



WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [REDACTED]

Gender: [REDACTED]

First Name: [REDACTED]

Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: [REDACTED]

Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: BANGUI, CAR

ID No: [REDACTED]

Date of Birth/Age: [REDACTED]

Nationality(s): CAR


Ethnicity: [REDACTED]

Religion: [REDACTED]

Language(s) Spoken: Sango and French

Language(s) Written: Sango and French


Language(s) Used in Interview: French



Names of all persons present during interview: Investigators [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Interpreter [REDACTED]

Signature(s): [REDACTED]



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


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
Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I was told that they are Investigators with the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and I was told that he is an interpreter for the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from 1st August 2012 until present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and translated into French. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer their questions. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
6. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
7. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
8. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
9. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.

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- [REDACTED]
10. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

11. [REDACTED]

March 2013

12. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 24th March, the SELEKA entered BANGUI. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We saw 15 SELEKA at the house. We approached them to find out what they were up to and greeted them. When they saw us, they immediately opened fire. I could see the fire from the guns and the bullets coming. I shouted "Lord" and fell down. It was bizarre, I found myself around 200 meters away from the place and I was on the ground.

14. I fled into the bush and found [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The SELEKA stopped firing at around 3 am and left. When the SELEKA were gone, I went to [REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
15. On 29th March, I managed to speak to my family by phone. It was then I was informed about the SELEKA [REDACTED]

June 2013

16. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] The purpose of the movement was to protect ourselves and the civilians.

17. General DOLOWAYA was the Chief of Staff under DJOTODIA. A month after his appointment, he called on all the soldiers to come out and to regroup in locations he indicated. [REDACTED]

18. At some point there was a call for all the FACA to come back to the forces, but at the same time FACA were killed whilst going to work.

August 2013

19. I went back to BANGUI and stayed with a friend, [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] That was around August 2013.

20. Shortly afterwards, the same month [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] I managed to call other FACA soldiers to join us in [REDACTED]. Plenty of soldiers joined. [REDACTED] Soldiers were fleeing and were looking for a safe place. They joined the movement [REDACTED]

21. When we were there, we got indications that the SELEKA was based [REDACTED] at time, we couldn't attack them. They were better armed than we were. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED] We decided to come out in the night and set up roadblocks. Around 3 or 4 in the morning, we removed the roadblocks and went back to our base.

October 2013

23. Around October 2013 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

November 2013

24. [REDACTED] had learned about our activities and had contacted me. [REDACTED]. He wanted to know, if we had weapons. We did not have enough. [REDACTED] suggested we raise funds in order to get weapons to resist properly. We decided [REDACTED] in order get weapons, but we realized that they were very well equipped. We realized that the population would be affected if we launched an attack, so we did not.

25. [REDACTED] I was called to protect my community against the attacks of the SELEKA. All the high ranking people had fled, either in exile or in hiding. Only the ordinary soldiers were still around. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Léopold BARA, the spokesperson [REDACTED]

26. At its peak around [REDACTED] joined and more than [REDACTED] but some left later, [REDACTED]

27. I went in the bush with the aim of identifying the SELEKA and kicking them out of my area. I wanted to protect [REDACTED] Later, [REDACTED], captured SELEKA were handed over to the MISCA, Burundian contingent or to the Sangaris. I even protected the Muslims in my area. [REDACTED]

28. I protected [REDACTED] including the international NGOs in the area. [REDACTED]. When DJOTODIA left power, I wanted to avoid armed robberies, pillaging and people settling their accounts in the neighbourhood. I wanted to protect the entire community, everyone from different background as long as they were Central Africans, including Muslims.

29. [REDACTED] There were no written orders in the group, [REDACTED]. As an example, if they caught an enemy, they would have to bring the individual to the base and [REDACTED]

30. Still in November 2013, [REDACTED] told us that [REDACTED] were not happy with the name ANTI-BALAKA and were not in favour of us using that name. We told him that we were soldiers not rebels. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

ourselves. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was in contact with the French most of the time. I didn't know much about his activities. We told him that we needed weapons and he promised to see if the French would help. In the end, the French didn't give us weapons. [REDACTED] attack the SELEKA positions in order to get weapons, but we were too weak to do it.

31. By the end of November 2013 things started to move. [REDACTED] told us at our base in [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had called upon all the ANTI-BALAKA groups to circle BANGUI in order to build up pressure and to remove DJOTODIA. Many ANTI-BALAKA came to BANGUI from rural areas. This was when YEKATOM aka ROMBOT moved to GNAWARA School.

December 2013

32. There was a big advance from different groups of ANTI-BALAKA on 5th December 2013. We could hear that but and it was also reported on the public radio and televisions. I was also informed by telephone by friends and family. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The ANTI-BALAKA groups came from the north. Another big advance was on the 20th December 2013. There were also fights in between.

33. Around the 5th December 2013, [REDACTED]. We came out from [REDACTED] during the night [REDACTED] and the SELEKA was afraid to attack us.

34. [REDACTED] At around 4 am we heard gun shots around Boy Rabe, Camp KASSAI and other places. There was heavy fighting. We were informed that it was the ANTI-BALAKA who had attacked Camp KASSAI and NGARAGBA. This was common knowledge and even reported on the public radio. Members of my family, which I don't want to name, informed me about the attack on NGARAGBA. They joined forces with YEKATOM's troops. I called YEKATOM and asked him about the attack. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

called him on the 5th December 2013 because it was a major attack and I knew that he was in contact with the ANTI-BALAKA from the North. As far as we were concerned, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At that time there was no plan, how to cooperate with other ANTI-BALAKA groups in case of an attack. Every group had to manage it on its own.

35. All the ANTI-BALAKA from the rural areas were looking for bases, some even came to us. We welcomed them as fellow CAR citizens. [REDACTED]

36. In December 2013, YEKATOM was already out there. He had set up his base at GNAWARA School. [REDACTED] We had heard that the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had joined YEKATOM. We called [REDACTED] to join us. I called [REDACTED] and told him that the ANTI-BALAKA name was not liked. [REDACTED]

37. On 20th December 2013, the SELEKA attacked Captain NGREMANGOU's and YEKATOM's position in BANGUI. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NGREMANGOU was the big boss, because he had the connection to BOZIZE. According to what I heard he was receiving money from BOZIZE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was one [REDACTED] who wasn't happy with the way this money from BOZIZE was used. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. I told him that I was not part of their group and didn't receive any money. [REDACTED]

38. YEKATOM was in GNAWARA School. KAMEZOLAI [REDACTED] was with YEKATOM's troops. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] heard that he had escaped from prison and had hid with YEKATOM. [REDACTED]

39. [REDACTED] We heard heavy gun shots. I called [REDACTED]

and he informed me about the attack. At around 3 pm, I sent some people to support him, but when they arrived the fight was already over. I sent my people to help YEKATOM on my own initiative, because I wanted to help the fighters. I have never received such support from YEKATOM. I also didn't receive support from other ANTI-BALAKA groups. I wouldn't like to ask for any help, because many of the other ANTI-BALAKA groups had dodgy characters among their ranks and they would have taken advantage of such a situation.

40. [REDACTED]. Every area had its own enemies. My enemies were [REDACTED] but I didn't attack them for the reasons I explained elsewhere. There were probably more than [REDACTED]

SELEKA's [REDACTED] They had many fire arms. There were no other SELEKA [REDACTED] but the SELEKA [REDACTED] would also patrol the main roads in [REDACTED] There were also Chadian MISCA troops [REDACTED]

41. [REDACTED]



- [REDACTED]
43. The same day, at 7 pm, NGREMANGOU called KAMEZOLAI and informed him that the choice had not been accepted by the outside and constitutional order had to be restored, meaning bring back BOZIZE and the former power. KAMEZOLAI refused to accept this, because he didn't want BOZIZE to come back. He wanted the people of Central Africa to choose their new leader. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

44. That was the split in the ANTI-BALAKA. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

45. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] That led to a split of the ANTI-BALAKA. The split was based on the disagreement about the return of BOZIZE. The ANTI-BALAKA South wanted a new Government, the ANTI-BALAKA North wanted to

[REDACTED]

restore the constitutional order, which means that BOZIZE and the Parliament from before the crisis would come back. [REDACTED]

46. With the split, we became the ANTI-BALAKA South. There was no structure in the South. [REDACTED]

47. The ANTI-BALAKA North was commanded by former President BOZIZE. He gave the orders. I assumed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I don't have any other proof for that. NGAISSONA, MOKOM [REDACTED] and Francis BOZIZE financed the ANTI-BALAKA to buy weapons and ammunition. They were given orders through Captain NGREMANGO and Lt. KONATE, Lt. WANGAI, WENEZOU, Father KOB, KOKATE. They were using their [REDACTED]

48. [REDACTED]

On that occasion

ANDJILO was not at any peace talks.

49. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

January 2014

51. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which was in the bush, until DJOTODIA left power. On the 10 of January 2014, we came out of the bush and established a base in [REDACTED] This base was in a small street [REDACTED] Our base was called [REDACTED] and was opposite to [REDACTED] The base that I have marked in the map Annex A, was the [REDACTED], which is in reality [REDACTED]. I have corrected my sketch and put my initials to the change.

52. The SELEKA left [REDACTED] around one week after DJOTODIA left office. They were protected by the French and then asked by the French to leave. They left without a fight. They attempted to attack [REDACTED], but we didn't respond. We just fled into the bush. We didn't want to attack their base because of the civilians nearby.

53. The French were in contact with [REDACTED]. Sangaris had located all the groups and made contact with them, [REDACTED]. They came to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

54. Until DJOTODIA left power, the SELEKA had several positions in [REDACTED] and I wasn't in control of [REDACTED]. After DJOTODIA left [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the crisis, there were robbers around. If you didn't control your area you would be blamed by the population. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

55. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

That was the rule each of us had to protect his own area. The rule didn't come from anybody, it was just common practice. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

56. The person that didn't follow this rule was YEKATOM. He even attacked the Gendarmerie [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They came once to his post and disarmed him at his PISIMISI check point. After that he attacked the Gendarmerie during the night and he took away their weapons. During the next day, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

negotiations. YEKATOM wasn't present. I contacted him and asked him why he took the weapons. He answered that the French came and took his weapons and he felt betrayed by the Gendarmerie. This was the reason he took their weapons. Others spoke to YEKATOM and in the end he agreed that the weapons were picked up from his people. He agreed to this, because he was under pressure from all sides, including the ANTI-BALAKA leadership. ZILABO was at the negotiations. He was the mediator of the ANTI-BALAKA. He wanted YEKATOM to return the weapons. He called him and talked to him. He told him to return the weapons because the Gendarmes were not his

[REDACTED]

57. There was another occasion, where YEKATOM attacked the Gendarmerie, when they were on patrol. This was when NGAISSONA's name was not on the list of Presidential candidates which was published by the Interim Government. Again he took their weapons. In this case he never returned them. This time there were no negotiations.

58. I am not aware that YEKATOM was ever disciplined or punished by the ANTI-BALAKA leadership. I don't believe that they were able to discipline him.

59. I controlled a good part [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

60. [REDACTED]

61. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These areas were controlled by YEKATOM. He controlled

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[REDACTED]

the rest of BIMBO 1 and parts of LOBAYE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

YEKATOM's area of control went on after the bridge up to BODA.

62. By the time DJOTODIA left power, [REDACTED]
c [REDACTED]
63. My maps show the areas of responsibility as of 10th January 2014, when DJOTODIA left power.
64. There was a meeting in NDJAMENA to broker peace. In this meeting General MOKOKO and General TOMAITA from Congo indicated that DJOTODIA didn't tell the truth about certain SELEKA massacres. The Generals offered to bring the ANTI-BALAKA as witnesses. Idriss DEBY agreed that they should have ANTI-BALAKA present as well. DEBY sent a plane and they picked up Léopold BARA. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BARA was taken to the Presidential Palace and explained the situation as a representative of the ANTI-BALAKA. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] give all the details of the crimes committed by the SELEKA. DEBY decided that DJOTODIA could not go back. [REDACTED] to inform him that DJOTODIA had signed his resignation letter.

Meetings prior to the Brazaville talks

65. A meeting was held at PISIMISI, around 6 months after DJOTODIA left power. YEKATOM invited people to the meeting. He invited the ANTI-BALAKA north and south. Around 500 people attended. Only ANTI-BALAKA were present for the discussions. The meeting was chaired by WENEZOU. He read out the items on the agenda. He said that we needed to organize ourselves militarily and politically and decide who will take decisions. All leaders introduced themselves. BARA was present. NGAISSONA was not present.
66. The second meeting was at LAKWANGA (2nd Arrond.) and organised by MOUDA. [REDACTED]
was held about a month after PISIMISI. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] After WENEZOU became the General Coordinator, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
67. After the meeting at [REDACTED] (around a week or two later) there was another meeting with [REDACTED] He spoke with NGAISSONA's group

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

and later, at another meeting, [REDACTED]

68. Next, MOUDA organized a meeting at UNDP. This was around a month later. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
meeting.

69. A month after the UNDP meeting, we had a meeting at Hotel AZIMUT. It was a big meeting. More than 500 people took part. MINUSCA, SANGARIS, some advisors to the President and many other people were present. The President of MOUDA was the daughter of President SAMBA PANZA. An advisor of MOUDA read out a list of functions in the ANTI-BALAKA. I don't know how the positions were agreed on before. NGAISSONA became General Coordinator, WENEZOUÏ became the Deputy. Vivien BEINA became the General Treasurer. Namsio EMOTION remained the spokesperson. MAMADOU became the Deputy Treasurer. ZILABOU became general mediator.

70. As the General Coordinator of the ANTI-BALAKA, NGAISSONA coordinated the actions of the movement. If something went wrong in the country, he would call the ComZones and would for example order them to erect roadblocks. When he said something, everybody had to execute. I received plenty of orders from him to erect roadblocks or to create disorder. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EMOTION was later arrested and replaced by Igor LAMAKA, [REDACTED] There was also a Chief of Staff above NDOMETE, but he got arrested at some point and NDOMETE was covering his position as well. I don't remember the name of the Chief of Staff. Some of the orders I would not fully implement. [REDACTED]

71. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The money didn't arrive where it was supposed to arrive. NGAISSONA went on air on public radio and requested civil disorder to make her step down. We were supposed to erect roadblocks and create disorder, by stopping all the traffic.

72. [REDACTED]

73. There was no payment or other support in return from the ANTI-BALAKA leadership.

74. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The only person that erected roadblocks without permission was YEKATOM. He wouldn't ask

[REDACTED]

for permission. He would block the bridge at PK9 and the ANTI-BALAKA leadership couldn't do anything about it.

Brazzaville Talks

75. SAMBA PANZA organized a meeting with religious, military, civil society and armed groups at the palace. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The two biggest groups were the SELEKA – with 23 seats – and the ANTI-BALAKA with 23 seats as well. Most other groups had two seats, although some had up to 5. There was a good governance commission, a peace negotiation commission, a DDR commission. President SASSOU NGESSOU (Congo) was the mediator for the crisis in CAR. He sent a plane to pick the delegates for talks in Brazzaville. [REDACTED]

76. The representatives for the ANTI-BALAKA were chosen within the ANTI-BALAKA. They were looking for people, who could talk and had the knowledge. NGAISSONA decided who went there. [REDACTED]

77. [REDACTED]

YEKATOM aka ROMBOT

78. YEKATOM was born in Brazzaville. His parents are from Congo. His parents divorced. His mother moved to BANGUI and got married to a Lieutenant YEKATOM. YEKATOM was brought up by this Lieutenant. When BOZIZE took power, Lt. YEKATOM was BOZIZE's colleague. When they recruited people for the army, BOZIZE asked YEKATOM, if he had young people that would join the army. YEKATOM's name was actually Alfred SARAGBA, when he lived in Congo. YEKATOM made Alfred SARAGBA change his name so he could join the army as YEKATOM. When YEKATOM joined the ANTI-BALAKA, he took the name ROMBOT. He even tried to change his birth certificate to ALFRED ROMBOT YEKATOM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Before the SELEKA came, YEKATOM was chief of a unit at FACA HQ. He remained at HQ and cooperated with the SELEKA. At some point, I don't know why, he fled and went to Zongo, DRC. From there he went to the bush and started his activities from the bush. This is common knowledge in the Army. He had four firearms in his house in CATTIN, BANGUI. He started attacking Muslims in small villages and collected weapons from them. This was the way for him to grow. He also got his share from the money that BOZIZE had sent. When DJOTODIA left, the SELEKA from PISSA surrendered to YEKATOM "ROMBOT" and gave him all their weapons. He also attacked the Gendarmerie in MBAIKI and got a lot of weapons from there. He also had links to Congo Brazzaville.

79. After DJOTODIA had left, YEKATOM was in control of around half of BIMBO 1 and LOBAYE. His area went up to MBAIKI, PISA, BODA, KAPOU, NDAGALA,

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[REDACTED]

MONGOUMBA, SEKIA (his people are still there now), ZILA (around 1 km from PK9 bridge), BOTAMBI, DJIMBA, MPOKO at the other side of the river; BANGANDOU, NDOLOBO. There were also plenty of smaller villages under his control.

80. YEKATOM's Deputy is Habib BEINA. Rodrigue MOMOKAMA is his right hand man. Aristide BEINA was one of his key commanders. YEKATOM had around 3000 elements under his command. He had also around 200 FACA under his command. He committed many atrocities, [REDACTED]

81. When the movement split, he became rich. One month after DJOTODIA had left power; YEKATOM provoked people, even civil servants, and blamed them for being SELEKA and that they must be killed.

82. As an example, his men did bad things to General WANGAOU. YEKATOM's people slapped him at his base. Habib BEINA and MOMOKAMA and Aristide BEINA were present. YEKATOM was not present at the time. WANGAOU had gone to BODA to conduct peace talks. On his way back in the evening, he was stopped at the PK9 checkpoint. The General came out of his car. He shouted at them and asked them how they could stop him, since he is the Minister of Defence. YEKATOM's elements answered: Where were you when the SELEKA came? You have benefited from our actions? Why? In that exchange the Minister slapped Habib BEINA. BEINA didn't accept that and slapped him back. A heated exchange followed. Both sides pulled out guns. [REDACTED]

83. [REDACTED]
- YEKATOM seized some NGO's vehicles and only released them after money was paid.

84. [REDACTED]

85. A Colonel went to visit his farm. On his way back, YEKATOM followed him. The Colonel didn't stop and YEKATOM shot at him. YEKATOM also attacked [REDACTED] Gendarmerie station [REDACTED]

86. Even the child of General LAPO, who was FACA and the Aide de Camp of DJOTODIA's wife, was killed. YEKATOM's people attacked DJOTODIA's wife, as she travelled in a vehicle with her Aide de Camp. I cannot recall the name of the Aide de Camp. They were in Boeing on their way to a funeral. The Aide de Camp was slaughtered on the spot by YEKATOM's people. They took him some metres from the

[REDACTED]

car, tied his hands and legs and his throat was cut. YEKATOM was present and he ordered the killing. They brought DJOTODIA's wife to YEKATOM's base and she was released later. [REDACTED] The brothers of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The killing happened at the time when YEKATOM was still based at GNAWARA School, before DJOTODIA had left power. I called YEKATOM and asked him what happened to the Aide de Camp and he answered in Sango "Eforolo Tonga na Papai" – my understanding was that it meant "we have removed the skin of the Papaya". He stated that the soldier was a traitor. When we had this phone call, YEKATOM seemed to be calm. I can't remember the day of the incident.

87. YEKATOM killed three of his Aide de Camp at the PK9 Bridge. One was called SEDA (he died in hospital), another KOBOLA Vianet aka FADAL (died at the scene) and a third person (I cannot recall the name) died at the scene as well. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] called YEKATOM, but his phone was switched off. According to [REDACTED] YEKATOM used a Russian made PM (automatic weapon that takes 50 rounds). YEKATOM always used this weapon. According to some sources, the three men had taken goats from Muslims. YEKATOM was very greedy and took all the goats from the guys. This time, the guys didn't agree with YEKATOM taken all from them. That led to the killing. I only heard this as a rumour.

88. On another occasion, YEKATOM took a young man from PETEVO. HABIB and MOMOKAMA were present. It was around 9 pm. I was at home. I received a call from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] couldn't do anything. YEKATOM crossed the bridge and killed the young man on the other side. This incident is well known in PETEVO and people started to demonstrate against YEKATOM. YEKATOM was interviewed about it at Radio NDELUKA and denied the incident, but people had seen him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He had seen the kidnapping and was the brother of the victim. The young man never came back. He was killed close to BOYALI and buried there. YEKATOM questioned the young man and YEKATOM himself took a machete and cut him.

89. YEKATOM had a permanent checkpoint at the bridge of PK9. When DJOTODIA was in power, YEKATOM had his main base at GNAWARA School. When DJOTODIA stepped down, YEKATOM moved to PK9 the next day. He took over a compound on the left hand side, after you crossed the bridge. It is a compound with a wall made of blocks and a big house on it. The compound is called PISIMISI, because it is the name of the owner. The owner fled when the Seleka came in. Today, the owner has retaken his compound. YEKATOM moved out when MINUSCA took control of the compound in 2015. They took over the compound due to the criminality emanating from it. I gave some examples before.

[REDACTED]

90. YEKATOM's people started attacking me. One day they targeted a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and brought them to their compound to kill them. Only KAMEZOLAI was able to free the guys. On another occasion I had to call Sangaris to free some of my people from his detention. The area between the PK9 Bridge and LOBAYE became an area of concern.

91. YEKATOM is very well equipped. He has a lot of weapons. His area of control has natural resources, like diamonds. Therefore, he is wealthy and considers others as dogs. Right now, he is a Member of Parliament.

92. YEKATOM controlled [REDACTED] His people were pillaging and doing others things like robbery against all parts of the community and he allowed them to do such things. YEKATOM even killed his Aide de Camp at PK9. Any FACA, who opposed his actions were killed.

93. I have been asked how YEKATOM controlled the area. He had checkpoints on the road to MBAIKI. He would extort money at the check points. The men at the checkpoints questioned the people, searched them and took their possession. I don't know if people from the area had to pay him as well. YEKATOM's men also patrolled the area. They would control the villages. Many bad things happened, many people were killed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There were people from different religions. There were Muslims and people who had converted to Islam. The majority were Christian. Maybe out of 100 people, 2 to 3 were Muslims. When SELEKA was in power, many additional Muslims came to the area. There might have been up to 60% Muslims at one stage. This was because the Muslims brought all their families to the area. At the same time, the Christians left the area, often leaving their belongings behind. When DJOTODIA had to step down, many of the Muslims were scared because they knew that the ANTI-BALAKA was around, so they fled, although some stayed behind.

[REDACTED]

95. When it comes to the population in the area under control of YEKATOM, there are almost no Muslims left. They all fled. He killed many and took their properties. If you look at KAPOU, PISSA and MBAIKI you can check that YEKATOM took their houses. A pocket of Muslims remains in the centre of BODA today.

96. In YEKATOM's area there were plenty of Muslims doing their trading business. When DJOTODIA left power, YEKATOM carried out attacks from one village to the other to attack Muslims. Their fate was death. I haven't seen it myself, I was only told, partly by people from YEKATOM's group.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

97. [REDACTED]

98. [REDACTED]

Roles, responsibilities, relationship and contacts

99. Former President BOZIZE

I have spoken already about his role behind the ANTI-BALAKA. I had never any contact with him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I asked him, how he got the money for the weapons. He told me that he received the money from BOZIZE. The money was sent to a bank and someone else would pick it up and give it to him.

100. WENEZOU

He is one of the ANTI-BALAKA leaders. At some point during the Transition he was the Minister of Environment. [REDACTED]

101. KOKATE

[REDACTED] When the movement split, he was with the ANTI-BALAKA north. [REDACTED] he wasn't happy with the split. [REDACTED]

102. MOKOM

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] am not sure about his role within the ANTI-BALAKA before he created a mess. He was very close to BOZIZE. [REDACTED]

103. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was the Secretary General. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

104. KONATE

[REDACTED] I don't know his role in the ANTI-BALAKA. I know he is a soldier. He was in charge of his area. He was the ComZone in an area, but I don't know which one.

105. KAMEZOLAI

He is a military chief. [REDACTED] He is a senior officer [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] he went back to the ranks.

106. Edouard NGAISSONA

He became the General Coordinator at the meeting [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

107. Francis BOZIZE

I have never met him and I don't have his contact details.

Annexes

Annex A: Hand drawn map [REDACTED]

Annex B: Hand drawn map [REDACTED]

Closing Procedure

108. I was informed that individuals, who according to the judges, qualify as victims will be entitled to participate in future Court proceedings and potentially to receive reparations. I was informed of the existence of the Victims' Participation and

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[REDACTED]

Reparation Section and its function, as well as of the procedure for applications. I consent to my personal data being shared with the Victims' Participation and Reparation Section.

109. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
110. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.
111. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
112. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.
113. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
114. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the English with interpretation in French and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

[REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by [REDACTED] that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence [REDACTED] who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. [REDACTED] has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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