

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [REDACTED] Gender: Female

First Name: [REDACTED] Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: N/A Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Passport number: [REDACTED]

Date of Birth: [REDACTED] Nationality: [REDACTED]

Ethnicity: N/A Religion: none

Languages Spoken: [REDACTED] English, French

Languages Written: [REDACTED] English, French

Language Used in Interview: English

Occupation: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: The Hague, Netherlands

Dates and Times of Interview: 9 May 2018, [REDACTED]
10 May 2018 [REDACTED]
11 May 2018 [REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview: [REDACTED] (Witness); [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Associate Investigator); [REDACTED] (Associate Trial Lawyer);

On 9 and 10 May 2018: [REDACTED] (Analyst)

[Initials of all persons present during interview]



Signatures:

WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and told that they are associate investigator, associate trial lawyer and analyst with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from 1st August 2012 until present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English. I fully understand and speak English.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.

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9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

11. I have been a [REDACTED] since the age of [REDACTED]. I have worked in Africa since 2008 and I am based in [REDACTED]. Currently, I am the [REDACTED]. Before 2008, I was working for the [REDACTED].
12. I decided to go to the CAR in 2013 after the Seleka coup that occurred in March 2013. After a discussion with my boss we decided that I could [REDACTED] from there. I had never been in the CAR before.
13. I went back to the CAR almost a year later, as the violence had reached a very nasty scale. I wanted to try and meet the same people and go to the same locations as in 2013 to see what had changed in between.

14. [REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

TIMELINE

16. I went twice to the Central African Republic. My first trip was from [REDACTED] April 2013 to [REDACTED] May 2013. [REDACTED] My second stay in the country was from [REDACTED] February 2014 to [REDACTED] March 2014. That time, I arrived in the CAR by land, crossing the Oubangui River by boat from ZONGO in the DRC. During

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those trips

17. I stayed at the place of [REDACTED] house in BANGUI [REDACTED] gave me information about the situation in the country and provided me with some contacts. [REDACTED] told me who was who in the circles of power and who was organizing what. [REDACTED] told me that when the Seleka passed DAMARA (km 55), people were called in the Stadium to get machetes, and that therefore it was probably NGAISSONA who organised it (since he was the sport minister) [REDACTED] told me that there was a meeting in the Stadium for that purpose, and that it was probably under his initiative. I did not check that information myself.
18. The day after my arrival, on [REDACTED] of April 2018, I spoke to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] who gave me an overview of the humanitarian situation. I went then to [REDACTED]
19. On the [REDACTED] of April 2013 [REDACTED]. During the whole afternoon, I tried to figure out who was who among the Seleka [REDACTED] and a person from the FOMAC military police. [REDACTED]
20. That day, I talked to [REDACTED] from MSF. They had been looted quite a lot by the Seleka. He talked to me about the looting and the condition in the hospital de l'Amitié and the types of injuries [REDACTED]
21. Then on [REDACTED] of April 2013, I went to Saint Vincent de Paul cathedral, then to the Prime Minister office [REDACTED]
22. On [REDACTED] of April 2013, I went to [REDACTED] the town hall, where the civil registration office had been completely looted.



[REDACTED]

23. On the [REDACTED] of Apr 2013, [REDACTED] at the Interior Ministry and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was like a military police within the Seleka. A prison system and investigation department. [REDACTED] said that Colonel Ali is in charge of the command of the military police. He was in charge of issuing identification cards for the Seleka members. The signature on the ID cards was the one of general ADAM.

24. That same day [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25. On [REDACTED] May 2013, [REDACTED] went to Miskine [REDACTED]

26. On [REDACTED] May 2013, [REDACTED] UNHCR, then [REDACTED] WWF about the looting of ivory for [REDACTED] s benefit.

27. The second trip was more chaotic. I came from KINSHASA by land and arrived in ZONGO on [REDACTED] February 2014. [REDACTED] There, I visited the MOLE IDP camp. I arrived in CAR on the [REDACTED] February 2014. From the [REDACTED] February onwards I stayed [REDACTED], I went to the gendarmerie [REDACTED] Then I met [REDACTED] from the World food program about the arrival of the first food trucks convoys [REDACTED] I saw the first trucks which had safely arrived, the road was safeguarded by Rwandan troops. [REDACTED]



28. [REDACTED] youths who were destroying Muslim houses on the road to the airport [REDACTED]

29. On the [REDACTED] February 2014, I met with [REDACTED] Later on that day I went to PK5, the Muslim quartier. I went to the mosque at PK5 and saw bodies. They had no access to the cimetière and could not bury the bodies.

30. And then on the [REDACTED] March 2014, I went to SIBUT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] came back to BANGUI on same day.

31. On [REDACTED] March 2014, I went to the Cathedral where [REDACTED]

32. On [REDACTED] March 2014, [REDACTED] who was a member of the transition council in the Parliament. That same day [REDACTED] He was in charge of demobilisation and of organising the new army. He was negotiating with [REDACTED] I also went to the ministry of mining and spoke to [REDACTED] He spoke about the financing of the militias and how the Anti-Balaka were gaining control of mines especially in BOSSANGOA because of [REDACTED]'s influence there. [REDACTED] That day, I also spoke to some Burundian soldiers. I spoke to [REDACTED]

33. On [REDACTED] March 2014, I spoke to [REDACTED]



34. I left on the [REDACTED] March. I then stayed in ZONGO for a day.

FIRST TRIP

Meeting Seleka [REDACTED]

35. Before coming to CAR, I had read a lot about the CAR situation, in particular reports and news articles. So I had already 3-4 names from my readings before I arrived. My idea was to get in touch with one of them, if not DJOTODIA. [REDACTED] told me who was who, mentioned to me [REDACTED] gave me a little bit of an overview of who were [REDACTED] told me that he was very corrupt and dealing ivory. He made a lot of money with that. [REDACTED]

36. The Ledger was like the Seleka HQ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It was an expensive, freshly built hotel but the pool was empty and DJOTODIA's men were camping in it. There were a few hundred soldiers in the Ledger compound. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

37. At the Ledger there was a big meeting with DJOTODIA, probably about how to solve the current chaos in CAR. I felt that there was a lot of tension and that the Seleka coalition was collapsing. The fighters were not friends with each other and there was a sense of rivalry and competition between them. Different Seleka fighters were notably dissimilar from other elements there, wearing different types of uniform, or in civilian dress or wore different traditional ornaments on them. Some of the commanders were also not friends with each other. So I felt that it was no longer a unified alliance.

38. [REDACTED]



39. [REDACTED] was aged in his mid 40s, tall and strong in appearance, with a little belly. He was uniformed, with black boots had had walkie talkies, He was not fully shaved but without a big moustaches. He could have been wearing a beret. No insignia on uniform that I recall. I had the impression that he had military training as he knew military codes. [REDACTED] had known [REDACTED] for a long time, was well educated, speaking French and was in Congo now and then.

40. [REDACTED] was aged around mid to late 30s. He was uniformed, friendly and his behaviour was that of someone with military training in my view.

41. [REDACTED] I could tell that he was from the military police because his vehicles had Military Police written on it. The Military Police was a new institution from the Seleka at that time. The purpose was to clean up the current chaos. [REDACTED] behaved aggressively and brutally to those around him, shouting a lot which made people scared.

Boy Rabe visit

42. On [REDACTED] of April 2013, I went to BOY-RABE. Three weeks after the Seleka coup, it was still a sensitive and chaotic area. Before going there, I had been told that looting and shooting were occurring in the area every night. I was told that the Seleka had punished that quartier for being close to BOZIZE and that they had come three or four times to pillage, until nothing remained.

43. [REDACTED] There was a road block at the entrance of BOY-RABE with a rope across, manned by men with machetes on both sides. I don't know if they were Seleka and cannot remember if they wore uniforms. [REDACTED] we managed to go through.

44. I could see that BOY-RABE had been heavily looted. The houses, everything was empty. The doors were destroyed. Loose elements were wandering around, including some women in Seleka uniforms, who were looking for food. I did not see many Seleka in BOY_RABE that day. I was told that there were militiamen of



BOZIZE in BOY-RABE at the time and that NGAISSONA, before, he left BANGUI, had ordered to set up a militia. This had been told to me by [REDACTED] from OCHA. [REDACTED]

45. NGAISSONA's residence was the biggest in the area. I know that it was NGAISSONA's since it was confirmed to me by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It had the biggest gate with a lot of bullet holes visible on it. [REDACTED] explained to me that the Seleka targeted the house before looting it [REDACTED]

46. [REDACTED]

47. [REDACTED]

48. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

49. [REDACTED]

different ministries in BANGUI, which had all been looted. There was not even a chair left in them. The only one which was not looted was the Ministry of Public Security. Here everything remained intact, including computers, lighting and air conditioning. By contrast, even [REDACTED] Forestry Ministry had been looted of Ivory. My assumption is that [REDACTED] went there upon entry into BANGUI to tell



[REDACTED]

50. On [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] The ministry was full of his Seleka elements. Outside, there were 3 to 4 parked pick-up trucks and the car park was surrounded [REDACTED] bodyguards and escorts. [REDACTED] At the Ministry entrance was a person with a notebook listing people coming. [REDACTED]

51. [REDACTED]

The office was extremely busy, many people came to see [REDACTED] and telephones were ringing all the time. [REDACTED] was very busy. However despite the busy nature of the Ministry, it seemed very orderly. [REDACTED]

52. I spoke to different international NGO people (MSF, Croix-Rouge, OCHA) and all told me that they had a meeting with [REDACTED] who they described as a saviour in the midst of chaos. Previously, there was no one to call in Seleka to inform if a vehicle or supplies were stolen. [REDACTED] was the one they would contact in such circumstances. By this, it was quite obvious that he was a significant figure.

53. There were some uniformed men seated in the waiting area. A Colonel in a ceremonial style uniform said that he wanted a meeting with [REDACTED] and seemed pretty nervous. A police officer in camouflage was also reporting to [REDACTED] that all the police uniforms from the barracks had been looted.

54. Occasionally [REDACTED] would sometimes open his door when someone was leaving his office and he would usher the next person to enter. [REDACTED]

55. At another point, a very senior man entered the waiting area followed by one assistant who was carrying two laptop-like bags. He could enter [REDACTED] office without waiting and left very shortly after without the bags. I know that he was



high ranking because he had a very fancy civilian suit which stood out in the local conditions at that time.

56. When I eventually spoke to [REDACTED] he was kind and hospitable in the Arab style.

[REDACTED]

57.

[REDACTED]

58.

59.

60. [REDACTED] he had taken a count of all Seleka elements before the advance on BANGUI and reached a figure of 3350 fighters. Upon arrival, Seleka had grown to an estimated 6-7000 elements. [REDACTED] considered that the difference in these counts was explained by those *faux Seleka* who had joined at the last minute, en route to the capital. This was also a consequence of BOZIZE emptying the prisons and opportunists posing as Seleka.

61. [REDACTED] at the beginning of April he started to issue Seleka ID cards. This was his way to weed out the *faux Seleka* as anyone posing as Seleka without an ID would be a fake. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The signature on the card was from General ADAM. I was also informed that the ID included the name of the individuals commander.

62.

63.

Visit to [REDACTED]

64.

65.

[REDACTED] Sous Chef d'Etat Major and explained that his superior, the former FACA Etat-Major, was still in BRAZZAVILLE, but that had promised to return.

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66. [REDACTED] the HQ of the Seleka military police but it may have been HQ of the BOZIZE era military police I think. There were a dozen confiscated pick-ups in the parking area which had been stolen and then recovered [REDACTED]. Men in camouflage uniform speaking Arabic were smoking marijuana, in uniforms. The only word that I could understand from them was *securite*. They had red PM inscriptions on their uniforms. PM is the French form of Military Police. The general question was whether the people arrested were Seleka or not. The Seleka accused the former regime of having opened the prison 'centrale' when it left. So there was a mix when people were looting.
67. [REDACTED] the Military Police. It did not exist before [REDACTED].
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Since 4 or 5 days they were going from house to house conducting disarmament searches and reportedly found 52 weapons amongst the population. They cooperated with FOMAC and the French during disarmament operations [REDACTED].
68. In the previous 3 weeks they had begun to issue ID cards to and Seleka were now being ordered into barracks alongside the old FACA to guarantee security against *faux Seleka*. The Military Police was now trying to arrest all remaining Seleka not following orders. [REDACTED] they imprisoned those found looting, and that they received military punishment. Recently, 38 males had been detained for looting and disobeying orders [REDACTED].
69. [REDACTED] I had a kind of parade of these 38 male detainees and I could see that a lot of these men had been seriously beaten. They had bruises, swollen eyes and some were in bandages. I'm sure they had been tortured in the prison. The detainees were dressed in flip-flops, civilian t-shirts, some in boxer shorts only and some with camouflage trousers. Most of them were very young. They were described to me as bandits, detainees, *faux Seleka*, or people pretending to be Seleka. It was clear that it was a military prison, not a civilian prison. I don't know what happened to these 38 people. I don't have names or details of the detainees I spoke to [REDACTED].
70. The prison was like an open compound area, in a yard. There was a wing of small rooms around the yard with fence windows or fenced stores. I could not see inside. I was just in the yard. A sketch of the site that I made at the request of the investigators is at Annex B to this statement.



71.




72.




73. Military police was written on vehicles, and the combatants had military police written on the arm of their uniform. They had red berets.




74.



75.



76.



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77.

78.

BANGUI bank protests

79. In my last day in BANGUI, 02 May 2013, I went to the Central Bank as there was an announcement that the government would issue payment for its staff and that everybody should come to the bank to collect their salary.

80. The whole town was on the move to that bank building, right next to BOKASSA's Presidential Palace. People were standing in line there. I spoke to a lady who was a teacher who told me that she had children she could not feed and someone else was waiting for his pension. There was a lot of hope to get some cash.

81. The Seleka had surrounded the area as there was a big meeting involving the SANGARIS at the nearby Presidential Palace and they wanted to ensure that DJOTODIA and others could pass, hence they closed the bank. So it turned a bit to a chaos. FOMAC was also deployed to block the roads. French SANGARIS came past and saw the situation but did not intervene.

82. I was curious as to how the Seleka would deal with a mass protest as the situation became more tense and the Seleka became nervous when the Palace meeting was ending and DJOTODIA would exit.

83.

CAR-OTP-2076-0925

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[REDACTED] The Seleka loaded their weapons as ordered, as a warning to the crowd to disperse. Eventually people left, probably considering it was not worth being shot.

84. [REDACTED] He explained ma a little bit about the situation which led to the coup d'état, talked to me about the history of the Seleka, why general ADAM split his wing from the CPJP. He told me that the former CPJP chief was the former minister of youths, NGAISSONA's predecessor, who signed the peace agreement in 2012. That this man refused to enter BANGUI and storm it, but that ADAM decided to enter BANGUI. We spoke about the army, how it could fall apart so easily, we spoke about the prisons, how they were opened. We spoke of the fact that DJOTODIA had no vision and was not a strong politician, of the fact that the ministries were not operational, that DJOTODIA had no charisma. I listened to a speech that DJOTODIA made on the radio. It was his very first speech on the radio after he became President. That speech was a non sense. That person gave me the whole picture to understand the situation. This was on [REDACTED] May. [REDACTED]

85. [REDACTED] I noted a Seleka a camouflage vehicle with writing on the side saying "*Pas de Negotiations*" in white or red. I was informed at the time that this vehicle was associated with [REDACTED] although I cannot recall who told me. [REDACTED]

SECOND TRIP

MOLE IDP camp (ZONGO)

86. My second trip was more chaotic than the one of 2013. I travelled from Kinshasa by land, and arrived in ZONGO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 3 days after, on [REDACTED] February 2014. Since I was stuck there for a few days because the border was officially closed, I visited the MOLE IDP camp, located in ZONGO. The refugees there were from the CAR except 20 individuals who were from Cameroon, Benin, Ivory Coast and Rwanda. Within the CAR refugees, most of them were Christians. The Muslim minority (I have no idea of the numbers) of the CAR refugees had mostly come from PK5, crossing the Oubangui River. I was told that there were no problems between the Christians and Muslims in the camp.
87. [REDACTED] He explained to me that there had been two waves of arrivals of refugees, in March and December 2013. There were 5500 households in the camp and 1200 houses built, a cyber-café and two



schools. [REDACTED] told me how much these people were traumatized [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told me that many refugees had come from BANGUI. He spoke to me about the Anti-Balaka, telling me that it was a youths initiative [REDACTED]

Arrival in BANGUI

88. On [REDACTED] February 2014, I crossed the Oubangui River by boat. [REDACTED] explained to me that he had helped BOZIZE's wife and family cross the River to ZONGO when they fled at the time of the coup. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BOZIZE had gone to CAMEROON by helicopter. He gave me some general information about the Anti-Balaka, notably about their gris-gris. According to him, French distributed machetes to arm the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]

89. Once I crossed the River, I had to go through the immigration post which was at the official port. A woman was seated, at a table, with a stamp. Two Anti-Balaka were there, wearing jeans, flip-flops and fétiches. One of them, armed with a machete, grabbed my bag, told me that he was in charge, that they were controlling, and that I had to pay for my entrance. I tried to negotiate. I gave the Anti-Balaka 50 dollars to get my luggage back and an entry stamp.

90. From my arrival, I stayed [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] February 2014, I went to the gendarmerie Head Quarters. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] major problem was the financing since he had no money to pay salaries and was not able to recruit. He had to send his men unarmed in the quarters. [REDACTED] the central prison had been opened, that they could arrest only 150 of the escaped detainees. [REDACTED] his force was strong of 3,000 gendarmes for the whole territory.

Situation in the MISKINE district

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CAR-OTP-2076-0927



91. [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED]
February 2014, I went to the MISKINE district. On my way to MISKINE, I could see that Muslims' houses and shops had been destroyed; people were coming to take the bricks to construct their own houses or use the plots. I know that because it was said to me by the people I talked to. I saw some youths destroying Muslim houses, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] They were taking bricks away in front of me. [REDACTED] The people that I saw destroying houses were civilians. They had no gris-gris. People hated Muslims, it was the mood at the time.

Discussion with a Rwandan MISCA colonel about the conduct of disarmament operations in BANGUI

92. [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] February, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He told me that MISCA had difficulties to go to BOY-RABE in order to conduct disarmament operations, that incidents took place there, but that they proceeded successfully to such operations in other areas of BANGUI where they seized AK-47 and crude weapons from Anti-Balaka.

Visit of camp RDOT, last Seleka base in BANGUI

93. On [REDACTED] February 2014, I went to camp RDOT, which was the last Seleka base in BANGUI. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Visit of the Dom BOSCO IDP camp

94. On [REDACTED] February 2014, I went to the Dom BOSCO IDP camp, which was the biggest in BANGUI. It was located in a parish [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The refugees there were Christians.

Meeting with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



95. On [REDACTED] FEBRUARY 2014, I met with [REDACTED] My friends [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were working on the Anti-Balaka but mostly on the Anti-Balaka from BOSSANGO and BAMBARI. For me the structure and chain of command of the Anti-Balaka was unclear and I decided to focus on BOY-RABE since people were saying that it was reportedly where the Anti-Balaka Head quarter was. I got the telephone number of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmed his identity and that he was [REDACTED] and I asked if it was possible to meet him. I insisted for the meeting not to be too late in the afternoon as I wanted to avoid going at a time where they would be drunk and drugged. I had heard from the refugees and the psychologist at the Mole IDP camp in ZONGO that the Anti-Balaka were taking drugs. It was a mixture between cocaine leaves and tobacco which was quite strong and that was available even before the conflict in the pharmacies. I don't know how it is called. It is killing appetite and makes them very aggressive. They are very aggressive in the afternoon because of this. The Anti-Balaka would put it in little tin boxes or little bottles. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it would cut their appetite.

96. I agreed with [REDACTED] the taxi driver and stopped the vehicle at the entrance of BOY-RABE at the road-block. The road-block was made of a rope. There were about 5 or 6 Anti-Balaka, they had small hunting knives and some old and broken looking rifles. They started talking with [REDACTED] in the local language. They were very aggressive in the way they were talking. Some of those Anti-Balaka looked young, some looked below 15, but it is very difficult to assess, especially since appreciation of age changes with ethnicities. I saw one that seemed to be a 10-12 years old boy. [REDACTED]

97. Those Anti-Balaka had boxes for their drugs as described above, under their fétiches. Since everybody had this, my assumption is that it was probably distributed by commanders [REDACTED] In the fétiches, there was a chain with little finger bones, teeth, padlocks, gris-gris sign, plastic doses where the drugs were. I was a bit afraid because people were running and there was a few non-automatic shooting in the quartier [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When he arrived, all of the Anti-Balaka on the roadblock, even the youngest looking ones, saluted [REDACTED] The Anti-Balaka in BOY-RABE were the best armed, meaning that it was the first time that I was seeing Anti-Balaka with rifles.



98.

99.

[REDACTED] was in a kind of military fatigues. He was the first Anti-Balaka that I saw in proper military shoes as all the Anti-Balaka I had seen before were wearing flip-flops. He had a super new ID card [REDACTED]. I think that they used the same machine the Seleka were using to print their ID cards before (this is my assumption since it is difficult to find such machines). [REDACTED]

100.

101.

[REDACTED] headquarters. I asked if it was NGAISSONA's house. He told me "yes, this is the house of our boss" and called him "coordinateur". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There were youths in flip flops. It was looted [REDACTED] compound [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I think they were between 5 and 10 but I did not count them. I did not see any woman. All the doors of the different rooms in the building were open and I could see inside.

102. It was an open compound. On a side there was the house and on the other a garage-storage building. [REDACTED] came from the private house on the left side. In the garage were these young boys dancing around the prisoner and torturing him. There was no hiding place – the garage was open and broken so it was easy to capture the situation [REDACTED]

103. From the seating area, you see the main gate.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

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111.

[REDACTED]

112.

[REDACTED] 12 PUISSANCES [REDACTED] and said that
the chef had been calling, [REDACTED]

113.

[REDACTED]

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

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CAR-OTP-2076-0932



Page 22 of 34

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

120. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that the patron was the youth minister and was their coordinator. Other people were saluting [REDACTED]

121. [REDACTED]

122. [REDACTED]

123. [REDACTED]

124. I tried to contact NGAISSONA via his askari but I could not reach him.

Visit of the PK5

125. On [REDACTED] February 2014, I went to the PK5, the Muslim district. [REDACTED] possibly in the Ramandan period. I spoke to the Imam, to the chief of the traders in PK5 and to the President of the Muslim youths association [REDACTED]

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CAR-OTP-2076-0933



Page 23 of 34

[REDACTED]
dead bodies there [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

126. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] showed me videos of brutal killings and body parts. I don't remember the content of the video exactly. I just remember it was related to cannibalism. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Visit of SIBUT

127. On [REDACTED] March, I went to SIBUT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] When we left BANGUI, the Rwandan MISCA could not tell us if SIBUT was under the control of the Seleka or of the Anti-Balaka. SIBUT was the front line.

128. The journey to SIBUT was safe. It was like a hundred kilometres towards North. The road was clear, with no roadblocks. On our way, we saw a few Anti-Balaka, but small groups only.

129. When we arrived, we could see that SIBUT was under the control of MISCA Gabonese troops. No Seleka was present anymore. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] had about 300 elements under [REDACTED] command. According to [REDACTED] SIBUT was safe and quiet. [REDACTED] said that the Muslim population was there and that they, the MISCA, were trying to protect them from the Seleka and Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED] told me that shops were open, that there was a market, and that the school was open again. However, the surrounding of the town was very unsafe because there had injured people 14 kilometres away and 30 kilometers away, Seleka had attacked a village.

130. We visited the local help Center. I met [REDACTED] Save the children [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Their office had been looted. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I observed that the Muslim quartier (the houses and the shops) was completely destroyed, including the mosque. [REDACTED] told me [REDACTED]

that the mosque [REDACTED] and the Muslims house [REDACTED] had been destroyed by the Anti-Balaka.

131. We saw in town two Anti-Balaka, who were bleeding. They had come to the MISCA troops to ask for bandages and antiseptics [REDACTED] I engaged them and tried to talk to them. They said that the local population had revolted against them. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ANDJILO was the leader of the Anti-Balaka in BOSSANGO area, which is close to SIBUT. [REDACTED]

132. [REDACTED] told me that the initial objective of the Anti-Balaka was to defend against the Seleka, but that they were now ripping the whole population. According to him, 3/4th of the population of SIBUT were youths and had joined the Anti-Balaka. He told me that they had taken the population in hostage. In the street, we saw a very young Anti-Balaka combatant with a bow. [REDACTED] told me that he was aged 7 and told me his story: that this child wanted to take revenge because his parents had been killed. At one point, [REDACTED] pointed to me an Anti-Balaka leader who was passing by, with whom we talked shortly. [REDACTED] or someone else that we met that day told me that the total number of Anti-Balaka in SIBUT was about 400 men [REDACTED]


TELEPHONE NUMBERS

133. During my first trip in 2013, I used the telephone number: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

134. During my first second in 2014, I used the telephone number: [REDACTED] and could be reached on the [REDACTED]

135. [REDACTED]






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
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Page 27 of 34






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
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145. [REDACTED]

146 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the Seleka
has a new Seleka ID card around his neck, showing the rear side.

147 [REDACTED]

148 [REDACTED]

149 [REDACTED]

150 [REDACTED]

151 [REDACTED]

another Military Police Seleka with red PM brassard.

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CAR-OTP-2076-0940



Page 30 of 34

152.

153.

154.

155.

[REDACTED] FOMAC had been deployed to secure the area as there was a meeting at same time at the Presidential Palace, right next to the bank. French Army officers were at this meeting, and DJOTODIA had left Ledger to come to the palace too meaning that a lot of Seleka were present. [REDACTED] and the FOMAC personnel are detectable due to their green brassard. [REDACTED]

156

157

158

[REDACTED] Seleka vehicle, discernible as it has no number plate and self-made camoflague scheme.

159

160

161

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CAR-OTP-2076-0941



Page 31 of 34

162.

163.

164.

165.

166.

167. I was shown the following OTP photographs and video footage and asked if I recognised anyone:

168. For CAR-OTP-2001-7581; CAR-OTP-2001-7616; CAR-OTP-2001-7626; CAR-OTP-2001-7635 ; CAR-OTP-2001-7642; CAR-OTP-2001-7675; CAR-OTP-2001-7844 and CAR-OTP-2001-7646 - I do not know anyone in those images.

169. On CAR-OTP-2001-7655 – This may be General ADAM's ADC but I cannot be sure.

170. On CAR-OTP-2054-1311 – ADAM is on the left and DOTODIA is shaking hands with an unknown man with a Turaya.

171. About CAR-OTP-2067-0553 – This person is familiar but I cannot recall who he is.

172. About CAR-OTP-2047-0355 - Seleka vehicle with writing on side

173. About CAR-OTP-2048-0368 – This can be a military police vehicle due to red flag with something written on it. Other vehicle had visible Military Police markings on them, clear from far away, but I cannot remember exactly what. Red is the traditional colour of military police so I associate this colour with the Military Police.

174. About CAR-OTP-2074-0746 at 00:00:36:00 – Seleka Military Police at the Ledger car park. In rear is a Military Police on the vehicle with Machine Gun. Some have

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
CAR-OTP-2076-0942



Seleka ID card around neck. I suspect the Military Police were all from ADAM's CPJP-F wing.

175. About CAR-OTP-2075-2001 at 00:01:25– He looks familiar and I suspect he was a military police commander. I may have seen

ANNEXES



Closing Procedure

176. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

177. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.

178. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.

179. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

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CAR-OTP-2076-0943



Page 33 of 34

180. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

181. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read over this statement and it is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]