

Statement of [REDACTED]

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:



Date of Birth/Age: [REDACTED]

Nationality(s): Central African Republic

Ethnicity: Gbaya

Religion: Christian


Language(s) Spoken: French, Sango

Language(s) Written: French

Language(s) Used in Interview: French with English

Occupation: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: Bangui, CAR



CAR-OTP-2068-0037



WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I was told that they are investigators with the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and I was told that she is an interpreter for the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from 1st August 2012 until present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in French. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that this interview is voluntary and that I may end it at any time.
6. Before I was questioned, the investigators explained to me that the OTP is in possession of information that gives them grounds to believe that I have been associated with an armed group, the Anti-Balaka, that committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. This information includes my admitted membership of the Anti-Balaka armed group.
7. I was informed that I have the following rights under Article 55(2):
 - a. The right to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of my guilt or innocence;
 - b. The right to legal assistance of my choosing, or, if I do not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to me, without payment by me in any such case that I do not have sufficient means to pay for it; and
 - c. The right to be questioned in the presence of my counsel unless I voluntarily waived my right to counsel.

8. I agreed to continue with the interview without the presence of legal counsel and signed a waiver of rights in this regard. OTP Investigators tape recorded my waiver of right to counsel (See Annex A) and I also signed a Waiver of Right to Counsel form (See Annex B).
9. I was informed that the Prosecutor of the ICC will not present for trial at the ICC all the persons who might have committed crimes in relation to Central African Republic. The investigators explained to me that, as a matter of policy, Prosecutor of the ICC aims to prosecute those persons who appear to be the ones most responsible for the crimes committed, were notorious perpetrators or have committed particularly grave crimes. I was further informed by the investigators that, based on the information the OTP possesses to date, I am not amongst the group of those likely to be prosecuted and that I am being interviewed merely as a witness of events under investigation.
10. I declined to have the interview tape recorded and agreed instead to a written record of my statement being taken.
11. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer to their questions.
The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
12. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
13. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
14. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
15. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
16. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.



Statement of [REDACTED]

Background

1. [REDACTED] but I am mostly known by my nickname [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. I was born in [REDACTED] The name of my late father was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and my mother's name is [REDACTED] My mother is alive.
3. I attended primary school [REDACTED] and secondary school [REDACTED] I finished
my studies [REDACTED] Afterwards, I remained in
BANGUI for [REDACTED]
4. From [REDACTED] I moved back to [REDACTED] where I worked as an artisan in the
diamond mining industry. I remained there until [REDACTED]

20 March 2013- 3 February 2014 in BANGUI

5. On 20 March 2013 I returned to BANGUI and I [REDACTED] in PK5. The Seleka
entered BANGUI a few days later on 24 March 2013. While in BANGUI, I was living
[REDACTED] close to PK5, but on 5 December, I moved my family [REDACTED] for
safety. We stayed in the church with the nuns at [REDACTED]
6. On 5 December 2013, [REDACTED] in PK5 in the morning and heard
detonations and saw people fleeing. The Muslims wearing uniforms (Seleka) started
shooting at the population. Later I heard that the Seleka were also shooting in
KPETENE, BEA-REX, CATTIN, and MAMADOU MBAIKI. We were scared of the
Seleka. I fled to my house in [REDACTED] but my wife and four children had already
fled to [REDACTED] Later I went back to check on my house
and shop, but my shop had burned down. Before this incident, we didn't have any
problems with the Seleka.
7. I did not see any Anti-Balaka on 5 December 2013. We had heard that they were
around Boy Rabe where NGAISSONA lives, though NGAISSONA was not in
BANGUI. I did not see any Anti-Balaka while I was in BANGUI. There was no
attack in BODA on the 5th December 2013.
8. Prior to 5 December 2013, I heard about the Anti-Balaka forming in BOSSANGO
and BOUCA. I heard that they intended to fight the Seleka to destabilize the
Government. I also heard that the Anti-Balaka were killing Muslims in



Statement of [REDACTED]

BOSSANGOYA and the Muslims then started killing the Christians in PK5. This is the reason I left PK5. I heard all of this from the radio. People would call into the radio and tell what was happening in BOSSANGOYA, BOSSEMBELE, BOSSEMPTELE, LANDI, BOUCA, KAGA-BANDORO.

9. I know a lot of CAR nationals fled to areas like ZONGO and Cameroon and lived as refugees. My brother, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I also know [REDACTED] fled to ZONGO. His brother [REDACTED] was an Anti-Balaka and he remained in BODA. I was not in contact with anyone in ZONGO and CAMEROON.
10. When I lived in [REDACTED] I lived near [REDACTED] who was a FACA and from BODA. As a FACA he was based in BANGUI, but he was not working. We heard about killings in BODA on 29 January 2014 and could not just sit still. People's families were being killed. [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Fidel SOUSSOU. He was the former Mayor of BODA and a former Member of Parliament. He was well respected in BODA. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] a message to all the FACA from BODA to go defend BODA.
11. [REDACTED] February 2014, [REDACTED] gathered all the FACA from BODA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The FACA had weapons and ammunition. They brought their own, but it was easy to buy weapons in Bangui. Even women and kids were selling weapons. I didn't have a weapon since I was a civilian. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had been looking in BANGUI for FACA to come to BODA, but in vain. Most of the FACA had fled already. I do not know if [REDACTED] was in contact with anyone in BODA or in MBAIKI, but I was not.
12. [REDACTED]

29 January 2014: Clashes in BODA

13. War broke out in BODA on 29 January 2014. While in BANGUI, I heard about these clashes in BODA. I heard that people were fleeing from BODA; and that houses were being burned, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] My younger biological brother, [REDACTED] and his friend [REDACTED] were killed [REDACTED] January 2014, but I didn't learn about their deaths until I [REDACTED]
14. It was difficult to receive information on what was happening in BODA because the phones were cut off and the roads were blocked, but the news was reaching us through friends and relatives that had managed to come to BANGUI.



15. The Seleka had already left before 29 January 2014 and it was the Christian and the Muslim population who started threatening and shooting at each other. The Muslims had weapons and the Christians used make-shift weapons. The Seleka had not committed any serious crimes in BODA. They had only stolen the car of the priest. The Seleka did not kill people in BODA.
16. The conflict became a religious problem as the Muslims were perceived to be Seleka, but in reality not all Muslims participated in the war. Some Muslims were in the FACA, and some Christians were in the Seleka. But everyone believed that when the Seleka took power, all Muslims supported them. When they were in BODA, the Seleka were associated with the Muslims and many local Muslims supported them and became their informants telling them who were the Christians in town who had money. After the Seleka left, the Christians from BODA were saying to the Muslims that since their relatives, the Seleka, had left, they were going to chase them out of the town.
17. I was [REDACTED] in PK5 and I was amongst the Muslims so I saw for myself that the Muslims were supporting and associating with the Seleka. Everyone was talking about it. I knew that they supported the Seleka. I did not hear anything like this on the radio, but I could see it. The Muslims supported the Seleka in BODA too.
18. The reality was that within the Seleka there were a lot of Central African FACA who were Christians, as well as foreign mercenaries, but the perception was that all the Seleka were all Muslims.
19. The Muslim and Christian populations were clashing with each other in BODA between the 29 January to 03 February 2014. The Christians had artisanal weapons while the Muslims had proper weapons. The youth of BODA were fighting the Muslims. They ranged in age from 15 to 40 years old. At this time they were not officially Anti-Balaka. Some of the youth had been "vaccinated" as Anti-Balaka, but not all. When I say "vaccinated," I mean they were given protection with gris-gris. The rest became 'vaccinated' when an Anti-Balaka/Marabout named '8'(huit) or "Witte" came to BODA on 5 February 2014 and then they all became officially Anti-Balaka. I will give further information on '8'(huit) further in my statement.
20. At that period there was no other commander in BODA apart from the President of the Youth, Hippolyte YAMINI. He was like a Comzone. When I was in BANGUI, I could not be in contact with him as the phones were cut off, but when we arrived in BODA later on, [REDACTED] he had gathered together the youth (the Anti-Balaka youth) at the Catholic Church. I don't know if he had been in contact with [REDACTED]

Statement of [REDACTED]

21. As a President of Youth, YAMINI was in contact with everyone: the youth and the population in BODA; the local authorities; the MISCA in BODA. I do not know if he was in contact with Anti-Balaka groups in the surrounding areas or in BANGUI. In BODA there is a structure in place for the representatives of the youth and there is an office, a President and a vice- President.

22. [REDACTED] In 2006, Narcisse "Nasco" BANGUE was elected President of the Youth and he remained in this position until the end of 2013. Narcisse "Nasco" BANGUE had reportedly taken some money and he fled BODA before the Seleka left from the town. BANGUE's deputy was the President of the Elders, WILLIKONDI. After Narcisse "Nasco" BANGUE fled from BODA, Hippolyte YAMINI became the interim President of the Youth from the end of 2013 until 16 November 2016. YAMINI was never elected but he took this position when BANGUE fled. YAMINI's deputy was Perpetu GOUMOUROU. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As part of social cohesion, one person must be Christian and the other Muslim.

23. [REDACTED]

24. Before the crisis in the country, YAMINI was the President of all the youth, Christian and Muslim. But after the crisis started, since he is a Christian he sided himself with the Christian youth. Similarly, the mayor of BODA, AWAL, was Muslim and when the crisis started he sided with the Muslim community.

25. YAMINI's objective was to chase out the Muslims until they left the town. The Seleka had already left, but the Muslims, many of whom were born in BODA, were the ones who had killed two Christians. YAMINI had made the decision to attack the Muslims, and the Christian population respected and followed his orders. Everyone agreed with his decision. He coordinated the youth and he was ordering them to bring weapons to protect the population. Everyone gathered at the Church and YAMINI stayed there too.

February 2014: Return to BODA via MBAIKI

26. It was difficult to get to BODA. On [REDACTED] February 2014, [REDACTED] FACA (including [REDACTED] took a truck [REDACTED] to MBAIKI. The empty truck was going to MBAIKI [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] FACA included: [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27. [REDACTED] could not find more men to go to BODA from BANGUI, as people were fearful and were returning to their native villages. [REDACTED] I don't know Coeur de Lion's proper name. He was RAMBO's deputy.

28. [REDACTED] We knew that RAMBO was in control of the area, but we only went to MBAIKI to find a means of transport to reach BODA. We had not planned to go to MBAIKI to get reinforcements. I don't know if [REDACTED] had been in contact with Coeur de Lion before meeting him in MBAIKI.

29. [REDACTED] Coeur de Lion was RAMBO's Deputy. Coeur de Lion himself said that [REDACTED] When we travelled to MBAIKI we passed through two Anti-Balaka check points: SEKIA and PISSA, but we did not hear that RAMBO was there.

30. [REDACTED] RAMBO, and Coeur de Lion all knew each other from the FACA. [REDACTED] and Coeur de Lion were from the same promotion rank. RAMBO worked [REDACTED] as a digger at the mine in BODA, as did [REDACTED] RAMBO is now a member of the parliament, but I can't remember his real name. People started calling him RAMBO after he joined the military. Coeur de Lion had another nickname too, the "Centrafrican Sangaris."

31. [REDACTED] 54 [REDACTED] travelled to BODA.

32. Coeur de Lion's elements included both FACA and Anti-Balaka. Some of the FACA were wearing uniforms, but not all of them. I knew that they were FACA- even the ones who were not wearing uniforms- because they had real weapons. Coeur de Lion told us that the Anti-Balaka amongst his elements were from BOSSANGO. They were wearing jeans, t-shirts and gris-gris and they were carrying knives and machetes. I do not remember how many of Coeur de Lion's men were FACA and how many were Anti-Balaka, but most were FACA. I did not recognize any of these



Statement of [REDACTED]

38. I have marked on a map of BODA, the route we took to [REDACTED] I have also marked where the five Anti-Balaka areas were with Comzones, the Muslim area, the airstrip, and the red line which separated the Muslims from the Christians in BODA. I will provide more details on this red line further in my statement. (See Annex C).

03-04 February 2014: Attack on BODA

39. [REDACTED] He said he needed our assistance because the Muslims were strong and armed. The Anti-Balaka youth of BODA were all gathered together [REDACTED] Habib SOUSSOU and Coeur de Lion took charge and told them that the FACA would lead during the attack. They gave instructions to the whole group [REDACTED] YAMINI also participated in the planning of the attack since he knew the ground better than the others. YAMINI, SOUSSOU, and Coeur de Lion spoke to the group.

40. They would all start out from the Catholic Mission and split into three groups. One group led by Roddy MBOSSÉ would attack the Muslim area from the North. Isao TEMOUNGUE would attack it from the South. "SONGOLET" WILLIKONDI was also in that group with TEMOUNGUE. Habib SOUSSOU and Coeur de Lion would lead a group that would attack from the West. The groups were made up of mixed FACA and Anti-Balaka youth. The FACA would be positioned in front of the youth. At the time of the attack there were no Comzones in BODA; that structure was created afterwards.

41. SONGOLET was with the Seleka when they were in power even though he is a Christian. When the Seleka left he switched and became an Anti-Balaka. SONGOLET is from BODA and he is WILLIKONDI's son. He only had 3-4 elements and sometimes they set up barricades outside of BODA. SONGOLET and his men were uncontrollable elements. SONGOLET and his elements are currently in prison. Two of SONGOLET's elements were Issai '2GIGA' and Enoch BEKAIL. I do not remember the names of the others. When Anti-Balaka from PAMA (a neighbouring village) came to BODA, SONGOLET joined them as well. Those Anti-Balaka from PAMA were headed by '8' (huit). SONGOLET and '8' (huit) knew each other for a long time.



Statement of [REDACTED]

42. During this big meeting [REDACTED] before the attack, the FACA did not discuss what to do if a Muslim was captured. If one was captured, they would be killed. I have never seen a Muslim being killed in front of me. They didn't discuss what to do if they captured women or children. Our objective was to chase away the Muslims. This objective was stated in the meeting and it was agreed that the Muslims had to leave CAR and go back to their countries. It was also discussed that at a later stage, MISCA and Sangaris should contact the immigration services to come and take away the Muslims. We agreed that we did not want Muslims in the town. All this was discussed openly in the meeting before the attack since our objective was clearly to chase away the Muslims.
43. The attack took place from 5:00-10:00 a.m. in the morning of 04 February 2014. The [REDACTED] elements of Coeur de Lion and [REDACTED] FACA from BANGUI, plus 300-400 Anti-Balaka youth of BODA joined in this attack. These were the youth who YAMINI had organized. The FACA had real weapons and the youth had hunting rifles. The FACA advanced in front with the youth behind them and they clashed with the Muslims. Coeur de Lion and two of his FACA died during this clash. Coeur de Lion was not from BODA and he did not know the area very well. During the clash he tried to flee, but he fled towards a Muslim area and he fell into an ambush. [REDACTED]
44. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I was not in contact with any of them during the attack as they were on the ground fighting. We were all sad as we were hearing the detonations from the attack. We tried to remain calm and we prayed.
45. At 10:00 a.m. the Sangaris arrived and the clashes stopped. The Red Cross coordinated with the Sangaris and they collected the bodies at about 14:00 p.m. the same day. I heard that 11 Muslims were killed. The bodies of the three killed FACA were brought to the Church. Two Anti-Balaka were also killed. The three FACA were later put in a vehicle and taken to BANGUI.
46. Many Sangaris arrived that morning, including a plane with weapons. A large number of Sangaris also arrived some time later, but I do not remember the exact date. Later on the Sangaris brought representatives from both the Muslim and Christian communities to the Town hall to tell them to stop the fighting. These



Statement of [REDACTED]

meetings which were initiated by the Sangaris had happened on more than one occasion.

04 February 2014: Coeur de Lion's elements return to BANGUI

47. On 04 February 2014, Coeur de Lion's elements took the bodies of Coeur de Lion and the other two FACA who had died to the morgue at the Hopital Communautaire in BANGUI for their families to claim. David BAMBARASS was an adjutant amongst Coeur de Lion's elements [REDACTED]. He is still in BANGUI and he is with the FACA.

48. Coeur de Lion's elements then left BODA because their chief had been killed and because they wanted to transfer the bodies to BANGUI. None of [REDACTED] FACA from MBAIKI remained behind in BODA. The [REDACTED] FACA [REDACTED] remained in BODA.

05 February 2014: '8' and his Anti-Balaka in BODA

49. On 05 February 2014, Anti-Balaka came to BODA from PAMA, a village 36 km away. These Anti-Balaka were headed by a notorious man named WILITÉ, mostly known by his nickname '8' (huit) or '8-8' (huit-huit). People also called him WITÉ instead of WILITÉ.
50. We had already heard that '8' (huit) was on his way to BODA. PAMA is a zone of diamond mines. There are a lot of people coming and going from BODA to PAMA on foot and by motorbikes and they informed us about him. We had heard that he was coming to help the Christians to chase away the Muslims.
51. '8' (huit) came with about 200-300 elements. There were also women amongst these elements. He met with SONGOLET and his two elements ("2Giga" and Enoch BEKAIL) in BODA. SONGOLET's two elements are currently imprisoned in Camp de Roux. SONGOLET and the other two men are from BODA. Later on, SONGOLET had killed a youth on a motorbike. [REDACTED]. He later escaped from NGARAGBA, but he is now back in NGARAGBA prison.
52. A lot of Anti-Balaka from BODA joined '8' (huit) including those who became Comzones when the Anti-Balaka structure was established. After the Anti-Balaka



structure was established, those who became Comzones in different areas of BODA did not join '8' (huit) in his activities anymore, but they were rather supervising and protecting their zones. The seven FACA who had come to BODA [REDACTED] February 2014 did not join '8' (huit).

53. '8' (huit) is a 'feticheur', he makes gris-gris and he "vaccinated" the Anti-Balaka so that the bullets could not harm them. A lot of people were going to see '8' (huit) in PAMA in order to get their gris-gris. Even before the 29 January 2014, people like SONGOLET and other youth from BODA were going to PAMA to get their gris-gris from '8' (huit). I have been 'vaccinated' since birth by the elders in my family and I did not need to go to '8' (huit) for gris-gris.
54. I saw '8' (huit) when he came to BODA with his elements. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He said that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He did not attack the Muslims on the 5th. He had real weapons, Kalashnikovs and also grenades, but he is not a FACA. People would sometimes pay him for their gris-gris by giving him weapons.
55. Additionally, BOZIZE used to store many weapons in BOSSEMBELE. When the Seleka took power, they took all these weapons and some of the Seleka were selling them for 20,000 or 30,000 XAF. This is another way that '8' (huit) got his weapons.
56. Some Muslims hid in the diamond mines in the areas around BODA. '8's elements and Firmin DOPANI's elements planned an attack on them at: Camp NGOUM, the villages of BOSSOUI, YAWA and BOLO. DOPANI was a Comzone under '8'. They discussed and planned the attack at the Catholic Church. [REDACTED] splitting into groups to attack the different areas. [REDACTED] they clashed with the Muslims in BOLO and many Muslims and Anti-Balaka died. The Muslims in YAWA and BOSSOUI had already fled. At Camp NGOUM, the Anti-Balaka killed the Christians there who had been guarding the Muslims belongings in order to steal them. Firmin DOPANI was also the President of the Youth of the 1st Arr. in BODA. His nickname is 'KPARE'. Men respected DOPANI. DOPANI sometimes refused '8's decisions, such as killing people for no reason.
57. DOPANI was responsible for an attack on the village of BOBOUA. He killed the Muslim Mayor of BOBOUA. He heard the mayor had weapons and he wanted to get the weapons. I think the attack was on the 9th or 10th of February. This was one of the villages that DOPANI and '8' discussed attacking, along with BOLO, YAWA and the



Statement of [REDACTED]

other villages. There were many small villages along the road which those Anti-Balaka attacked.

58. RAMBO and his elements later came and took back BOBOUA and its surrounding areas. RAMBO and his elements set up a checkpoint in BOBOUA about three days later. RAMBO took control of BOBOUA in retaliation for Coeur de Lion being killed. He believed that the Anti-Balaka had killed Coeur de Lion in BODA. [REDACTED]

59. '8' (huit) was born in BODA and he spent some years there but then he returned to his native village, PAMA, where his family came from. PAMA is a small village and there are only diamond mines there.

60. '8' (huit) is still alive, he lives in PAMA, but he goes to BODA sometimes. He does not speak French and he does not have a phone. He lives in the bush. He has created a lot of panic and he is the origin of all the bad things that happened in BODA. He is a lot like Andjilo. He has committed a lot of crimes including raping young women, killing old women as witches, looting and burning houses, both of Christians and Muslims. He would go into Muslims areas at night and plunder Muslim homes. He and his men did this for 2-3 months.

61. '8' (huit) captured 45 women and children and took them to the Church to kill them. They had been out gathering mangoes for food when he captured them. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This incident must have occurred between February and June 2014. These women and children were captured at the 6th Arr. of BODA, which is next to the 5th Arr. where the Muslims live. They came out of the 5th arr. very early in the morning before daylight to look for food. '8' (huit) was around that area that night. He captured them at about 4:00-5:00 a.m. and brought them to his base next to the Catholic Church in BODA. If they had been seen later, they would have been killed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] '8' (huit) and SOUSSOU wanted to kill them, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it was then decided to call the Sangaris who came to pick them up. The women and children were not harmed at all. They were between the ages of maybe 8-30.



62. At that time, the Sangaris had informants in different parts of BODA and if anything was to happen, the Sangaris would know about it immediately and they would intervene within 10 minutes.

Sexual Violence committed by Anti-Balaka in BODA

63. The OTP investigators showed me a Human Rights Watch article (ERN CAR-OTP-2061-1680) about women being captured and raped. I do not think that the incident described in this article is the same as the one that I mentioned above. But I did hear that women were raped by the Anti-Balaka in BODA. I heard '8' and SONGOLET were responsible for many rapes. [REDACTED]

64. I heard that Christian women who were married to Muslim men became the targets for '8' (huit) and other Anti-Balaka who were saying to them that they were going to 'marry' all of them now that their Muslim men were gone. The Anti-Balaka took them as spouses. Many of these women could not flee with their husbands as they were Christian and remained behind.

65. '8' (huit) and SONGOLET wanted to kill [REDACTED] who had married Muslims. He threatened to kill them [REDACTED] seek refuge to MISCA for protection. All Christians thought that even if someone was married to a Muslim, they should be killed. [REDACTED]

66. I had not seen '8' (huit) raping women, but I had heard a lot of stories. We did not like what '8' (huit) was doing, but he had a lot of men around him and they were armed so we were scared of him. I am not surprised about these articles that are talking about '8' (huit)'s violent behaviour.

67. SONGOLET and his few men were also responsible for many crimes including rapes of women and girls. There are complaints of rape brought before the local tribunal in BODA. I recall an American attorney had obtained such files from the prosecutor in BODA.

68. There were also cases of women who were punished for selling manioc to Muslims. Those who were doing that were considered traitors by the Anti-Balaka. They were usually punished by being forced to undress down to just their underwear and



Statement of [REDACTED]

beaten in public. They did this to men and women. I did hear that there were women who were punished by being raped for selling food to Muslims.

69. [REDACTED] a teacher from BODA was captured because she tried to deliver food to her younger sister who was in the Muslim area, as she was married to a Muslim man. The teacher gathered some manioc and went to the red line to bring it to her sister. '8' (huit), SONGOLET and two of his elements "2GIGA" and Guy "Dollar" captured her and brought her to their base near the Catholic Church. She was stripped of her clothes and beaten with a wooden club in public. Many people gathered around and were watching [REDACTED] I do not know if she was raped. I do not remember the name of the teacher, but she had filed a complaint with the BODA Prosecutor for this incident.

70. I remember another incident [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] took some manioc to sell it to the Muslims. At that time you could sell manioc for 1,000 XAF to the Christian side and for 15,000 XAF to the Muslim side. She was captured by '8' (huit), SONGOLET, 2 GIGA and Guy "Dollar" in the night around the red line. She was brought to their base near the Catholic Church. She was stripped of her clothes and people were looking at her and insulting her. [REDACTED] The Anti-Balaka asked her why she was selling food to the Muslims; that it was forbidden, and that the Muslims would become stronger and come back to kill the Christians. She was beaten with a wooden club. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] she had been raped by SONGOLET and Guy "Dollar" that night too. She has also filed a complaint with the local authorities.

Violence committed by '8' and his Anti-Balaka

71. At the time that these incidents took place the [REDACTED] Provisional Coordination of the Anti-Balaka was already in place. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] do anything as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] not armed while '8's(huit) and his elements were armed. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

72. I also knew of a man who was caught stealing from '8'(huit) and he was whipped so much by '8'(huit) men that he later died. This man was a Christian. He was beaten with pieces of wood and with the sides of machetes. His nickname was



[REDACTED]

73. There are a lot of complaints against '8' (huit) in the local tribunals. Since he was committing all these crimes the people of BODA revolted against him and asked him to leave and this is why he returned and burned the houses of some Christians as well. More recently he returned to BODA to ask forgiveness from the local authorities and the population in order to be allowed to go around the town freely again.

74. [REDACTED] Some of his men are in detention in BANGUI. SONGOLET is one of his men who is in detention in NGARAGBA and there are two other of his men (2Giga and Enoch BEKAIL) who are in detention in Camp de Roux.

75. '8' (huit) is from PAMA, but some Anti-Balaka of BODA had also joined him when he was committing crimes.

76. In the evenings '8' (huit) was going to the Muslim areas and attacking them. Sometimes he and his elements were also looting the Muslim houses. He and his men would stay near the Catholic Church when in BODA. He had his own base in the area of the Catholic Church, outside of the compound.

77. For many months, '8' (huit) and his elements would loot and attack and then return to PAMA until the next attack. From February until August 2014, he was committing crimes in BODA, usually attacking in the evening.

78. There were no other villages between PAMA and BODA. There are only some big mountains between the two places.

Negotiations between Muslims and Anti-Balaka

79. [REDACTED] I heard that the Muslims paid money to the BODA Councillors to tell '8' (huit) not to attack BODA. They gave 300,000 XFA to the Councillors on three different occasions to give to the Anti-Balaka. The Councillors never gave the money to the Anti-Balaka and instead divided it amongst themselves.

[REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

After 05 February: Anti-Balaka Provisional Coordination of BODA

80. Habib SOUSSOU naturally became the Coordinator of BODA. He was the highest ranking FACA, his family was well respected in BODA, and he was also well respected himself. [REDACTED]

81. Habib selected five Comzones to supervise the five Christian Arrondissements. He selected Rodrigue KARAMOKOUNDJI to be the Comzone over all of them. KARAMOKOUNDJI was a manufacturer of hunting weapons and supplied hunting guns to the Anti-Balaka. He was later officially given the title of 'Commandant de zone' after SOUSSOU [REDACTED]. KARAMOKOUNDJI was supervising the Comzones under him and making sure that they were not going to other neighbourhoods to loot. At that time there was a lot of stealing as people did not have anything to eat and were starving.

82. [REDACTED]

83. [REDACTED]

84. At that time there were no functioning state authorities in BODA, but those who had remained in the town were in contact with the authorities in BANGUI. I believe that it is through this communication from the local authorities of BODA to the national



Statement of [REDACTED]

authorities in BANGUI that we received humanitarian assistance from the WFP and other organizations. NGOs started bringing food, medicine and water in BODA.

85. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

86. [REDACTED] would call NGAISSONA directly. If NGAISSONA was not available [REDACTED] talk to someone else in the Coordination, like WENEZOU. Habib SOUSSOU [REDACTED] knew NGAISSONA personally as NGAISSONA used to be a Minister during the time of BOZIZE and Habib SOUSSOU was a FACA. They were both Gbaya but they were not particularly close. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

87. [REDACTED] reporting to NGAISSONA everything [REDACTED] that was happening in BODA. He also called [REDACTED] about different things, if for example there was a mission that was coming to BODA.

88. [REDACTED]

89. NGAISSONA and the national Coordination never contributed anything to the Coordination in BODA, not even a drop of water. [REDACTED] advice [REDACTED] should bring back the peace.

90. Habib SOUSSOU put in place the structure of the Comzones in BODA about 2-3 weeks after 5 February 2014. [REDACTED] because there was a lot of pillaging. A system had to be put in place so that people could be responsible and could control their own areas. This same structure became the official Coordination structure later in about July 2014. All the same people who were holding the positions unofficially in the past, were later on appointed officially.

91. [REDACTED]
Habib SOUSSOU left BODA to return to the FACA in BANGUI 1-2 months prior to this meeting [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The people on this list held the same positions with the Provisional Coordination in February 2014. On the last page of this document there is a mistake. It should read "Prefect of Lobaye", not Prefect of BODA.

92.

[REDACTED] SOUSSOU would buy hunting rifle ammunition when he travelled to BANGUI. [REDACTED] bought makeshift weapons in BODA.

93. On the map of BODA (Annex C), I have marked the six Arrondissements in BODA. Five are Anti-Balaka areas with Comzones, and one is Muslim.

- a. 1st Arr. is called La Mission. The Anti-Balaka Comzone was Sylvain BOUIN [REDACTED] is dead).
- b. 2nd Arr. is called BAGUERA led by Comzone Medard DIMANCHE.
- c. 3rd Arr. is called GBAORO led by Comzone Ali GBADI. This is the area that '8' burned down [REDACTED]
- d. 4th Arr. is called COTONAF and is led by Comzone Maixent KODOU.
- e. 5th Arr. is the Muslim area and is led by Yassir BARADINE [REDACTED]
- f. 6th Arr. is called CAPABLE and is led by Comzone Ibrahim KEBE.

94. In BODA the city was divided. There were the Muslims on one side and the Christians on the other. I marked where the red line is located on the map (Annex C). It denotes the boundary between the Muslim neighbourhood and the Christian areas. The Sangaris designated a red line (ligne rouge) soon after they arrived that should not be crossed by the two communities. If either a Muslim or a Christian crossed it, they'd be killed by the other. But I never heard of Anti-Balaka snipers who attacked Muslims who were crossing the ligne rouge.

Anti-Balaka National Coordination and BODA Coordination

95.

[REDACTED] were communicating with NGAISSONA on the phone [REDACTED] informing him



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

96. [REDACTED] on 4 February 2014, NGAISSONA had not yet returned to CAR. I don't know when he returned. When BOZIZE was chased away by the SELEKA, NGAISSONA also had to flee as he was BOZIZE's relative. I had heard that he went to CAMEROON or BURKINA FASO, but I am not sure about it.

97. After February 2014, the Anti-Balaka National Coordination in BANGUI contacted the de facto and unofficial Coordination in BODA; National Coordinator NGAISSONA called SOUSSOU specifically. The Anti-Balaka National Coordination in BANGUI coordinated with other Anti-Balaka in CAR. Most of the Anti-Balaka in the country were in BANGUI. Habib SOUSSOU [REDACTED] to BANGUI 2-3 times a month. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was [REDACTED]

98. When it comes to BODA specifically, NGAISSONA asked [REDACTED] peace to the area [REDACTED]. He said that what '8' (huit) was doing there was not good. [REDACTED] he knew all the facts. He knew about '8' (huit) and SONGOLET [REDACTED].

99. In June 2014, NGAISSONA called Habib SOUSSOU and asked the commanders in BODA to come to BANGUI for a meeting [REDACTED]

100. Roddy MBOSSÉ and Moraise SENDÉ (both FACA) joined the [REDACTED] meeting, though they were not appointed to any position in the Coordination and were just elements. They were not considered as Comzones. NGAISSONA did not want all the Coordination to be military so this is why they were not all appointed to any position in the Coordination. SENDÉ and MBOSSÉ are both Gbaya from the South. NGAISSONA asked Habib to come with his elements from the Provisional



Statement of [REDACTED]

Coordination, but the other FACA couldn't afford the trip. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

101. NGAISSONA never appointed SENDE to any position in the Coordination. After the meeting in BANGUI, NGAISSONA asked [REDACTED] as to make badges, so we selected SENDE [REDACTED] Everybody who was part of the Anti-Balaka was given a badge which would be used for the DDR.

102. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This meeting took place before the BRAZZAVILLE talks and [REDACTED] to lay down our weapons and to reconcile with the Muslims who were born in CAR since they are our brothers. He told [REDACTED] not kill the Muslims, to bring back peace, and to wait for the DDR.

103. There were many Anti-Balaka present in the meeting including WENEZOU, 12 Puissances, as well as Anti-Balaka commanders from BAMBARI, SIBUT, BOSSANGO, KAGA BANDORO, CARNOT, BERBERATI, GAMBOULA, GAZI, YALOKÉ, BOSSEMBELE, BOSSEMPTELE, BOALI and DAMARA. Apart from the coordinators from BODA and BAMBARI, the others were all Comzones. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

104. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CARNOT's Comzone was 'Chiki Chiki'. He was in charge of both CARNOT and BERBERATI. YALOKÉ's Comzone was "Le Bleu." GAZI's was Rodrigue, and even now he still has weapons and he patrols the streets with weapons and grenades. Rodrigue was the general Comzone for the area since there were many small villages. GUEN is one of those villages in GAZI under him. It is only 10 KM from GAZI. GAZI is a sub-prefecture and GUEN is a small commune within it. I have never heard of Edmond BEINA.

105. The people who were invited and present in this meeting were Comzones from different areas of the country who had influence and authority over the population in their areas, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NGAISSONA made a document appointing them as Comzones [REDACTED]

106. RAMBO was not present at this meeting. RAMBO did not get along well with NGAISSONA and the BOY RABE group. RAMBO controlled the following areas: FATIMA, BOEING, BIMBO, PETEVO, KPETENE, CATTIN, PISSA, BOSSONGO, NDANGALA, SEKIA, and SAMBA. RAMBO didn't control MBAIKI because there were no problems in MBAIKI. There were Sangaris and MINUSCA there. He controlled from MBAIKI to BOBOUA. After BOBOUA, we controlled the road to BODA.

107. NGAISSONA suggested that we should raise awareness amongst the population in [REDACTED] provinces in order to persuade people that there is no reason to kill each other and that the violence needed to stop. [REDACTED] he knew about BODA. [REDACTED] The Coordinations would keep in contact with one another. For example, BODA would be in contact with the CARNOT Coordination.

108. A strategy for disarmament was also discussed during this meeting. Not everybody in the meeting was in agreement about that. Even amongst the different Anti-Balaka groups in the area around BODA there was disagreement on this topic. People would say that they could not disarm since the Muslims were still armed. The Anti-Balaka from BOGANANGONE and GAZI for example refused to put down their arms and they carry their weapons up to this day.

109. The day after this meeting, NGAISSONA officially appointed Habib SOUSSOU as Coordinator of BODA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The document is signed and stamped by NGAISSONA, as well as: the Company Commander of the Gendarmerie of MBAIKI; the Gendarmerie of BODA; the MISCA Commander, Congolese Captain Ghislain (but his deputy Anselme LIKALO signed for him); Captain Mathieu from the Sangaris [REDACTED] and someone from USAF, a special anti-fraud unit in BODA. The document is stamped with the dates of 01-03 July 2014.



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

110 [REDACTED]

111 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Habib SOUSSOU for example was coordinating the Anti-Balaka chiefs of all the different quarters in BODA. We had an auditor who collected money, a treasurer, a spokesperson who would speak to MINUSCA or the Sangaris, Councillors who were elder advisors, and people working on Protocol who would welcome visitors.

112. SOUSSOU settled problems in areas. He gave orders to Comzones to stop plundering. Sometimes they were followed and others not. He would not give orders to YAMINI. YAMINI was in charge of the youth and SOUSSOU was in charge of the Anti-Balaka. But if the youth was an Anti-Balaka then SOUSSOU was in charge of them.

113. [REDACTED] created an Anti-Balaka Police Brigade, but it later dissolved because they themselves committed crimes, like pillaging. The Police Brigade handled crimes like rape and armed robbery. [REDACTED] traditional measure of discipline; when someone was caught stealing they were whipped. But if someone had committed a more serious crime, like a killing for example, they were taken to MBAIKI where there were still some functioning authorities. People who were committing serious crimes in LOBAYE were taken to MBAIKI. I do not know what measures were taken in other provinces. Some of the more serious crimes [REDACTED] were: throwing grenades around to scare people and stealing from older Christian women. These were crimes committed by Christians against Christians.


114. If they didn't obey, they were punished. If they killed someone, they were taken to MBAIKI where they'd be put in prison. If they stole, they would have to return the belongings to the owner and they'd be whipped. [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a disciplinary measure to be put in place for BODA. [REDACTED] Each area could make their own disciplinary measures. This was during the Anti-Balaka period. Now the CAR authorities are in place and they are responsible for punishment of crimes.

115. The Investigators have shown me a copy of a document titled, Anti-Balaka 'Ordre Mission', [REDACTED]



116. There were check points at: PK9- Bangui exit, at 17 KM -SEKIA, PISSA entrance, MBAIKI entrance and exit, and NDANGA (25 KM from BODA). RAMBO and his Anti-Balaka elements with the Gendarmes controlled the checkpoints at PK9, SEKIA, and PISSA. The Gendarmes alone controlled the checkpoints at MBAIKI and NDANGA.

117. The National Anti-Balaka Coordination came to BODA to speak about peace and cohesion with the Muslims. WENEZOU, KOKATE, and RAMBO all came, along with their men. [REDACTED] they came in vehicles sometime after 5 February, maybe in March. WENEZOU and KOKATE only came once, but RAMBO came more frequently. He was close with Habib SOUSSOU and would come to meet with the Muslim and Christian communities to stop the fighting between them. NGAISSONA never came to BODA.

118. [REDACTED] sent written minutes to the National Coordination regarding peace meetings [REDACTED] with the committee of Elders on the Christian side. This was the only written paperwork we sent to the National Coordination.



Situation in BODA

125. We were short of everything during the conflict, for both Christians and Muslims. There wasn't any drinking water, little food, no medicine. We only ate vegetables. We couldn't circulate freely because of the red line. If you crossed, you would be killed. The Sangaris would patrol along the red line. It was forbidden to sell food to the Muslims so either they would starve to death or they would be forced to leave. The convoys with aid had to be escorted into BODA, otherwise, DOPANI and his men would pillage them. MINUSCA would escort them in.

Known BODA people

126. Hyppolyte YAMINI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] currently works in the mines and runs a motel. I do not know of YAMINI being appointed by NGAISSONA to any position. He had no relationship with NGAISSONA. In the Provisional Coordination of the Anti-Balaka in BODA, YAMINI was put in place as Deputy General Treasurer, but this was not known by NGAISSONA. This took place before the big meeting with NGAISSONA in BANGUI. YAMINI remained President of Youth for only a short period. He was President of the Youth from 2014-2016 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

127. Maxim MBONZO [REDACTED] was a trader in BODA. He is a member of Parliament. He didn't have any involvement with the Anti-Balaka. He didn't finance the Anti-Balaka.

128. Aime Jerome KOTTE [REDACTED] is the current interim mayor of BODA. He converted to Islam. Even Muslims wanted to kill him so he fled into the bush. He negotiated a position and was appointed Mayor/President of the Delegation.

129. "Nasco" Narcisse BANGUE [REDACTED] was the President of the Youth before YAMINI and a Town councillor under Mayor AWAL. He was the councillor who fled with money the Muslims paid to the Anti-Balaka not to attack them. He now works in a mine in BODA.

130. Moraise SENDE: I do not have his phone number.

131. "Noumande" Roddy MBOSSE [REDACTED]



Statement of [REDACTED]

132. Symphorien DIMBALE is an Anti-Balaka. He is the one who brought the feticheurs from the provinces for the Anti-Balaka. When YAMINI was President of the youth, he was one of his youth elements. Sometimes he would buy the hunting ammunition from BANGUI along with Habib. He was a guard at Tear Fund in BODA and now he is now doing gardening work.

133. General LAPO is in BANGUI. I've heard he send weapons to BODA. [REDACTED] his family is in BODA. He and MBONZO are from the same village from BOSSOUI.

134. Edgar FLAVIEN is currently in Bangui. He is an old man. He was the first spokesperson for the Anti-Balaka in BODA. Guy WANGA was another spokesperson at the same time in March 2014.

135. Alfred DIMANCHE is not in BODA. He is in DRC and he is not an Anti-Balaka. His brother, Medard DIMANCHE is an Anti-Balaka. Medard is in BODA [REDACTED] He was the Deputy Comzone of the 2nd arr.

136. Cpt. KAMEZOULAI is not from BODA. I heard his name, but I have never seen him.

137. Cpt. NGREMANGOU: I do not know him. I have never heard of him.

138. Maxime MOKOM was present during the meeting of the Coordination. He was next to NGAISSONA. He was also at the Bangui Forum. [REDACTED]

139. [REDACTED]

140. Habib SOUSSOU [REDACTED] lives in FATIMA in BANGUI and is with the FACA.

141. Ibrahim KEBE [REDACTED] was the first Deputy Mayor of BODA during BOZIZE's time. He was Secretary General of the BODA Coordination. He was in BODA during the whole conflict in BODA.

142. Melvi MOKONZE was a Deputy Comzone of the 4th Arrondissement. KODOU was his ComZone. He is now a Customs agent in BODA. Jean Noel NONDJIO is an Anti-Balaka from the 6th Arr. He is one Ibrahim KEBE's elements.



Statement of [REDACTED]

143. "Romeo" and "Malou" are diamond collectors and relatives of General LAPO and Maxine MBONZO. They gave us a lot of money during the conflict to buy food. They were not Anti-Balaka, [REDACTED] V [REDACTED]
144. Ali GBADI was Comzone of 3rd Arr. [REDACTED]. Now he works in the mines. KODOU is a bus driver in BANGUI, but I don't have his number.

Other documents given to OTP Investigators

145. [REDACTED]

146. [REDACTED]

Photos of Anti-Balaka

147. I was shown photos from CAR-OTP -2058-0573 at 00:27:52:20 (Annex I). I have identified the following Anti-Balaka in the photo:
- a. KAMBA BRICE: he is vice-President of Firmin DOPANI the President of the Youth for the 1st arr.
 - b. The one in the red hat. I don't remember his name. He was shot by the Sangaris and then brought by plane to BANGUI
 - c. The others are 8's elements from PAMA
148. I was shown photo from CAR-OTP-2058-0573 at 00:27:55:16. (Annex J). I have identified KAMBA BRICE. I do not have his phone number. He is selling palm wine and he is still in BODA.

Reuters Video: CAR-OTP-2066-5312

149. I was shown this video and asked to comment on it and identify any people or locations.
- a. At 00:00:01:15- I identified the market in BODA in ALI neighbourhood. This is not the main BODA market. It is true that the Muslims couldn't



move around to buy food, such as manioc. If the Christians sold manioc to the Muslims, they would be killed. Some Christians mixed rat poison in the manioc and sold it to the Sangaris who then gave it to the Muslims. Women did this in their homes.

- b. 00:00:20:20-00:00:45:20-Anti-Balaka did block trucks on the roads and steal food and belongings to bring back to their neighbourhoods. "KPARE" seen at 45:22 was someone who caused problems on the roads between BODA-MBAIKI and BODA- BOGANANGONE. KPARE, SONGOLET, and his men would steal money, food, belongings, motor bikes on the road. There was an unofficial Anti-Balaka check point at the exit of BODA, 2 KM from the airport strip, but it was uncontrollable elements had set it up.
- c. 00:00:45:22-'KPARE' with his two Aide de Camps. The one on the left in the black cap is Andre NDERE. The one on the right is 'KPARE's younger brother. 'Kpare's real name is Firmin DOPANI.

CNN NEWS Video: CAR-OTP-2060-0795

150. I was shown this video and asked to comment and identify any people or locations.

- a. At 00:01:23- I identified the area where Muslims from the provinces lived. The neighbourhood is called KPOMBANGA. Muslims fled from BOGANDA, BOGUERA, YAWA, BOUZOUOLA, BOSSOUI, BOSSEMBELE, BOSSEMPTELE. They fled these areas because the Anti-Balaka wanted to kill them. They fled to BODA before 29 January 2014.
- b. At 00:00:14:20-I identified Anti-Balaka Spokesperson Eric LOSSI. He was a civil servant with the water and forestry service.
- c. At 00:00:29:18- I identified the 1st Roundabout of BODA.
- d. At 00:00:43:08-I identified the Mayor AWAL of BODA. It is true that the Muslims were surrounded in BODA. We found 21 Kalashnikovs in Mayor AWAL's house.
- e. At 00:00:58:20- It is true that the Christians were not allowed to sell food to the Muslims, as I explained before.
- f. 00:01:10-There were clashes in the bush. Some Muslims crossed over the river to the 4th Arr. looking for food and the Anti-Balaka from YAWA attacked them. I know the Anti-Balaka from YAWA were led by Bienvenue BANALAY. His brother is the MP of the region.
- g. 00:01:30- is the Catholic Church
- h. 00:01:40-The man on the left in the flowered shirt is the Choir leader of the Church. The man with the gris gris on his head is an Anti-Balaka called Ali GBADI. He is the Comzone of the 3rd Arr.
- i. 00:01:48-That is Cpt Gislain and Deputy LIKALO



Statement of [REDACTED]

- j. 00:01:49- All these persons are Anti-Balaka from PAMA.
- k. 00:01:58-'KPARE'. His full name is Firmin DOPANI. The man with the bullhorn is WILLIKONDI. He is SONGOLET's father. He is a former Minister of Education Inspector and President of the Elders.
- l. 00:02:04-Two Anti-Balaka: Blaise NDJIMBALE AND TINDO MESMIN, aka METHODE.
- m. At 00:02:23-It's true that some of the problems were due to economic reasons. The Muslims had more money than the Christians. There was jealousy.
- n. 00:02:30- It is true that it was impossible to leave BODA. If you are born there, there is no place else to go.

Annexes

Annex A: Signed Waiver of Right to Counsel form

Annex B: SD card with audiotaped Waiver of Right to Counsel

Annex C: Map of BODA with annotations

Annex D: Photo : CAR-OTP-2058-0573 (00 :28 :01 :10)



Annex I: Photo of CAR-OTP -2058-0573 at 00:27:52:20

Annex J: Photo of CAR-OTP -2058-0573 at 00:27:55:16

Closing Procedure

- 1. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
- 2. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.
- 3. At the beginning of each day of interview, I was reminded of and I confirmed of my free will the following:
 - a. My willingness to continue the interview;



Statement of [REDACTED]

- b. That I had no difficulties with the interpretation;
 - c. That I had the right to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of my guilt or innocence.
 - d. That I had the right to stop the interview and have legal counsel present at any time during the interview.
4. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
5. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.
6. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
7. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.



Statement of [REDACTED]

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the English with interpretation in French and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by [REDACTED] that he speaks and understands the *French* language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the *English* language to the *French* language in the presence of [REDACTED] who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. [REDACTED] has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in *his* statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

ICC RESTRICTED

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[REDACTED] CAR-OTP-2068-0069 [REDACTED]

