

**INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR**

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: NGAYA	Gender: Male
First Name: Alfred Legrand	Father's Name: Jacques NGAYA (deceased)
Other names used: N/A	Mother's Name: [REDACTED]
Place of Birth: BANGUI, CAR	Passport / ID number:
Date of Birth/Age: 14/09/1960	Nationality(s): Central African Republican
Ethnicity: Gbaya	Religion: Christian

Language(s) Spoken:	French and Sango
Language(s) Written:	French
Language(s) Used in Interview:	French-English

Occupation: Chief of Cabinet for President of the National Assembly

Place of Interview: [REDACTED]

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview:


[REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview:

[REDACTED], Investigator, [REDACTED] Associate Investigator, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Alfred Legrand NGAYA.

[REDACTED]





WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and told that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and told that he is a French-English interpreter with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in the Central African Republic since August 2012. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I was read my rights under Article 55(2) and this portion of my statement was audiotaped. I chose not to have the interview recorded beyond the explanation of my rights. I waived my right to have counsel present during the interview and signed a waiver. The SD card containing this audiotape is attached to my statement as Annex A. The waiver form is also attached as Annex B.
5. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in French and English, with the assistance of a French-English interpreter. I fully understand and speak French.
6. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions.



The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.

7. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
8. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
9. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
10. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
11. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

12. I was previously interviewed by OTP investigators from 6 to 9 April 2016. This is my second interview with the OTP.

National Council for Youth

13. As part of my work as Director General with the Ministry of Youth, I began to set up the National Council for Youth in 2007. We established the bases in the main cities in the prefectures and in BANGUI. I sought funding from organisations such as UNICEF and UNESCO and then put the structure in place and built youth halls across the country. In every prefecture, I put in place a council for the youth. Likewise, in each *arrondissement*, I put in place a local council for youth.
14. We organised elections for young people to elect their youth presidents and representatives. The Youth Councils acted as focal points between the Government and the local community. This structure brought together all youth organisations, so people could come together to talk about topics such as citizenship and the fight



against poverty. They were also encouraged to engage in micro-entrepreneurship. They would send their activity reports to the Ministry of Youth.

15. The Ministry of Youth put in place a policy document detailing the structure and the role of the National Council for Youth, and the Central African Government accepted it, for a term of three years at a time. In 2010, we set up the National Executive Committee and youth elections were organised. The term of this committee was also for three years. It expired in October 2013, and was not immediately renewed because of the crisis. I think it was not renewed until 2016 or 2017, by which time I no longer worked with the youth. When BOZIZE was overthrown, those who took power did not want to work with such a structure, who they labelled the 'youth of BOZIZE'. In reality, it was an apolitical organisation for the education and training of the young people, Christian and Muslim, so that they could become responsible adults. The structure stayed in place throughout the conflict.
16. In June 2014, when we were about to renew the term, I was dismissed from my position in the Ministry of Youth. Minister Leopold BARA was responsible for deciding on my removal, and SAMBA-PANZA signed the decree. I knew that God had a new plan for me, and later, SAMBA-PANZA also signed the decree which appointed me as Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Tourism. When I left in June 2014, an acting President called AMADJIDA Bernard took over my position, and a lady named ORANDROU Gertrude took over from him. Later, AMADJIDA Bernard returned to the position. He was succeeded by LOMBET Marcelin Boniface, who still holds this post.
17. I set up the National Council for Youth because I wanted young people to be involved in the decision making process in the country. That is how young leaders were identified. They were elected by their peers. If a *mairie* wanted to organise an event, they could contact the youth structure to get their point of view. If NGO's or international organisations wanted to work with the youth, they would also go through this structure.
18. I do not know if these youth leaders also helped to mobilise the youth to join the Anti-Balaka in their localities. There is no detailed list containing the names of the Anti-Balaka. Equally, there is no list containing the names of the youth. It is important to bear in mind that when you talk about 'the youth' - those aged between 15 and 35 - they make up about 46% of the population, or over 2 million people.
19. I could not allow the Coordination of the Anti-Balaka to work with this youth structure. I know what is needed for youth to develop and become responsible, so I did not want them involved with an armed group. I authored the youth policies and



I drew up the youth charter. I do not think that the Anti-Balaka Coordination dealt with the youth council or *mairies*. In any event, around the time of the conflict, the country was not functioning administratively and the *mairies* were not in use. I have never heard of the National Coordination organising an event for youth in the provinces.

National Coordination Committee for Peace and Security

20. When the Seleka took power in BANGUI, they committed many crimes and all the political leaders fled, leaving nobody to speak for the people. Due to this, in May 2013 I helped to set up a collective of the residents of the 4th *arrondissement*, where I lived. It comprised the leaders of NGO's and *chef de quartiers* of the 4th *arrondissement*, who worked together with the local population. In the 4th *arrondissement*, soldiers of the Central African army (FACA) were particularly targeted by the Seleka. For instance, some were kidnapped and their bodies found in the river OUBANGUI.
21. Our aim was to speak for the people of our neighbourhood and to try to publicise the crimes of the Seleka. We wanted to draw attention to our situation. If we heard that a FACA soldier had been kidnapped, the collective would meet and then circulate the news amongst media outlets. I myself would go on radio to denounce the crime, in the hope that this would create pressure that would lead to the kidnapped soldier being released. On occasion, we would have the result we hoped for and the soldier would return. NAMSIO Emotion was a part of this collective. He is the only other person in the collective who later joined the Anti-Balaka.
22. After some time, we realised that this problem was not only restricted to our *arrondissement*, but was rather a national problem. The Seleka were committing crimes all over the country, and we wanted to bring together national leaders to collect information. In November 2013, we therefore created the National Coordination Committee for Peace and Security. A young man named TOUABOY Brice was also a member of this movement and I was the Coordinator. BEOROFEI Julius, MOKPEM Jacob Bionli and a pastor named REBOHANAM Emmanuel were also on the committee, but I cannot remember their exact roles. Most of the *chefs de quartiers* were discouraged from joining, because their work was limited to the administration of their own neighbourhoods. Instead, we worked with community leaders and leaders of various associations.
23. While on this committee, I searched for the contact details of the OBAMA administration, the French National Assembly and Madame ZOUMA, President of the African Union Commission. Every time our organisation wrote a press release, I would save it on my USB key and circulate it to all these organisations. I also sent this information to the Coordination of the UN Experts on the Central African



Republic. The OBAMA administration sent me an email informing me they had received my communication, while the UN Experts on CAR replied asking for more information.

24. The National Coordination Committee for Peace and Security had regular meetings in schools outside of the 4th *arrondissement*. We circulated notices before meetings. I do not know if I still have the attendance lists of these meetings. I cannot remember all the attendees, but they were community leaders and leaders of various associations. Our organisation had the same approach at the national level as we had at the community level. Our role was to denounce the atrocities of the Seleka.
25. We heard about these atrocities by word of mouth. For instance, I remember hearing about a vehicle coming from the MBAIKI axis, bearing passengers wearing t-shirts with the logo of BOZIZE. They were killed, and the news was passed on to us. We then publicised it. In my own neighbourhood, when someone's relative was taken by the Seleka, people would look for me to report the matter.
26. We also heard about atrocities which took place outside of BANGUI, usually through rumours. Radio NDEKE LUKA and RFI also reported on these crimes. It was not easy for us to find out what was happening in other prefectures. The situation in our country was very difficult, and we were afraid.
27. This committee ended its work in January 2014, when DJOTODIA stepped down.

Meeting with Transitional Government

28. Two days before the election of the new President of the Transition (I think that the election was on the 20 January 2014, so this meeting was on the 18 January), the Transitional Government convened a meeting with all the political parties and civil society organisations of the nation. Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA (who I refer to as 'NGAISSONA') and the Anti-Balaka staff wanted to attend this meeting, which was to prepare for the election of the new President of the Transition. At the same time, the MISCA called all the Anti-Balaka leaders to the base at MPOKO. The MISCA had a list of Anti-Balaka staff. At that time, I did not know that the Anti-Balaka even had staff.
29. Because I had a good relationship with NGAISSONA - we lived in the same neighbourhood in BANGUI - he called me and asked me to speak at this meeting on his behalf while he attended the MISCA meeting.
30. NGAISSONA and I had already spoken on the telephone two or three times while he was in exile in CAMEROON. He would ask for news about the neighbourhood. I explained the situation regarding the kidnappings and the atrocities. He is a



businessman. He had a warehouse full of merchandise in our neighbourhood. When the Seleka invaded the neighbourhood on 14 April, they pillaged his warehouse. It took them a whole day to loot all the merchandise that it contained. It was horrible. I passed this kind of information on to NGAISSONA.

31. I had a relationship with NGAISSONA dating back to 2005 when he put himself forward for parliamentary election. I was not interested in politics at the time. NGAISSONA got to the second round and was competing against Maître TIANGAYE. I did not want Maître TIANGAYE to win the election, so I joined NGAISSONA's campaign team as Secretary General. He won the election, and we became friends. After that, he became a Member of Parliament and we went our separate ways.
32. In 2011, when the elections were being organised, I was President of the Independent Electoral Commission in the 4th *arrondissement*. This time around, NGAISSONA was not putting himself forward in our neighbourhood, he was rather competing for another seat, in the province of NANA BAKASSA. He won the seat in the province, and all of a sudden, he became my minister. Shortly afterwards, the Seleka came and took power. I would not say that there is any kind of special friendship between NGAISSONA and me, but due to what I have just explained, we had quite a good relationship.
33. In January 2014, because the situation was very serious and there were a lot of atrocities committed by the Seleka, I gathered my courage and accepted to take the Anti-Balaka's message and to speak in their name for NGAISSONA at this Transitional Government meeting. I like to say that this was the day that I became an Anti-Balaka, and people began to think that I was one of their leaders.
34. At this meeting, I wanted to explain that the Gbaya are the main ethnic group in the country, making up about 33% of the population. However, because BOZIZE was Gbaya, the Seleka targeted all the Gbaya, although not all the Gbaya had profited from BOZIZE. In BOY-RABE, there are a lot of Gbaya, and we suffered a lot under the Seleka. However, I was stopped from speaking when the Commander of the MISCA called me outside to arrest me and I was taken to the MISCA base at MPOKO. I realised that many Anti-Balaka leaders had been arrested at MPOKO. That was the day I first met KONATE. That day, there were also many ComZones at MPOKO, who I met for the first time.

Anti-Balaka Violence

35. The conflict in my country was not a religious war. I think that people were used. For instance, the French had the contact details of all the warlords or military leaders. They later contacted me and called me into a hotel and asked me to bring



the Anti-Balaka into the street for a peaceful march in October 2014. I told them that it was impossible to do so peacefully without the Anti-Balaka shooting. The French then went to NGAISSONA instead, and he called together the ComZones. I do not know why he called them together. He knew their mentality as well as I did, and it was obvious that there was no chance that they would remain peaceful. It was clear that they would commit violence during the march.

36. This was the cause of the violence in BANGUI in October 2014. In this way, the French manipulated the leaders and opposed community groups. Earlier in the conflict, I did not understand when people talked about France's involvement. It was only when the French came to extract me and take me to Hotel du Centre, as I will explain later, that I understood that the French were involved.
37. When the Seleka came and took power, we thought that it was just a regular coup d'état. However, when they looted goods from non-Muslims (Christians and animists), they took them to Muslim neighbourhoods. Muslims had to be blamed for this as well, as they protected the Seleka. This is why Muslims, and not just the Seleka, became the target of the Anti-Balaka. From BIRAO to BANGUI, the Seleka attacked pastors and priests, and made friends only with Muslims. In Islam, there is a concept called 'communitarianism'. This means that Muslims should be in solidarity with one another. This is a big problem, as they even protect criminals and those who do bad things, which creates a feeling of hostility.
38. Islam itself does not create problems in the minds of Central Africans, we were used to working with Muslims. I recall speaking to Abdoulaye HISSENE who was a minister under DJOTODIA. He was unable to read – I learned this when I saw a journalist give him a document, which he did not understand. He told me that in NDELE, when Muslim children reach CM2 (the sixth year of school), the parents removed them from mainstream schooling to take them to the Koranic school. If a child has not been schooled in the normal way, it is difficult for them to later work in the administration. That is why there are not many Muslims working in government, although there are some, such as Désiré KOLINGBA, who carries out his job without a problem.
39. I do not think that all the Muslims protected the Seleka, as amongst the Muslims there were good people. However, the Anti-Balaka would consider that all Muslims helped the Seleka. If an Anti-Balaka captured a Muslim, it took a lot of effort to protect that Muslim. I never encountered a Muslim myself that I needed to protect. I remember once that two Muslims were captured and taken to NGAISSONA's concession. From there, NGAISSONA ensured that they were protected and returned to their families. NGAISSONA had a lot of friends in KM5. I cannot tell you exactly who captured these Muslims.



40. I did not hear about other specific instances in which Muslims were captured. Such captures took place mainly on 5 December, when the Anti-Balaka killed many innocent Muslims civilians, women and children. I think that they targeted Muslim civilians because when the Seleka arrived, they were friends with Muslims and they attacked non-Muslims. Therefore, people felt hostile towards Muslims. I was hiding at the time in my brother's house in [REDACTED] but I followed these events on the television (France 24).
41. When the Anti-Balaka entered BANGUI on 5 December, the Anti-Balaka began to act as the Seleka had. Shortly afterwards, when they settled in the neighbourhoods, they harassed and persecuted the entire population of BANGUI – Muslim and Christian. They racketeered and stole. People came to me and asked me to approach them, to ask them to stop.
42. I tried to dissuade them from behaving like this. Towards the end of December 2013 or beginning of January 2014, I began collecting money from the population to give to the Anti-Balaka to try to stop them from behaving in this way. Other *notables*, such as Feikere Seraphin PERSONNE, who was advisor to the office of the president at some point, also collected money for the Anti-Balaka. I do not know who exactly in the Anti-Balaka he gave this money to.
43. I made two collections in my neighbourhood. I did not collect money through the church. My neighbours and I donated money for the cause. We hoped that if the Anti-Balaka had food and shelter, they would stop behaving in this way. I also once called NGAISSONA and asked him to donate. He sent me about 80,000 or 100,000 CFA. I told NGAISSONA that I was giving the money to the Anti-Balaka. Each time, I gave the money specifically to ANDJILO. I decided myself to give the money to ANDJILO because he was a chief. I knew he could influence the other Anti-Balaka, and hoped he would stop them from terrorising people. I did this about three times. To be honest, my plan did not work.
44. When he returned, NGAISSONA gave money to the Anti-Balaka, as I will explain later. I am not aware if he gave other money to the Anti-Balaka before his return.
45. There was sporadic violence after the 5 December. The mentality of the Anti-Balaka was bad and they were weak. They would beat up and kill unarmed people. I saw that they were killing Muslims on the television, but I did not see it with my own eyes - I did not go with them to KM5. I don't know why they did this. When the devil gets into a man, this is how he acts. The typical Central African is not wicked, but we had not experienced this kind of conflict before. I think that the crisis created the conditions for the devil to get into men. For instance, one day ANDJILO killed a *gendarme* for the simple reason that he did not salute him. How can I explain this terrible mentality? Nobody can.



46. I did not see or hear about any rapes take place. I cannot say it did not happen, but I think it was rare. I did not hear of women being captured or detained. The fetishes of the Anti-Balaka came with conditions – sleeping with an unknown woman was a danger to the person who wore the fetish. The investigators told me that they think that certain Anti-Balaka must have violated the principles of their fetishes. I replied that of course they did. Stealing was also against the principles of the Anti-Balaka, but this does not mean that they did not do so.
47. Nobody had the courage to speak to the Anti-Balaka. That is why I myself decided that I had to try to talk to them, to tell them that what they were doing was no good. I would just try to speak to them – I would not handle a weapon.
48. I recall that the Anti-Balaka sometimes caught Muslims or members of the local population and tied them up. I remember at ANDJILO's base, they tied people up. NAMSIO also tied someone up. I went and told them that God was against what they were doing. NAMSIO released the person, but ANDJILO refused.
49. Sometimes, when the Anti-Balaka stole people's cars, the owner of the car would ask me to intervene. I would then go to the Anti-Balaka and plead for the return of the car to its rightful owner.
50. I also worked with the Anti-Balaka for another motive. The country was going through a peace process, but the Anti-Balaka were not being taken care of. I felt that it was only right that the Anti-Balaka should also be considered in the DDR. I asked myself 'How are we going to live peacefully if these people are not taken into consideration?' Most of the Anti-Balaka were not educated, so I wrote a lot of documents which I shared with my contacts. I tried to make the international community understand that the Anti-Balaka must be taken care of in order to bring back peace. We took requests from the Anti-Balaka to the Government and to international organisations. From January to October 2014, there were no major issues with the Anti-Balaka, perhaps just the occasional firing of weapons.
51. Within the Anti-Balaka movement, some people wanted peace, and others did not. Those who did not favour peace – the pro-BOZIZE hardliners - wanted to create chaos, to create the impression that the only person who could keep the situation under control was BOZIZE. These were people who benefited from BOZIZE, such as KONATE, FEISSONA, Maxime and Bernard MOKOM. There were some others who are now dead. If BOZIZE was not around, they lost these benefits.
52. NGAISSONA and I were working for the peace process. KONATE also worked with NGAISSONA. MAZIMBELET was on NGAISSONA's side – he was for peace



but also went around stealing cars for easy money. This of course did not contribute to peace.

53. Many people know me in the Central African Republic because I have worked a lot with the youth. I am like a big brother in the neighbourhood. I think I became a burden to the hardliners. Those who wanted peace, like me, would express their views openly, while the hardliners would stay silent until they saw an opportunity to create chaos.
54. I want to add that you cannot draw an exact line between these two groups. It happened that one day a person would be in favour of peace, and the next day, they would be against it.

Visits to YAOUNDE

55. In 2013, I went to YAOUNDE twice for my professional activities. At that time, I was Director General of the Youth. In September 2013, I travelled there for a regional workshop organised by UNESCO regarding youth employment. I returned in October 2013 for a workshop organised by CEEAC (Communauté Economique des États de l'Afrique Centrale). I travelled quite a lot – in between these trips, I went to MALABO, and transited in DOUALA. When I am in DOUALA, [REDACTED] who also visits Central African Republic from time to time. I do not seek to meet people in DOUALA, for me, the priority is the church.
56. Around this time, rumours regarding 'SIRIRI' were everywhere. We heard that it was a group of military persons, but in fact it was the FACA (Central African forces) who organised themselves. I do not know where they organised themselves. Sometimes we heard that they were behind the hill of BOZOUM-BANGUI, but I did not know exactly where they were based.
57. I heard later that SIRIRI was led by KONATE and Abel DENAMGANAI. I do not know who else exactly was involved. I was asked by the investigators if I heard of GOBERE. I replied that the rumour goes that the Anti-Balaka began in GOBERE, and that's where they went to get their fetishes. They speak about it themselves. The fetishes that the Anti-Balaka used were also used by the FACA, but I do not know if they got them from GOBERE or from somewhere else. Everyone knew about SIRIRI, but the term 'Anti-Balaka' only became known on the 5 December 2013.
58. NGAISSONA and I did not discuss SIRIRI, but we would discuss some actions that we could take in BANGUI. For instance, twice between May and July 2013, we decided to ask people in the neighbourhoods to play a 'concert of pots' at a specific time. By this I mean that we asked them to take out pots and pans and began to hit



them at 1900 hrs. I wrote a text asking people to do this, then hired a photocopier to make copies. I then called elements (young courageous people that I identified through relatives, so I knew that I could trust them) in various *quartiers* and gave them piles of leaflets to distribute. The whole town then played their pots – it made a horrible noise. These are the kind of actions I discussed with NGAISSONA. Such actions helped create pressure which led, together with international community pressure, to DJOTODIA's resignation.

59. While in YAOUNDE in October 2013, I dined with Bernard MOKOM, BOZIZE's [REDACTED] and NGAISSONA at NGAISSONA's house. His house was in a residential area of YAOUNDE, but I do not know the name of the neighbourhood. Freddy NGAISSONA, the younger brother of NGAISSONA, was also there. Investigators asked me what they were doing while in exile. I did not look on any of them being from the military. I had no suspicions at all with regard to them, and I did not imagine that they might be involved in military operations, they were civilians. Later, when NGAISSONA came back to BANGUI, I saw that he knew the Anti-Balaka very well. I realized that NGAISSONA had links with the military because I saw him with FACA. For instance, when NGAISSONA called me on the day of the meeting with the Transitional Government in January 2014, I went to his house and saw that he was with Lieutenant KONATE. That was my first time seeing Lieutenant KONATE. It was clear that they knew each other from before that day. I knew that amongst the Anti-Balaka, there were FACA such as KONATE, MAZIMBELET and Herve GANAZOUI. Outside of this, I do not know the connection between the FACA and the Anti-Balaka.
60. The visit to NGAISSONA in YAOUNDE was a simple social visit. I knew him from back home, and he had been in exile for a long time. I did not know that Bernard MOKOM and BOZIZE's [REDACTED] were together with NGAISSONA in YAOUNDE. I only realised that when I arrived. I called NGAISSONA on the phone to arrange dinner. He had a Cameroonian number, but I called with a Central African number as I did not have a Cameroonian phone. I do not remember his Cameroonian number. However, it was Bernard MOKOM who picked me up from my hotel. We walked to their residence. I met BOZIZE's [REDACTED] when we arrived there. We spent about an hour eating a meal, and then I returned to my hotel. I cannot remember the name of the hotel.
61. I was surprised to see Bernard MOKOM. I did not know that he was in CAMEROON. I do not know what he was doing there, I only know that he was in exile. When BOZIZE fled, he fled with some military persons. BOZIZE then left CAMEROON and went to UGANDA, but NGAISSONA and Bernard MOKOM stayed behind.



62. NGAISSONA was one of the right hand men of BOZIZE. NGAISSONA was very influential, and I heard that he could easily go to see BOZIZE. He used to take names from young people from the neighbourhood, to get them employed in the civil service. When BOZIZE was president, he could even get people appointed into certain positions, but I cannot remember concrete examples of this. I did not ask him for such an appointment. As for Bernard MOKOM, he is related to BOZIZE. So there was a sort of relationship between them all, but I do not know the nature of this relationship. As NGAISSONA was so close to BOZIZE, I presume that he was familiar with BOZIZE's relatives.
63. At this time, we did not know or feel that NGAISSONA would return to the Central African Republic while BOZIZE would not. At the time, people were focussed only on the return of peace to the Central African Republic. They were not preoccupied by the return of BOZIZE, they were preoccupied by peace. You could not see, at this point, that there were two separate trains of thought in the Anti-Balaka, and that it would divide into two branches, those who supported BOZIZE and those who supported NGAISSONA.
64. At the time, there were some movements which advocated for BOZIZE's return, but we did not imagine that he actually would return – it was not that easy. However, later it became clear that in the Anti-Balaka there were both the pro-BOZIZE hardliners, and the branch that favoured the peace process. We, the latter, knew that BOZIZE would not come back, because the French no longer supported it. We knew that it was finished for him – there was simply no question of his return. This explains why, later, within the Anti-Balaka there were two branches.
65. The FROCCA were for the return to the constitutional order in CAR. They were led by Maître Lin - he is a lawyer. Maître Lin's deputy was NGAISSONA. This was a political movement, I knew that. The rest of the movement or the actions they took, I am not aware of, because they were doing these things discreetly.
66. The investigators asked me about Maxime MOKOM. I heard about Maxime MOKOM. I think he was based in the DRC, where some other people had also fled to when the Seleka entered. NAMSIO was also in the DRC. I do not know anything more about what they were doing in the DRC.

Return of NGAISSONA and Organisation of the Anti-Balaka

67. When DJOTODIA resigned, many Anti-Balaka from the villages and the provinces were in BANGUI. Most of them did not have relatives in the capital, and had no food to eat. They came from SANGRELIM (near BOUAR), BATANGOFO, BOUCA, and covered hundreds of kilometres on foot with little food and water. These were young people whose parents were killed by the Seleka. I do not know how they all



knew to come to BANGUI on 5 December 2013. I did not know in advance that they were coming.

68. Afterwards, I heard that the Sangaris told them come to BANGUI, and promised them weapons which never materialised. On the 5 December, the Anti- Balaka came out not with weapons, but with sticks. Many of them died in front of the National Assembly. [REDACTED] of their forces. The French then presented the resolution to the UN Security Council which then authorised the intervention of the Sangaris in CAR.
69. I went to meet NGAISSONA at the airport when he returned to BANGUI on 14 January 2014. It was good to see a minister from BOZIZE's regime returning from exile, as a political leader. The whole neighbourhood was really overjoyed at his return. He did not give a speech. His house was destroyed, so when he came back, he went to live in the house he had built for his father. When he came back, there was a crowd of people at this house celebrating his return.
70. About a week after NGAISSONA's return, there was a meeting of Anti-Balaka ComZones at his house, where they designated him their coordinator. I was not at this meeting. I don't know who was there. He returned on the 14 January 2014, and the election of the new President of the Transition took place on the 24 January. He became coordinator before the election of the new President of the Transition.
71. After the attack of 5 December, the Anti-Balaka staged armed robberies and harassed the population for their survival. On his return to BANGUI, the first role NGAISSONA played was to provide them with supplies. He supported them with his own money. The Anti-Balaka would often go to his place, asking for money for things such as funerals, sickness, or to give to pregnant women. NGAISSONA is a person who is sensitive to the needs of others. When he saw that the Anti-Balaka had a need, he helped them and gave them some money here and there. This is how he became their representative.
72. After that, we requested that the Government take care of the Anti-Balaka. In that way, the population could live peacefully. However, this is where the Government failed. The situation became very difficult to manage, and the Anti-Balaka continued harassing people.
73. Sometimes, NGAISSONA received money for the Anti-Balaka and he did not pass it on. We learned later that he had received money from SAMBA-PANZA for the Anti-Balaka, but kept much of it himself. When he went to BRAZZAVILLE for the talks, President SASSOU NGESSOU gave money, but again NGAISSONA kept a big chunk of it.



74. I often discussed events directly with NGAISSONA, and he asked me to be spiritual advisor for the Anti-Balaka Coordination. We then thought about it a bit more, and thought that it was better not to have a religious connotation in my role. I therefore became a 'political advisor' within the Coordination.
75. I am a servant of God and I have a good reputation. There are things that NGAISSONA would not and cannot tell me. I think that when he was inclined to do bad things, or 'go to the other side of things', he would not tell me. He knows my point of view and knows how I function. He knows how rigorous I am with values, and he knows and respects me as a Christian leader. When he called me to tell me that he was coming back to BANGUI, he did not tell me more than this. He would not invite me to all meetings with ComZones, as there were likely things they were planning to do that I would be against. The investigators asked me for examples. I cannot link the behaviour of the ComZones to instructions coming from NGAISSONA, but I heard that meetings took place. I was not involved - I think they knew that I would not approve of the decisions they made at such meetings. Otherwise, as a member of the Coordination, why would I not be invited? It must be because he did not want me to disagree and disapprove.
76. I know that NGAISSONA's intention was to control and take care of the Anti-Balaka, we discussed it. The Anti-Balaka had already started to bother the population and they were a concern to us all. He wanted to control them so that peace could return. You can see how we tried to control them through the press releases that I gave to the OTP during my interview in April 2016.
77. If there was information to share with the Anti-Balaka, I went on my motorbike to their bases to talk to them. For instance, one day I learned that an Anti-Balaka had killed his Anti-Balaka friend and dismembered him. I was frightened. I went to their bases and preached from the bible. That activity pushed MAZIMBELET to disarm himself. We convened a big gathering with the Minister of Defence and MAZIMBELET handed over his weapons. Two weeks later, MAZIMBELET was killed. I did all this in my capacity as a pastor on my own, not as part of the Coordination.
78. Investigators asked me what other means the Coordination used to control the Anti-Balaka. NGAISSONA also tried to control the Anti-Balaka through a small team of police led by NAMSIO Emotion. I do not remember what it was called. When Anti-Balaka elements stole or did not contribute to the peace process, he organised that they be taken to the *gendarmerie*. However, this was only done with the weak, you couldn't do it with the powerful Anti-Balaka, such as YEKATOM (also known as ROMBHOT), ANDJILO, KONATE or DOUZE PUISSANCE. The Coordination spoke to them, but it did not do much good. I was not armed and I do not think NGAISSONA was armed. Sometimes in the morning, I would go to NGAISSONA's



house and we would think about what to do about ANDJILO and YEKATOM, but we did not come up with a solution. It became a concern that they did not contribute to peace. Once, ANDJILO opened fire in front of NGAISSONA and me while we were talking. There was nothing we could do. On my own initiative, I helped the Sangaris to make a plan to capture ANDJILO, but it did not work. Later, the MINUSCA arrested him.

79. The investigators asked if the Coordination ever tried to arrest any others, such as YEKATOM. I replied that he did not travel alone, but rather with his *aides de camps*, so we could not have called a meeting to capture him. I think that he only came to one meeting. As I have mentioned, I did not attend meetings with ComZones, so I do not know what happened during these meetings. YEKATOM, ANDJILO and all the ComZones would be invited to such meetings by the operational commander, MOKOM.
80. The investigators asked if the Coordination ever expelled any of these chiefs from the Anti-Balaka. I replied that we did not. If we did that, I ask you, where would they have gone?
81. NGAISSONA did not have bad intentions. I know that he is not a bad person because he built a big temple for the church with his own money. However, I do not know what he was doing secretly or 'in the shadows'. I can simply say that intention and reality are two different things.
82. The Coordination's idea was to push the Government to mobilise resources to give the Anti-Balaka camp. First of all, Anti-Balaka members had to be identified and lists needed to be drawn up with where they were located. Some groups were living in abandoned buildings, so they needed to be identified. Every ComZone had a list with the names of his elements, to prepare for the DDR.
83. I recall a young IT engineer who had a laptop and a camera. I think NGAISSONA gave him this equipment. He took details of individuals within the Anti-Balaka and issued them with badges. I think this happened about two months after NGAISSONA became coordinator.
84. In order to take the issues of the Anti-Balaka to the Government or to international organisations, we had to structure ourselves. This is why we began to draw up lists.
85. Concretely, nothing was done other than drawing up lists and issuing the Anti-Balaka with badges. There was no way to offer them accommodation and food. As I have explained, NGAISSONA did not always pass on money that he received for the Anti-Balaka to the Anti-Balaka. This is why we couldn't really control them. This is the bad side of the whole thing.



86. The Coordination contacted the ComZones in the provinces by telephone. They had to be given instructions to identify and list their elements. At that time, MISCA would move with the Seleka, but they did not move around with the Anti-Balaka leadership. We requested that the Anti-Balaka leadership should be able to visit the provinces with security provided by MISCA, to better understand the organisation. However, MISCA did not provide security.

Missions to the Provinces

87. Within the Anti-Balaka Coordination, there was an operational commander - Maxime MOKOM. Sometimes he organised missions to the provinces.

88. The objective of the missions was for the Coordination to give information to the Anti-Balaka regarding the progress of the peace process, and to convey the content of our discussions with the Government and international organisations. I think that Maxime MOKOM travelled to the provinces himself. FEISSONA, NAMSIO, DOUZE PUISSANCE, YADJOUNGOU and Dieudonné NDOMATE (also known as 'PAPADIEU') also went on missions to the provinces. They organised teams of Anti-Balaka to go on these missions. During their journeys, I think they had some problems with the international forces. I cannot tell you exactly what would happen because I have not carried out a mission with them. These missions took place later, in April, May and June 2014, because in the early days we were all busy with our commitments to the peace process. They took place both before and after the talks at BRAZZAVILLE.

89. I know DOUZE PUISSANCE, YEKATOM, KONATE, and MAZIMBELET were involved in some official Anti-Balaka operations in the provinces, such as the dismantling of roadblocks which came out of the BRAZZAVILLE talks. The first mission to dismantle the roadblocks was to YEKATOM's zone. I think that ANDJILO was never involved in missions because he could not be trusted and he was not psychologically balanced.

90. I looked with the investigators at a map of the Central African Republic, to help me recall where missions took place. I believe that some missions took place to BODA, BOSSANGOA, BAMBARI, BERBERATI, GRIMARI, CARNOT, BOUAR, BAORO, BOSSEMPTELE, BOSSEMBELE, BOUCA and YALOKÉ. I did not hear about a mission to MBAIKI, but they would have passed through there on the way to BODA. The investigators asked me if I heard about a mission to BOZOUM. I did not hear about a mission to BOZOUM but there were Anti-Balaka there.

91. DOUZE PUISSANCE used to go to BOGANGOLO as part of these missions.



Anti-Balaka Leaders

92. Certain people within the Anti-Balaka, such as ANDJILO, YEKATOM, DOUZE PUISSANCE and KONATE had a kind of freedom. They did not always seek the approval of the Coordination and they decided whether or not they would come to the Coordination meetings. We felt weak within the Coordination to change this. NGAISSONA always invited them, but they did not always report to the Coordination. We could not control ANDJILO. It was difficult to control YEKATOM, but at least he was balanced, in contrast to ANDJILO. I do not know if the Coordination tried to control him. YEKATOM came to coordination meetings from time-to-time. He was not independent to the same degree as ANDJILO.
93. Most other Anti-Balaka leaders could be controlled. MAZIMBELET was not totally autonomous because he submitted himself to the Coordination.
94. The Anti-Balaka had its origins in various resistance groups who had formed to protect themselves against the Seleka. At the outset, the Anti-Balaka Coordination provided a link between all these groups. The first Anti-Balaka meeting was the meeting with ComZones when NGAISSONA returned to BANGUI. The Coordination then organised further meetings, and tried to bring structure, organisation and control to the Anti-Balaka through the use of communications, press releases, mission orders and military police units. However, some individuals were difficult to control, as I have indicated above.
95. The Anti-Balaka did not have a constitution or rules. Our principles relied on common sense, they were not laid out clearly in writing. However, at meetings, certain instructions were passed on by the Coordination to ComZones, such as telling them not to steal or harass the population. This is why the Government and international organisations trusted the Coordination.
96. ANDJILO, YEKATOM, DOUZE PUISSANCE and KONATE felt that they were very powerful, and they did not get on with certain other members of the Anti-Balaka. MAZIMBELET and DOUZE PUISSANCE did not get on with ANDJILO. KONATE could also get very angry with people at times.
97. Once, ANDJILO met MAZIMBELET and pointed a weapon at him, asking him to kneel down. He took him as a prisoner to NGAISSONA's place. It was humiliating for MAZIMBELET, and he never forgave ANDJILO. MAZIMBELET was a military man while ANDJILO was a civilian. From then on, the group of MAZIMBELET and that of ANDJILO had a problem with each other.
98. ANDJILO controlled the axis between BANGUI and BOUCA. He had his own group of Anti-Balaka in BOUCA who moved with him. He did not report to the



Coordination and the Coordination had no control over him and his group. He would shoot in the air even when people were sitting calmly. He did whatever he wanted, without receiving orders from anyone.

99. The Anti-Balaka had fetishes, and these influenced their behaviour. Once they got angry they became uncontrollable. You had to wait for them to calm down until you could speak to them. I blame this on the fetishes, as I have seen how they affect people. I am a church leader, and I recall one Anti-Balaka who had a dream in which he was told to go to my church. He told me that he wanted to stab his wife, but at the last minute had thrown the knife away. I asked him to bring his fetishes to me. I prayed and burned the fetishes and he recovered his normal senses. Since then he leads a normal life.
100. Similarly, in 2003 when BOZIZE entered with his *libérateurs*, I met a young liberator named Olivier KOUDEMON, aka 'GBANGOUMA'. He had been my driver when I was Head of Cabinet at the Ministry of Social Affairs. He was not taken care of in that role, and he later joined the army. The relationship that I had with him was like that of father and son. When he came with BOZIZE's rebellion, they behaved a bit like the Anti-Balaka. I called him and asked him to bring his fetishes to me. I burned them and prayed, and he became normal. That is how he gained promotion in the army and is now a leader. For these reasons, I believe that the fetishes caused people to create disorder.
101. When, for example, it was a question of designating people to attend the BRAZZAVILLE talks, we had to make a choice. We chose YEKATOM as one of the ComZones to represent the Anti-Balaka. He was involved with the Government and with international organisations. However, with regard to his actions in his zone, he would do what he wanted. His zone covered the area from PK9 to MBAIKI.
102. YEKATOM was not 100% bad. He also did good things. We chose him to go to BRAZZAVILLE because we knew that his elements listened to him and followed his instructions. I hoped that he would pass on a message of peace. His zone was the first area where roadblocks were dismantled. I did not go to his zone, but I heard from the Anti-Balaka Coordination that they were being dismantled. People from the Coordination – NZILABO Paleon and NAMSIO Emotion and FEISSONA - visited his zone, and reported back to the Coordination.
103. The people we chose to go to BRAZZAVILLE were people who could serve as a liaison between the Anti-Balaka Coordination in BANGUI and their own Anti-Balaka bases. They could pass to their elements the information regarding the measures that were recommended. This is also why KONATE and DOUZE PUISSANCE were chosen. Twenty-two people were chosen in total.



104. The investigators showed me a document with the list of those who attended the talks at BRAZZAVILLE (CAR-OTP-2001-6924 at 6926). Looking at the list, I can tell you that some people are not military persons. For instance, DEDE Alexander is a doctor of law. It was important to have military leaders attend so that they could pass the message to their elements.

Anti-Balaka in the Provinces

105. I think that a mission was deployed by the Coordination to BODA, and I recall that ROMBHOT was part of the mission. They deployed a mission to try to reconcile people. I learned about this mission by radio and rumours. However, I know that the ComZones in BODA informed the Anti-Balaka Coordinator NGAISSONA what was happening. All the ComZones in the provinces were in regular contact by telephone with NGAISSONA. By this, I mean that they could call each other at any time. Sometimes when I went to see NGAISSONA, he would pass on information to me about those areas. I would sometimes help him to make decisions, such as what instructions to write in *communiqués* to ComZones. For instance, we would instruct them to let vehicles circulate freely in the provinces.
106. The operational commander of the Anti-Balaka, Maxime MOKOM, was also in regular contact with all the ComZones in the Provinces. In turn, the operational commander reported directly to NGAISSONA. MOKOM would sometimes go to see NGAISSONA directly, without going through the Coordination. YADJOUNGOU was the deputy operational commander, if I am not mistaken.
107. NGAISSONA told me what was happening in BAMBARI and GRIMARI. He might speak to me before he deployed a mission or took a measure, such as issuing a press release. For instance, we discussed issuing a press release asking the Anti-Balaka to leave humanitarians move around freely. There was a wider issue with freedom of movement and sometimes we asked the UN forces to help us. We had good intentions but there were some realities, such as the fact the Muslims could not freely move in certain neighbourhoods, and the fact that Christians could not go to a Muslim neighbourhood. We could not do anything about it – even today, it is risky to go to KM5 in BANGUI.
108. There was one ComZone in each area. Generally, they did not have deputies and secretaries, they simply organised themselves. The Coordination did not have the means to visit the provinces very often – missions happened quite rarely.
109. Namsio EMOTION went to BAMBARI on mission. It was only when he was arrested by the Sangaris that I realised that he had gone there on mission. I was part of the Coordination, but I did not know that he had gone on mission until he was arrested. NGAISSONA, Maxime MOKOM and Dieudonné NDOMATE



'PAPADIEU' must have known that he was on mission. NGAISSONA would sign the mission orders, so I think he knew of all missions. Maxime MOKOM also signed some mission orders.

110. ANDJILO and DOUZE PUISSANCE would travel without a mission order. Some of them were disciplined, others were not. Someone like Dieudonné NDOMATE 'PAPADIEU' would not travel without a mission order – he was disciplined.
111. We would sometimes learn of problems in the provinces. In BODA, there were problems between the Anti-Balaka and Muslims, but in BERBERATI, there were issues between the Anti-Balaka themselves. I do not recall what exactly this was about, but it was mostly a problem of division of spoils. In BOUCA, ANDJILO terrorised the population. Once, he burned the village of GBANGOU.
112. The Anti-Balaka Coordination wanted to work with those in the provinces to bring back peace. The Anti-Balaka formed initially as a resistance to the Seleka, but later, they began to terrorise the population. The Coordination wanted to make them understand that they should not terrorise the population.
113. People complained about ANDJILO everywhere he went. The population would complain to the Coordination about car robberies. Once, ANDJILO stole the car of a former minister, Zoumbé STANISLAS, and he went asked me to negotiate with ANDJILO for its return. I did not manage to do so. When the Anti-Balaka took a motorbike in BANGUI, people would contact NGAISSONA or me, as we were calm and we understood. They could not contact the ComZones about such a theft, because they might just react badly and do bad things to them.
114. It is possible that people from outside BANGUI contacted NGAISSONA to complain about other matters, but they did not contact me. Within the Coordination, there were key people: NGAISSONA (Coordinator), MOKOM (Operational Commander), NDOMATE (MOKOM's deputy), KONATE (an influential person) and FEISSONA (Chief of Staff). The organisation was not structured properly. For instance, the Chief of Staff was not really a Chief of Staff, as there were hardly any troops. Due to their role, these five people were able to know what happened in the provinces. They were all in frequent contact by telephone with the ComZones in the provinces. For instance, they simply called the ComZones and asked them to go to BRAZZAVILLE. ComZones in the provinces would call whoever amongst these five people that they were most close to. These five would then pass the information on in a meeting, or give the information directly to the Coordinator, NGAISSONA.
115. When the Anti-Balaka committed theft or robbery, we tried to talk to them. I recall that around Easter, two Anti-Balaka were caught stealing. NGAISSONA and I



called them and asked them to kneel down. We spoke to them, and told them that they had to change, at this important moment of Easter. Two days later, we heard that they simply did the same thing again, even though they had given the impression that they were listening. Both were put in prison but one, whose name is [REDACTED] is now out.

116. The only person who could speak to ANDJILO was NGAISSONA, but he had to speak to him in a calm way, taking care not to raise his voice. He had to be dealt with carefully, and spoken to early in the morning. Once the sun rose, he would begin taking drugs and you could no longer speak to him.
117. I helped the Anti-Balaka yet I could not stop them taking my car or motorbike. When they entered BANGUI, I found food provisions for them and even raised money to give them. Still they targeted me. When ANDJILO took my vehicle, I called him and said 'You are my son, how can you do this to me?' He replied that he simply did not care – and that 'a lion remains a lion'.
118. The investigators showed me the following documents:
119. **Mission order signed by Thierry LEBENE, CAR-OTP-2001-6300:** LEBENE was sufficiently autonomous to sign his own mission order. ANDJILO did not need a mission order. I know Maxime MOKOM signed mission orders, I recall seeing one.
120. **Appointment letter signed by NGAISSONA, CAR-OTP-2001-5466.** There was a split in the movement - MOKOM's branch and NGAISSONA's branch. A document like this was issued by NGAISSONA to indicate that a ComZone was under his authority. Once a ComZone was appointed and acknowledged by one branch, he could not belong to the other. If there was a leadership conflict between Anti-Balaka leaders in a particular zone, the one who received such an acknowledgement letter would be recognised as the official ComZone. I did not see letters like this signed by MOKOM. As far as I know, NGAISSONA was the only person signing such letters.
121. **Laissez-Passer bearing the name of ComZone BABA KAMISSE VICTORD, CAR-OTP-2030-0263 :** It is my first time seeing or hearing about such a document like this.
122. **Communiqué de Presse no. 025 asking for free circulation of NGO's and the Red Cross, CAR-OTP-2030-0247:** I remember this document. Its contents were aired on radio. I know this because the title says 'Communiqué de Presse' ('Press Release'), and all press releases were aired on radio NDEKE LUKA and published in the newspaper. It was written when the Anti-Balaka were causing problems with NGO's - I think in BAMBARI. When a document like this was written, it was sent to a ComZone to draw attention to international human rights. These documents



would be taken by motorbike to the ComZone by an Anti-Balaka element. I sometimes wrote press releases, because I had a computer. NGAISSONA would do the draft, and I would type out what he asked me to say in a proper format, perhaps with some small edits. Maxime MOKOM and another young man named BAUDOIN who was an IT engineer would also write press releases.

123. The role of the ComZone was to keep his elements under control. These *communiqués* would go out to all the ComZones in BANGUI. Sometimes they had meetings at NGAISSONA's house and they would be given to them. Sometimes they would be given to the ComZones in the provinces, if there was the opportunity. Perhaps NGAISSONA also gave the ComZones information by telephone.
124. The request in this *communiqué* could have been successful for a period, but afterwards, people would just do the same thing.
125. **Communiqué Radio CD.14, CAR-OTP-20130-0243:** I think I drafted this one - I can identify my style of drafting. It was written to be aired on a radio outlet, as were the other *communiqués*. This was written because there were some illegal roadblocks on some main axes, where Anti-Balaka were posted to racketeer travellers. The aim of the press release was to make them understand that they should desist. There were even some missions to dismantle these roadblocks, in which the Defence and Security forces were also involved. They went to the MBAIKI axis, the road to BOALI and the road to DAMARA. We were limited – the intent was there, but we had limited transportation options to go farther into the remote areas of the country. NGAISSONA was involved in this – not MOKOM. I think that NGAISSONA went on at least one such mission. Dismantling the roadblocks was one of the recommendations made at the BRAZZAVILLE talks, so he wanted to show that he was following their recommendation. I think that these missions were successful.
126. **Communiqué de Presse No. 026, CAR-OTP-2030-0246:** The UN and Sangaris provoked the Anti-Balaka. The purpose of this press release was to ask the Anti-Balaka elements not to react to their provocations. This *communiqué* was broadcast and published. The Seleka were mainly Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, and the Anti-Balaka emerged from people's reaction to their crimes. Paradoxically, the UN and the Sangaris attacked the Anti-Balaka. It was a sort of injustice that we never understood. I think this was the fault of the French, they could have disarmed the Seleka, but they instead accompanied them to SIBUT, which is why they are still in this country to this day. The Seleka took all of BOZIZE's weapons, and with those they still occupy part of the country. I think that this was the plan of the French.
127. The Central African Republic is a rich country. FRANCE planned to keep the Central African Republic as a reserve and not exploit it at the moment. Rights to



exploit oil were then given to the Chinese. Years ago, the French would encourage ethnic groups to fight amongst themselves, but while BOZIZE was in power, this ceased. The French then used political leaders to recruit mercenaries from DARFUR and other places. It was very well coordinated. It is clear that in the MISCA mission, the role of the Chadians was not to protect the Central African people. The Chief Commander of the MISCA said that there was a red line in DAMARA, and once the Seleka crossed the line, they would be at war with all the nine countries of the CEEAC. However, he said this for the sole purpose of keeping BOZIZE calm and distracting people while the Seleka entered the country. It was a big plot, and we are still suffering from it. The French could have just disarmed the Seleka and peace would have automatically come back. A delegation from EAST TIMOR did their own investigations on this in their country, and the President of EAST TIMOR came and told us all this information. Everybody knows it.

128. **Communiqué de Presse No. 027, CAR-OTP-2030-0245:** There are some things that are written incorrectly in this document, but I can see when it was drafted, because you can see that the *communiqués* are numbered. The *communiqués* started with the number 1, but I do not know how many of them there were in total. In the reference on the top left hand corner, CN stand for Coordination Nationale while CD signifies Comité de Direction – and 14 indicates the year, 2014. Amongst the Anti-Balaka, I was the only one to use this reference format. This *communiqué* was broadcast. It had to do with illegal checkpoints manned by the Anti-Balaka – usually created and manned by uncontrolled elements. This was a problem nearly everywhere where there were Anti-Balaka.
129. At the time, there were almost no state security forces, no *gendarmes*, no police. They did not start functioning again until the end of 2015. The intent to discipline people was there, we wanted to take them to the police so that they would be locked up, but in practice it was difficult to implement. In theory, we put in place a police to target uncontrolled Anti-Balaka elements. NAMSIO and YADJOUNGOU worked on this, in order to come up with a way to catch the uncontrolled elements to hand them over to the few police and *gendarmes* that there were. It made the Anti-Balaka furious when NAMSIO was arrested by the Sangaris – they did not know why he was arrested. He had worked a lot to restore peace. He used to catch uncontrolled elements and take them to the police. For some bizarre reason, he was arrested.



MBAIKI Ceremony, August 2014

130. The investigators asked me about a ceremony which took place in MBAIKI in August 2014, during which children associated with the Anti-Balaka were handed over to be reintegrated back into society. NGAISSONA asked me to attend this in the name of the Anti-Balaka Coordination, but as you know, I was also involved with the youth. People know me – this is my profile and background. I worked with



the youth and I was the focal point for UNICEF and the interlocutor for UNFPA in the Ministry. I reported to NGAISSONA after the ceremony, and we discussed it with the Coordination. We said that it was a good practice, and we wanted to see in what regions we had children who were associated with armed groups. We thought that this could be the model we would use to reintegrate them back into society. However, it took a lot of resources to identify children, find NGO's to cater for them, and seek funding from international organisations which we could use to take care of them. This is why we did not continue on with it.

131. I do not know about an agreement that the investigators told me was signed the day before the ceremony.
132. I do not remember what I spoke about during my speech at the ceremony – it was four years ago - but it must have been to encourage and promote the integration of young people.
133. I think it was YEKATOM who organised the return of the children, while I went there just for the ceremony. I think I attended for just one day. I cannot really remember, but I do not think that I went to the ceremony alone. I was probably with someone else.
134. I did not understand the context or the background of the event before my arrival, but I grasped it during the ceremony. I saw YEKATOM at the ceremony. I did not discuss it with YEKATOM – I was afraid of him and I did not wish to speak to him. When he got angry he could harm people. He was not an interesting person for me. I was Director General of the Youth for eight years so I attended many ceremonies regarding youth development.
135. YEKATOM did not only commit evil. Today he is a Member of Parliament, which shows some recognition from the population. I think that it was a good thing that he reintegrated the children into society. They were children, and I think it was best that they returned to a normal life. While they were in the Anti-Balaka, they could easily have been influenced to start smoking or taking drugs like the people around them.
136. It was only when I attended the ceremony that I learned that there were children associated with ROMBHOT's group. I do not know if others in the Coordination knew that there were children in his group. When children were in armed groups, we used the term 'children associated with an armed group'. UNICEF and the Ministry of Social affairs, who I worked with, used the term 'children associated with an armed group'.



137. There were certainly children in the Anti-Balaka in other provinces, but I do not have the data. I heard about this. UNICEF in particular was involved in this, and they would involve other NGO's such as DRC (Danish Refugee Council). They would deal directly with the Ministry of Social Affairs, but I would hear about it. I think they even calculated the number of children that were associated with armed groups.
138. Some of these children had relatives in the Anti-Balaka. Mostly, their parents had been killed, and that is how they found themselves in the Anti-Balaka. Sometimes, the Seleka would arrive in the villages and kill the parents of children. DOUZE PUISSANCE can tell you how they killed his parents, and you will take pity. The Anti-Balaka would then take them in, feed them and give them little jobs to do. I do not know what kind of little jobs they did. They would eat together and sleep together. They could be aged from 8-15 years old.
139. I attended another ceremony for the reintegration of children who had been in the Anti-Balaka, in *quartier* DAMALA in BANGUI. I think that these children came from the provinces. In DAMALA, a priest set up an NGO, and this NGO trained the children with the support of the NGO DRC. That is why it took place in DAMALA. I don't remember the name of the NGO or priest.
140. I do not know if there were children in the Anti-Balaka everywhere in Central African Republic, or if it was just in particular places. These were the only ceremonies that I attended regarding children who had been in the Anti-Balaka.

Resignation from the Anti-Balaka

141. In October 2014, SAMBA-PANZA, the President of the Transitional Government, called us for a meeting. The Anti-Balaka had been planning to request her resignation. The French had contacted me asking me to request her resignation, and I think that when I refused, they contacted NGAISSONA. NGAISSONA then called a meeting with the ComZones and told them that he planned to request her resignation.

142. However, before the meeting, the military attaché of the French army contacted NGAISSONA to ask him to withdraw the request for the resignation of SAMBA-PANZA. Then SASSOU NGESSOU called NGAISSONA and also asked him to withdraw the request for her resignation, so NGAISSONA decided to withdraw the request. He told KOKATE, MOKPEM Bionli Jacob (the current Minister for Tourism), NZILABO Paleon and me of his decision in a meeting, but never told the Anti-Balaka ComZones. I don't know why they wanted her to resign.



143. A delegation of four of us went to meet SAMBA-PANZA. The head of our delegation was Captain KOKATE. The others were MOKPEM Bionli Jacob and NZILABO Paleon. We presented five requests to SAMBA-PANZA. After the meeting, I was called by Olivier ROGER of RFI. He asked me what was discussed during the meeting with SAMBA-PANZA. I answered that we had put forward five requests, some of which she had accepted.
144. When RFI broadcast my interview, people could hear that there was no mention of a request for the resignation of SAMBA-PANZA. Bernard and Maxime MOKOM were the leaders of the pro-BOZIZE group of the Anti-Balaka. Bernard MOKOM told the pro-BOZIZE Anti-Balaka - who told the rest of the Anti-Balaka - that I had withdrawn the request for the resignation of SAMBA-PANZA. I learned this later through MAZIMBELET.
145. After the meeting with SAMBA-PANZA, we had a meeting with the Anti-Balaka ComZones and elements at NGAISSONA's house. When they heard that I had withdrawn the request for her resignation, all the Anti-Balaka in zones controlled by the MOKOMS - eg. *quartier* COMBATTANT - came against me. The Anti-Balaka from BOY-RABE protected me. At this time, the Anti-Balaka had split into two branches.
146. On the day of the meeting, ANDJILO charged his weapon and went to point it at me. Other Anti-Balaka went and caught him and took him away before he could kill me.
147. At the time, I was the acting Director of the Cabinet for Tourism. I had a vehicle, and Bernard MOKOM telephoned MAZIMBELET to ask him to take my vehicle. He refused. Bernard MOKOM then called ANDJILO and asked him to steal my vehicle. MAZIMBELET told me later about both of these calls.
148. My son hid my vehicle at a nearby monastery, but ANDJILO came into the neighbourhood with his troops. I could hear shots being fired in the air, and locals later told me that it was ANDJILO and his men firing. They then went to steal my car, a NISSAN PATROL, from the monastery.
149. In October 2014, the hardliners in the Anti-Balaka, led by DOUZE PUISSANCE, decided to attack *quartier* OUANGO. They entered and burned houses in the neighbourhood. I do not know if they targeted any particular homes. This was during the peace process. All of this became too much for me, and that same month, I resigned from the Anti-Balaka. French troops sent a vehicle to take me to the Hotel du Centre, for my own protection.



150. From then on, I no longer knew what was really happening within the Anti-Balaka. I reconciled with Bernard MOKOM and I chose to try to forget what he had done. We see each other from time to time and wave or even exchange kisses. I tried to get his contact number for the investigators, but it has become clear that people do not want to give it to me.

Confirmation of my Phone Numbers

151. I have four telephone numbers: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The investigators asked me if the following numbers also belonged to me:

[REDACTED]

143. I also used another number when I was with the Anti-Balaka. It is [REDACTED]

Annexes

Annex A- SD card recording of 55.2 rights read.

Annex B- Signed form of waiver of right to have an attorney present.

Closing Procedure

1. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
2. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.
3. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
4. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]



5. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
6. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.


WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the French language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.



INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I,  certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by Alfred Legrand NGAYA that he speaks and understands the French language.



4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of Alfred Legrand NGAYA who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. Alfred Legrand NGAYA has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his / her statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his / her knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his / her signature where indicated.

Signed

Dated:

