

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: NGAYA

Gender: Male

First Name: Alfred Legrand

Other names used:

Place of Birth: BANGUI, CAR

Passport number: [REDACTED] issued [REDACTED]

Date of Birth/Age: 14/09/1960

Nationality(s): Central African Republic

Language(s) Spoken: French and Sango

Language(s) Written: French

Language(s) Used in Interview: French-English

Occupation: Director of Cabinet for the Ministry of Tourism

Place of Interview: [REDACTED]

Date(s) and Time(s) of Interview: [REDACTED]

Names of all persons present during interview: Investigator [REDACTED]
Investigator [REDACTED] Interpreter [REDACTED] Witness Alfred NGAYA



WITNESS STATEMENT

Procedure

1. I was introduced to Investigators [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and told that they are investigators with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). I was introduced to interpreter [REDACTED] and told that he is an interpreter with the OTP of the ICC.
2. The investigators explained to me what the ICC is and described its mandate. They explained the role and mandate of the OTP within the ICC.
3. The investigators explained to me that they are investigating events that took place in the Central African Republic between August 2012 to the present. I was informed that the OTP is contacting me because they believe I may have information relevant for establishing the truth.
4. I was read my rights under Article 55 (2) and this portion of my statement was audiotaped. I chose not to have the interview recorded beyond the explanation of my rights. I waived my right to have counsel present during the interview and signed a waiver. The interview tape is attached as a memory card, Annex A. The Waiver form is attached as Annex B.
5. I was told that I have the right to be questioned in a language that I fully understand and speak. I confirm that French is a language that I fully understand and speak. I confirm that the language used by the interpreter in this interview is French.
6. The investigators explained to me that this interview is voluntary and that I may end it at any time.
7. I was informed that any information I give to the OTP, including my identity, might become subject to disclosure to the parties of the proceedings at the ICC; in particular the Judges, Accused persons, the Counsel of the Accused and the legal representatives of the victims.
8. I was informed that I might be called to testify before the Court. It was brought to my attention that ICC trials are held in public and explained to me that, as an exception to the principle of public hearings, the judges may apply protective measures to those testifying if circumstances require.



9. I am currently willing to appear as a witness in Court, if called to testify. I understand that disclosure of my identity and information I have provided may take place whether or not I am called to testify.
10. The possible security implications resulting from my interaction with the OTP were discussed with me. The investigators have explained to me the reasons and importance of keeping my contacts with the OTP confidential, which I fully understand.
11. Having understood all the above issues, I confirmed my willingness to answer the investigators' questions.
12. The investigators explained to me how the interview was going to be conducted. I was told by the investigators that it is important that I am as accurate as possible in my account; and that I state when I do not know or do not understand the question. I understand that I need to distinguish between what I have experienced or seen myself and what I have heard or learned about from someone else.
13. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had the opportunity to review it, make any corrections, or add additional information.

Background

14. I was born in BANGUI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] As a consequence, my family frequently moved. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Since 1992, I have lived in [REDACTED] in BANGUI. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
15. I completed my higher education at the University of Bangui in youth education and sociology. I have a Master's degree in Sociology of Work and Organizations from the University Lumière LYON 2, France. In 1992 I became a civil servant.
16. I served in the following positions within the CAR Civil Service:
 - 1995-1997, Chief of Service for the Ministry for Youth and Sports
 - 1997-1999, Chief of Cabinet for the Ministry of Social Affairs
 - 1999-2006, Chief of Service for the Ministry of Youth and Sports
 - 2004-2007, Executive Secretary for DDR (Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration)
 - 2006-2014, Director General of Youth for Ministry of Youth and Sports
 - 2014-2015, Special Advisor for Ministry of Handicrafts



2015-present, Director of Cabinet for Ministry of Tourism

17. I was shown document CAR-OTP-2004-0380, a Decree that removed me as the Director General for Ministry of Youth and Sports which is accurate. I also was shown document CAR-OTP-2004-0578-0579, a Decree which appointed me as Special Advisor of Handicrafts which is accurate.
18. From 1992-2004, I was a member of the Social Democratic party. From 2004-2008, I joined the Central Africa Democratic party and was first national secretary. I didn't have time to continue in politics due to my professional and religious work so I stepped down in 2008.
19. From 2002-2004, I studied theology at the Faculty of Evangelical Theology in Bangui. I am a Pentecostal. The Holy Ghost guides me. I first started a church in my living room. I now have three churches that I manage in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and at [REDACTED] on the road to [REDACTED] They are all called [REDACTED] Church.
20. My interest in national politics is with an evangelical view. For example, in early 2013 when the Seleka approached BANGUI, I met with 50 pastors and organized activities. I organized a large collective prayer in the stadium. I also organized a march of pastors and we wrote letters to the President, the French President, and to the EU. Another example is that 21-23 March 2013, 16 others and I fasted and prayed in the national stadium. I organized the religious ceremony for the jubilee for the 50th Anniversary of CAR.

August 2012-24 March 2013: BOZIZE period before Seleka took power

21. I have no relationship with Francois BOZIZE nor anyone in the BOZIZE family.
22. I believe that the Seleka rebels' claim that the Francois BOZIZE Government did not take care of their region was just a pretext. In reality other regions were also suffering and the Government tried to do as much as it could. For example, BOZIZE's Government built roads to OBO and VAKAGA. I personally visited the BIRAOU – VAKAGA area during 2008 and saw improvements done to the area. I even photographed some of these improvements. I therefore felt that these accusations against BOZIZE were unjust. [REDACTED]



23. The rebellion against President BOZIZE was started by DJOTODIA in BIRAO. Several rebel groups from BIRAO and NDELE made demands to BOZIZE for more inclusiveness in the government. They started negotiations and marching to BRIA and BAMBARI and BANGUI. The CAR army retreated to SIBUT. Despite the deployment of FOMAC, South African forces and French forces, the Seleka were able to enter BANGUI.
24. Although the BOZIZE government had a longstanding defence agreement with France, President HOLLANDE did not support him. I believe there is a strong anti-French feeling in the Central African Republic. The general feeling is that the French do not want us to develop as a country and some believe that the Seleka rebels were used by the French to destroy the country.
25. Michel DJOTODIA wrote to Saudi Arabia claiming that the Muslims in Central African Republic were being mistreated which was not the case. I believe that France and Arab countries collaborated to destroy our country. When the Seleka invaded the country BOZIZE called for help from the French Government. They responded that they would not support his regime.
26. I believe that this attitude by France was directly related to the mineral resources that can be found in the Central African Republic. For example, BOZIZE approached the French to assist the country in the exploitation of uranium. The French claimed that the Uramine was of a low quality and that they were not interested. A South African company, Uramin, then conducted further tests and reported that the uranium was actually of a very high quality. A French company, AREVA, bought the rights to exploit the mines, but put any operations on hold until 2035 so CAR can't benefit from the mines until 2035.
27. Another example is cement: The French claimed that the quarries did not carry sufficient quality material to be exploited. An Indian company conducted some tests and confirmed that the quality was good. They built a factory, but it is not operational because they lack an electricity supply.
28. Another example is oil: As a country we have always been made to believe that there were no oil resources in the Central African Republic. It was rather strange that oil could be found in all of our neighbouring countries but not in ours. A Chinese company managed to obtain a license and before they could start exploiting oil the Seleka attacked the area.
29. I believe that France viewed BOZIZE as a threat and an enemy, and used him as a scapegoat. The Seleka were allowed to overthrow a Government and destroy everything and nobody assisted us. We felt weak and defenceless.



30. In early March 2013 the Seleka had already advanced to DAMARA. The youth in Bangui gathered in front of BOZIZE's political party's offices and requested to be provided with firearms to defend the city. No firearms were provided to them, but the Seleka had firearms and the youth remained unarmed.

31. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The soldiers were competent but I believe that there was [REDACTED] I am not able to identify any of the military leaders.

32. [REDACTED]
33. [REDACTED]
34. [REDACTED]

35. The FOMAC forces and French troops were in Bangui and we hoped that they would defend our city, but they didn't.

BOSSEMBELE prison

36. I don't have any links with President BOZIZE's security system. One of BOZIZE's weaknesses is that he didn't target political leaders. His opponents were free to move about. Maybe people were arrested and jailed, but I don't have any information about that. I left politics before this time and just focused on my work and religious activities. I'm not aware of any violence committed during President BOZIZE's reign.

37. I heard about the prison in BOSSEMBELE but I have never visited it. I heard that there was a strong presence of the Presidential Guard in BOSSEMBELE. I know a person who was arrested in Bangui and detained at the BOSSEMBELE prison. His name is [REDACTED] and he was a Christian Seleka. I met him when I was



[REDACTED] I do not know why he was arrested but once the Seleka arrived in Bangui he was released and he became one of the leaders in the movement. His phone number is [REDACTED]

Machetes

38. I am not aware of any machetes being distributed to the youth by President BOZIZE. I heard from International media reports that this happened but I never saw this. Every household in CAR will have at least one machete as it is a useful tool.
39. I saw on the television (RFI) that when the Anti-Balaka entered Bangui they attacked the KM5 area and killed many people using machetes.

24th March – 5th December 2013: Seleka in Power

40. BANGUI was invaded by forces from Chad, Darfur, and Sudan, and President BOZIZE fled CAR. The Seleka entered Bangui on 24 March, 2013.
41. Central African Republic is used to coup d'états. In the past, we just waited for the new person to take over and put his people in place. Instead, the Seleka started attacking us. They especially targeted FACA elements. They would hunt them down, kidnap them, and then their bodies would be found in the river. Seleka considered BOY RABE to be BOZIZE's neighborhood and targeted it. They killed, looted, and stole people's possessions. They looted Christian neighborhoods and brought the loot to KM5, the Muslim area.
42. I was fearful of the Seleka because I was a Christian leader. I went to work as usual managing the church but things were not easy. I worked for Minister Abdoulaye HISSEIN at the Ministry of Youth who did not approve of the Seleka. On 14 April 2014 my house in BOY RABE was looted by the Seleka [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Everything I owned was taken away by the Seleka. I left the area and moved to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In March 2014 I moved back to BOY RABE. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
43. DJOTODIA's wife tried to involve me in the youth programmes but I avoided meeting with them as I believed that they were still looking for me. I also did not want to be an accomplice of what they were doing. Nobody dared to speak up against the Seleka. One politician, Joseph BENDOUNGA, spoke out on the radio. He

criticized and denounced the actions of the Seleka. I do not know if anything happened to him as a result of his statements. Pastor Nicholas GUEREKOYAME also spoke out against the Seleka and he was arrested. The Archbishop went to the police to protest and the Pastor was eventually released.

44. The Seleka took weapons away from the FACA so no one could defend themselves. People disappeared. People couldn't speak out. FOMAC and Chadian forces acted just like the Seleka so there was no one to go to for help.
45. In May 2013, I called for all Chef de Quartiers and community leaders to come together to form an association or collective of the 4th Arrondissement to combat crime in the 4th Arr. We denounced the Seleka's actions by writing press releases to the embassies, to the media, and speaking on the radio.
46. Between 20-27 August, 2013, the Seleka attacked BOY RABE, looting and killing people. I asked to speak to Prime Minister TIANGAYE, but he said he was overwhelmed with the situation and didn't know what to do.

National Coordination Committee for Peace and Security

47. I created the National Coordination Committee for Peace and Security in November 2013 to denounce crimes by the Seleka on a national level. Community leaders, intellectuals, and community organizations joined from BOY RABE, MISKINE, COMBATTANTS, GOBONGO, ST. JEAN 23rd, and BOEING. It only existed from November 2013 to January 2014. We only had a few meetings. One of the main reasons why it did not last was because of fear of the Seleka [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
48. I had to be very careful with my own movements at this time. I would still have secret meetings with the National Coordination Committee and I would use my motorcycle to deliver my media releases to different offices in Bangui.
49. Two of our members were arrested in the 4th Arrondissement and tortured [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] &
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] They were released a few days before DJOTODIA resigned and they are still living in Bangui.

November-December 2013: Formation of the Anti-Balaka attack

50. The Seleka also committed crimes in the countryside, like in BOUAR, BOSSANGO, BOUCA, and BOCARANGA and the youth rebelled. We started hearing that people were mobilising all over the country and moving towards Bangui using the cattle routes. FACA members formed a movement called "Siriri"



(meaning "peace" in Sango) to resist the Seleka. Lieutenant KONATE was the leader of this group. I know that Lieutenant Abel DENAMGANAI also joined the "Siriri".

51. I am not sure if the term Anti-Balaka was used at this time but I know the name "Siriri" was used already. The name Anti-Balaka was being used by the time they attacked Bangui on the 5th December 2013.
52. They all reached Bangui at the end of November and set up a base behind the hill in BOY RABE, in BOEING and BIMBO. Initially the youth only had machetes as weapons. They would attack the Seleka and take their firearms. They were called the Anti-Bal-Aka – which meant "anti AK-47 bullets." These youth wore armbands (gris-gris) that protected them against bullets. The armbands could be touched in a certain way that would cause a jam in the firearm of the enemy. The enemy would then not be able to fire his gun. For example, Lt KONATE visited the Ministry of Security to collect his passport. He was approached by the police who wanted to arrest him. He pushed his armband up and drew his gun. The police were not able to fire and he managed to escape.
53. The youths from BOY RABE also joined the Anti-Balaka who were gathering behind BOY RABE hill preparing to attack the Seleka. I do not know how many people were gathered there but heard there were many. They started to run out of food and it is possible that the locals provided them with supplies. [REDACTED]
54. I am not aware of any meetings held to co-ordinate the Anti-Balaka attack on Bangui. I spoke to Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA who became the leader of the Anti-Balaka and a friend of mine, by phone at the time. He was in YAOUNDE, Cameroon and did not mention the planned attack. I do not know who was coordinating the attack on Bangui.
55. I'm not aware that anyone provided weapons or money to the Anti-Balaka. I later heard that the Sangaris were involved in coordinating the movement of the Anti-Balaka to converge on Bangui. The Anti-Balaka was promised to be provided with weapons by the Sangaris but this never materialised.

December 2013: Anti-Balaka Attack on Bangui

56. On the 5th December 2013, Lt. KONATE, a FACA member, and his men attacked Bangui from the KASAI area and attempted to take control of Camp de Roux and the Radio Station, but they failed. The youth armed with sticks and machetes clashed with the Seleka in front of the parliament and the Anti-Balaka were slaughtered.



Other Anti-Balaka attacked from MBAIKI through BIMBO. Alfred Yekatom ROMBHOT led that group. I knew him as a Zone Commander of BIMBO.

57. On the 5th December 2013, I stayed at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] His house has a fence and gate and we decided to stay indoors. We were able to watch some of the events unfold on the television news.
58. I heard that after the initial attack the Anti-Balaka fanned out to areas like BOEING, GALABADJA, COMBATTANTS, GOBONGO and BOY RABE. The Anti-Balaka were easy to recognise as they were wearing charms and gris-gris.
59. The attack lasted for approximately 1 to 2 weeks. During a lull in the fighting we would go out to get food. The GOBONGO area was not the focus of the attack so there was not that much activity. The main attack was launched in the MISKINE and KM5 areas. I did not witness any crimes committed in GOBONGO. We were waiting and hoping that DJOTODIA would leave. We stayed indoors most of the time. It was dangerous to venture out and we were even concerned that the Anti-Balaka could hurt us.
60. The Burundian contingent protected the civilians but the Chadians caused many problems. For example, during a peaceful march in COMBATTANTS the French were present to monitor the march but the Chadians intervened and fired directly into the marchers. There were frequent clashes between the Chadians and the Anti-Balaka.

January-October 2014: My membership and role with the Anti-Balaka

61. As Coordinator of the National Coordination for Peace and Security, I was invited along with other civil society organizations and parties to a one day meeting with the Transitional Government (CNT). NGAISSONA was also invited to this meeting as the head of the Anti-Balaka.
62. I had known NGAISSONA when he was elected to parliament and I was on his campaign team. He was Minister of Youth when I was Director General of Youth. We live in the same neighborhood and are friends.
63. On the same day as this meeting with the CNT, NGAISSONA was invited to a meeting with MISCA and other Anti-Balaka leaders. NGAISSONA asked me if I would represent him at the CNT meeting so I spoke on his behalf and my deputy, Brice TOUABOY, represented the National Coordination for Peace and Security association.
64. The meeting that NGAISSONA attended with MISCA was not an actual meeting, but an arrest of the Anti-Balaka leaders. Because I had represented the Anti-Balaka at



the CNT meeting, people assumed I was Anti-Balaka and I also was arrested. This is how I ended up joining the Anti-Balaka.

65. I was worried when I saw Anti-Balaka also committing crimes like the Seleka. I am an apostle and I thought that I could explain to them that they had to respect human rights. Some listened and others did not. [REDACTED] didn't listen. I consider him to be a very bad man.
66. The international forces decided that the Anti-Balaka could not be part of the DDR because they were civilians. I disagreed because the young people had weapons and knew how to use them. People abandoned the young Anti-Balaka, They were afraid of them. So I started writing press releases to the UNSC, President OBAMA, the French parliament, South African President ZUMA, and others to tell them really what had happened. It was only a small percentage of the Anti-Balaka who caused problems. I felt my role was to represent the Anti-Balaka and not abandon them. My goal was to steer the youth as a way out of the conflict.
67. Others, who I call "hardliners" want to use the arms struggle as a way to bring Bozize back to power. If they could create violence and problems, people will want Bozize to return. I don't know if they were in contact with BOZIZE at this time.
68. I arranged meetings with Anti-Balaka Zone Commanders ("Comzones") to tell them not to commit crimes. I used my role as a pastor and visited neighborhoods on my motorbike and talked to people. I saw that the hardliners disagreed with me.
69. The Anti-Balaka wanted to be represented in the new CNT. At the BRAZZAVILLE talks, it was agreed that the Anti-Balaka would be part of the new government, but SAMBA-PANZA didn't want this.
70. The goal of the BRAZZAVILLE talks in July 2014, was to bring about conditions to bring peace to CAR. The Anti-Balaka had the goal to create peace, but the Seleka opposed this and wanted to divide the country. I was present at the peace talks along with 21 others. It included Anti-Balaka representatives from Bangui and also the provinces of: BERBARATI, CARNOT, BOUAR, BOZOU, BOSSANGOA, BAMBARI, SIBUT, and KEMO.
71. Emotion NAMSIO was the Anti-Balaka spokesperson. He was arrested one day returning from SIBUT by the Sangaris at PK12. He had taken weapons from Anti-Balaka in FERE, between SIBUT and DAMARA and was turning them in as part of the disarmament process when he was arrested and accused of having weapons. Everyone knew he was doing good. His arrest triggered violence in Bangui in October 2014.
72. The Anti-Balaka called for SAMBA-PANZA's resignation, and demanded that Emotion be released. The Anti-Balaka also demanded to be represented in government, and Mahmat KAMOUM resignation. SAMBA-PANZA then requested a meeting with us. She accepted some of our demands and rejected others. She asked



NGAISSONA to withdraw his demand that she resign. NGAISSONA didn't tell others that she had asked him to do this.

73. When I left the meeting with SAMBA-PANZA, I was called by a journalist, Olivier ROGER, from RFI who asked how the meeting went and I told him. The interview was published and people thought I had acted alone and alone withdrew the demand for her resignation. The hardliners seized this opportunity to say that I had been bribed by her. Some hardliners, [REDACTED] wanted to kill me. I fled [REDACTED] and stayed in [REDACTED]. When the Anti-Balaka then committed crimes, such as burning houses and killing people [REDACTED] resigned. [REDACTED] We had been moving toward peace, and then they reverted back to violence.
74. I was shown several press releases about the meeting and my resignation, CAR-OTP-2001-6105, CAR-OTP-2001-6112, CAR-OTP-6432, and the articles are accurate.
75. I stayed at [REDACTED] for two months and during that time, the youth realized that they had been manipulated against me and I was able to return home.
76. MISCA and MINUSCA advised the Anti-Balaka that they should form as a political party, so they formed the Central African Party for Unity and Development. NGAISSONA asked me to become their political advisor. The party was never recognized though. My aim was to prevent the youth from acting badly. NGAISSONA and Emotion NAMSIO also had the same wish for peace.
77. In October 2014, my house was looted. I lost everything before when the Seleka took everything. I was able to buy a new vehicle and motorbike again, but then the Anti-Balaka hardliners took them. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was threatened by Anti-Balaka in Boeing and Combattants. They told my wife that I must pay them the money that Samba-Panza had paid me. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
78. In August-September 2015, four Anti-Balaka who caused problems were arrested: [REDACTED]. Their arrest triggered violence in Bangui. Hardliners used these men to create violence, and then these four took advantage of the violent situation to steal. They were from BOY RABE and caused problems in BOY RABE and elsewhere, but I don't know where.
79. Occasionally I still advise Anti-Balaka to try to convince them not to commit violent acts. I also hold a mass prayer.



CLPC/Anti-Balaka Organizational Structure

80. The initial formation of the CLPC was created by FACA members before the December 2013 attack and they had fled to ZONGO, DRC. The leader was FACA [REDACTED]
81. The official CLPC (*Combattants pour la Libération du peuple Centrafricains*) was formed after the election of SAMBA-PANZA as the President of the Interim Government in January 2014. The leaders at the National level of the CLPC were mostly from a civilian background. The name CLPC didn't last and we were named Anti-Balaka instead by the end of January or beginning of February 2014. CLPC and Anti-Balaka are one in the same.
82. On 14 January 2014, Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA returned from YAOUNDE, Cameroon and gathered all the Zone Commanders. His aim at the time was to get control over the different Anti-Balaka groups and to focus their efforts on establishing peace in the area.
83. I have drawn an organigram of the Anti-Balaka structure, titled, "National Coordination of the Movement Anti-Balaka Patriots" (see attached Annex C). This organigram depicts the structure of the Anti-Balaka hierarchy in February or early March 2014. The structure evolved to this point. Each position in the Anti-Balaka structure, starting with the Coordination Committee (initially called Steering Committee), is described as follows:
84. Charge de Mission (Special Envoy), "CMS" was Paleon NZILABO. He received instruction from the General Coordinator, NGAISSONA, regarding missions. His role was to collect information of incidents in BANGUI and liaise with international organizations. If there were incidents in the provinces, they didn't have the means to travel there. They didn't have any vehicles. They asked MISCA for help, but didn't receive any, though they helped Muslims.
85. Education and Training Advisor, "CEF" was Serephin FEKERE [REDACTED] He is a Professor of linguistics at the University of Bangui. He and I discussed training programs for the youth, but we didn't have any money to implement any of them. We had hoped to train them in areas, such as: stone masonry, woodwork, electricity, tailoring, and sewing so that they could integrate back into society.
86. Treasurer General, "TG" was Vivien BEINA [REDACTED] We didn't have any money, nor did anyone receive salaries. We received 1 million CFA from President SASSOU to attend the Brazzaville talks. The Treasurer distributed some of the money and kept the rest as money to use internally. It was used to assist individuals in need. For example, NGAISSONA convened a meeting in BANGUI



with the Comzones from the provinces and we used some of the money for their transport. NGAISSONA may have received funds from other sources that I'm not aware of. Some questions you don't ask, especially about money. We also received 1 million CFA from [REDACTED] for the youth. The Archbishop gave money away to displaced people, refugees, and people in the provinces. He, and the pastor and Imam LAYAMA formed a religious platform to try to bring peace during the conflict.

87. Coordinator General was NGAISSONA. He was appointed leader by the Anti-Balaka leaders when he returned from exile after DJOTODIA resigned. I was not at the meeting, but people gathered at his house when he returned and he was appointed the leader. He was very popular and generous. I don't know if he had contact with the Anti-Balaka leaders when he was away in exile. I spoke with him the day before his return when he told me he was coming home, but he didn't tell me about his plans. I also visited him while on mission to YAOUNDE in October 2013. I met him at his home where Bernard MOKOM, Freddy NGAISSONA, and [REDACTED] were also present. I just paid a friendly visit to NGAISSONA and we had dinner. At that time, Francois BOZIZE was not in YAOUNDE.
88. Special Advisor "CS" was Joachim KOKATE. He was a former minister to NGAISSONA and they were very close. He had the most access to NGAISSONA.
89. Political Advisor "CP" was me. My role was as spiritual advisor, but the title was changed to political advisor so as to have a neutral non-religious title. I wasn't the spokesperson as is sometimes reported. When the press called me, and the Steering Committee agreed, I would then speak to the press. I also reminded and taught people about human rights. And I helped people understand the disarmament process. I tried to convince them not to be violent. I would meet with Chef de Quartiers and ask them to bring together the Comzones and youth and I would explain the process to them. I also visited them at their bases. [REDACTED] never attended such meetings. They had no interest in social cohesion.
90. Communications Advisor "CC" was Jacob MOKPEM. In theory he wrote press releases and spoke on the radio, but in reality, I helped him and did a lot of the work. I did a lot of the publishing on our CLPC Facebook page and on social media.
91. Spokespersons "PP" was Emotion NAMSIO and Sebastian WENEZOU [REDACTED] They basically split their duties based on territories. NEMSIO covered BOY RABE and WENEZOU covered Boeing. [REDACTED]

92. At the beginning there were two branches of the Anti-Balaka. WENEZOUÏ led one group and NGAISSONA led another. YEKATOMBE led the attack in December from the South. The other attack was from the North before NGAISSONA arrived, but he led that group when he arrived. They talked and decided to merge in approximately early March 2014. NGAISSONA became the leader and WENEZOUÏ his deputy.
93. Operational Commander "CO" was Maxime MOKOM. He was a member of the BOZIZE family and a supporter of BOZIZE returning to power. He was at NAIROBI and I consider [REDACTED] After the NAIROBI talks, Domete NDOMATE (ANDJILLO's uncle) took his place as Commander. The CO monitors operations and oversees all the Comzones in the country. He reports directly to NGAISSONA and gives orders to the Comzones. The Comzones report to him or have reported directly to NGAISSONA when MOKOM was away in Nairobi. MOKOM's support of BOZIZE caused a division in the movement. But before Nairobi, the Comzones were loyal to MOKOM and reported directly to him. The Operational Commander could create operations and didn't need the committee's approval to carry them out. The Operational Commander wouldn't have carried out any significant operation without NGAISSONA's knowledge and approval. Maxim MOKOM and his father Bernard MOKOM had a lot of power. MOKOM and his father manipulated Comzones against me after our meeting with SAMBA-PANZA when they thought I had been paid off.
94. Secretary General was Judicael OROFEÏ [REDACTED] He was a student at the University of Bangui. His role was to take notes at meetings, write minutes and letters, manage archives, provide information to Comzones, and summon Comzones to meetings. There was no Anti-Balaka headquarters so I think OROFEÏ kept all documents in his laptop which he brought to meetings.
95. Military Police "MP" was FEISSONA and his Deputy was Gustave YADJOUNGOU. Emotion NAMSIO did more work in this role than the official leaders. There were several teams within a Military Police unit. Their role was to locate and arrest those who committed crimes in BANGUI, MBAIKI, BERBERATI, CARNOT, BODA and the rest of the country. I've given the OTP an Anti-Balaka "Order of Permanent Mission" No. ATB/14, which established them as Military Police for the Anti-Balaka. There is also a mandate included which appoints Thomas INZAI as a trainer for the Military Police. (see Annex D). There were no Military Police in towns in the provinces so these men would go to the provinces to make arrests and bring people back to the Gendarmerie jail in Bangui. Few of them did what they were supposed to. Only Emotion NAMSIO, YADJOUNGOU and FEISSONA did their jobs.
96. "Comzones" or Zone Commanders "CZ" consisted of 20-25 commanders in Bangui. I have given to the OTP a document titled, "Project for Emergency Billeting of Anti-



Balaka Fighters". This document lists the Comzones in Bangui and the provinces, and their number of elements. (See Annex E). The Zone Commanders did not necessarily control a specific area or zone but could be in charge of a group of Anti-Balaka with freedom of movement in the area. For example in BOY RABE there were several groups with their own commanders and they were not restricted to a certain part of BOY RABE. When the Seleka left, some Zone Commanders took advantage of the situation, stealing and killing. That is why we tried to channel and control them through the Coordination structure. We had only partial results, but were able to bring peace in the end.

97. On the Coordination Committee, some had prior close relationships with NGAISSONA, such as KOKATE and MOKOM. There was no election process to the Committee. It was difficult to get educated people to join the Anti-Balaka. Intellectuals feared the ICC.

National Coordination Committee meetings

98. We did not have regular meetings – maybe only once a month. Between January and October 2014 I estimate that we met 4 or 5 times. The General Coordinator would decide when it was necessary to meet and the Secretary General would call us to inform us of a meeting. The majority of our meetings were held at NGAISSONA's house in BOY RABE, but if we were a big group we would meet in a conference facility in a hotel. This was usually when all the Zone Commanders gathered and it happened at least three times. These three meetings happened in preparation of the Brazzaville talks, the Bangui Forum, and when it was decided to turn the movement into a political party.

99. The Committee supported NGAISSONA to become the next potential President. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Anti-Balaka operations and actions

100. There were no significant operations between the December 2013 attack on Bangui and the October 2014 operation in Bangui.
101. The October 2014 operation was to set up road blocks to block movement in Bangui and shut the city down. The purpose was to force the Government to listen to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

our demands. We demanded representation in the CNT and our members released from jail. We got what we wanted.

102. Other than the October 2014 operation, the Anti-Balaka reacted spontaneously to attacks launched by the Muslims. For example when the Muslims attacked the Polices Station in the 5th Arrondissement and started marching towards the Christian area, the Anti-Balaka reacted and managed to push the Muslims back. Similarly after the Fatima Church attack, the Anti-Balaka from FATIMA and BIMBO reacted and stopped the Muslim attack.
103. The Operational Commander still had effective control over the Zone Commanders ("Comzones") even though planned operations were not being conducted anymore as the battle against the Seleka was over.
104. The Anti-Balaka movement used cell phones for communication. I never saw any radios used by members of the Anti-Balaka.
105. The Anti-Balaka conducted a census in March or April 2014. It was estimated that there were 8500 Anti-Balaka in Bangui and 50,000 in the country. There are 3000 Anti-Balaka in BOY RABE. The census was conducted by asking each Comzone to bring a list of his elements/troops. Comzones in the provinces also sent lists to Bangui. The Comzones in the provinces regularly keep in touch with the Comzones in Bangui. When there are important issues, we need to speak to the Comzones. The Secretary General of the Coordination Committee has the list of all the Comzones and their phone numbers. Some of the cities in the provinces might have a Comzone and deputy commanders. There are no regional commanders.
106. When the Anti-Balaka participated in the peace talks in BRAZZAVILLE and Bangui, we sent Comzones from the provinces to attend as well.
107. When the Anti-Balaka arrived from the provinces to the hill at Boy Rabe to participate in the December 5th attack, they all needed to return home to their villages afterwards. As part of the Coordination Committee, we wrote a proposal to the Transitional Government to return them back to their villages. They mainly came from: BOUCA, BOTANGAFOU, BOSSANGO, BENZEBE, BOZOU, BOUAR, YALOK, and BOALI. I've given to the OTP an Anti-Balaka document titled, "Project for Emergency Aid to Regroup Anti-Balaka Fighters" (See attached Annex F). the proposal to the government). They came on foot from the bush, tracing the paths of the Peuhl. The government didn't pay for their return. Most returned to their homes on their own and NGAISSONA helped pay for some to return.



Anti-Balaka Recruitment

108. The youth joined the Anti-Balaka spontaneously as they were angry with the way they were treated by the Seleka. They were motivated and it was not necessary to recruit anyone to join. I saw the Anti-Balaka entering Bangui walking in two lines armed only with machetes and sticks but they were willing to attack the armed Seleka.
109. It was fortunate that the Sangaris were in Bangui at the time as I believe that the whole population would have descended on KM5 killing everyone. It would have been a genocide. The people heard that the Muslims in KM5 were protecting the Seleka so the locals started viewing all Muslims as being Seleka. Muslims lived freely in different areas in Bangui before, but after the Seleka regime the locals wanted to take revenge on all Muslims.

Supply of arms

110. I do not know if any weapons were issued to new recruits joining the Anti-Balaka. I heard from a French Lieutenant at the French Embassy that the Sangaris accompanied the movement of Anti-Balaka along the way to Bangui. The Anti-Balaka were promised weapons by the French along the way, but that they never received any.
111. The FACA elements in the Anti-Balaka had their own firearms.
112. It sounds logical that someone had to arm the Anti-Balaka youths before they attacked Bangui. That is why I feel compassion for these youths who gave their lives for us. They must have been insane to be prepared to fight the heavily armed Seleka with machetes and sticks.

Anti-Balaka membership cards

113. The moment we heard of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) process we realised that we will be required to distinguish between the Anti-Balaka and local population to be included in the process. The Anti-Balaka was often blamed for criminal activities that were in fact committed by criminals. It was important to be able differentiate between them. The local population would also retaliate against Seleka attacks in the Provinces and then the Anti-Balaka would be blamed.



114. The membership card was not replacing the identification card but was only a means for confirmation later of Anti-Balaka membership. The main goal of the introduction of a membership card was to assist in the implementation of the DDR. The card contained a photograph of the individual, his name and surname and location.
115. The cards were issued to Anti-Balaka members who joined before and up to the 5th December 2013. There were also many “fake” Anti-Balaka who did not follow the rules but claimed to be Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] “Real” Anti-Balakas stood for peace.
116. NGAISSONA provided the funds to buy a camera and a computer to produce the membership cards. The Zone Commanders were instructed to bring all their members and each individual were photographed and issued with a membership card.
117. The Secretary General also toured the country and visited the Comzones to complete this procedure. He should still have these files with him.

DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) process

118. The DDR process was created, but not implemented yet. It is meant to assist in the reintegration of former fighters into the community. They are supposed to receive training and be taught new skills so that they can start a new profession. At the end of the program an individual should receive a kit consisting of the tools of his new trade so that he can start working and earn a living.

Document: “Déclaration des Combattants Antibalaka relative a la situation sécuritaire en République Centrafricaine”

119. I handed over a document to the OTP Investigators with the title “Déclaration des Combattants Antibalaka relative a la situation sécuritaire en République Centrafricaine” with reference number 15/CLPC/13 and dated 14 February 2014. It outlines the demands of the Anti-Balaka and is signed by many members of the Coordination Committee and Comzones (See attached ANNEX G).
120. The document addressed the security situation in Bangui. The Zone Commanders voiced their demands and requests at a meeting and I then drafted this document. We held meetings at NGAISSONA’s father’s house in [REDACTED] Boy Rabe. NGAISSONA would decide when a meeting was required and would then instruct



the General Secretary, Judicael OROFEI, to call all the Commanders to attend. He would contact them via mobile phones.

121. Patrice-Edouard NGAISSONA contributed to this document and approved its release. The document was also approved and signed by the different zone commanders. The documents list all the commanders who signed the document. NGAISSONA and I decided not to sign the document as we did not want to give the impression that we at the National level were making the policy decisions in the Anti-Balaka. NGAISSONA wanted the Zone Commanders to take some responsibility. We both agreed to the contents of the document but did not want to be seen as steering the Anti-Balaka policy.
122. All documents that were approved for release by NGAISSONA were entered into a register and a reference number was assigned. The General Secretary, Judicael OROFEI, was responsible to log these documents.
123. I was asked by the investigators if I could provide additional information on the individuals from the Anti-Balaka listed in the document. I can add the following:
 - 1) Sylvester YAGOUSSOU: He was a coordinator and in charge of the Zone Commanders of BOEING, COMBATTANTS and BIMBO areas.
 - 2) Brice Emotion NAMSIO
 - 3) Sebastien WENEZOU
 - 4) Euzebe EMTENOU: He used to be a Lt. in the FACA. He has since been promoted to a Captain. I think he was the Zone Commander for PK12.
 - 5) Charles ANGA: He was a corporal in FACA and a Zone Commander for COMBATTANTS and DAMARA.
 - 6) Benjamin OUAPOUTOU: He was a civilian and a Zone Commander in BOY RABE.
 - 7) Marcellin DEHOLLO: I think he was a Zone Commander in GOBONGO.
 - 8) Thierry LEBENE: He had the rank of a Captain even though he never served in the military. He was a Zone Commander in OUANGO area.
 - 9) Aime Abel DENAMGANAI: He was a Lieutenant in FACA and a Zone Commander in BOY RABE.
 - 10) Bernard YAKOUZOU: A Zone Commander, not know where.
 - 11) Aristide BAKAFE: A Zone Cammander, not know where.
 - 12) Richard BEJOUNANE: He was a civilian and a Zone Commander in BOY RABE.
 - 13) Guy WAZIMBELET: He was in FACA and the overall Commander in BOY RABE.
 - 14) Guy Gustave YADJOUNGOU: He was a civilian, a Military Police, and a Zone Commander in Cite JEAN 23.
 - 15) Seraphin KEANSSEM: He was a Sergeant in FACA and a Zone Commander in BOY RABE.



- 16) Guy Gervais MOKPEM: He was a FACA and a Zone Commander in PK12.
- 17) Yvon DONOH: He was a Lieutenant in FACA and a Zone Commander in BOEING.
- 18) Sylvain BEOROFEL: He was a civilian and a Zone Commander in BOEING.
- 19) Dieudonne HOURONTI: He was from the Gendarmerie and a Zone Commander in PK12.
- 20) Patrick OROFEL: He was a member of FACA and a Zone Commander in BOY RABE.
- 21) Maxime MOKOM GAWAKA: He was the National Coordinator of Operations for the Anti-Balaka. He is a family member of BOZIZE and worked in the Presidency. He received training in Libya

Anti-Balaka Press Release from 14 February 2014 (CAR-OTP-2006-1210 to 1213)

124. The investigators showed me a document with reference number CAR-OTP-2006-1210 to 1213. I believe that this is a draft version of the document I produced earlier to you with reference number 15/CLPC/13 (Annex G). This document was released too early as no signatures appear on it. As explained above, NGAISSONA and I decided not to sign the document. The document was amended and our names were removed from the list of signatures.
125. On this document with reference number CAR-OTP-2006-1210 to 1213 is a list of members of the Steering/Coordination Committee and Zone Commanders. Those who were members of the Coordination/Steering Committee were: NGAISSONA, KONATE, NAMSIO, WENEZOU, MOKOM, KOKATE, and myself. Our goal as members of the Coordination/Steering Committee was to prevent and control the Anti-Balaka from acting like the Seleka. We wanted the Anti-Balaka to be reinstated as normal members of society. We also tried to raise awareness of the youth not to commit human rights violations. Our role was to provide leadership to the Anti-Balakas.
126. [REDACTED]. That is why they refused to negotiate with the Anti-Balaka. The FACA had to arrange security in the neighbourhoods. The international forces did nothing to help.

Anti-Balaka bases

127. Most of the Anti-Balaka bases that I visited were in the 4th Arrondissement, but there were many others in Bangui. I know of two bases near the airport in BOEING.



Both located in houses. There a few bases in COMBATTANTS, one in Sylvestre YAGUSSOU's house. There is one in DAMALA too which SAMI uses. Most bases are either houses or abandoned schools. ANDJILO had bases in BAFIO and DEDENGE. MAZIMBILET had a base in MANDABA. There were only two Arrondissements which didn't have Anti-Balaka bases: the 1st and 3rd Arrondissements.

128. The Anti-Balaka were organised in small groups, each group in their own base. The Evangelic Convention for Peace (a religious group I created in my neighbourhood) visited these Anti-Balaka cells and preached to them. I soon realised that they would pretend to listen to us and promised to follow our advice but as soon as we left they continued with their criminal activities.
129. I mostly visited the groups based in the Boy Rabe area. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] spoke to these leaders and their followers to try and stop them from harassing our community and to stop their criminal activities. I used to read a passage to them from the bible Ezekiel 3:17-21 which I also used to guide me in my work.
130. I was requested by the OTP Investigators to mark the locations of Anti-Balaka bases on a Google map printout and to draw a sketch of the locations. I noticed that the Google maps were outdated and did not show recent developments and new structures in the area. I identified the following bases that I know:
131. Base 1: The base is in the BOEING area next to the Bangui Mpoko airport. It is located near WENEZOU's House. I visited this base. The base location is marked on a map (see attachment Annex H). Sketch of location marked as (Annex H-1).
132. Base 2: The base is in the BOEING area and situated at the end of the runway at the Bangui Mpoko Airport. The base was used by Maxime MOKOM. It was a small house made of firebricks with an iron sheet roof. It is situated next to the road. I visited this base. The base location is marked on a map (see attachment Annex I). Sketch of location marked as (Annex I-1).
133. Base 3: The base is in the COMBATTANTS area and situated near the UCATEX building. It was YAGOUSOU's base and his house. It is a small family house, built with fire bricks and with an iron sheet roof. I visited this base twice. The base location is on a map (see attachment Annex J). Sketch of location marked as (Annex J-1).
134. Base 4: The base is in BOY RABE and was used by MAZIMBELET. It is located on the edge of the forest in a residential area. The house was not completed at the time.



The windows and doors were not completed. He used to stay in this house with his men. The base location is marked on a map (see attachment Annex K). Sketch of location marked as (Annex K-1)

135. Base 5: The base is in BOY RABE and was used by ANDJILO. It is situated near a school and health centre. The house had a fence around it. I visited the house but ANDJILO had already moved to another location in BOY RABE. The house was empty. It is situated approximately 100 metres from the road. The base location is marked on a map (see attachment Annex L). Sketch of location marked as (Annex L-1).

Anti-Balaka Hardliners

136. There were certain individuals in the Anti-Balaka who strongly supported the return of Francois BOZIZE as President. I call them the "hardliners" and they were bad elements in the movement. The hardliners consisted of [REDACTED]

137. They would seize any opportunity to cause disruption. For example, in October 2014 they fuelled the violence on in Bangui for their own benefit. In another incident when Muslims attacked a police station in the 5th Arr., the hardliners attacked International Forces in retaliation.

138. They wanted to benefit from chaos. Their idea was to foster trouble to show that only BOZIZE was capable of bringing peace to the country. I cannot identify specific crimes that were committed by these individuals and their followers but I heard that they were involved in the robbery of vehicles and in killings. I don't know if any of them committed rapes.

139. These groups did not attend our National Coordination meetings or any of the training provided which caused us problems. NGAISSONA and I spoke to [REDACTED] directly to encourage him to change his ways but he did not listen to us.

140. [REDACTED]



141. I realised that the only way to deal with these criminal groups [REDACTED] was to involve the international community. I discussed this option directly with NGAISSONA [REDACTED]

142. We spoke to MISCA and suggested to them that we could put our Military Police units at their disposal to assist in the tracking and arresting of these criminals but they declined the offer.

143. We sent letters out with ideas on how to establish peace. One letter was addressed to President SAMBA-PANZA, but we never received any assistance from the Government. We also sent these letters out to different Embassies and the United Nations. I handed over copies of the letters with the title "Contribution du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka pour la restauration de la Paix et de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine" to the OTP Investigators (see attachment Annex M)

Individual Anti-Balaka members

Major GREMANDOU (23672075327)

144. Major GREMANDOU was a member of the FACA and became the Private Secretary to the Minister of Defence after DJOTODIA resigned. Before that he was demoted in rank and started working with the Anti-Balaka. He was an influential figure and one of the leaders in the fight against the Seleka. He was involved in the fight from the 5th December 2013 until the resignation of DJOTODIA. He does not appear on the organizational structure of the Anti-Balaka but was very influential in the operations conducted by the Anti-Balaka. He reported directly to NGAISSONA and Maxime MOKOM.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Brice Emotion NAMSIO

148. Was the spokesperson for the Anti-Balaka. When the Coordination Committee made a decision, his job was to relay the message to the public. After he was arrested, he testified against those Anti-Balaka who committed crimes. He wasn't able to return to his neighbourhood afterwards. He lived with the [REDACTED] awhile and now lives in [REDACTED]

Leopold-Narciss BARA

149. [REDACTED] Then when the Anti-Balaka arrived to the hill outside Boy Rabe, he met with them and aligned himself with them. He represented the Anti-Balaka at the N'djamena talks. He was not a civil servant, but had been appointed Minister of Youth for the Anti-Balaka. While he was the Minister, he made a decree to remove me from my post as Director General of Youth. I was competent and had been doing good work so there was no good reason for him to do this. I was then moved to Ministry of Tourism.

Lieutenant KONATE [REDACTED]

150. Lieutenant KONATE was a member of the Presidential Security for President BOZIZE. He was the leader of the FACA resistance against Seleka. He is still a member of FACA in Bangui. When crimes happened, he would respond with his FACA team to control the situation. He set up a military police to track Anti-Balaka crimes and send them to the gendarme. Other members of the Military Police were YADJOUNGOU, BEJOUANE, NAMSIO, and FEISONA (a Sgt in the FACA, and others). KONATE also provided personal security for NGAISSONA.

Other organizations and groups

FROCCA *Front pour la restauration de l'ordre constitutionnel en Centrafrique*

151. Was set up by BOZIZE's lawyer, Lin BANOUKEPE, after BOZIZE left CAR. The lawyer and organization were based in France. I communicated briefly with him to find allies and to share information at the time. Their goal was to restore BOZIZE back to power legally. Their base was people from France. Levy YAKETE was a member of FROCCA. YAKETE had been BOZIZE's advisor for Youth Affairs when I



was the Director General for Youth Affairs. I had a good professional relationship with YAKETE. We were not friends, but I had known him for a long time. The organization no longer exists.

COCARA *Coalition citoyenne d'opposition aux rebellions armées*

152. Was a group led by Levy YAKITE who lived in Fou which searched for Seleka who had infiltrated neighborhoods in BANGUI. The neighborhoods where COCARA primarily operated were: BOY RABE, COMBATTANTS, GALABADJA, BOEING, GOBONGO, PK12. They started to set up barricades in Bangui approximately two weeks before the Seleka attacked. The youths were looking for Muslims and non-Sango speakers. I do not know what happened to the people they found at these barricades. I however know that when the Seleka took over power they released many Muslims from the prisons. I never attended any of their meetings and don't know any more details about them. They no longer exist.


COAC *Coalition des Actions Citoyennes*

153. Was a group similar to COCARA led by Lt. Steve YAMBETE who lived in Cite Jean 23. Their goal was to foster self-defense against the Seleka. They also searched for Seleka infiltrators. YAMBETE is now in jail in Cameroon for bank robbery. He had been the special advisor for Youth under BOZIZE. They once organized an action to burn the French flag. I know COCARA had more members than COAC. They no longer exist.

154. I gave to the OTP the following documents which I possessed regarding the Anti-Balaka:

- a. *Communiqué De Presse No. 09, (N. ATB/14) April 2014 (See attachment Annex N)*
- b. *Contribution du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka pour la restauration de la Paix et de la Sécurité en République Centrafricaine" (No. ATB/14) (See Attachment Annex O)*
- c. *Declaration Conjointe between Anti-Balaka and Seleka: End of Hostilities (See attachment Annex P)*

Anti-Balaka member phone numbers given to OTP:





ANNEXES

- A. Memory card of Audio recording
- B. Signed Waiver form
- C. Organigram sketch of the Anti-Balaka structure
- D. Document "Order of Permanent Mission" No. ATB/14, which appointed Military Police for the Anti-Balaka.
- E. Document "Project for Emergency Billeting of Anti-Balaka Fighters"
- F. Document "Project for Emergency Aid to Regroup Anti-Balaka Fighters"
- G. Document "Déclaration des Combattants Antibalaka relative a la situation sécuritaire en République Centrafricaine" with reference number 15/CLPC/13
- H. Map of Base 1
H-1 Sketch of Base 1
- I. Map of Base 2
I-1 Sketch of Base 2
- J. Map of Base 3
J-1 Sketch of Base 3
- K. Map of Base 4
K-1 Sketch of Base 4
- L. Map of Base 5
L-1 Sketch of Base 5
- M. Document "Contribution du Mouvementdes Patriotes Antibalaka pout la restauration de la Paix et de la Securite en Republique Centrafricaine"
- N. Document *Communiqué De Presse* No. 09, (N. ATB/14) April 2014
- O. Document *Contribution du Mouvementdes Patriotes Antibalaka pout la restauration de la Paix et de la Securite en Republique Centrafricaine* (No. ATB/14)
- P. Document *Declaration Conjointe between Anti-Balaka and Saleka: End of Hostilities*



Closing Procedure

- a. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify. I am available to be contacted in the future for clarifications or questions on topics not covered during this interview.
- b. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will.
- c. There has been no threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my account.
- d. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This statement has been read over to me in the English and French language and (it) is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.



INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

1. I, [REDACTED] certify that:
2. I am duly qualified to interpret from the French language into the English language and from the English language into the French language.
3. I have been informed by Alfred NGAYA that he speaks and understands the French language.
4. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the French language in the presence of Alfred NGAYA who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this statement.
5. Alfred NGAYA has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in his statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

