two weeks.

List of FACA at NGOBERE

208. The investigators showed me a list with the reference number CAR-OTP-[REDACTED]. [REDACTED] The list is of FACA who gathered at NGOBERE. I can see that KONATE is at the head of this list – I had forgotten about him, but now I remember that he was indeed there with us. He was the highest ranking military chief amongst us. I remember that during the attack on BANGUI, he went with [REDACTED] attack [REDACTED].
209. I can see the names of some people I mentioned to you on this list: SANDJINATE, MOKPEM, NDOMATE and MINANG Samuel.
210. I can also see the name DEDANE on this list. He was also at NGOBERE, I remember now. He was an Anti-Balaka chief. DEDANE worked and slept in the same area as [REDACTED]. I often saw him walking together with [REDACTED]. They circulated amongst us, making sure that all the elements were doing well. I do not know if [REDACTED] or the other way around, or if they were equals.
211. When any Anti-Balaka chief came to where we were, all of us elements had to stand and salute him. We were expected to listen to what our chiefs had to say. The chiefs did not greet each element individually, but they spoke to a few to make sure that we were eating and sleeping.
212. These FACA were not a separate group at NGOBERE, they mixed with the rest. I could not recognise everyone that was a FACA while I was there.
213. I remember some gatherings at NGOBERE where we all stood in front of the Anti-Balaka chiefs such as KONATE, LEBENE, DANGBA, DEDANE, and ANDJILO and they spoke to us. They would tell us to stay calm and to not be afraid, and that



our God would help us to exit the bush. They told us that we had no choice but to have fled to NGOBERE to save ourselves, but that a time would come when we would be able to exit the bush and drive the Seleka away.

214. The investigators told me that I had mentioned that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were present in NGOBERE. I consulted the list that the investigators provided me with. I told the investigators that in fact, I am not sure if they were at NGOBERE or not.

215. The investigators asked me if ROMBHOT or KONATE visited [REDACTED]. I replied that they did not.

List of Anti-Balaka ComZones

216. The investigators showed me another list of Anti-Balaka ComZones, with the reference number CAR-OTP [REDACTED]. They asked me if I could identify who was in NGOBERE from this list. I told them that [REDACTED] was at NGOBERE. Now that I see the name [REDACTED] I remember that this was his first name. I think that [REDACTED] was the proper name for [REDACTED]. I mentioned the name of [REDACTED]. The investigators asked me if [REDACTED] was with us at NGOBERE. I do not know.

217. The investigators asked me to tell them about [REDACTED]. I told them that he was one of the last people to arrive in BANGUI. Before that, he was in [REDACTED]. The investigators asked me again who led me into the attack on BOSSANGO. I told them that I think that the overall chief who led the attack on BOSSANGO was KONATE. I think that [REDACTED] was the chief of my group when we attacked BOSSANGO, and that he also led my group when we attacked BOUCA. I now clarify that [REDACTED] did not come to NGOBERE and he did not lead me during the attack on BOSSANGO. I think that I got a bit confused with the questions earlier; there was some sort of misunderstanding. All of this happened a long time ago. In addition, French is not my first language, this could be the cause. The investigators told me that if we meet again, they will bring a Sango interpreter. I think that this is a good idea.

Work with [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]



219. The investigators showed me [REDACTED] Facebook page which has picture of an event with [REDACTED] and the Anti-Balaka. It is attached to my statement as Annex D.

220. The interpreter read the text of the caption to me. From left to right on the middle photo on the right hand side of the page, I can recognise [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] On the bottom picture left hand side of the page, I recognise [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] was an Anti-Balaka youth.

2

222. The children on these lists were at the Anti-Balaka bases with us. These people were aged about 16, 17 or 18 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There were many people who wanted to acquire a trade, who wanted to have a future [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] would accept this and enrol them in studies [REDACTED] young boys and girls who were with us at the bases in this way. Some got involved in agriculture, business, carpentry, and so on.

223

224

Anti-Balaka Elements Post-Conflict

225. After the conflict, many Anti-Balaka dispersed and went to live in various neighbourhoods or with family. Many of my comrades who were based in the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are still waiting in BANGUI for assistance from the DDR process. They are waiting for someone from the DDR to call them and tell them that they must have suffered a lot in the bush, but that they can now receive training and return to the community. This is what happened to me. I was told that I could

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receive training in a trade such as carpentry [REDACTED]
In this way, I can be a useful person in society.

226. Some Anti-Balaka did not wait for the DDR process, but simply got a job or went farming. [REDACTED]

227. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I
burned many documents which associated me with the Anti-Balaka, [REDACTED]

22

Contact with [REDACTED]

229. The investigators asked me when I last spoke with [REDACTED] I replied that I do not know when I last spoke with [REDACTED] but then I remembered that I called him last week on Thursday or Friday to say hello. [REDACTED]

23

Other Documents

231. I gave the investigators a copy of a blank permission form. This form was filled out to grant an Anti-Balaka element permission to leave their base. This form is Annex E to my statement.

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232. I told the investigators that I may be able to get more documents from my friends who were with the Anti-Balaka. I cannot do so now, as I am busy [REDACTED] but perhaps I could get them in a few months' time, when I return to [REDACTED]

ANNEXES

Annex A- Map of CAR

Annex B- Map of BANGUI

Annex C- SD card containing list of Anti-Balaka elements [REDACTED]

Annex D-Facebook page of [REDACTED]

Annex E-Blank Anti-Balaka permission form.

Closing Procedure

233. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

234. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.

235. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.

236. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

237. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

238. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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This statement has been read over to me in the French language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by [REDACTED] that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of [REDACTED] who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. [REDACTED] has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

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