

**INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR**

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: BEINA

Gender: Male

First Name: Vivien

Father's Name: [REDACTED]

Other names used: Ngbha Rostand

Mother's Name: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: Bocaranga, CAR

Passport / ID number: CAR [REDACTED]

Date of Birth/Age: 25/11/1983 (32 years old) Nationality(s): Central African

Ethnicity: Gbaya (Ouest)

Religion: Christian

Language(s) Spoken: Sango, French, English

Language(s) Written: Sango, French

Language(s) Used in Interview: French, English

Occupation: Programmer for IT Applications

Place of Interview: Bangui, CAR

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and was told that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and was told that they are interpreters with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in Central African Republic from August 2012 to present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I agreed that the interview would be conducted in English and interpreted into French. I fully understand and speak French.
5. The investigators explained to me that I do not have to answer their questions.
6. The investigators explained to me that they are seeking to find out the truth. I agree to tell the truth and that my answers to their questions are as complete as possible and reflect the best of my knowledge and recollection.
7. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, may be shared with the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
8. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
9. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigator's questions.
10. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told that I needed to be as accurate as possible in my account and that I should state when I do not know the answer to or do not understand the

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question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.

11. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

12. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I am a civilian. I've never been involved in any politics.

13. [REDACTED]

14. From 2012-to the end of 2013, I was employed by a company called [REDACTED] near the *Stade Vingt-Mille Places*. The company was financed by the General Manager's private funds. The company closed after the events of 2013 and 2014 and the General Manager left.

15. In 2015, I travelled to Cameroon twice and assisted [REDACTED] in his meetings with [REDACTED] to potentially open a branch in CAR.


16. [REDACTED]

Seleka in power in BANGUI

17. What happened in CAR was a conflict between BOZIZÉ and DJOTODIA. Before he came, DJOTODIA's mercenaries were based in the north and north-east of the country and they should have stayed there. People trusted the Seleka not to enter

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Bangui. When the Seleka came to Bangui, they committed killings along the way. They raped women, killed children, and killed their parents. This began nine months of pillage, torture, and killings. The Seleka also did evil in the remote areas of country.

18. DJOTODIA's power was not legitimate. There were no legitimate police or army anymore, just mercenaries dressed in uniforms they had stolen. At the Gendarmerie or Police HQ you would find only Muslim colonels who knew nothing about justice and only how to take things by force. The Gendarmerie was a great force but the person in the role of the Deputy to the General Director was a simple gendarme who turned himself into a colonel. He was a Goula named Djouma NARKOYO.

Detention by SELEKA

19. Throughout the Seleka period, I was living in [REDACTED] with my little brother Habib BEINA. He is 31 years old. He was a *Caporal-chef* in the *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA). He was arrested once by the Seleka.
20. The Seleka came with weapons to our house and took Habib away. I asked to go with him, but they pointed their weapons at me and threatened to kill me. They were informed that my brother had weapons in the house and searched the house, but didn't find any. They took my phone, computers and printers. Habib was beaten as they took him away. At the time, we didn't know where he was taken to. Later when I called my own phone, someone in BRIA.
21. My older sister [REDACTED] put an announcement on radio Ndeke Luka when he was taken. My cousin searched for him at the police station and brigade. The Seleka were killing people when they took them. We learned on the radio that they killed nearly 30 people near SODECA and a common grave was found there. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Habib was released two days later. He had been held at Camp de Roux.
22. Habib spent one day at home before he was called by [REDACTED] who sent him to the Prosecutor who then sent him to the police. He was then taken by the gendarme to OCRB where he spent a week.
23. In the OCRB, they were killing people they picked up during night patrols. I visited Habib there who said they were going to kill him one day. "They are

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taking people just like that and they kill them in the 7th Arrondissement," he said. He escaped and fled to ZONGO where he lived for four or five months.

24. A week later, on a Sunday, the Seleka came for me, including a petit from the quartier. [REDACTED] They took me and my other brother, [REDACTED], to their base not far away.
25. They returned to my house, shooting their guns in the air. I had been raising funds to create a cyber café so my wife gave them 3000 CFA and that's when they released me. We had nothing to live on afterwards. It was very hard with my wife and children at home.
26. The Seleka brought me to their base which was "BTP" company site (Batiments Travaux Publics), called Le Semence. They had taken it over. There was a security agent who was guarding the block of flats near it who saw me. I don't know his name but he is a MINUSCA night guard now and I see him sometimes. It was common for the Seleka to take over other people's places.
27. There was a group of Seleka there when I got there. They were unkempt and badly behaved. I'm not sure I would even recognize them again. They said that they heard I had brothers in the army and the gendarmerie. I told them yes and my father was a gendarme. They said that they would inform their general and that I would be killed that day as the brother of a military. They searched my house while I was at the base. I was released when my wife paid the 3000 CFA.
28. I was kept there from 0700 to 1100 hours. They didn't beat me up, but they threatened to kill me. There was no one else detained there, but I couldn't see the interior of the company building.

Arrival of Anti-Balaka to BANGUI

29. Under Seleka rule, people felt helpless and this triggered the creation of the Anti-Balaka. It came from everywhere, not one person. Initially, people only gathered to protect themselves. When the Seleka entered villages, they killed men, women and children. Some of the boys managed to escape and they organised to defend themselves. If you take 100 Anti-Balaka, everyone has their reasons for joining. They can tell you what the Seleka did to them in order to turn them to the Anti-Balaka. People didn't initially gather to retake Bangui. The idea of taking Bangui came later. The goal was to get rid of the Seleka. They had no political ambition.
30. I was living in BIMBO at the time the Anti-Balaka attacked BANGUI. The first time was on 5 December. The second attack occurred before Christmas. BIMBO

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was quiet and I wasn't a part of the attacks. I never left my neighbourhood during December.

31. Before the first attack, I know Anti-Balaka gathered in BOEING near the airport. I don't know who was commanding, but I know ROMBHOT was there. Sebastien WENEZOU and Captain NGREMANGOU were also there. There was also Captain KAMAZOULAI who was with ROMBHOT, and was captured by one of NOURREDINE's group and taken to SERD prior. ROMBHOT also had been captured by the Seleka prior and had fled to ZONGO before December. Most of the people who fled to ZONGO had been at one time detained by the Seleka. I don't know what the chain of command was.
32. WENEZOU told me later that he encouraged NGAISSONA to return to BANGUI from Cameroon.
33. After the 5 December attack the Anti-Balak split: ROMBHOT moved from BOEING to BIMBO while other groups stayed in BOEING. I don't know if the BOEING group was under WENEZOU's command or not. YAWARA was the area they were at in BOEING. It's a quarter in BOEING that is close to the airport. My younger brother Habib joined the Anti-Balaka and was with ROMBHOT in BOEING. Sometimes he would phone me to tell me where he was.
34. I know the second attack was focused on KM5, but I don't know more.
35. Most of the Anti-Balaka groups were made up of people who had fled from the Seleka into the bush and formed there before coming to BANGUI. Others were children who fled killings in their neighbourhood and joined the Anti-Balaka for protection. Anti-Balaka stayed in BOEING, the 8th Arrondissement, BOY RABE, GALABADJIA, COMBATTANT, PK12, and BIMBO. Some lived with parents or friends there. Most were children who went into the bush and reinvented themselves, and returned to BANGUI.
36. When the Anti-Balaka were approaching BANGUI along the southern axis, they grouped behind the bridge in BIMBO. Paleon ZILABO and I went to talk to them and asked them not to enter the neighbourhoods and take revenge. They were armed, uneducated, and untrained. We told them it's better to protect the population, and not to do anything against the people and families living in those areas. We told them that nobody should be above the law. We spoke to ROMBHOT.
37. After the attacks on BANGUI, I told ROMBHOT that they needed to enter into discussions with the authorities. They needed someone with political experience to do that. At that time, the Anti-Balaka group was being contacted by a lot of

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NGOs. I proposed someone I worked with before, Paleon ZILABO and ROMBHOT accepted. I went to ZILABO and told him that if the men came into the neighbourhoods they would take revenge. I told him, "You can be their interface." We discussed this with WENEZOUÏ and other chiefs in BOEING. It took time, but we eventually acted as the interface with authorities and NGOs.

Anti-Balaka Coordination

38. Marie MONTAGNE was appointed by the government to the MINISTRY of Reconciliation to assist in talking to armed groups. She convened a meeting in the office of the Prime-Minister. They told the Anti-Balaka to structure their groups so that the government could go forward with a counterpart on their side. Anti-Balaka set up the Coordination to show that they were organized and to "have a voice at the table."
39. In early April, we created an ad-hoc committee for the South. Sebastien WENEZOUÏ was chosen to be coordinator of an ad-hoc committee representing the Anti-Balaka of BIMBO and BOEING. I was designated as his secretary and ZILABO was an advisor. At that time, the North and South Anti-Balaka groups were not coordinated. We knew we had to coordinate with the Anti-Balaka in BOY RABE.
40. A Dane called Jerome and Madame ANDARA, Mayor of 4th Arr., with NGO MUDA called the two Anti-Balaka groups to meet at the UNDP. The BOEING and BIMBO group met with the BOY RABE groups. It was decided to create an office representing all the Anti-Balaka groups. NGAISSONA was chosen as Coordinator General, through Jerome's mediation. NGAISSONA had arrived in Bangui after December 5th. WENEZOUÏ was designated as his deputy. I was chosen as General Treasurer. Romaric VOMITIADE was chosen as Secretary General. The unified group now had the chance to speak to the authorities. The SAMBA-PANZA government was the same as the DJOTODIA government, with the same people involved. This made discussions with them difficult.
41. The Coordination was constituted as follows: The Coordinator General was NGAISSONA and the Deputy Coordinator was WENEZOUÏ. The Secretary General was VOMITIADE, who prepared recommendations for the Brazzaville peace talks. There was also a Deputy Secretary General and advisors who settled disputes and issues in the field, and reported to the NGAISSONA. I was Treasurer and there was also a Deputy Treasurer, Sylvain BEOROFEI, but we never spoke. WENEZOUÏ appointed him. There was also an auditor, Dieudonne NDOMATE. I don't remember all their names.

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42. NGAISSONA had to be very patient to coordinate. There was a vacuum in authority. Those who were in charge had fled. The population was abandoned and in the hands of criminals. The Anti-Balaka did not have a political ambition or structure, and they wanted revenge. People had lost everything.
43. In the South, the population were protected by the Anti-Balaka. There was no trouble like in the North. In fact, the people showed their support by electing ROMBHOT as their MP against 16 rivals. The Anti-Balaka (North) had many leaders and problems.
44. After the Coordination was organised, the Anti-Balaka were able to work with the government and took part in the talks in Brazzaville. The Coordination became the focal point for complaints. People who were ill or hit by bullets knew where to go. The Coordination also acted to bring combatants to reason. Anti-Balaka groups had no internal regulation or constitution, but the Coordination did not create a constitution. The purpose for the Coordination was for the government to have a focal point, but the positions of the Coordination were voluntary.
45. The Anti-Balaka now have 9 MPs in Parliament.

Role with Anti-Balaka

46. It was only after May that I became involved with the Anti-Balaka Coordination. Aside from some talks with ROMBHOT and WENEZOU, I was not involved before May.
47. I never managed any money. My post had no responsibilities. I accepted it because I wanted to control our brothers. I never received money as treasurer. There was no bank account for the group. There was no office or documents related to finance for instance. I never signed a financial document.
48. I was not in the military chain of command. I was a civilian. In BOY RABE, the combatants were looting and they were very brutal. We had a Coordination meeting where asked them to change their behaviour. NGAISSONA gave them this advice too.

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Additional Explanation of RJDH article, 15 May 2014 (CAR-OTP-2001-4867)

49. WENEZOU I was in BOEING and wanted to free the route to the Muslim cemetery so that the Muslims could bury their dead. He was called a traitor for this by those in BOEING.
50. Anti-Balaka in BOY RABE were committing blunders. It wasn't good for armed combatants to live among civilians. I heard there were problems in Combattant, the 8th Arrondissement, and the 7th Arr. too.
51. "Troublemakers" is a general term that meant the Anti-Balaka from the southern group. In BOY RABE, Emotion NAMSIO was the spokesperson, but they didn't recognize those from BIMBO and BOEING. Even after the Coordination was formed, he remained the spokesperson.

Zone Commanders (ComZones) in BANGUI


52. The zone commanders came after the conflict. ComZone is the commander of the bush elements who came into the city. People came from the bush and would claim a zone after the Seleka were pushed out. ComZones were self-proclaimed. As an example, ANDJILLO came from BOUCA, but he claimed a zone in BANGUI. Anyone who had a group, proclaimed themselves a ComZone. You could have 15 or 30 groups in one area, each with their own commander. There were a lot of zone commanders in every zone. These new ComZones didn't want commanders imposed on them when they reached the city. The ComZones could be brutal and people tended to avoid them. The Coordination did not select zone commanders. The fewer ComZones in the South: Basile MBOMON and ROMBHOT, all from the military.
53. The ComZones didn't just stay in their own zone, they moved around and visited people. Commanders respected each other's zones though because many of them had relatives in a zone.
54. If the government had anticipated the situation it would have been OK in the city. But the Anti-Balaka needed to feed themselves so they started stealing. I was never with the zone commanders so I'm not sure of their involvement in these crimes.

Crimes in BANGUI

55. The Anti-Balaka protected and controlled the southern part of BANGUI. Evidence of that is that ROMBHOT was elected to Parliament. The Anti-Balaka

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in the North and the South committed wrongdoings. Most of the crimes were in the North because the combatants lived with the population, whereas those in the South retreated.

56. Most of those responsible for the crimes are in prison. You can contact them via the prison and they can talk about their conditions. There were some "loose cannons" who stole cars and were arrested by the Anti-Balaka Military Police. They were brought to the Gendarmerie and are now in prison. This was how peace came back to the 4th Arr. Sometimes radio announcements say someone has been arrested and asks for people to come forward who have grievances against them.
57. Nobody is above the law. Liberating Bangui was one thing, but the crimes that came afterwards, they must be held accountable for. For example, ANDJILO is in prison and he can account for his actions.

Military Police

58. Those with military training led the military police units. They would respond to crimes and make arrests. If a car was stolen, they'd get it back. They brought Anti-Balaka criminals to the gendarmes. I never saw them in the South of Bangui. They had their own chain of command.

DDR Mission

59. I was sent by NGAISSONA on a mission to tell Anti-Balaka groups about the DDR program. We were deployed to LOBAYE, the East and South of CAR to meet with ex-combatants. People were sent to different areas. The mission chief was ROMBHOT with Paleon ZILABO and me as his assistants.

Anti-Balaka figures


60.



61. Romaric VOMITIADE was Minister for Tourism. When the Coordination was established, he was chosen as Secretary General. He became a minister later, but
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[REDACTED]

62. Maxim MOKOM [REDACTED] He wanted BOZIZE back and called for a constitutional order. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MOKOM was given millions of CFA for the Anti-Balaka to attend the BRAZZAVILLE peace talks, but he kept most of the money instead. Each person was supposed to have gotten 2 million CFA. Instead, MOKOM gave us 900,000 each and said it was only 1 million we were to get. He said he took 100,000 from each of us, to give to those Anti-Balaka who couldn't attend. MOKOM is influential in GOBONGO in the 4th Arr., and that's where he still lives. I know MOKOM, but I have no personal relationship. He and NGAISSONA do not get along.

63. Those closest to MOKOM are: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Those who shared MOKOM's views went to NAIROBI. DJOTODIA and BOZIZE were also at the Nairobi talks.

ANNEXES

64. None

Closing Procedure

65. I was informed that I may be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.

66. The investigators informed me of the protective measures that may apply during and after the investigation and/or trial proceedings.

67. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.

68. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.

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69. There has not been any form of coercion, duress, threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.

70. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the French and English language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.



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INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by Vivien BEINA that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of Vivien BEINA who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. BEINA has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

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