

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: OUABIRO DANA

Gender: M

First Name: Jo-Brice

Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: "Captain Jo"

Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: Bangui, 8th Arr.

Passport / ID number: None

Date of Birth/Age: 21.12.1990/ 25 years

Nationality(s): Central African

Ethnicity: Mbaka -Mandja

Religion: Mid-Mission-American Evangelist

Language(s) Spoken: French, Sango

Language(s) Written: French, Sango

Language(s) Used in Interview: French and English

Occupation: Sells clothing material

[REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview: Investigator [REDACTED]
Associate Investigator [REDACTED] Interpreter [REDACTED] Witness Jo-
Brice OUABIRO DANA

Signature(s):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CAR-OTP-2031-0241



WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who told me that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to interpreter [REDACTED] who told me that she is an interpreter with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic between August 2012 and today. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I was told that I have the right to be questioned in a language that I fully understand and speak. I confirm that French is a language that I fully understand and speak. I confirm that the language used by the interpreter in this interview is French.
5. The investigators explained to me that this interview is voluntary and that I may end it at any time.
6. Before I was questioned, the investigators explained to me that the OTP is in possession of information on my person that gives them grounds to believe that I have either committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or have been associated with those who committed crimes.
7. I was informed that I have the following rights under Article 55(2):
 - a. The right to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of my guilt or innocence;
 - b. The right to legal assistance of my choosing, or, if I do not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to me, without payment by me in any such case that I do not have sufficient means to pay for it; and
 - c. The right to be questioned in the presence of my counsel unless I voluntarily waived my right to counsel.



8. I agree to continue with the interview without the presence of legal counsel and signed a waiver of rights in this regard. Attached as Annex A.
9. I choose not to have the interview tape recorded.
10. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
11. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
12. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
13. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
14. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

15. I was born on 21 December 1990 in Bangui in the 8th Arrondissement. I have lived with my mother in [REDACTED] and then joined my father's village [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
16. I left high school a year before my A levels (fin de la Premiere) in Bangui, and returned to my father's village, [REDACTED] I moved to [REDACTED] when Ange-Felix PATASSE was ousted by a military coup. Because I used to live with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] people might have thought I was supporting PATASSE so I moved back to [REDACTED] to avoid trouble. I was living with my family in [REDACTED] when the conflict started.



17. I was the President of Youth association of my village and I did not belong to any political party since I didn't like politics. I was also the Secretary of [REDACTED] Neither I nor any of my close relatives were military, political or government officials.
18. I was the Secretary General of the Anti-Balaka in my village, directing operations to attack the Seleka in the bush. I had a hunting rifle and we made our hunting cartridges out of ammunition that we had seized from the Seleka we attacked.
19. While Francois BOZIZE was still in power, there were armed Peuhl and Seleka who travelled through our village to attack Bangui. They attacked us and we managed to defeat them and seize their weapons (Kalashnikovs, grenades, AK47). We later handed the weapons over to Francis BOZIZE, Jose BINOUA, and Prime Minister TOUADERA. The Mayor of DAMARA and the Sous-Prefet were also present when we handed over the weapons. I think that a later attack on my village by the Seleka was in retaliation for this incident.
20. On 13 April 2013, when the Seleka were moving toward Bangui, they attacked our village, and burned it down. They also killed my cousin, [REDACTED] I confirmed this date by calling his younger brother. They burned my house, and stole my hunting rifle and my ID card. The Seleka wanted to kill all the men so we fled into the bush. The Seleka arrived in a white vehicle with an MSF (*Medecins Sans Frontieres*) flag. We thought they were coming to give assistance, but it was Seleka fighters who had stolen the vehicle and immediately started shooting at people. We took my sisters and other women to the bush to hide them. The Seleka then headed [REDACTED] towards DAMARA.
21. I don't know the Seleka who attacked my village, except there was a man from DAMARA working under [REDACTED] He currently is in BANDORO. The [REDACTED]

Creation of Anti-Balaka in the West of CAR

22. Anti-Balaka stands for "anti-knives." A certain type of small "*saguet*." It also stands for "anti-bal-AK47," meaning against the bullets of an AK47. Both are correct. We started calling ourselves Anti-Balaka when BOZIZE was still in power. There were armed Peuhl acting as road bandits in the bush causing problems so we started to defend ourselves because the police did not help.



23. We heard that men were gathering in GOBERE (North of BOSSANGO) with planes, weapons, and tanks; and that white people were going to give us weapons. By word of mouth, we were told to go there. This spread all over the provinces. Those who had been close to BOZIZE fled to GOBERE and were planning to go back to BANGUI to force out the Seleka who had taken control. I heard from a fetish seller that we "had to go to GOBERE to defend our country against the Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries." These mercenaries don't even speak Sango or French, only Arabic languages. This is also a reason for the massacres by the Seleka. They could not understand people talking and explaining themselves in Sango.
24. We thought the international community would see us fighting the Seleka with our wooden sticks against their weapons and see that we needed help, and that they would then come help us. We also heard that Marabouts would bring fetishes to GOBERE. Only our ancestors, through the fetish makers can give us the strength to fight, but I don't want to tell you the exact process. When we got to GOBERE, there were no weapons. It had all been a lie. If I had known, I would have stayed in my village to fight.
25. So, we left my village [REDACTED] in June 2013 (almost two months after my village had been attacked) to join the men gathering in GOBERE. There were 67 of us who walked there, with others who joined us along the way. It took us 15 days to get there. We walked from 0500 to 1600 hours each day. "Youngsters" whose family members had been victims of the Seleka and wanted to avenge their deaths joined us along the way. These "youngsters" were 18-20 years old. Before accepting them into our group, we assessed their physical strength because we were walking far through the bush, crossing large rivers so they had to be strong and resistant. We lived on what we found in the bush, in addition to donations by farmers and villagers (cassava, sometimes the Chiefs of village may offer to sacrifice pork) in support of our movement. I was chosen to be a leader of our group walking to GOBERE.
26. I've pointed out the towns and villages on a map (marked in red) where we stayed overnight on our way to GOBERE (See Annex B). We didn't use maps at the time, it was all in our heads. We walked from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and then stayed in the bush close [REDACTED]. We did not go through the main roads, only in the bush. We would send people to the nearest village to buy food and medicine. Then we crossed BOSSANGO, crossed the OUHAM river and reached GOBERE. GOBERE is in the bush between YOUROUBA (where BOZIZE had his house) and BENZAMBE, a mountainous area north of BOSSANGO. The closest village to BENZAMBE is BOUSANSOUMA. BENZAMBE is located between Francois BOZIZE's and Francis BOZIZE's houses. GAGA village is the native village of Francois BOZIZE and the place where Francis BOZIZE built his house. I've drawn a diagram of where GOBERE was located in relation to other villages (see Annex C).



27. The Seleka learned that men had left our villages to go to GOBERE and started attacking those villages. Our families remaining in [REDACTED] had to flee to the bush again. Whenever Seleka would enter a village, all men had to flee to the bush. Anti-Balaka wives/women had to hide in the bush as well; otherwise they would be taken by the Seleka and mistreated. I know of one person killed in [REDACTED] two people killed in [REDACTED] including an elderly person; and a youngster taken in [REDACTED] next to my village and killed in my village.

Organization of Anti-Balaka in GOBERE

28. Many people had already made their way to GOBERE when we arrived there. Initially, there were only 15 FACA (mostly from the Presidential Guard) and 1 policeman among us civilians. FACA progressively joined over time. Initially, FACA and police officers were not in command. We accepted the FACA, but didn't follow them. With time they took over more power within the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]

29. We were divided into 14 companies and each company had between 500 and 1000 persons, if not more. Each company was divided into four sectors. Each company was dispatched to areas according to the province of origin of its elements. There had been a total of 52, 000 Anti-Balaka in the whole country. Later when in Bangui, all ComZones across the country had to count their elements and give that number to our Coordinator, NGAISSONA, which is how I learned this number.

30. Men gathering in GOBERE were coming from BOZOU, BOSSEMBELE, BOUAR, BAORO, BERBERATI, and CARNOT to get fetishes from the Marabout in GOBERE and then return to their villages and recruit in their locality and share the fetishes to make themselves stronger to fight. Men returned to their villages and proclaimed themselves Chiefs with their fetishes. The sharing of fetishes helped the whole Anti-Balaka movement to spread in CAR.

31. The Anti-Balaka in GOBERE were led by DEDANE, a Corporal-Chef in President BOZIZE's Presidential Guard, and Maxim MOKOM, a Police Official under BOZIZE. DEDANE, other Presidential Guards, gendarmes, FACA, and civilians had tried to defend the regime in Bangui against the Seleka, but failed so they moved to GOBERE in order to recruit Anti-Balaka from the provinces. FACA and police were being persecuted by the Seleka in Bangui and had to flee Bangui. GOBERE was an area far from the Seleka. The Seleka was hunting down BOZIZE's close circle and MOKOM sought refuge in ZONGO. DEDANE fled to GOBERE.



32. Both MOKOM and DEDANE knew one another from the time they were serving within the Defense and Security Forces. MOKOM and DEDANE were both family members of President BOZIZE so people believed that BOZIZE was behind our operations. If this had been the case, we would have had more means and weapons in order to fight. As a former Head of State, BOZIZE had the means to help so if he had supported our actions, we would not have had to suffer that much to survive, get ammunitions and medicine. In the bush, we did not receive any money, just medicine.

Anti-Balaka structure in the field

33. When I reached GOBERE, DEDANE had already created his command structure. DEDANE's deputy was 12 Puissances. His full name is Thierry LEBENE. A ComZone named KEMA, a FACA, was among his command. Maxim MOKOM who was in ZONGO was the one coordinating operations with DEDANE. DEDANE was reporting to MOKOM and receiving orders from him during our attacks on the villages. Within the command structure, there was also all the Chiefs of the companies.
34. DEDANE would communicate with Maxim MOKOM by cell phone, but I was not present when they spoke. DEDANE would call the chiefs of companies together to give instructions that he had received from MOKOM. DEDANE, his deputy and the ComZones told us to be calm, wait, and get ready with our fetishes until the moment we would be sent to the prefectures where the Seleka were. I was a Deputy-Chief before I became a Chief of a company later.
35. I was in charge of registration of new recruits and informing them about the principles to be respected: *"do not steal, do not attack civilians."* An Anti-Balaka was not to steal and if caught, the thief would be tied up and beaten. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
36. Because I was one of the few literate men, I was asked to keep the register of companies and their members and provide them to ComZone KEMA who would then forward these lists to MOKOM. I also wrote letters for "authorisation of travel" and "authorization of absence" for Anti-Balaka to travel back to their villages. I would make the draft for ComZone KEMA to sign. He would sign, his deputy DANGBA would sign, as well as ComZone ROMAIN, another member of the senior leadership. I don't have any of these registers or letters.



37. ROMAIN and KEMA were very close because they came from the same origin. Though combatants thought that DANGBA should have been the leader because he was the most competent fighter.
38. Once people wanted to join our Anti-Balaka group, we would register their names, assign them to a company and tell them the rules: *"don't kill or steal; don't touch the Muslim women. And if the Seleka attack, you can defend yourself."* I don't have the lists anymore, however, the names were transferred to DEDANE and he communicated these names by phone to Maxim MOKOM. I was only the secretary of my company but because I could read and write perfectly, the secretaries of other companies would ask me to rewrite things for them. My company was the 8th company.
39. Each company was divided into sections. I would record the name of the head of each section and name of elements in the section, as well as letters of authorisation of movement. ComZone KEMA and his deputy DANGBA were present and the ComZone would sign the authorisation. This is the letter they would show at the checkpoints guarded by the Anti-Balaka so that we could control travel and avoid surprise attacks.

Anti-Balaka attacks in the provinces before 5 December 2013

40. Few people had cell phones. In my company, no one had a telephone. Before we set out to attack villages, we were given instructions of which villages and when we would attack. We had an overall time plan to keep to. I wrote down our company movements in a notebook, but I didn't keep this notebook.
41. We didn't have weapons, just stones, wood sticks and makeshift fire weapons (we used SODECA iron tubes attached to sticks), 12 calibre bullets and fetishes. On the front line we fought with makeshift traditional weapons. We seized weapons from the Seleka when we could, but their automatic weapons were too complicated to operate and thus would remain in the back. We used cartridges and parts to make our own ammunition with fetishes inside and weapons.
42. One company led by ANDJILO was sent to attack BOUCA. His was the first company to leave GOBERE. Another company was sent to OUHAM-BAC, another between GBADE and DADACOUTA 1 and 2, and another to LERE. My company was the last to leave and we were sent to BENZAMBE. I have circled in blue on the same map the villages that we were sent to attack (See Annex B). Two or three companies could be sent to the same town. For example, 3 companies were sent to BENZAMBE, mine and that of John ROMBHOT.



43. My company was composed of 715 elements at the time of our attack on BENZAMBE. 67 of my original men were sent to GBOZO and I kept 10 men with me and we joined another group which moved to BENZAMBE. I insisted on keeping in my company the men who had gone with me to GOBERE.
44. Our strategy was to target little villages occupied by the Seleka around BOSSANGOYA in order to defeat smaller groups of Seleka and seize their weapons. Then we'd become strong enough to attack BOSSANGOYA where the Seleka were numerous.
45. Usually when we arrived near a village we would send someone in the night to do reconnaissance to determine how many Seleka were present, confirm if people had fled to the bush and whether there were women or not. The Chief would be positioned in the front and lead the attack. He would instruct his men to cover the exits and other places where the Seleka would flee. Even Anti-Balaka women voluntarily took part in fighting in order to avenge crimes committed by the Seleka against their relatives.
46. We would search houses and mosques for weapons. In order to determine if a house was a Seleka house, we had to enter the house and look for weapons. It was easy to identify Seleka houses. They usually lived together in a group fenced off from the rest. If a Muslim man was found in a house and hadn't fled, he was a Seleka. We did not think that all Muslims were Seleka, the religion was not linked to Seleka. We had Muslims living among us. They had opposed the Seleka crimes and would even inform us of Seleka movements and crimes. In order to avoid being shot by a Seleka hiding in a house, you had to destroy all houses. For instance in BOSSANGOYA, I lost two Caporal-Chefs like that. A Seleka fighter was hiding and because my men had not checked the place, they were both shot by the same Seleka.
47. We also found weapons hidden in Mosques, in the floor boards under praying carpets (tapis). We destroyed those mosques. We did not touch State schools. We did not touch women and children. Women and children are innocents; we would only chase away men. We would only destroy Seleka houses. We could not destroy everything because we wanted the populations to be able to return and continue with their lives. We also wanted to be able to stay and cohabite with villagers without any problems. Each chief had his own personal strategy of attack and of combat.
48. Whenever we freed a village, we would stay in the village and take control of it for as long as a week, otherwise, the Seleka would come back and slaughter the civilians. We would encourage the civilians to return to the village so they could return to normalcy and not suffer consequences to their health.



Attack on BENZAMBE

49. When we attacked BENZAMBE, we sent girls sellers to warn those in the village who were not for the Seleka to go to the bush before the attack. When we attacked, my company divided into three groups and surrounded the village. We attacked around 0300 hrs. We wore fetishes, hats, and shouted and banged on 35 plastic Gerry cans with wooden batons, in order to scare the Seleka away. They shot at us with guns and RPGs, but thanks to our gris-gris, the bullets did not touch us. This scared the Seleka away.
50. We spared the Imam of BENZAMBE. When the SELEKA had entered BENZAMBE, the Imam defended the Christians and opposed the SELEKA actions. He helped pay ransoms in order to free the civilians abducted by the Seleka. I handed him over to the priest in BOSSANGO A in order to show that we were targeting Seleka, not Muslims populations.
51. After we controlled BENZAMBE, we marched towards OUHAM-BAC immediately. On the way, we met DEDANE and "12P." They were coming back from BOSSANGO A where they bought ammunitions for hunting rifles. We regrouped on the road between BENZAMBE and BOSSANGO A.
52. Three days after the BENZAMBE attack, we caught one Seleka Captain with his men coming from Chad who said he came to CAR to make money and go back to Chad in order to work the field. He had gotten lost in the bush. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
53. In villages where Christian men had fled, women and young girls would be left in the village with the Seleka and Peuhl. In order for a woman to be safe among the Seleka, her safest option was to marry a Seleka, in order to have a normal life. Such marriages happened. And the only way to live in acceptable conditions in a Seleka controlled village, was to convert to Islam.

The first attack on BOSSANGO A

54. After BENZAMBE, we marched towards BOSSANGO A. On the way to BOSSANGO A, 12 kms from the town center, some companies fell to a Seleka ambush, but thanks to our fetish, we were protected. Other companies were supposed to attack BOSSANGO A, but did not receive the message so my company attacked BOSSANGO A alone. We only had 17 bullets for hunting rifles, one AK 47 and one automatic weapon not functioning properly. The Seleka were heavily armed so we retreated and went to OUHAM-BAC.



55. We were joined by other companies, but the Seleka sandwiched us between BOSSANGO and BOZOU so we were separated. We paid a Marabout called [REDACTED] to cross the river to MBANG and started our way toward Bangui.

Anti-Balaka Movements towards the South

56. Near the village of BOBALA we received instruction from DEDANE to go to BOSSEMBELE. He was the one guiding us always. DEDANE was based in BOSSEMBELE where he had a working telephone network. He also sent instructions by a messenger on foot. DEDANE dispatched "12 P" to GBOZO and DANGBA to BOBALA in order to give us instructions to march toward BOSSEMBELE.

57. DANGBA is Mandja and from KABO. He was initially in my company when we conquered BENZAMBE. "12 P" known as "12 Puissances" is my cousin and is from BOGANGOLO.

58. We all gathered at Marabout LUNDI's house in BOSSEMBELE (who died two weeks ago. We all attended his funeral.) The purpose of going to BOSSEMBELE was to get medicine and reinforce ourselves. We spent one week in BOSSEMBELE and were told not to attack the city because there were too many Seleka combatants around. Instead one company was sent to GBOZO and my company was sent back to BOSSANGO. I became the Secretary for Chief "SOL-SOL" while in BOSSEMBELE. "SOL-SOL" is the nickname for Alexis MANDAGO who is now in detention.

The second attack on BOSSANGO on 5 December 2013

59. ComZone KEMA made me Chief of this company before we set off to BOSSANGO. I was also allowed to sign authorisations of movement for my men. We recruited new elements while in BENZAMBE and prepared to attack BOSSANGO. We stopped 30kms away from BOSSANGO, we fasted two days to ask God to give us strength for the battle and the next day, we attacked BOSSANGO.

60. It was 5 December 2013, at 0700 hrs when we heard on radio RFI that Bangui had been attacked by the group based in GBOZO headed by ANDJILO and with the support of volunteers coming from BANGUI. At 1300 hrs, we attacked BOSSANGO and finished around 1700 hrs, after it was dark. We wanted people to know that the Anti-Balaka attacked in the provinces too.

61. Before the attack we divided into 2 groups, one led by KEMA, the other by DANGBA. We attacked the Seleka posted outside the entrance of BOSSANGO. KEMA was



supposed to attack from behind the Maria radio station. The Seleka had been warned and fired at us, but eventually we defeated them.

62. Our task was to occupy the centre of BOSSANGO and free BOSSANGO so Christians could live in peace. The Christians of BOSSANGO had sought refuge in the Catholic Church and were stuck there.
63. We "cleansed" the houses in BOSSANGO so that Christians could go back to their lives. Houses were "dirty of the Seleka." We only cleansed the Seleka men. As good Christians, we put women and children in the "Liberte" neighbourhood of BOSSANGO. UN forces protected them for several months as they waited for trucks to evacuate them.
64. In BOSSANGO, whoever was a Muslim was a Seleka while Christians were Anti-Balaka. Most men who converted to Islam would support the Seleka. If someone stayed in a house, we assumed he had a weapon to defend himself. We did not capture anyone. The "Liberte" neighborhood was an area of refuge. We would not go after them there. Those who came to face us were Seleka and we fought them.
65. Once we controlled BOSSANGO, I was asked by FACA Comzone KEMA to write a mission order to allow some FACA Anti-Balaka to establish checkpoints in BOSSANGO. I saw these FACA then stealing from people at the checkpoints, abusing their authority. These were FACA who had fled Seleka in the bush and dressed themselves as civilians. When we took BOSSANGO, they came back and asked to join us. I registered them as civilians but discovered that they had another agenda and they were using nicknames to hide their identities. ([REDACTED])
[REDACTED] This made me angry and I decided to leave BOSSANGO.
66. I had no mobile phone, but when other Chiefs were making phone calls, they would allow me to use the phone to call my relatives in BANGUI. I talked to my cousin KOLONGO on the phone and he told me that he was walking free in BOY-RABE, and that I should come join him. He had arrived in BANGUI two days after the attack of 5 December 2013. The Seleka were not going to attack BOSSANGO again and I didn't have any relatives there, plus I didn't speak Gbaya, so I decided to go to BANGUI.
67. I arranged for a truck to take me, another Chief called [REDACTED] and 30 of my elements. On that same day, Jojo BOZIZE arrived in BOSSANGO and had someone tell me that I should not go to Bangui. I don't know why he didn't want me to go, but I had already arranged the truck so I went. I never personally saw Jojo BOZIZE.



Anti-Balaka financial support in the field

68. After the second attack of BOSSANGO when we were recovering in BENZAMBE, we learned that we had received money. We received information that we had been given 500,000 XAF in order to buy food and medicine. This money came through the CAMEROON border to BOUAR. We organised a meeting of Chiefs and KEMA decided that two Chiefs should be sent to collect the money. I don't remember the names of those Chiefs. The [REDACTED] knew the way and was chosen to accompany them to BOUAR. When they returned, only 180,000 XAF was left. They had used some of the money to buy solar panels to charge cell phones. This led to anger and a huge dispute among the elements. I never found out who the money came from.

69. [REDACTED]

Arrival to Bangui in 2014

70. I was not present in BANGUI during the December attacks. I arrived two months later. There were numerous Chiefs coordinating those actions, and I don't know the details of the attacks. I can't remember when I arrived in Bangui exactly, but NGAISSONA was already in Bangui and acting as the Anti-Balaka Coordinator. I think I returned before Maxim MOKOM arrived. When I arrived, houses had been destroyed and the Anti-Balaka controlled the neighbourhoods of: BOY-RABE, the 8th arrondissement, COMBATTANT, and PK12. The Muslims were occupying KM5.

71. My cousin, "KOLONGO," had been a Chief in MANDABA neighbourhood of BOY-RABE, but left for DAMARA before I arrived. He took part in the attack on the National Assembly in December. There is famous video footage of him wearing animal tails on his head. His elements were left with no Chief so I came to BOY-RABE to replace him as Chief. Later on I was appointed ComZone of MANDABA by NGAISSONA. I led 400 Anti-Balaka fighters, including the 30 I travelled with and then my cousin's men coming from the provinces as well. "12 P" was in NGAISSONA's house in POUNGOULOU, 4th Arrondissement.



Organization of ComZones in BANGUI

72. Initially after the December attacks, there were only the following ComZones in BANGUI: "KOLONGO" my cousin at MANDABA, KONATE in Jean XXIII, "12 P" in POUNGOULOU in BOY-RABE, ANDJILO in BOY-RABE, MOKPEM at PK10 GOBONGO, GUSTAVE at Jean XXIII, "Tex" in VOUDAMBALA, HOURONTI and TOUABOYE at PK12, " SOL-SOL" in PK12, SAMI in COMBATTANTS, TALBOT in the 8th Arrondissement, INDJEZEKANIN in MALIMAKA, GABAYO in TAGAOUICHI, NDOTOY in 5th Arrondissement, Alain ZONI in KASAI but he is now deceased. This was before NGAISSONA's return and the Coordination.
73. Later after the Coordination was established, there were a lot of Chiefs and it was decided that some of the Chiefs should become ComZones. This was decided at the level of the Coordination. Those who were seen as having more morals and ability would become a ComZone. "BENJAMIN" (who was from NDJO) and I became ComZones of MANDABA in BOY RABE; he was the Chief ComZone and I was his Deputy.
74. The Chiefs under BENJAMIN and I were: PATRICK "Patti" OROFEI, MAZIMBELET (now deceased), and "TIYO," (I don't know his real name). There were only these three. Each neighbourhood had a ComZone, a Secretary, Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs, and their elements. The zones were delineated by the Coordination. The Chiefs were from the neighborhood already so we did not select them. You couldn't bring a Chief in from a different neighbourhood. Each ComZone and Chief had their own base. A ComZone had authority over several chiefs in the zone under his control. For instance you could have one ComZone in charge of several bases.
75. Each of us had our own base (TIYO, BENJAMIN, my base, MAZIMBELET's base on the hill and further away PATRICK OROFEI's base). I've drawn a diagram of where our bases were in MANDABA (see Annex D). Men were assigned to patrol and check that everything was ok in our zone each day. [REDACTED] MANDABA where my base is can tell you which Chiefs were good or bad. Chiefs of the neighbourhoods know such information.
76. By base, I mean a place where all my men gathered and lived. It could be a compound or barracks. The role of the Secretary was to register names, solve disputes and send men to arrest the elements committing crimes. I used to keep my men in my base which was a fenced compound in MANDABA. I would assign some men to protect houses in BANGUI at the request of owners. The owners would sometimes pay so then I could provide food for my men. My Secretary would keep track of these assignments and I would assign men from the lists kept by my Secretary. I know my elements so I would keep eye on those who tend to misbehave and give more



freedom to the disciplined and trustworthy elements. I punished them the same way I did in the field.

77. Those who wanted to leave the base had to ask for an authorisation letter to go out. My Secretary would keep track of the requests and signed authorisation letters. If I found one of my men in town with no authorisation, he would be punished. I don't know how the other ComZones operated. Literate and illiterate ComZones did not function the same way.
78. As my base was not causing problems, neighbours would offer some food to us. We were also paid for protecting people's houses. When we attended Coordination meetings, we would be paid transport fees. I don't know how other Chiefs supported themselves. Some elements caused problems by stealing other people's goods by force, like vehicles and motorbikes. MAZIMBELET's base received the most complaints. If someone complained, we would go to their base with our weapons and take back the stolen vehicles and motorbikes. I only heard about armed robberies and theft regarding MAZIMBELET's base.
79. None of my men has ever been arrested, I maintained discipline among them. I would take sanctions in case of misconduct and crimes committed by my men. For example, for a case of theft in BANGUI, I would have the stolen good given back and the thief beaten up. I have instructed my men not to destroy and loot Muslims houses. When I was ComZone of MANDABA, there was no trouble, misconduct or crimes in the area under my control. I have not been involved in crimes, I have a clear conscious. I am still poor because I have refused to take goods that do not belong to me.
80. As another example, I sent some of my elements to MESKINE to guard a house and one of my elements was stabbed in the back by an element of MESKINE. All my men went to MESKINE to fight. I went personally to MESKINE in order to take the weapons away from my men in order to avoid problems. The owner of the house did not trust the elements of MESKINE to guard his base so he asked me to do so and he paid me for it.
81. When a Seleka was leaving KM5 in order to attack another area, immediately the population would call Anti-Balaka in BOY-RABE to intervene. They knew we would intervene immediately. It was possible for an Anti-Balaka to walk around other districts but you would speak to the Chief first. A Chief or a ComZone had to be informed by phone before going into another zone.
82. No ComZones from other zones could come to BOY-RABE, but we could go anywhere. Nobody would tell us anything because we were the real Anti-Balaka with real gris-gris. We could create trouble anywhere.



83. Fake Anti-Balaka using a bakery as a base near BENZ-VI created problems and harassed civilians in the neighbourhood so me and my men drove them away and closed the base.
84. When ANDJILO was away, a lot of robberies were committed in the Anti-Balaka name. When he came back, we had a meeting. We decided that any Anti-Balaka who stole, would be killed.
85. There was no Anti-Balaka "detention" facility for any captured Seleka. If there was an incident, the person would be brought back to the base. If the case was serious, the person would be brought to the Coordinator NGAISSONA. I did not witness such cases, but before coming to BANGUI, I heard that people were brought to the Coordinator and then handed over to the Sangaris forces. Later when the Military Police were operational, there were two incidents regarding the theft of two vehicles. The vehicles were retrieved by the Military Police and given back to the owners.

Anti-Balaka Military Police

86. The Anti-Balaka Military Police was created before I arrived to BANGUI. Its purpose was to arrest "fake" Anti-Balaka who committed crimes, like theft. This was headed by Commander GUSTAVE and "DOGO." Each Anti-Balaka Chief had to provide elements to the Military Police. Everyone had GUSTAVE'S number and would just call him by phone. He would convene an urgent meeting of the Chiefs and send elements to take back the stolen goods and the thief would be taken to the Gendarmerie.
87. Military Police would intervene for crimes like robbery and theft. I did not see with my own eyes more serious crimes.

Anti-Balaka Coordination in Bangui from January 2014

88. When we were in the provinces, we had never heard about NGAISSONA. In the provinces, we listened to Maxim MOKOM. When I returned to BANGUI I met with NGAISSONA and was told that he was the Coordinator. I briefed him about BOSSANGO and gave him the telephone numbers of the combatants. The command structure was already in place when I arrived.
89. MOKOM said he did not want to oppose him because they were from the same family and NGAISSONA was older than him. MOKOM and NGAISSONA had reached an agreement that MOKOM would be the Coordinator of Operations on the



ground while NGAISSONA would be the National Coordinator. If any attacks or events happened in Bangui and the provinces, MOKOM would be informed. He would give instructions if there was a Seleka attack, otherwise, he did nothing. NGAISSONA gave us orders.

90. The Anti-Balaka Chief of Staff was Richard BEZOUA (deceased) and his Deputy was Hypollyte Come AZINOU. AZINOU made badges for Anti-Balaka elements in order to identify the real Anti-Balaka. He went to the Anti-Balaka bases and the Chiefs would show him his elements. He would take pictures in order to make the badges. He was recruited in my village and he was in the bush with us. He is currently a student at the University of Bangui.
91. NGAISSONA convened the Coordination meeting with ComZones every week. This is when I realized that Anti-Balaka spirit had been corrupted. During these Coordination meetings held in front of NGAISSONA's house, NGAISSONA gave money to the Anti-Balaka chiefs in order to support destitute combatants who came from the provinces. For the Chiefs who had no houses, NGAISSONA paid for them to have houses. This encouraged people to support him as the Anti-Balaka Coordinator. By accepting his money, they were accepting his orders as well.
92. I have never heard NGAISSONA giving the order to commit a crime nor to sanction any of his men who had committed a crime. [REDACTED] The only thing he did was corrupt the men with money in order to influence their actions. NGAISSONA was systematically rewarding the crimes of his elements. For instance, NGAISSONA's men stole my cousin's motorbike. I went to his base fully armed for the purpose of destroying his base and I took the motorbike back. I went to NGAISSONA house and I saw him giving money to them.
93. As far as I know, NGAISSONA had never established rules or code of conduct or disciplinary rules to be followed by Anti-Balaka under his command. Whenever he would gather us at the time of his Coordination, he would just talk about his activities; he would never discuss anything substantial with us, and just pay for our transport.
94. Many Anti-Balaka in BANGUI proclaimed themselves as Chiefs due to the lack of strict control by their ComZones. Individuals hiding at the Ledger hotel, like Patrick OROFEI, went to see NGAISSONA to ask him to send Anti-Balaka to protect their residences. This led to the multiplication of Chiefs in Bangui leading to the troubles that occurred. Real Anti-Balaka started losing control of the situation. NGAISSONA did not know the identity of all real Anti-Balaka so whoever came to see him introducing himself as Anti-Balaka, NGAISSONA would just believe him.



Politicization and split of the Anti-Balaka Movement

95. NGAISSONA wanted to turn the movement into a political party and told us so at a Coordination meeting at his house. He told us that within two weeks, life would change for the children of the country. French Ambassador Charles MALINAS gave him authorization to turn the Anti-Balaka into a political party.
96. A split then developed in the Anti-Balaka: those who viewed it as a self-defence group who would return to their provinces and those who viewed it as a political group to take over the Presidency. The self-defence group was led by Maxime MOKOM. Their purpose being to defend the country until elections took place so that the Anti-Balaka could then go back to their provinces and work their land, this was an apolitical resistance group. The other group led by NGAISSONA, wanted to use the Anti-Balaka to seize political power so NGAISSONA would become Head of State.
97. I don't remember the date but NGAISSONA convened a meeting with all ComZones from the provinces at Hotel AZIMUT, in the presence of Anna SAMBA-PANZA, daughter of the President. We were informed that the Anti-Balaka Movement was a political party with NGAISSONA as General Coordinator and WENEZOU as his deputy. The combatants were surprised and very upset. As a consequence, the Anti-Balaka from the provinces returned to their provinces and refused this politicization. When they left, a large number of people from Bangui joined the Anti-Balaka in order to commit crimes and called themselves Anti-Balaka.
98. The Anti-Balaka in Bangui now are just thieves; they joined in order to steal, loot and harm civilians. They did not share our objectives to defend the country. They destroyed our movement and dignity as Anti-Balaka. FACA were ashamed because they had fled their responsibilities to protect the country while we civilians stood up against the Seleka so the FACA wanted to get rid of us. NGAISSONA would manipulate the fake Anti-Balaka ComZones and their elements in order to create violence as they were mainly constituted of criminals. Real Anti-Balaka who had suffered in the bush in order to protect civilians would not take actions except for the purpose of protecting civilians.
99. I learned that NGAISSONA had meetings with President SAMBA-PANZA, but he did not tell us the full content of those meetings. NGAISSONA received money from her to protect her presidency. MOKOM had a copy of their agreement. NGAISSONA used the Anti-Balaka, but did not share that money with Anti-Balaka. When there was an arrest warrant for him, his lawyers warned him so he sent his Anti-Balaka to block roads and create troubles in town. Then, SAMBA-PANZA asked him to mediate with those Anti-Balaka in order to bring back order. He did so and the



execution of the arrest warrant was suspended. So, I felt he used the Movement for his personal interest.

NAIROBI Talks

100. There was an appeal by MOKOM to the Anti-Balaka of the provinces and those of Bangui to go to NAIROBI talks. We wanted to change the Coordination leadership. I did not join, but the Anti-Balaka Chief from OUHAM-PENDE Chika Basile, KONATE and CHIKI-CHIKI from BERBERATI did attend. All Chiefs were convened to go to NGAISSONA's house. The French Ambassador said that NGAISSONA should not go to Nairobi otherwise he would be arrested. NGAISSONA and KONATE refused to go.
101. The Anti-Balaka from provinces decided to change the Coordination because we did not want the Anti-Balaka to be a political party but just a self-defense militia. MOKOM called back to Bangui all ComZones of the provinces in order to tell us about the discussions of NAIROBI. We and MOKOM went to see MOKOKO (Representative of SASSOU-NGUESSO) and MINUSCA officials as they were the international mediators. We wanted to explain our situation. Monseigneur NZAPALENGA convened a meeting between us and NGAISSONA but NGAISSONA did not show up.
102. After the Nairobi talks, NGAISSONA sent someone to give me money so that I would support him. I told NGAISSONA that I did not want his money nor would I support him. I had suffered in the bush and he has used my pain to serve his hidden agenda. He convened a meeting of ComZones to try to win our support back. He said he would never forgive Maxim MOKOM.
103. I returned to my village one week after the Nairobi talks. In Bangui, I had just been taking care of my elements while waiting for the CAR Government to support our DDR so that we could go back to the provinces. Many people started to proclaim themselves as Chiefs and ComZones. The Anti-Balaka had already turned into a political party, and changed its name to the PCUD. This is when I decided to withdraw and dissolve my company. I told my elements to go back to their provinces and work the fields.
104. The real Anti-Balaka who are now in contact with NGAISSONA are "12 P" and KEMA who became a Parliamentarian. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This is how he got ANDJILO arrested.



North-South Distinction of Anti-Balaka

105. This distinction between the Anti-Balaka from the North of Bangui and the Anti-Balaka from the South was a political issue. There were no "real" Anti-Balaka in the South. RHOMBOT in BIMBO was supposed to attack from the South and attack KM5 and 6th and 2nd Arrondissements on 5 December 2013, but he did not. He was supposed to get weapons from the French, but he didn't get them which is why he did not attack. Those who fought on 5 December 2013 were the Anti-Balaka from the North who attacked the National Assembly, Camp Kasai, and 7th Arr. A third group entered via Sassara and attacked PK12. RHOMBOT elements failed to do their part of the job in the South and then claimed that they had fought. The groups who fought in the North wanted to attack the men of the South as retaliation, but they renounced. All those attacking from the North came from my village GBOZO. I heard about it from other combatants from the North.
106. Those who accepted money, accepted politicisation of the movement, and publically rejected BOZIZE, received money and support from the French Embassy. They were coming from the South whereas, those coming from the North including my village were accused by politicians of being pro-BOZIZE. Up to now, I have not seen evidence that we were pro-BOZIZE.

Comzones in the Provinces

107. Whenever there were attacks of Seleka in the provinces, MOKOM would be informed. In BAMBARI and BANDORO, MOKOM would give the ComZones in the Provinces instructions to defend themselves or move one way or the other. As MOKOM was known in the provinces, the Chiefs would tell MOKOM when a place is attacked by the Seleka and asked for his instructions. As they had no ammunition, MOKOM would order them to move, flee the attack and leave the Government of Transition to react. But I am not the one who can tell you how he operates.

Other figures in the Anti-Balaka movement

108. KONATE talks on behalf of the Anti-Balaka, yet he did not suffer in the bush with us and has no right to speak for us. He had an education and was able to speak French.
109. WENEZOUÏ used to live at "Ngoyas" BEOROFEI's house before he joined the Anti-Balaka and entered Government [REDACTED] He is not an Anti-Balaka.



110. Captain GREMANGOU of 8th Arr. is the one true Anti-Balaka chosen by the Anti-Balaka to join the Government, but didn't last after 3 months in government.

111. EMOTION claimed to be our Spokesperson. [REDACTED]

112. KOKATE on the way to NAIROBI offered us money so that we vote him as National General Coordinator and not MOKOM who did not offer us anything. I told my men that a man buying our vote could not be trusted. We humiliated KOKATE by supporting MOKOM. KOKATE did not want to be his Deputy so he left the movement and went back to NGAISSONA.

113. MOKOM is the one who talked on the behalf of the real Anti-Balaka at the Bangui Forum.

Contact details for ComZones

114. Lists and contact numbers for Anti-Balaka ComZones in Bangui and Provinces

- ComZone of AMADA-GAZA: [REDACTED]
- Coordinator of OUHAM -PENDE, Basile DJIKA [REDACTED]
- CARNOT [REDACTED]
- Coordinator of YALOKE (Alain) [REDACTED]
- Deputy of RHOMBO: [REDACTED]
- Coordinator of BOSSEMPTELE (Gervais) [REDACTED]
- PK12 TOUABOYE: [REDACTED]
- PK 12 HOURONTI: [REDACTED]
- Lt Bambari: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of GRIMARI (KPANOU): [REDACTED]
- DEKOA: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of GAZI: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of BOGANDA: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of BOALI: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of DAMARA [REDACTED]
- PK 12 FEIKOUMA [REDACTED]
- Patrick OROFEL: [REDACTED]
- Jean XXIII and DAMARA now DOTE Delphin: [REDACTED]
- BENJAMIN: [REDACTED]
- SIBUT: [REDACTED]
- ComZone of BAMBARI: [REDACTED]
- "12 P": [REDACTED]



116. I have given the investigators four photographs from the time period when I was a Comzone in Bangui. They scanned these photos onto a memory card and returned the originals to me. (See Annex E)

ANNEXES

Annex A: Waiver of Counsel signed by witness

Annex B: Map of path I took from [REDACTED] to GOBERE and towns the Anti-Balaka attacked near BOSSANGO

Annex C: Diagram of towns near GOBERE where the Anti-Balaka were deployed

Annex D: Sketch of Anti-Balaka bases in MANDABA, BOY RABE

Annex E: Memory card containing four scanned photos of Witness


Closing Procedure

117. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.
118. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings
119. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
120. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.
121. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
122. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.



WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the French language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.



INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by Jo Brice OUABIRO DANA that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of Jo Brice OUABIRO DANA who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. Jo Brice OUABIRO DANA has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

