

ANNEX B

Confidential

OTP INTERVIEW SUMMARY: Chrysostome Berba YAPELE aka Chiki Chiki (P-1077)

This summary pertains to the un-redacted portions of the following interview transcripts from:

CAR-OTP-2107-3366 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3394 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3396 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3428 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3454 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3483 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3500 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3530 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3554 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3584 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3610 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3636 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

CAR-OTP-2107-3666 - ICC Statement - ICC transcribed statement

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. P-1077 was born [REDACTED] "Chiki Chiki" was a nickname P-1077 gave himself in 1999.¹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While he was on a business trip to CARNOT, the Seleka looted and took away everything that he and his family had in the village. He believes that the Seleka looted his property around the time of the fight between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka in BOHONG. He does not know who were the Seleka who looted his property.⁵

3. P-1077 returned to BERBERATI to start his small business but he did not have the capital to travel and buy merchandise. He would mostly spend his time playing games with his friends in the neighbourhood.⁶

SELEKA'S CRIMES

4. P-1077 explains that the Seleka killed his father as well as [REDACTED] other people in a village located [REDACTED] The Seleka went to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and left like this for [REDACTED]

¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3397-3398, 1.36-71.

² CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3379-3380, 1.474-524.

³ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3381-3382, 1.526-578.

⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3382-3383, 1.579-610.

⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3383-3385, 1.623-704.

⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3385-3386, 1.706-739.

hours before he was shot dead. P-1077 thinks that his father was killed by the Seleka fleeing toward CHAD following the Anti-Balaka's attacks on BOHONG and BOSSANGO. ⁷

5. P-1077 further adds that the Seleka committed numerous crimes, including killing 14 civilians at a petrol station in BERBERATI. ⁸

EMERGENCE OF THE ANTI-BALAKA

P-1077 joining the Anti-Balaka

6. P-1077 decided to join the Anti-Balaka movement after the Seleka pillaged his family's properties and killed his father who also financially supported the schooling of his children. ⁹ He first joined the Anti-Balaka in the bush between BAORO and CARNOT, about 40 to 50 km north-east of CARNOT. He went in the bush by motorbike with five "brothers", including

and two others. When the Anti-Balaka in the bush suspected them of being spies, went back to BERBERATI and got arrested by gendarme. ¹¹ P-1077 went near BAORO to get his *gris-gris* because he knew that there were Anti-Balaka there, as well as in BOUAR and CARNOT. ¹²

Gathering of Anti-Balaka near BAORO.

7. Through word of mouth, P-1077 heard that Anti-Balaka were gathering near BAORO. Everyone knew about it, it wasn't a secret. People came from BOSSEMPTELE, BOSSEMBELE, BAORO, BOUAR, BOZOU, BOCARANGA, BOSSANGO. The groups from BOSSANGO, YALOK, GAGA were chasing the Seleka who had fled and went to take refuge in BERBERATI. P-1077 explains that when they left for BERBERATI, the objective of the group was to chase away all the Muslims. ¹³ According to P-1077, over 1000 men and women gathered in the bush near BAORO. Some women joined the Anti-Balaka as fighters too. Some of the fighters had make shift weapons and arrows. There were no FACA. ¹⁴ While in the bush, P-1077 and other recruits sat under trees or made little huts, and looked for food.

⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3386-3388, 1.747-811.

⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3389, 1.829-848.

⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3388, 1.815-828.

¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3522, 1.770-775.

¹¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3400-3402, 3407-3410, 1. 126-211, 400-506; CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3592, 1.274-297; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3616-3617, 3621-3622, 1.220-243, 389-417.

¹² CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3389-3390, 1.851-897.

¹³ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3391-3393, 1.924-942, 979-1016; CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3402-3403, 3407, 1.212-256, 374-383.

¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3399-3400, 1.72-125.

Villagers would give them food and water. The Anti-Balaka would make plans of what to do, where the Seleka were, when to attack. Villagers would inform them where to find and attack Seleka.¹⁵ While most of the Anti-Balaka left the bush to go to BERBERATI, some stayed behind to defend the villages.¹⁶

8. P-1077 initially said that he spent about two weeks in the bush near BAORO;¹⁷ but later clarified that he spent a total of 11 days out of BERBERATI on his journey to get the *gris-gris*. He explains that he went from BERBERATI to NANDOBO where they spent a night. He spent another night in CARNOT before going to the bush. He met and told [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that he was looking for *gris-gris*. After a night in the bush, P-1077 returned to CARNOT and bought his *gris-gris* two days later. He stayed a few more days in CARNOT until he got money to pay his transportation to BERBERATI.¹⁸

9. While in the bush near BAORO, P-1077 met the Anti-Balaka leader in BAORO, nicknamed [REDACTED] (he is now deceased).¹⁹ P-1077 also saw Anti-Balaka leaving to attack the Seleka further away but he does not remember the locations.²⁰

Gathering of Anti-Balaka in others locations

10. P-1077 heard on the radio (FRANCE 24, RFI and other national and international media), and later from the Anti-Balaka in the bush that Anti-Balaka gathered in BOSSANGOA and GOBERE. He never heard of KALANGOI.²¹ According to P-1077, at the beginning, there was no clear strategy or coordination to attack the Seleka as the Anti-Balaka were scared of each other and would only speak to people they knew.²²

¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3404-3405, 1.264-320.

¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3407, 1.384-389.

¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3391, 1.924-927.

¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3619-3621, 1.312-382.

¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3390-3391, 1.905-918.

²⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3417-3418, 1.763-793.

²¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3613-3614, 1.92-140.

²² CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3618-3619, 1.261-310.

THE SITUATION IN CARNOT

11. The Anti-Balaka elements who were in the bush with P-1077 came to CARNOT, but not all at the same time. Some were on foot, others on motorbike.²³ P-1077 arrived in CARNOT with [REDACTED] after the conflict had started in CARNOT. He spent the night in a house provided by [REDACTED] with no *gris-gris*, they did not go out as the Anti-Balaka could have harmed them.²⁴ P-1077 spent five days in CARNOT, during which he just hung out in the town. He did not attend any meeting or visit the church.²⁵ P-1077 was forced to spend these days in CARNOT because he lacked money to pay for a motorbike to return to BERBERATI.²⁶

12. P-1077 heard on radio RFI that the Muslims fled the conflict from BAORO to CARNOT, fleeing toward CAMEROON. But he did not see anything or hear any detonation while in CARNOT. He also did not see any destruction in CARNOT because he would have had to go into the Muslims areas to see the destructions.²⁷

13. P-1077 added that when they arrived in CARNOT, there were no Seleka as they had fled to the bush. There were already some Anti-Balaka in CARNOT, but P-1077 does not know how they were received.²⁸

14. P-1077 further explains that there were many Christians in the town. Most Muslims took refuge at the Catholic church while other had already fled to CAMEROON.²⁹ According to P-1077, Muslims sought refuge at the church because they were afraid of the Anti-Balaka. Within a Muslim family there might have been one of two people associated with the Seleka and the whole family was afraid they would be targeted.³⁰ According to P-1077, there were some Anti-Balaka who spoke ill of Muslims. They would say: *"moi quand je trouve un musulman, je vais seulement le tuer"*.³¹

15. P-1077 passed in front of the parish two or three times, but the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Muslims who took refuge there were [REDACTED]

²³ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3410-3411, 1.513-532.

²⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3410, 3412-3413, 1.504-512, 559-604; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3626, 1.560-587.

²⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3413-3414, 1.606-635.

²⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3416, 1.700-726; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3620-3621, 1.375-382.

²⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3626-3628, 1.595-649.

²⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3411-3412, 1.533-558.

²⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3411-3412, 3414, 1.533-558, 636-655.

³⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3414-3415, 1.656-675.

³¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3415, 1.692-698.

██████████ did not want the Anti-Balaka attacking them. If Anti-Balaka approached in a group of three to four or more ██████████

THE SITUATION IN BERBERATI

P-1077's arrival in BERBERATI and his warning of the Muslims residents against the Anti-Balaka' upcoming attack

16. While the rest of the Anti-Balaka stopped in CARNOT, P-1077 went ahead to BERBERATI and arrived about three days before the rest of the Anti-Balaka. Since he had friendly and business relations with a number of Muslims P-1077 went to the Muslim neighbourhood, POTO-POTO to warn them of the upcoming attack. He told the Muslims that if they had money they should go to CAMEROON, or seek shelter at the Catholic church before the Anti-Balaka attacked. While he knew that not all Muslims were Seleka, P-1077 also knew that some of the Anti-Balaka who had left their villages to launch attacks were not making any distinction between Muslims and Seleka.³³

17. P-1077 identified several locations in BERBERATI on a satellite image which constitute annexes A and B to his statement. The locations include the Central Mosque, the central Market, the Catholic church, ██████████ and the residences of ██████████ ██████████ the Muslim neighbourhood, POTO-POTO, the hospital, the BAC, the , the central Market, ██████████ etc.³⁴

Presence of Rocca MOKOM in BERBERATI

18. When Rocca MOKOM arrived in BERBERATI, P-1077 had not returned to BERBERATI from the bush yet.³⁵ When he arrived in BERBERATI, P-1077 saw Rocca MOKOM with weapons, going around the town with his elements in a pick up; patrolling with the gendarmes. P-1077 does not have any other information on Rocca MOKOM as they were not close to each other. P-1077 was not yet a ComZone and did not have any relation or contact with Rocca MOKOM.³⁶

19. P-1077 did not attend any meeting at the Gendarmerie with Rocca MOKOM, as he was at the hospital due to a motorbike accident. But he heard that Rocca MOKOM and the

³² CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3628-3629, 1.650-710.

³³ CAR-OTP-2107-3366, at 3392, 1.946-982; CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3418-3419, 3424-3425, 1.795-829, 1004-1051; CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3542-3543, 1.442-465.

³⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3429-3432, 1.25-131; CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3419-3424, 1.831-1002.

³⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3533-3535, 1.76-180.

³⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3533-3537, 1.76-234; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3631, 1.753-762.

gendarmes went to search POTO-POTO. He does not know if Rocca MOKOM was in charge of BERBERATI at the time.³⁷

20. According to P-11077, Rocca MOKOM left BERBERATI two to three days after P-1077 returned to BERBERATI. But he does not know where Rocca MOKOM went after BERBERATI.³⁸

Anti-Balaka's attack on BERBERATI

21. According to P-1077, more than 1,000 Anti-Balaka came to BERBERATI from many different places, including BOSSANGO, BOCARANGA, BOZOUM, GAGA, YALOE, BOUAR, etc.³⁹ Two to three days after he warned the Muslims, P-1077 was with Anti-Balaka from AMANDAGAZA at the gendarmerie sensitizing the Muslims when they heard people fleeing and shouting that the Anti-Balaka were attacking POTO-POTO. People were fleeing toward the gendarmerie and the Catholic church.⁴⁰

22. P-1077 later states that he was at the hospital when he heard gunshot coming from the Muslims neighbourhood of POTO-POTO and NDJAMBALA. When he arrived at POTO-POTO, P-1077 told the Anti-Balaka to spare young Muslims as they were not Seleka. The Anti-Balaka listened to P-1077. P-1077 then called [REDACTED] to come and take the Muslims who had been surrounded by the Anti-Balaka and bring them to the church. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] brought the Muslims to the church four to five at a time. [REDACTED] made several trips to collect the Muslims.⁴¹ P-1077 further clarifies that on 9 or 10 February [2014], the day before BERBERATI was attacked, he was involved in a motorbike accident and had a surgery because the cut got infected. The next day he left the hospital and went to POTO-POTO following the attack.⁴² P-1077 did not see any women Muslims or Seleka killed or captured or detained.⁴³

³⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3533-3535, 1.76-180.

³⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3646, 1.349-356; CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3533-3535, 1.76-180.

³⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3537-3538, 1.251-292.

⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3432-3433, 1.132-157.

⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3433-3436, 1.159-259; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3631-3632, 1.777-820.

⁴² CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3637-3639, 1.16-91.

⁴³ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3634, 1.873-822.

Provision of *gris-gris* and identification of the Anti-Balaka

23. P-1077 explains that *gris-gris* were not always provided by Marabouts. He bought his own *gris-gris* from someone on the street paying 100,000 to 200,000 XFA. He later sold it to others when he returned in BERBERATI.⁴⁴

24. P-1077 recognized the Anti-Balaka by the *gris-gris* they were wearing.⁴⁵ But P-1077 also clarifies that it was not always possible to distinguish the Anti-Balaka from the local population which also took machetes and arrows and made themselves Anti-Balaka. Sometimes the Anti-Balaka wore *gris-gris* that distinguish them but other times their *gris-gris* were not immediately visible. According to P-1077, the Anti-Balaka was a popular revolution against Seleka's crimes and the population participated in it.⁴⁶

Presence of other Anti-Balaka leaders in BERBERATI

25. From list CAR-OTP-2059-0026, P-1077 confirms that he knows [REDACTED] an Anti-Balaka leader who went to BERBERATI, GAROUA-BOULAI and GAMBOULA. After learning that P-1077 was the ComZone of BERBERATI, [REDACTED] visited P-1077 in the hospital.⁴⁷

26. P-1077 had not met them prior to that visit. They came in town with their own elements, and they never became part of P-1077's group. They stayed with their elements in an apartment in BERBERATI for about one year and a half.⁴⁸ After P-1077 was discharged from the hospital [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] was a military. P-1077 also heard that [REDACTED] was a FACA. They called each other from time to time to ask about each other's well-being but they did not know each other well.⁴⁹

Crimes committed against Muslim population in BERBERATI

Destruction of Muslims properties

27. P-1077 agrees that Muslims' houses and mosques were destroyed in BERBERATI but insists that in the first two days of the events, no houses were destroyed. The Muslim houses and Mosques which were still standing on the first two days of the events, were destroyed by

⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3614-3616, 1.144-219; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3664, 1.990-1010.

⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3435, 1.222-231.

⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3548-3549, 1.669-715.

⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3497-3498, 1.493-531; CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3502-3503, 1.44-67, 86-94; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3640, 1.116-120.

⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3502-3504, 3509, 1.70-114, 304-325.

⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3504, 1.121-147; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3640, 1.121-132.

both the Anti-Balaka and the local population due to the grudges they were holding against specific Muslims who had collaborated with the Seleka.⁵⁰

28. P-1077 adds that the properties were destroyed while he was in the hospital, despite the fact that he had previously told the Anti-Balaka not to destroy Muslims' properties; but to rather live in them. After being discharged from the hospital, P-1077 launched an investigation to find out who had looted which houses and tried to return the stolen materials (such as roof metallic sheets).⁵¹

29. According to P-1077, the Seleka were mostly Muslims and the Muslims were foreigners. They had come and built houses in their county. Since the Muslims had left, the houses were property of CAR and bandits should not have destroyed them.⁵²

30. P-1077 further explains that to his knowledge, out of all the Mosques in BERBERATI, the Central Mosque was the only Mosque damaged but not destroyed by bandits, with the roof taken off. He was still recovering at his house after being discharged from the hospital when it happened and he called the MINUSCA or the gendarmerie to secure the Mosque.⁵³

Forcible transfer of Muslim population

31. After P-1077 warned the Muslims upon his return to BERBERATI, some left - especially the Chadians and Fulbe who were targeted by the Anti-Balaka - but others - mostly the Malian and Senegalese - only fled to the church after the Anti-Balaka attacked the town. Later others Muslims went to CAMEROON by car.⁵⁴

32. P-1077 explains that there were no Muslims left in the *quartiers* of BERBERATI. He often went to the parish to see the Muslims and found some of his trading partners staying there as well. It made him sad to see them there, and he even gave money for food to some of them. P-1077 told them that it was a time of conflict but sooner or later they would come back in the city. Before going to visit the Muslims, he would call the MINUSCA in advance to tell them he had food.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3537-3538, 3544, 3547-3550, 3452-3553, l. 251-292, 490-522, 620-643, 716-747, 829-837.

⁵¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3544, 3547-3550, 3452-3553, l.490-522, 620-643, 716-747, 829-837.

⁵² CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3553, l.838-853.

⁵³ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3643-3645, l.253-297.

⁵⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3396, at 3425-3426, l.1053-1059; CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3543-3544, l.469-485; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3632-3633, l.823-867.

⁵⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3557-3556, l.17-42; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3634-3635, l.883-912.

33. When P-1077 was the coordinator, the Muslims returned and have continued to return to their houses in BERBERATI, coming from the Catholic church and from abroad.⁵⁶ According to him, the Muslims returned in their former neighbourhoods, namely POTO-POTO, LOUMI and NDJAMBALA, which are next to each other. Both Christians and Muslims lived in these neighbourhoods.⁵⁷

ANTI-BALAKA LEADERSHIP IN BERBERATI

P-1077's role and activities as the Anti-Balaka leader in BERBERATI

P-1077's role as the ComZone of BERBERATI

34. According to P-1077, the Anti-Balaka who attacked POTO-POTO spent two days in town and left. Local population then joined the Anti-Balaka and remained in BERBERATI. The Anti-Balaka chose P-1077 as their ComZone, to deal with authorities and Sangaris because he had the *gris-gris* and a bit of money to buy some food for the Anti-Balaka.⁵⁸

35. As a leader, his role was to give advice to his elements so that they could secure the town after the Seleka and all the Muslims had fled. He also worked with [REDACTED] mission order issued by P-1077 to chase the Seleka in bush.⁵⁹

36. While he was the ComZone of BERBERATI, P-1077 received a call from the [REDACTED] 5 km away from BERBERATI, informing P-1077 that the Anti-Balaka had attacked 27 women and men Peuhl gathered in bush, stealing their cattle and beating two of the men. The [REDACTED] called him because he had heard that P-1077 was the Anti-Balaka leader in BERBERATI. P-1077 and other Anti-Balaka elements went to collect the Peuhl and took them back to BERBERATI.⁶⁰

37. P-1077 informed the [REDACTED] of his intention to bring the Peuhl and their cattle to BERBERATI. After spending a week with the Peuhl at his base, P-1077 told the [REDACTED] that he will bring the Peuhl to the Catholic church as he could no longer protect them or their cattle. According to P-1077, the Peuhl thanked him and gave him four bulls.⁶¹ P-1077 explains that he brought the Peuhl to BERBERATI to protect them from Seleka

⁵⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3556-3558, 143-141.

⁵⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3559-3560, 142-154.

⁵⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3436-3437, 1265-309; CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3539, 1.306-321.

⁵⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3437, 1.310-327.

⁶⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3437-3439, 3441-3442, 1.329-397, 457-496.

⁶¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3439-3440, 3442, 1.398-438, 504-528.

and fake Anti-Balaka who pretended to be Anti-Balaka and wanted to get rid of Muslim or take their belongings.⁶²

38. As the ComZone, P-1077 would sensitize the population by telling them that the conflict was over, that the Seleka had left, and that the Muslims who had stayed were the real Muslims from CAR and should return to their houses.⁶³

P-1077's role as the Coordinator for the MAMBERE KADEI

39. After the BRAZZAVILLE summit, it was decided in BANGUI that every prefecture should have a coordinator. Since he was in charge of BERBERATI, P-1077 became the Anti-Balaka coordinator for the MAMBERE KADEI prefecture, including BERBERATI, CARNOT, GAMBOULA, SOSSO NAKOMBO, BANIA, and AMADAGAZA. P-1077 never travelled to these places, but he was in telephone contact with the leaders from these areas, including

He further clarifies that he never received any appointment letter to become the coordinator for the MAMBERE KADEI.⁶⁵

40. As the coordinator, P-1077 would relay information of the National Coordination to local leaders of the MAMBERE KADEI province. For example upon his return from the BRAZZAVILLE summit, P-1077 organized a meeting in BERBERATI with Anti-Balaka leaders from places such as CARNOT, GAMBOULA, BANIA, and AMADAGAZA to inform them about the outcome of the BRAZZAVILLE talks: they were not to carry weapons and should stop hostilities. P-1077's elements did what he told them to do. He showed them a copy of the agreement to end hostilities signed by NGAISSONA, SASSOU, SAMBA-PANZA, and the Seleka. P-1077 did not hold any other meetings with local Anti-Balaka leaders in BERBERATI.⁶⁶

41. P-1077 further clarifies that from the beginning to the end of the conflict, they never had any barricades set up in BERBERATI and therefore did not receive any order to dismantle such barricades.⁶⁷

42. As the Anti-Balaka leader, P-1077 had to deal with small problems such as robberies caused by fake Anti-Balaka. P-1077 would tell his deputy to bring them to the Gendarmerie.⁶⁸

⁶² CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3440-3441, 1.439-456.

⁶³ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3556-3558, 1.43-141.

⁶⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3449-3451, 1.785-850; CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3505-3506, 1.170-199.

⁶⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3595, 1.405-408.

⁶⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3477-3479, 1.850-901; CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3505, 1.148-169.

⁶⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3479, 1.903-928.

⁶⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3448-3449, 1.757-778.

The local leaders in the MAMBERE KADEI prefecture would often call P-1077 to let him know what was happening in their respective areas. In case of issues, such as robberies, P-1077 would [REDACTED] to go to the bush, the Anti-Balaka would go in the bush, get the culprits and bring them to the gendarmerie.⁶⁹

43. When his own elements would disobey his orders, P-1077 would bring them to the gendarmerie and ask for them to be kept for a week before being released. P-1077 remembers that sometimes, he would take to the gendarmerie bandits who had gone to destroy and pillage Muslims houses, stealing tiles, ceilings, and the iron on the ceiling.⁷⁰ P-1077 once asked the [REDACTED] because he disobeyed his orders. [REDACTED] ho was scaring the population, was put in a cell for a week.⁷¹

P-1077's hospitalisation after being shot [REDACTED]

44. P-1077 explains that a week to 10 days after the attack on BERBERATI, the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] held a meeting with P-1077 to discuss security concerns in the sub-prefecture. P-1077 believes this was a [REDACTED] hot at their feet.⁷² After being shot, P-1077 spent two or three months at the hospital, during which he remained the ComZone of BERBERATI.⁷³

45. While P-1077 was at the hospital, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] managed the situation in the town, patrolling the different bases [REDACTED] appointed chief of sections and had a list with the names of these chiefs of sections as he was in charge of BERBERATI.⁷⁴ When P-1077 received complaints from the *chefs de quartiers*, he would call and ask any of them to manage the situation, as they were in charge of various small sections.⁷⁵ After his discharge from the

⁶⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3449, 3451-3452, 1.790-795, 845-897.

⁷⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3452-3453, 1.898-943.

⁷¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3589-3592, 1.162-176, 214-297.

⁷² CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3444-3447, 1.594-711; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3640-3641, 1.143-150.

⁷³ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3447-3448, 1.712-755; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3639-3640, 1.93-112, 133-142.

⁷⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3447-3448, 1.712-755; CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3513-3514, 1.453-480; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3639-3640, 1.93-112, 133-142.

⁷⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3550-3551, 1.752-778.

hospital, he stayed home for about a month since he could not walk well and Sister Benedict, the manager of the hospital, used to visit him daily.⁷⁶

46. P-1077 claims that he had no dealings with the mines when the Anti-Balaka took over BERBERATI but acknowledges that some Anti-Balaka went to work in the mines.⁷⁷

P-1077's Base in BERBERATI

47. P-1077's base was in ANDE, a big building next to the central market of BERBERATI, where nobody lived. ANDE is the place where the Peuhls go to get medicine for their cattle. P-1077's elements stayed there only for a week. After he was [REDACTED] and had to be hospitalised, P-1077 told his elements to return to their houses as they were youngsters from BERBERATI.⁷⁸

P-1077's arrest

48. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] P-1077 explains that after NAIROBI, he spent three months in BANGUI, then returned to BERBERATI after the BANGUI Forum, and was arrested.⁷⁹ He claims that he was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He believes it was all [REDACTED] against the Anti-Balaka. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Organisation of the Anti-Balaka in BERBERATI

49. P-1077 had between 50 and 200 elements under his command, depending on the day. Anti-Balaka from small villages would come and go. There were no list of elements.⁸¹

50. P-1077's deputy, [REDACTED] was in charge when P-1077 left BERBERATI. But P-1077 mostly stayed in BERBERATI and would only go to BANGUI to attend coordination meetings.⁸² When P-1077 became the coordinator for the MAMBERE KADEI prefecture, his deputy [REDACTED] became the ComZone for BERBERATI.⁸³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and a member of the Anti-Balaka Bureau of BERBERATI ("Bureau").⁸⁴

⁷⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3642-3643, 1.204-252.

⁷⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3603, 1.687-714.

⁷⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3510-3513, 1.343-401, 417-452.

⁷⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3603-3606, 1.715-774, 793-799.

⁸⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3605-3608, 1.775-873.

⁸¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3443, 1.529-567.

⁸² CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3444, 1.570-592.

⁸³ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3505-3506, 1.170-199.

⁸⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3514, 1.481-497.

The Anti-Balaka Bureau of BERBERATI

51. P-1077 decided to create the Anti-Balaka Bureau of BERBERATI after BRAZAVILLE to organise the Anti-Balaka in the town. The Bureau included a General Secretary, a ComZone, a deputy ComZone, Section Chiefs, and a spokesperson. The Bureau would record everything, reports of meetings they had with local authorities, MINUSCA, etc. According to P-1077, this was not a replicate of the National Coordination or other *bureaux*.⁸⁵ P-1077 explains that members of the Bureau had weekly meetings to discussed issues. They also participated in meetings at the Town Hall with the authorities and if there were any problems or complaints against the Anti-Balaka they would manage the situation. However P-1077 claims that there were no problems.⁸⁶

52. P-1077 further explains that the Bureau did not hold meeting when the situation got calmer. They only met to discuss the DDR process when members of the National Coordination would come to BERBERATI to initiate the pre-DDR process. While P-1077 was in BANGUI, [REDACTED] would call him to ask if these persons really came from BANGUI.⁸⁷ P-1077 later clarifies that he meant to say that members of the MINUSCA would come for the Pre-DDR process and insists that no one from the National Coordination visited BERBERATI.⁸⁸

53. Members of the Bureau would sometimes call and inform P-1077 on what was going on. The Bureau also informed the National Coordination about what was happening in their area or get information about the DDR process. But according to him, the National Coordination did not give any information or instructions to the Bureau.⁸⁹ When shown appointment letters included in CAR-OTP-2001-5386, at 5466; press releases, CAR-OTP-2066-1601, at 1656 and CAR-OTP-2030-0245, at 0246; and Anti-Balaka declaration, CAR-OTP-2030-0248, P-1077 explains that the Bureau of BERBERATI never received such documents from the National Coordination. They didn't listen to the radio as there was often no radio coverage in

⁸⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3585-3587, 3592-3593, 1.35-98, 300-336.

⁸⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3514-3516, 1.500-559; CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3587-3589, 3594, 1.101-145, 162-176, 354-370; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3611, 1.9-12.

⁸⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3599-3600, 1.557-584.

⁸⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3612, 1.50-61.

⁸⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3516-3518, 1.560-630.

BERBERATI.⁹⁰ P-1077 also noted that only one of the documents shown to him are signed by the National Coordinator while the rest are either undated or unsigned.⁹¹

54. According to P-1077 [REDACTED] was the Secretary General who kept the meeting notes; while the spokesperson was [REDACTED]. The Bureau also had advisors.⁹² P-1077 adds that in BERBERATI there were five to six Anti-Balaka Section chiefs covering different *quartiers*. [REDACTED] as one of the Section chiefs. After [REDACTED] took over and became the Section chief covering the area of BABA SALAO. [REDACTED] was the Section chief in POTO-POTO where he was often based.⁹³

55. The Bureau was still operational when P-1077 left BERBERATI. He is still in touch with its members, including [REDACTED] as he is still responsible for the MAMBERE-KADEI province. He also notes that after leaving BERBERATI, his decision did not have the same weight because others members of the Bureau would prefer listening to the authorities.⁹⁴

Knowledge of Anti-Balaka leaders in the MAMBERE KADEI

56. After consulting the list of ComZones in the MAMBERE-KADEI prefecture contained in document CAR-OTP-2030-0445, P-1077 recognised some of the leaders, including [REDACTED] the ComZone of CARNOT who is now deceased,⁹⁵ [REDACTED] P-1077 explains that after the meeting with NGAISSONA in BANGUI, he travelled back with other ComZones from his prefecture. They stopped at CARNOT where they discussed NGAISSONA's proposition to join his political party. They agreed that those who wish can freely join NGAISSONA's party.⁹⁷ P-1077 further explains th [REDACTED] as the Anti-Balaka Chief of BANIA. He never came to BERBERATI.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3594-3596, 1.374-429.

⁹¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3596-3598, 1.430-506.

⁹² CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3514-3516, 1.500-559; CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3587-3589, 3594, 1.101-145, 162-176, 354-370; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3611, 1.9-12.

⁹³ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3506-3510, 3512, 3518-3521, 1. 202-303, 327-340, 403-416, 631-750; CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3531, 1.12-29; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3621-3622, 1.383-388, 418-420.

⁹⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3598-3599, 3600-3601, 1.515-546, 585-623; CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3524, 1.835-848.

⁹⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3532, 1.54-61; CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3577, 1.832-848.

⁹⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3581, 1.981-990.

⁹⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3581, 1.999-1015.

⁹⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3647, 1.372-396.

57. [REDACTED] was a native of BERBERATI and the Secretary General of the Bureau. He was not a Chief of Section.⁹⁹

58. [REDACTED] is an Anti-Balaka leader who was in charge of NADJEMBE, a village 17 km away from BERBERATI.¹⁰⁰

Collaboration with local authorities and foreign troops deployed in BERBERAT

Meeting with the [REDACTED]

59. According to P-1077, [REDACTED] arrived in BERBERATI two days after the events. The following morning, on the third day of the events, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] P-1077 responded that they had revolted on behalf of the population and only the population should tell them when to stop. P-1077 also told them that since the Seleka were still present in the villages and in the bush the Anti-Balaka could not stop patrolling. [REDACTED]

60. When shown media article CAR-OTP-2001-4257, dated 18 February 2014 on Anti-Balaka attacks and crimes, including the killings of Muslims in BERBERATI, P-1077 claims it is the first time he hears of the killings of the Muslims mentioned in the article. He became ComZone of BERBERATI after the events in BERBERATI and not before.¹⁰²

Meeting with local authorities to discuss the return of the Muslims

61. When shown an [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The meeting was held at the cultural centre of the Catholic church and was attended by representatives from civil society, the Muslim community, police, gendarmerie, MINUSCA, Anti-Balaka, the sub-prefect, the *chefs de quartiers*, and the mayor. The meeting of social cohesion was initiated by [REDACTED]

⁹⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3521-3522, 1.751-769.

¹⁰⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3522-3523, 1.785-811.

¹⁰¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3540-3542, 3546-3547, 1.344-424, 595-610.

¹⁰² CAR-OTP-2107-3530, at 3545-3547, 1.526-618.

[REDACTED] to request the return of Muslims from the parish to their houses.¹⁰³ P-1077 explains that [REDACTED] as often in contact with [REDACTED] but not with him.

62. During the meeting, P-1077 told all the attendees that it was not yet the right time for the Muslims to return to their houses as there were still bandits around in the town [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He also told them that if anything were then to happen to the Muslims, the Anti-Balaka would not take any responsibility, as he did not have enough elements to ensure the protection of Muslims if they were to return to their homes. P-1077 claims that one of the Muslim representatives in attendance agreed that it was not yet the right time for the Muslims to go back given the remaining tension.¹⁰⁵ P-1077 adds that he and other Anti-Balaka in attendance did not oppose the return of the Muslims in the provinces; but they thought it was too early, there had to be reconciliation starting from BANGUI.¹⁰⁶

63. P-1077 claims that the document CAR-OTP-2003-1654 is fake and was made in [REDACTED]

64. P-1077 also claims that, as the ComZone [REDACTED] what the population was thinking. Some of the residents were already occupying Muslim houses and did not want to leave them. They even organised a protest during the meeting because there had been rumours that P-1077 had received 5,000,000 XAF from the Muslims to allow them to return to their houses.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3560-3562, 1.202-280.

¹⁰⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3565-3566, 3574, 1.387-427, 724-742.

¹⁰⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3562-3563, 3567-3568, 3570-3571, 1.282-322, 473-484, 496-525, 599-608.

¹⁰⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3570-3571, 1.585-621.

¹⁰⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3563-3565, 3572, 3574, 1.323-386, 665-667, 745-760.

¹⁰⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3566-3570, 1.429-498, 526-573.

65. P-1077 considers that the local authorities in BERBERATI should be investigated as they have links with Muslim traders from whom they got money and they wanted to impose the Muslims to the city even though the population still had bad feelings against them.¹⁰⁹

66. P-1077 believes that there were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They did not have a functioning police, military, at the time of the Seleka which blocked the whole country. The Seleka killed from 1000 to one million CAR people during their nine month realm. They felt completely abandoned as the International community did not answer their calls for help over 9 months. They were compelled to confront Seleka and are now rewarded by imprisonment. P-1077 and others decided to join the Anti-Balaka and die for their country because they have lost their relatives.¹¹¹

CONNECTION AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ANTI-BALAKA LEADERSHIP IN BERBERATI AND THE NATIONAL COORDINATION, INCLUDING NGAISSONA

67. Three weeks after he left the hospital following the [REDACTED] - 1077 received a call from the Coordination in BANGUI, inviting him to go to the BRAZAVILLE summit.¹¹² P-1077 explains that prior to this invitation, he had no relationship with the Anti-Balaka from BANGUI. He denied any contacts with Sebastien WENEZOU ("WENEZOU") and only learned about WENEZOU's involvement in the National Coordination when he arrived in BANGUI. Maxime MOKOM would call P-1077 and other ComZones to come for a general assembly in BANGUI. According to P-1077, all Anti-Balaka leaders in the provinces attended this general assembly which took place at hotel AZIMUT.¹¹³

68. P-1077 states that he did not know NGAISSONA before the BRAZZAVILLE summit but he had heard that NGAISSONA was the National Coordinator. After BRAZZAVILLE, P-1077 and others went to NGAISSONA's residence and NGAISSONA gave them money for

¹⁰⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3571, 1.624-632; CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3602-3603, 1.653-686.

¹¹⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3584, at 3589-3590, 1.177-213.

¹¹¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3666, at 3668-3670, 1.42-146.

¹¹² CAR-OTP-2107-3428, at 3448, 1.740-746.

¹¹³ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3457-3458, 3466-3469, 3470-3471, 1.81-123, 399-469, 500-525, 583-591.

fuel and food.¹¹⁴ P-1077 does not find it strange that out of the blue he was called to come to a meeting in BANGUI. He explains that he was not part of the leaders who met to establish the National Coordination and elect NGAISSONA; but as the leader in a small town, he had to come to BANGUI when he was called to the meeting because NGAISSONA was elected and a Coordination had been set up.¹¹⁵ P-1077 had never met MOKOM before the call asking him to come to BANGUI for the BRAZZAVILLE summit. P-1077 met him for the first time at NGAISSONA's house.¹¹⁶

P-1077's attendance to peace talks

BRAZZAVILLE's Talks

69. P-1077 confirms that he attended several peace talks, including in BRAZZAVILLE, NAIROBI, and BANGUI.¹¹⁷ When shown document CAR-OTP-2001-6924, a list of participants in the BRAZZAVILLE summit, P-1077 confirmed that he met with the 23 Anti-Balaka representatives in BANGUI prior to going to BRAZZAVILLE. P-1077 also recognised some of the names on the list, including (i) [REDACTED] who was from BOUAR and coordinator in the NANA-MAMBERE prefecture, and (ii) [REDACTED] from BOHONG and the coordinator in the OUHAM PENDE prefecture [REDACTED]

NAIROBI Talks

70. P-1077 was contacted by Maxime MOKOM who asked him to come to BANGUI to prepare his departure for NAIROBI. Maxime MOKOM first called him at 10 am; then in the evening of the same day telling P-1077 that it was important to come to BANGUI. P-1077 left at 10:00 PM to go to Bangui. P-1077 did not know anything about NAIROBI and was not briefed when he arrived in NAIROBI.¹¹⁹

71. P-1077 states that around 10 Anti-Balaka's representatives went to NAIROBI.¹²⁰ When shown document CAR-OTP-2059-0026, a list of participants to the NAIROBI talks, showing Maxime MOKOM as the President, Joachim KOKATE ("KOKATE"), as the vice president, P-1077 thinks it is a fake list because there are some names on the list that he did not know and

¹¹⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3469-3470, 1.533-562.

¹¹⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3470, 372-373, 1.554-581, 652-672.

¹¹⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3470-3471, 1.583-610.

¹¹⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3456, 1.61-78.

¹¹⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3459-3462, 1.163-260; CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3582, 1.1018-1028.

¹¹⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3486-3487, 1.82-123.

¹²⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3487; 1.126-129.

who did not go to NAIROBI.¹²¹ P-1077 confirmed that the following individuals were in NAIROBI [REDACTED]

Maxime MOKOM, and KOKATE. The individuals on that list who did not go to NAIROBI include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] etc. According to P-1077 some of the participants, such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was in charge of BOSSANGO are not mentioned on the list.¹²²

72. P-1077 says they were told to go, but not forced. Maxime MOKOM told them that NGAISSONA would come later with the CAR president, but that in the meantime, NGAISSONA has sent KOKATE as his representative. NGAISSONA never came.¹²³

73. While in NAIROBI, Maxime MOKOM said he would become National Coordinator after NAIROBI.¹²⁴ There was a mediation at BOGANDA roundabout for NGAISSONA, Maxime MOKOM, and KOKATE. After the BRAZZAVILLE agreement, the Anti-Balaka were supposed to get money from the Angolan government to help the elements and keep them in one place so as not to go into the neighbourhoods and cause problems. NGAISSONA, Maxime MOKOM, and KOKATE were accused of taking the money. Maxime MOKOM and KOKATE denied taking the money. Since NGAISSONA did not attend the mediation, it was decided that the Coordination must change and Maxime MOKOM was elected. [REDACTED] was there, as well as the leaders from the Provinces and BANGUI.¹²⁵

74. P-1077 also confirms that he knows [REDACTED] who is in BANGUI; [REDACTED] from BRAZZAVILLE and NAIROBI [REDACTED] both from NAIROBI.¹²⁶

Attendance of members of the Anti-Balaka leadership in BERBERATI (including P-1077) to meetings of the Anti-Balaka Coordination in BANGUI;

Meetings to prepare the BRAZZAVILLE Summit

75. P-1077 attended a meeting at the Presidential Palace with other members of civil society, representatives of armed groups, and government to prepare for the BRAZZAVILLE

¹²¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3488-3489, 1.149-190.

¹²² CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3498-3492, 1.197-293.

¹²³ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3492-3494, 1.305-361.

¹²⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3494, 1.386-394.

¹²⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3495-3497, 1.400-474.

¹²⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3498-3499, 1.532-560.

summit. His Deputy [REDACTED] also attended the meeting, but he stayed in BANGUI while P-11077 went to BRAZZAVILLE.¹²⁷

76. P-1077 states that he received a call from the Coordination in BANGUI asking him to come to BANGUI. P-1077 spent two days in BANGUI before going to BRAZZAVILLE; because they were supposed to agree on the theme and make recommendations. P-1077 added that the Secretary General [REDACTED] who called him and must have found out that P-1077 was in charge of the Anti-Balaka in BERBERATI.¹²⁸ He believes that NGAISSONA ordered [REDACTED] to call Anti-Balaka in the provinces to attend the meeting in BANGUI to prepare BRAZZAVILLE. P-1077 believes that the Coordination reached out to the ComZones so that they could get to know the local coordinators now that a National Coordination had been set up.¹²⁹

Meetings after the BRAZZAVILLE Summit

77. After BRAZZAVILLE, the Anti-Balaka had a meeting at Hotel AZIMUT to discuss the talks. The purpose of the meeting was to inform the Anti-Balaka leaders - all did not attend the summit - about the outcome of the summit, which was the decision to put an end to the hostilities, not carry weapons, and to wait for the DDR process. There was a transitional government. The police and gendarme were in place. There was a 'Procureur General'.¹³⁰

Issuance of Anti-Balaka badges by the Anti-Balaka National Coordination to the Anti-Balaka elements in BERBERATI

78. P-1077 explains that they received Anti-Balaka badges to show that they were Anti-Balaka. The Secretary General of the Anti-Balaka organized it with [REDACTED] while P-1077 was in the hospital. The National Coordination decided on the process. P-1077 paid 2.500 XFA to get a badge through [REDACTED]. Not all elements had badges because they couldn't afford it.¹³¹ P-1077 explains that [REDACTED] had a list of Anti-Balaka elements in BERBERATI.¹³²

¹²⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3455-3456, 3458-3459, 3462-3463, 1.24-60, 148-161, 273-297.

¹²⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3466-3468, 1.399-490.

¹²⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3472-3473, 1.631-699.

¹³⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3458, 3469, 3475-3477, 1.131-145, 538-543, 775-838.

¹³¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3479-3482, 1.929-1015; CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3484, 1.10-31; CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3642, 3653, 1.184-203, 581-592.

¹³² CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3484-3185, 1.37-41.

Transformation of the Anti-Balaka Movement into a political party.

79. When shown a PCUD list of Anti-Balaka's ComZones in BANGUI and in the Prefectures, including MAMBERE KADEI Prefecture (CAR-OTP-2030-0445) signed by NGAISSONA on 10 December 2014, P-1077 denies ever seeing the document. P-1077 explains that at some point, NGAISSONA called all of the Anti-Balaka from BANGUI and from the provinces, who all gathered at his house in BANGUI. They did not know that this was in relation to the creation of a political party. NGAISSONA told them that they had suffered enough and asked if they agreed that it was time to transform the movement into a political party. Even though NGAISSONA collected the names of all the ComZones, P-1077 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Anti-Balaka agreed to become members of NGAISSONA's party. P-1077 told NGAISSONA that day that the fact that he was creating a party and he was the leader of the Anti-Balak [REDACTED]

CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ANTI-BALAKA LEADERSHIP IN BERBERATI AND MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATION

Telephone attribution

P-1077's phone numbers

80. When shown document CAR-OTP-2030-0267, an Anti-Balaka list of participants in the BRAZZAVILLE summit, P-1077 denied ever seeing the document but he confirmed that the two numbers listed on the document next to his name are his numbers, namely [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] P-1077 explains that he used these Telecel and Orange numbers until after the NAIROBI summit when the Anti-Balaka stole his phone.¹³⁴ P-1077 also had an Azur phone he borrowed from his brother's girlfriend, and used it when he was away from BERBERATI but he gave it back when he got to BERBERATI. He did not remember the number.¹³⁵ P-1077 also confirms that the following phone numbers are attributed to him [REDACTED] He started using these numbers after the NAIROBI summit.¹³⁶

¹³³ CAR-OTP-2107-3554, at 3575-3579, 1.787-942.

¹³⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3463-3465, 1.298-346, 381-390; CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3624, 1.488-510.

¹³⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3610, at 3624-3625, 1.519-539.

¹³⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3454, at 3464-3465, 1.347-390.



Call Data Records

82. When confronted with CDR information that he used telephone number [REDACTED] from 3 to 8 February 2014 while in CARNOT, P-1077 enquired about the phone numbers he called. When provided with telephone numbers [REDACTED] (a number he called 157 times), [REDACTED] P-1077 did not recognise them and tried to call the numbers during the interview with no success.¹³⁸ P-1077 recognises one number which is attributed to his uncle in CARNOT.¹³⁹ P-1077 was also confronted with information related to telephone contact between his telephone number [REDACTED] and telephone number [REDACTED]. He claims that it is an old number that he does not know.¹⁴⁰

83. When confronted with contacts with [REDACTED] in July, August, September, and December 2014, P-1077 confirmed that he would sometimes receive calls from [REDACTED] or Maxime MOKOM about meetings or issues related to badges.¹⁴¹

84. P-1077 further acknowledges several contacts with Maxime MOKOM and [REDACTED] but he does not know what was [REDACTED] position within the National Coordination.¹⁴²

85. When confronted with his multiple contacts with [REDACTED] between 16 February and 1 March 2014, P-1077 claims they are incorrect. He never met [REDACTED] until after BRAZZAVILLE and would have no reason to call him. If he needed to find out something about the Coordination, he would usually call Maxime MOKOM or [REDACTED].

86. P-1077 acknowledges his contacts with [REDACTED] explaining that he met them in BRAZZAVILLE and has remained in contact with them.¹⁴⁴ He also confirms that he spoke with [REDACTED] who is a friend, usually about the DDR process to report back to people in BERBERATI.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3500, at 3524-3528, 1.851-987.

¹³⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3648-3651, 1.429-522.

¹³⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3651, 1.508-517.

¹⁴⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3651-3652, 1.524-546.

¹⁴¹ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3652-3653, 1.547-580.

¹⁴² CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3653, 1.593-607.

¹⁴³ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3653-3588, 1.608-654.

¹⁴⁴ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3655-3658, 1.656-692, 744-776.

¹⁴⁵ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3556-3657, 1.694-737.

87. P-1077 explains that NGAISSONA paid for his and all other ComZones' hotel during the BANGUI Forum. They stayed at the Golf hotel at PK11. NGAISSONA not only paid for the hotel but he gave them money for food.¹⁴⁶

88. P-1077 also clarifies that the Anti-Balaka chiefs from the provinces did not keep in contact. After P-1077 returned from BRAZZAVILLE he would just occasionally call other leaders to say hello now and then.¹⁴⁷

VIDEO CAR-OTP-2030-2280

89. When shown video CAR-OTP-2030-2280, P-1077 recognized himself and remembers talking to two white female journalists after the BRAZZAVILLE Forum. One spoke French and the other only English. A friend had told him at the hospital that two women wanted to ask him questions about the Anti-Balaka.¹⁴⁸

90. When asked to comment on the video, P-1077 explains that he provided the journalist with an explanation on how to become an Anti-Balaka and how they proceed with the vaccination using *gris-gris*.¹⁴⁹

91. When asked why he said he would show them how to kill a Muslim, P-1077 said he made a mistake and meant to say Seleka, not "Muslim". He also clarifies that they did not have any confrontation with the Seleka in BERBERATI and those who confronted the Muslims were Anti-Balaka from others areas. He further explained that he referred to "Muslims" in the video because at that time it was not possible to distinguish the Seleka from the Muslims as all true Seleka were Muslims."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3658-3660, 1.787-830.

¹⁴⁷ CAR-OTP-2107-3483, at 3485, 1.64-73.

¹⁴⁸ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3660-3661, 1.843-875.

¹⁴⁹ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3661, 3663-3664, 1.876-886, 956-981.

¹⁵⁰ CAR-OTP-2107-3636, at 3661-3663, 1.887-954.